When finding that a forcible transfer amounts to “other inhumane acts” under Article 5(i) of the Statute, the Trial Chamber has to be convinced that the forcible transfer in question is of a similar seriousness to other enumerated crimes against humanity.

330. The Appeals Chamber has held that “acts of forcible transfer may be sufficiently serious as to amount to other inhumane acts”.[1] Accordingly, a Trial Chamber should examine if the specific instances of forcible transfer in the case before it were sufficiently serious to amount to “other inhumane acts” under Article 5(i) of the Statute. The Trial Chamber did not do so in the present case; rather, it seemed to have assumed that the acts of forcible transfer amounted to “other inhumane acts” under Article 5(i) of the Statute.[2] The Appeals Chamber finds that this was in error, but is not convinced that this error invalidates the Appellant’s conviction for other inhumane acts (forcible transfer).

331. When finding that specific acts of forcible transfer amount to “other inhumane acts” under Article 5(i) of the Statute, a Trial Chamber has to be convinced that the forcible transfer is of a similar seriousness to other enumerated crimes against humanity.[3] This condition is satisfied in the present case. The acts of forcible transfer[4] were of similar seriousness to the instances of deportation,[5] as they involved a forced departure from the residence and the community, without guarantees concerning the possibility to return in the future, with the victims of such forced transfers invariably suffering serious mental harm.[6]