41. […] It is well known that customary international law protects the internal organization of each sovereign State: it leaves it to each sovereign State to determine its internal structure and in particular to designate the individuals acting as State agents or organs. Each sovereign State has the right to issue instructions to its organs, both those operating at the internal level and those operating in the field of international relations, and also to provide for sanctions or other remedies in case of non-compliance with those instructions. The corollary of this exclusive power is that each State is entitled to claim that acts or transactions performed by one of its organs in its official capacity be attributed to the State, so that the individual organ may not be held accountable for those acts or transactions. […]

[…]

43. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that, both under general international law and the Statute itself, Judges or Trial Chambers cannot address binding orders to State officials. […] It follows that if a Judge or a Chamber intends to order the production of documents, the seizure of evidence, the arrest of suspects etc., being acts involving action by a State, its organs or officials, they must turn to the relevant State.

See also para. 45.

Pages 2-3:

CONSIDERING that, pursuant to Rule 90 of the Rules, the Mechanism in the exercise of its inherent power may hold in contempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with the administration of justice;

CONSIDERING, however, that in matters pertaining to State obligations, it is well-established that State officials “are mere instruments of a State and their official action can only be attributed to the State”,[1] that, subject to certain limited exceptions,[2] “[t]hey cannot be the subject of sanctions or penalties for conduct that is not private but undertaken on behalf of a State”, and “cannot suffer the consequences of wrongful acts which are not attributable to them personally but to the State on whose behalf they act”;[3]

CONSIDERING that “[i]t is the State which is bound by [the obligation to cooperate with the Mechanism under Article 28 of the Statute] and it is the State for which the official or agent fulfils his function that constitutes the legitimate interlocutor of the [Mechanism] and “shall therefore incur international responsibility for any serious breach of that provision by their officials”;[4]

CONSIDERING that the Mechanism “is endowed with the inherent power to make a judicial finding concerning a State’s failure to observe the provisions of the Statute or the Rules” and “also has a power to report this judicial finding to the [United Nations] Security Council”;[5]

CONSIDERING, however, that the Mechanism “is not vested with any enforcement or sanctionary power vis-à-vis States” and that “[i]t is primarily for its parent body, the [United Nations] Security Council, to impose sanctions, if any, against a recalcitrant State”; [6]

[…]

CONSIDERING that the Mechanism has, therefore, taken appropriate measures provided for in the Statute and the Rules to address Republic of Turkey’s non-compliance with the Order of 31 January 2017 and that the procedure envisaged under Rule 90 of the Rules is not applicable in this case;