Trial Chamber III issued an oral decision on 2 September 2004 with written reasons to follow. Pursuant to Rule 73(B) of the Rules, Slobodan Milošević filed a request for certification to appeal the 2 September 2004 decision, which the Trial Chamber granted in an order issued 10 September 2004. Milošević subsequently filed a request with the Appeals Chamber for an extension of time in which to file the appeal against the 2 September 2004 decision, on the basis that the written reasons for the decision were still pending. The Appeals Chamber held, at p. 2:

NOTING that on 10 September 2004, Trial Chamber III issued an “Order on Request for Certification to Appeal the Decision of the Trial Chamber on Court Assigned Counsel,” which certified for appeal the question of whether representation by counsel should be imposed on Slobodan Miloševic (“Appellant”);

BEING SEIZED OF the “Request for Extension of Time to File Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Order Concerning the Representation of the Accused Dated 2 September 2004” filed by Appellant on 14 September 2004, in which Appellant requested an extension of the time limit to file a certified appeal under Rule 73(C)(ii);

CONSIDERING that, while Trial Chamber III has already issued an oral order finally resolving the question at issue in Appellant’s certified appeal, the Trial Chamber’s formal written decision has yet to issue;

DEEMING the lack of a reasoned written decision “good cause” for an extension of the time limit under Rule 127 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, since the lack of a written decision hampers counsel’s efforts to fully comprehend the reasons for the Trial Chamber’s decision;

HEREBY GRANT Appellant’s motion […] 

24. As indicated above, Rule 65(E) establishes the procedure by which the Prosecution should indicate its intention to seek a stay of a decision of a Trial Chamber granting an accused’s provisional release application. However, while the Appeals Chamber is of the view that Rule 127 should not be relied upon by the Prosecution as a means of circumventing the correct procedure set out in the Rules, the Appeals Chamber is also not persuaded that the Trial Chamber erred in applying that Rule to receive the Prosecution’s application for a stay as validly filed. The sole purpose of Rule 127(A)(ii) is to allow for exception to a strict application of the Rules where “good cause” exists for allowing that exception.

25. In the Impugned Decision, the Trial Chamber did not provide clear reasons for its finding that “good cause” existed for the application of Rule 127(A)(ii) to the requirements of Rule 65(E), but it was clearly within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to do so. In its stay application, the Prosecution made clear its intention to appeal the Impugned Decision. The “good cause”, as recently recognised by the Appeals Chamber in Prlić when it granted the Prosecution’s application for a stay of provisional release orders of a Trial Chamber, is the preservation of the object of the Prosecution’s appeal against the provisional release of the accused.[1] Preservation of the object of the appeal was the “concrete motivation” of the Judges of the Trial Chamber in granting the Prosecution’s stay application.

17. […] The Appeals Chamber acknowledges that neither the Rules nor the relevant Practice Directions require the inclusion of a word count or provide for a time-limit for the filing of Registry submissions pursuant to Rule 33(B) of the Rules. However, the Appeals Chamber has previously imposed time-limits and required the inclusion of a word count in Registry submissions where it found it necessary for the efficient administration of the proceedings and for ensuring equality.[1] Guided by the same considerations, the Appeals Chamber requests the Registry to include a word count in future Rule 33(B) submissions in response to motions filed in the present case and to make such submissions within ten days of the filing of the respective motion.

9.       An appellant is required to file an appeal brief within fifteen days after filing the notice of appeal concerning a decision to refer a case.[1] Duty Counsel filed the Notice of Appeal on 11 July 2012.[2] Although the Notice of Appeal was re-filed before the Mechanism on 17 July 2012 pursuant to an order of the Presiding Judge of the ICTR’s Appeals Chamber,[3] the Appeals Chamber considers that the time-limit for Duty Counsel to file the Appeal Brief began to run on 11 July 2012, when he filed the Notice of Appeal. Consequently, Duty Counsel was required to file the Appeal Brief before the Mechanism by 26 July 2012. Duty Counsel failed to do so.

10.     Rule 154(A)(ii) of the Rules allows a Chamber of the Mechanism, on good cause being shown by motion, to recognize as validly done any act done after the expiration of the prescribed time-limit. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that unforeseen logistical problems have been considered insufficient to establish good cause warranting extensions of filing deadlines.[1]

Having noted that Hategekimana and his Counsel work exclusively in French, the Appeals Chamber recalled the good cause requirement for an extension of time under Rule 116 of the Rules and granted the sought extension (p. 3):

CONSIDERING however that Rule 116 of the Rules provides that the Appeals Chamber “may grant a motion to extend a time limit upon a showing of good cause” and that “[w]here the ability of the accused to make full answer and Defence depends on the availability of a decision in an official language other than that in which it was originally issued, that circumstance shall be taken into account as a good cause under the present Rule”;    

[…]

CONSIDERING that the need for Hategekimana and his Counsel to be provided with the Rule 11bis Decision and the Prosecution’s written submissions in the present appeal proceedings in French in order to be able to make full answer and defence constitutes “good cause” within the meaning of Rule 116 of the Rules;

Haxhiu filed his notice of appeal against the trial judgement convicting him for contempt 26 days after the date of the trial judgement. The Prosecution asked to strike the notice of appeal as being time-barred. Haxhiu argued that appeals against judgements on appeal are filed not within the time limit prescribed by Rule 77(J) (15 days) but pursuant to the general time-limit for appeal against judgements pursuant to Rule 108 (30 days). The Appeals Chamber held as followed:

12. At the outset, the Appeals Chamber recalls that in Prosecutor v. Marijačić and Rebić it was confronted with a question similar to the one in this case. The Appeals Chamber in that case explicitly rejected the argument, made by one of the appellants in relation to the filing of the appeal brief, that Section III of the Practice Direction is only applicable to interlocutory decisions but not to judgements rendered pursuant to Rule 77. The Appeals Chamber consequently held that “Section III [of the Practice Direction] applies to final decisions of a Trial Chamber under Rule 77.”[1]

13. The same reasoning applies to Rule 77(J) of the Rules, which is mirrored in paragraph 4 of the Practice Direction. Indeed, in Prosecutor v. Šešelj, the Appeals Chamber stated that “Rule 77(J) of the Rules shall be interpreted as allowing for appeals against decisions disposing of contempt cases only.”[2]

14. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Haxhiu’s Notice of Appeal was filed outside the prescribed time-limits. […]

14. […] However, Haxhiu has requested the Appeals Chamber to recognize the late filing as validly done pursuant to Rules 127(A)(ii) and 127(B) of the Rules. He concedes that “counsel’s unfamiliarity with the Appeals Chamber’s procedure does not constitute good cause for an extension of time.”[1] Indeed, the Appeals Chamber recalls that “counsel participating in appeals proceedings are expected to familiarize themselves with the procedural requirements.”[2]

15. […] Given the existence of only a few judgements on appeal in contempt proceedings before the International Tribunal, Counsel is expected to have acquainted himself with the relevant jurisprudence on this issue. Accordingly, no good cause has been shown that would allow the Appeals Chamber to exercise its discretion in recognizing the filing of the Notice of Appeal as validly done.

On 20 June 2005 the Appeals Chamber instructed the Applicant, should he deem it necessary, to file additional submissions no later than twenty days after the date of assignment of Ms. Geraghty as Counsel (p. 2).[1] Counsel was assigned on 20 July 2005 (p. 2). On 17 August 2005 the Applicant acting pro se requested the admission of new evidence in order to allege a new fact (p. 3).[2] On 18 August 2005 the Defence requested an extension of time, inter alia, to file additional submissions (p. 3).[3] The Appeals Chamber found that in accordance with the Rules and the Decision of 20 June 2005, the final date for filing the additional submissions was 10 August 2005 and that, contrary to the Decision of 20 June 2005, Counsel failed to file the additional submissions relating to the new facts alleged by the Applicant within the prescribed time-frame (p. 7). The Appeals Chamber nevertheless held as follows (pp. 8, 9):

CONSIDERING that the arguments raised by the Defence in its belated request for extension of time[4] in the Defence Motion for filing additional submissions do not constitute good cause pursuant to Rule 116 of the Rules;

CONSIDERING, however, that Counsel’s failure to file the additional submissions within the time limit, ought not to be imputed to the Applicant, and that under the present circumstances it is in the interests of justice, that additional time be granted to file any additional submissions;

[…]

CONSIDERING […] that Applicant’s pro se filing on 17 August 2005 identifying a “new fact” should in the interest of justice be treated as timely filed, since the Applicant is not at fault for his Counsel’s failure to assist him properly in his filing or Counsel’s misunderstanding of the proper deadlines and because the Applicant has stated that he was unable to establish the existence of this new fact when filing his original Requests for Review;[5]

6. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Rules are silent on the procedure for filing appeals from decisions on requests for revocation of referral.[1] However, it has held that such appeals should follow the same procedure as provided for in cases involving appeals from decisions on referral as set out in Rule 14(E) of the Rules.[2] In relevant part, Rule 14(E) of the Rules provides that the “[n]otice of appeal shall be filed within fifteen days of the decision”. This Rule is mirrored in paragraph 21 of the Practice Direction on Appeals, which provides that “[a] party wishing to appeal from a decision of […] a Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 14 […] of the Rules shall file a notice of appeal within 15 days of the decision”.[3]

10.     Nonetheless, even where good cause has not been demonstrated, the Appeals Chamber may recognize submissions as validly filed where they are of such substantial importance to the appeal that doing so is in the interests of justice.[1] The Appeals Chamber considers that the Notice of Appeal is of substantial importance to Uwinkindi’s appeal: to refuse to consider it would deny Uwinkindi the opportunity to challenge the Impugned Decision. The subject-matter of Uwinkindi’s appeal concerns the fairness of criminal proceedings in Rwanda in which he is charged, inter alia, with genocide, a crime that is punishable with a sentence of life imprisonment.[2] Furthermore, as the deadline for appealing decisions on requests for revocation is not set forth explicitly in the Rules and has only been clarified by the Appeals Chamber in a single decision, the principle of in dubio pro actionis and the interests of justice weigh in favor of recognizing the Notice of Appeal as validly filed despite the failure of Uwinkindi’s counsel to file it on time or seek an extension. Additionally, accepting the Notice of Appeal will not prejudice the Prosecution, which will have sufficient time to respond to the submissions that form the basis of Uwinkindi’s appeal. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that it is in the interests of justice to recognize the Notice of Appeal as validly filed.

3. Mr. Renzaho now requests an extension of time to file his Appellant’s Brief within 75 days from the service to him and his Counsel of the French translation of the Trial Judgement.[1] In support of his request, Mr. Renzaho submits that because he is francophone and can neither speak nor read English, he is incapable of fully understanding the Trial Judgement, properly discussing grounds of appeal, and actively participating in the drafting of his Appellant’s Brief, particularly with respect to factual issues.[2] […]

4. Rule 116(A) of the Rules allows for the extension of time of any deadline on a showing of good cause. Pursuant to Rule 116(B) of the Rules, where the ability of the convicted person to make full answer and defence depends on the availability of a decision in an official language other than that in which it was issued, that circumstance shall be taken into account as a good cause. This provision may provide a basis for an extension of time, upon request, for the filing of the convicted person’s Appellant’s Brief pending the translation of the Trial Judgement into a working language of the Tribunal which he or she understands.[3]

5. Mr. Renzaho’s circumstances constitute good cause to extend the time for the filing of his Appellant’s Brief from the filing of the French translation of the Trial Judgement.

6. Mr. Renzaho’s Lead Counsel has the ability to work in both English and French,[4] and may therefore discuss the draft of the Appellant’s Brief with Mr. Renzaho, subject to his final approval once the French translation of the Trial Judgement is filed. It is therefore appropriate in this instance to allow a limited extension of time. 

See also, the “Decision on Tharcisse Renzaho’s Motion for Extension of Time for the Filing of Notice of Appeal and Brief in Reply” rendered in this case on 22 September 2009, where the Appeals Chamber held:

4. Pursuant to Rule 116(B) of the Rules, where the ability of the convicted person to make full answer and defence depends on the availability of a decision in an official language other than that in which it was issued, that circumstance shall be taken into account as a good cause. In practice, Rule 116(B) of the Rules does not provide a basis for an extension of time for the filing of a Notice of Appeal where the convicted person’s counsel can work in the language in which the Trial Judgement was pronounced.[5] This provision may, however, provide a basis for an extension of time, upon request, for the filing of the convicted person’s brief on appeal (“Appellant’s Brief”) pending the translation of the Trial Judgement into a working language of the Tribunal which he or she understands.[6]

5. In the present case, the information provided by the Registry shows that Mr. Renzaho’s Lead Counsel has indicated that French is his mother tongue and that he has a “good” knowledge of English, with the ability to read, speak, and write it fluently.[7] He is therefore able to discuss the contents of the Trial Judgement as well as any possible grounds of appeal with Mr. Renzaho. The determination of potential grounds of appeal falls primarily within the purview of Defence Counsel and, if an application is made after the Trial Judgement becomes available in French and good cause is shown, leave may be granted to vary the grounds of appeal under Rule 108 of the Rules.[8] For these reasons, Mr. Renzaho has not demonstrated good cause for an extension of time for the filing of his Notice of Appeal.

6.         […] A heavy workload in other cases and inadequate resources to deal with them all is not an appropriate basis for seeking an extension of time.  Counsel for the prosecution in an appeal is expected to be provided by the Office of the Prosecutor with the resources necessary to carry the workload in the particular case, and his or her workload in other cases will ordinarily be rejected as the basis for an extension of time, just as it has ordinarily been rejected for counsel for the accused.  Where there are special circumstances personal to counsel in relation to the particular case (be it for the prosecution or the accused), the Appeals Chamber will always consider those circumstances in determining whether an extension of time will be granted.  However, a systemic failure by the Office of the Prosecutor to provide adequate resources for its counsel to do the work which is necessary in the particular case will not be considered.

9. […] The Practice Direction on Procedure for the Filing of Written Submissions in Appeal Proceedings Before the International Tribunal (IT/155) sets out the time-limits for the filing of documents (responses and replies) before the Appeals Chamber. Where a party cannot, or does not, file its document before the expiry of the time-limit, then the filing should be accompanied by an application for an extension of time, setting out the reasons why the party filing the document could not adhere to the prescribed time-limit. If the Appeals Chamber accepts the reasons set out therein, then the Chamber will take account of the information contained within the document. If the document is filed beyond the expiry of the time-limit, and unaccompanied by an application for an extension of time, the Appeals Chamber is not required to either accept the filing or place any reliance upon it.

10. Where a document is filed after the expiry of the time-limit, without application for an extension of time, it does not follow that it will be automatically rejected. The Appeals Chamber may exercise its discretion to accept the document where the information contained therein is of particular importance or significance. Parties filing a late document must not, however, presume that their document will meet this standard. To avoid any risk of a late document not being accepted by the Appeals Chamber, an application for an extension of time should always be filed.

46.     The Appeals Chamber further finds that the failure to file an Appellant’s brief in support of a notice of appeal carries serious consequences as to the admissibility of the entire appeal. Rule 111 states that an Appellant’s brief shall contain all the argument and authorities. An appeal, which consists of a Notice of Appeal that lists the grounds of Appeal but is not supported by an Appellant’s brief, is rendered devoid of all of the arguments and authorities; the right to appeal may therefore be considered as having been waived if the Notice of Appeal is not followed by the timely filing of an Appellant’s brief. The Appeals Chamber notes that procedural time-limits are to be respected, and that they are indispensable to the proper functioning of the Tribunal and to the fulfilment of its mission to do justice.[1] Violations of these time-limits, unaccompanied by any showing of good cause, will not be tolerated.[2]

FINDING that no explanation has been provided which would justify an extension of time or page limits to the Appellant for the filing of his reply, and that a request by a party for extension of time does not automatically amount to a showing of good cause by the opposing party;

10.     The Appeals Chamber accepts Niyitegeka’s argument that, at the time he filed the Request for Certification, it was not clear that he was entitled to appeal as of right the Decision of 29 January 2016, which was issued, in part, on the basis of Rules 73 and 86 of the Rules [of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism (“”Rules”)]. […]

11.     In this context, the Appeals Chamber finds that it was reasonable for Niyitegeka to request certification to appeal the Decision of 29 January 2016, which was issued, in part, on the basis of Rule 86 of the Rules. Notably, Niyitegeka filed the Request for Certification within the seven-day timeframe provided under Rule 80(C) of the Rules.  Moreover, he lodged the present Appeal within seven days of the Decision of 10 May 2017 denying his Request for Certification. Consequently, and pursuant to Rule 154 of the Rules, the Appeals Chamber finds that there is good cause to recognize the Appeal of the Decision of 29 January 2016 as validly filed.

Pages 1-2:

CONSIDERING that, pursuant to Rule 133 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism (“Rules”), parties seeking to appeal a trial judgement are to file a notice of appeal no later than 30 days from the date on which the written judgement was filed;

RECALLING that, pursuant to Rule 154 of the Rules, the time limits prescribed in the Rules may be enlarged on good cause being shown;

[…]

CONSIDERING the length of the Trial Judgment and the significant complexity of this case;

CONSIDERING FURTHER that is in the interests of justice to ensure that parties have sufficient time to prepare meaningful notices of appeal in full conformity with the applicable provisions;

[…]

CONSIDERING the need to weigh carefully the interests in safeguarding expeditious proceedings before the Mechanism and allowing sufficient time for the parties to prepare their respective cases;

[…]

CONSIDERING that the reasons justifying an extension to file Karadžić’s notice of appeal also apply to the Prosecution and that a synchronised schedule for filing any notices of appeal in this case will assist the effective case management and is, therefore, in the interests of justice;

Pages 2, 3:

RECALLING that, pursuant to Rule 3(F) of the Rules, if a party is required to take any action within a specified time after the filing or service of a document by another party, and pursuant to the Rules, that document is filed in a language other than one of the working languages of the Mechanism, time shall not run until the party required to take action has received from the Registrar a translation of the document into one of the working languages of the Mechanism;

RECALLING FURTHER that, pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Practice Direction, where a party applies to present additional evidence pursuant to Rule 142 of the Rules, the “relevant documents and exhibits, where applicable, shall be translated into one of the languages of the Mechanism”;

[…]

CONSIDERING that, pursuant to Rule 3(F) of the Rules, the time for the Prosecution to respond to the relevant Rule 142 Motions should not run until it has received a translation of the Affected Annexes into one of the working languages of the Mechanism;

CONSIDERING FURTHER that it is in the interests of justice and effective case management to synchronise the briefing schedule for the Rule 142 Motions;[1]

FINDING, therefore, that it is justified that the time for the filing of the Prosecution’s response(s), if any, to the Rule 142 Motions shall run from the date of service on the Prosecution of the final translation of the Affected Annexes;

[…]