Two reasonable triers of fact can come to equally reasonable conclusions

Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

396. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Vasiljević trial chamber reached a different conclusion in relation to the same evidence, concluding that Hasib Kurspahić’s failure to include Vasiljević as one of the perpetrators on Pionirska Street rendered Huso Kurspahić’s trial evidence as to his presence unreliable.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalls that two reasonable triers of facts may reach different but equally reasonable conclusions when assessing the reliability of a witness and determining the probative value of the evidence presented at trial.[2] An error cannot be established by simply demonstrating that other trial chambers have exercised their discretion in a different way.[3]

[1] Vasiljević Trial Judgement, para. 147. During the Interview, Hasib Kurspahić mentioned having met “Mitar, a waiter” in the course of the day, but he did not list him as one of the perpertrators of the Pionirska Street Incident (see Interview, p. 4).

[2] Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, paras 11-12.

[3] Cf. Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 12. 

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 29.09.2014 KAREMERA & NGIRUMPATSE
(ICTR-98-44-A)

52.     The Appeals Chamber further recalls that decisions of individual trial chambers have no binding force on other trial chambers.[1] A trial chamber must make its own final assessment of the evidence on the basis of the totality of the evidence presented in the case before it.[2] Consequently, two reasonable triers of facts may reach different but equally reasonable conclusions when determining the probative value of the evidence presented at trial.[3] Likewise, the Appeals Chamber considers that an assessment as to whether the defence has been prejudiced by the Prosecution’s disclosure violations and whether a remedy is appropriate depends on the particular circumstances of the case.[4] An error cannot be established by simply demonstrating that other trial chambers have exercised their discretion in a different way.[5]

See also paras 257, 262, 439, 543.

[1] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 260; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 114. See also The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case Nos. ICTR-98-41-AR73 and ICTR-98-41-AR73(B), Decision on Interlocutory Appeals of Decision on Witness Protection Orders, 6 October 2005, para. 33.

[2] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 260; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 346.

[3] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 396; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, paras. 11, 12.

[4] See, e.g., Mugenzi and Mugiraneza Appeal Judgement, paras. 39, 43-46, 54, 55; Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, paras. 18-22.

[5] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 396. See also Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 12. 

Download full document