The Appeals Chamber restricted the scope of appeal for three reasons:

16. First, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Appellants expressly rely on the arguments contained in their relevant submissions before the Trial Chamber.[1] In this regard, the Appeals Chamber recalls that an interlocutory appeal is not a de novo review of the Trial Chamber’s decision.[2] Consequently, a party may not merely repeat on appeal arguments that did not succeed at trial, unless it can demonstrate that rejecting them constituted such error as to warrant the intervention of the Appeals Chamber.[3] Therefore, the present decision will not address the arguments that the Appellants simply reiterate after they have been rejected at trial, unless they seek to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber committed a specific error of law or fact invalidating the decision or weighed relevant or irrelevant considerations in an unreasonable manner.[4]

17. Second, the Appellants submit that the Impugned Decision is intricately linked to the Trial Chamber’s “Decision on Scope of Cross-Examination under Rule 90 (H) of the Rules” issued on the same day (“Rule 90(H) Decision”). They therefore suggest that “so far as reasoning behind the Rule 90(H) [Decision] is also part of the reasoning behind the Impugned Decision, the Appeals Chamber is bound to consider and correct such reasoning where flawed”.[5] While the Appeals Chamber cannot exclude that the Trial Chamber may indeed at any moment reconsider its Rule 90(H) Decision if it deems so appropriate, the scope of this Appeal lies strictly within the Impugned Decision[6] and there is no jurisdiction for the Appeals Chamber to decide on matters that the Trial Chamber explicitly declined to certify for appeal.[7]

18. Finally, the Prosecution also appears to be in disagreement with the Impugned Decision and, throughout its Response, invites the Appeals Chamber to correct it accordingly.[8] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber expressly denied the Prosecution’s request for certification to appeal the Impugned Decision.[9] Therefore, the Appeals Chamber will only consider the Prosecution’s arguments insofar as they properly respond to the submissions raised in the Appeal. Similarly, the Prosecution’s request to “issue a Decision approving the Popović Decision as the correct statement of Tribunal jurisprudence”[10] cannot per se be admissible in the framework of a response to an appeal filed in the present case.

It further rejected a bulk of arguments because the Appellants failed to plead specific prejudice:

26. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the burden of demonstrating that a Trial Chamber erred in exercising its discretion in admitting fresh evidence lies on the party alleging the errors.[11] With respect to the present Appeal, the Appellants failed to meet this burden, merely referring to potential prejudice as a matter of principle. The Appeals Chamber rejects these general allegations and re-emphasizes that “[t]he mere fact that [the admitted evidence] was probative of the Prosecution’s case does not mean that the [a]ccused were prejudiced”.[12]