29. In this context, the Appeals Chamber further considers the Prosecution’s argument that the Trial Chamber erroneously found that Rašić’s health problems were serious enough to warrant the imposition of a suspended sentence.[1] In support of this argument, the Prosecution refers to the Milan Simić case in which the trial chamber neither mitigated nor suspended Milan Simić’s sentence, although his health problems required “complete nursing care on a daily basis”.[2] The Appeals Chamber recalls that while “sentences of like individuals in like cases should be comparable”,[3] trial chambers have broad discretion in determining the appropriate sentence on account of their obligation to tailor the penalties to fit the individual circumstances of the convicted person and to reflect the gravity of the crimes.[4] Comparison between cases is thus generally of limited assistance.[5] The Appeals Chamber finds that the Milan Simić case bears no relevance for the present case. There are too many variables in both cases to be able to transpose the sentencing considerations from the former to the latter. In particular, Milan Simić was convicted of two counts of torture as crimes against humanity,[6] while Rašic was not convicted of any of the Statute’s core crimes. In these circumstances, the Prosecution has failed to show that the Trial Chamber erred in considering that Rašić’s health problems were serious enough to warrant a partial suspension of her sentence.

30. Further, the Trial Chamber did not err in taking into consideration Rašić’s conditions at the UNDU.[7] The Appeals Chamber notes that to date, no person convicted of contempt was transferred from the UNDU to an enforcing State to serve his or her sentence. Moreover, given the length of the sentence (12 months) and the length of time for which she had already been detained at the time of the Sentencing Judgement (84 days), the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that it was not unreasonable for the Trial Chamber to consider that Rašić would serve the remainder of her sentence at the UNDU. In these circumstances, the Prosecution has not shown that the Trial Chamber erred in taking into account Rašić’s detention conditions at the UNDU.

31. With respect to the Prosecution’s argument that Rašić’s confinement in the UNDU is not truly solitary, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber considered the ex parte medical reports of Dr. Vera Petrović (“Petrović Reports”)[8] concerning Rašić’s health condition.[9] In these reports, Dr. Petrović made observations about Rašić’s mental health condition at the UNDU.[10] While the Prosecution argues that Rašić was able to socialise “for 10 hours each weekday and for eight hours each day on Saturdays and Sundays” with other detainees in the UNDU to an extent that her confinement cannot be considered “quasi-solitary”,[11] the Appeals Chamber finds that the Prosecution does not show an error in the Trial Chamber’s finding. The Trial Chamber based its decision to impose a suspended sentence on Rašić’s “perception of her detention and the practical impact upon her well-being”.[12] The Prosecution does not show that the Trial Chamber ventured outside its scope of discretion when it relied on how Rašić perceived her confinement, on the basis of the Petrović Reports. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber based the suspension of the sentence not only on Rašić’s perception of her detention but also on “Rašić’s comparably young age and that this is the first time she is sentenced to a prison sentence.”[13]

104. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, pursuant to Rule 104(C) of the Rules, if the single judge finds an accused guilty on one or more of the charges contained in an indictment, he shall impose a sentence in respect of each finding of guilt and indicate whether such sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently. Neither the Statute nor the Rules vest in the single judge the power to order that a sentence for contempt be served concurrently with a previous sentence imposed on the same accused in separate proceedings under a different indictment before the ICTY, the ICTR, or the Mechanism.

105. In addition, the Appeals Chamber is not persuaded by Ngirabatware’s submission that, similar to the authority to suspend a sentence, the authority to impose a concurrent sentence is part of the single judge’s inherent power to determine the appropriate sentence.[1] The ICTY Appeals Chamber has previously recognized that the decision to suspend a sentence for contempt forms an integral part of a trial chamber’s judicial discretion in the determination of the sentence.[2] However, the power to suspend a sentence for contempt in a single proceeding is distinguishable from the power to order that a sentence for contempt run concurrently with another sentence imposed on the accused in separate proceedings by different judges, concerning unrelated charges under different indictments. The differences are such that the Appeals Chamber cannot accept that the authority to impose a concurrent sentence for contempt is part of the inherent power of the Single Judge in the circumstances of this case.