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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Nathan Dershowitz Participation - 08.09.2008 KRAJIŠNIK Momčilo
(IT-00-39-A)

8. When considering the Motion, the Appeals Chamber finds it appropriate to recall that it permitted Mr. Alan M. Dershowitz to advance arguments regarding the issue of JCE on behalf of the Appellant, because this issue “might be too complex for a non-lawyer to master”.[1] Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber “recognized the existence of heightened concerns regarding the basic fairness of proceedings when a defendant has chosen to self-represent”.[2] In light of this reasoning, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the Appellant should be granted the assistance of counsel on the matter of JCE in conducting the interview with Mr. Karadžić whose potential evidence will be primarily relevant for this issue. This is demonstrated inter alia by the numerous references to the relationship between the Appellant and Mr. Karadžić in the Trial Judgement of 27 September 2006.[3] The Appeals Chamber also finds that the conduct of the said interview by counsel on the matter of JCE is within the scope of the Order on Motion to Interview Radovan Karadžić in which it allowed the Appellant to speak to Mr. Karadžić in order to determine whether or not he wants to call him as a witness pursuant to Rule 115 of the Rules.[4] Such procedure is consistent with the Appeals Chamber’s heightened concerns for the fairness of proceedings against a self-represented accused.[5]

9. Having thus found that counsel on the matter of JCE can conduct the interview with Mr. Karadžić on behalf of the Appellant, the Appeals Chamber will now turn to the Appellant’s request to grant Mr. Nathan Dershowitz status of counsel. The Appeals Chamber is mindful of the fact that to date, he is registered as legal consultant to Mr. Alan M. Dershowitz, and not as co-counsel.[6] However, during the appeals hearing on 21 August 2008, Mr. Nathan Z. Dershowitz made oral submissions on the matter of JCE together with Mr. Alan M. Dershowitz, using part of the time allocated to the Appellant for submission of his oral presentation.[7] Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that it has already implicitly authorized Mr. Nathan Z. Dershowitz to act as de facto co-counsel on the matter of JCE together with Mr. Alan M. Dershowitz. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the Appellant has shown that Mr. Nathan M. Dershowitz is sufficiently familiar with the matters related to JCE to conduct the interview with Mr. Karadžić on this issue,[8] having already made oral submissions on the matter of JCE during the appeals hearing and having worked together with Mr. Alan M. Dershowitz on the matter.[9]

[1] Decision on Momčilo Krajišnik’s Motion to Reschedule Status Conference and Permit Alan Dershowitz to Appear, 28 February 2008 (“Decision of 28 February 2008”), para. 9.

[2] Decision of 28 February 2008, para. 6.

[3] See for instance Trial Judgement, paras 1087, 1099, 1105, 1107, 1110, 1112, 1115, 1116, 1121, 1123 and 1124.

[4] Order on Motion to Interview Radovan Karadžić, p. 3.

[5] Decision of 28 February 2008, para. 6.

[6] See correspondence from the Registry to counsel Mr. Alan M. Dershowitz by which the Registry accredited Mr. Nathan M. Dershowitz to Mr. Alan M. Dershowitz as his legal consultant, 15 August 2008, with reference to Request for Accreditation of Nathan M. Dershowitz as a Member of Momčilo Krajišnik’s Defence Team, 13 August 2008.

[7] See AT 191 et seq. See also Notice of Appearance, 12 August 2008, with reference to Scheduling Order for Appeals Hearing, 18 July 2008.

[8] This is of course subject to the fulfilment of all prerequisites under Rule 44 of the Rules by Mr. Nathan Z. Dershowitz.

[9] Momčilo Krajišnik’s Motion for Permission for Nathan Z. Dershowitz to Act as Counsel with Alan M. Dershowitz and for Extension of Time, 2 September 2008, para. 3. 

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Nathan Dershowitz Participation - 08.09.2008 KRAJIŠNIK Momčilo
(IT-00-39-A)

10. With respect to the request for an extension of time, the Appellant argues that Mr. Alan M. Dershowitz has commenced teaching responsibilities at HarvardLawSchool on 2 September 2008.[1] The Appeals Chamber gathers from this submission that the Appellant is arguing that due to these teaching responsibilities, Mr. Alan M. Dershowitz will not be able to participate in the interview with Radovan Karadžić at a time that would allow the Appellant to file a motion pursuant to Rule 115 of the Rules by 15 September 2008. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a counsel in a case before the Tribunal is under an obligation to give absolute priority to his commitments to the Tribunal and to observe the time limits in the Rules[2] or in an order of a Chamber. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber recalls that “other professional commitments of counsel should not have any bearing on the responsibilities of counsel towards their client and the International Tribunal”.[3] In these circumstances, the Appellant has not shown good cause for the extension of time sought.

[1] Motion, para. 3.

[2] Cf. Emmanuel Ndindabahizi v. The Prosecutor, ICTR-01-71-A, Decision on “Requête urgente aux fins de prorogation de délai pour le dépôt du mémoire en appel”, 1 April 2005, p. 3.

[3] Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, IT-02-60/1-A, Decision on Second Defence Motion to Enlarge Time for Filing of Replies, 1 April 2005, p. 4.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Translation - 04.09.2008 PRLIĆ et al.
(IT-04-74-AR73.9)

29. It is well established in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal that equality of arms does not mean equality of resources, but rather that each party must have a reasonable opportunity to defend its interests under conditions which do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.[1]  In this respect, the Appeals Chamber is not persuaded by Praljak’s argument that translation resources allocated to the Prosecution are relevant to the determination as to which resources should be allocated to him for the conduct of his defence. 

See also Karadžić Decision on Languages, 4 June 2009.

[1] Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, 15 July 1999, paras 44-55; Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleskovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, 16 February 1999, paras 23-25; The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgement, 1 June 2001, para. 69; Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Motion for Additional Funds, 13 November 2003, paras 23-24; Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement, 17 December 2004, paras 175-177; Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-AR73.2, Interlocutory Decision on Length of Defence Case, 20 July 2005, paras 7-9; Decision of 1 July 2008, para. 39.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Translation - 04.09.2008 PRLIĆ et al.
(IT-04-74-AR73.9)

9. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber’s calculations were indeed erroneous.  The Trial Chamber reasoned in the Impugned Order that “since the co-accused must respond to similar allegations from the Prosecution, a similar number of standard United Nations pages of documents should allow each one of them to effectively ensure his own defence”.[1]  Assuming this reasoning is appropriate in light of the specific circumstances of each accused, the total number of pages to be allocated to Praljak is to be compared with the total number of pages of translations received or to be received by the co-accused in question, including both the pages already translated and those pending translation.

19. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber did not commit a discernable error in requesting in advance a detailed description of the documents that Praljak wanted to have translated.  Without this information, the Trial Chamber could not make a reasonable assessment as to what translation resources were justifiably needed by the Defence. For the Trial Chamber to have left such an assessment until the opening of the Defence case, at which time the precise contours of the Defence case would be known, would only result in unnecessary delays in the translation process.  An early assessment of the resources to be allocated to the parties ensures the smooth and expeditious conduct of the proceedings and the request of the Trial Chamber clearly falls within its discretionary power based on its familiarity with the case and its daily management of the trial.

20. While the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the approach of the Trial Chamber fell well within its discretionary power, it is nevertheless concerned that the assessment of the Trial Chamber was in violation of the right of an accused being tried jointly to be accorded the same rights as if he were tried separately in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules.  The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber decided on the translation resources to be allocated to Praljak by reference to those already allocated to his co-defendants without considering whether that reference point was sufficient to take into account Praljak’s specific needs.  If a comparison among resources to be allocated to co-defendants is relevant to ensure the fair treatment of each defendant vis-à-vis each other, the Trial Chamber must still ultimately make an assessment of the resources of each accused separately in order to ensure these resources are sufficient for the conduct of that accused’s case pursuant to Article 21(4)(b) of the Statute.

25. The Appeals Chamber finds that Rule 3(E) of the Rules, which provides “(t)he Registrar shall make any necessary arrangements for interpretation and translation into and from the working languages” does not preclude the Trial Chamber from imposing a reasonable limitation on what translation resources should be made available to an accused to ensure a fair trial.  The authority to impose such a limitation flows from the Trial Chamber’s responsibility and authority of managing the proceedings before it.  As such, it is within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to limit the translation resources made available to the parties provided that the limitation is consistent with the statutory rights of an accused, including Article 21(4)(e) of the Statute.

26. The Appeals Chamber further notes that it is not necessarily inconsistent for the Trial Chamber to limit both the time available for oral testimony and the translation resources available for written testimony if the combined limitations do not hinder the capacity of the accused to present an adequate defence.  The key requirement under Article 21(4)(b) of the Statute is that the assessment of each measure ­ such as the limitation on translation services ­ must be made in the context of the totality of the other measures taken, including the limitations on oral testimony.

[1] Impugned Order [Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-T, Ordonnance portant sur la demande de Slobodan Praljak relative à la traduction de documents, 16 May 2008], p. 8 (emphasis added).

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ICTR Rule Rule 3(E) ICTY Rule Rule 3(E)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Admissibility of Notice of Appeal - 04.09.2008 HAXHIU Baton
(IT-04-84-R77.5-A)

9. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the International Tribunal, pursuant to Rule 77 of the Rules and in accordance with the International Tribunal’s consistent jurisprudence, possesses the inherent power to address conduct interfering with its administration of justice. The International Tribunal has both the subject matter and personal jurisdiction to prosecute contempt.

[1] See Prosecutor v. Josip Jović, Case No. IT-95-14 & 14/2-R77-A, Judgement, 17 March 2007, para. 34 with further references. 

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ICTR Rule Rule 77 ICTY Rule Rule 77
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Admissibility of Notice of Appeal - 04.09.2008 HAXHIU Baton
(IT-04-84-R77.5-A)

Haxhiu filed his notice of appeal against the trial judgement convicting him for contempt 26 days after the date of the trial judgement. The Prosecution asked to strike the notice of appeal as being time-barred. Haxhiu argued that appeals against judgements on appeal are filed not within the time limit prescribed by Rule 77(J) (15 days) but pursuant to the general time-limit for appeal against judgements pursuant to Rule 108 (30 days). The Appeals Chamber held as followed:

12. At the outset, the Appeals Chamber recalls that in Prosecutor v. Marijačić and Rebić it was confronted with a question similar to the one in this case. The Appeals Chamber in that case explicitly rejected the argument, made by one of the appellants in relation to the filing of the appeal brief, that Section III of the Practice Direction is only applicable to interlocutory decisions but not to judgements rendered pursuant to Rule 77. The Appeals Chamber consequently held that “Section III [of the Practice Direction] applies to final decisions of a Trial Chamber under Rule 77.”[1]

13. The same reasoning applies to Rule 77(J) of the Rules, which is mirrored in paragraph 4 of the Practice Direction. Indeed, in Prosecutor v. Šešelj, the Appeals Chamber stated that “Rule 77(J) of the Rules shall be interpreted as allowing for appeals against decisions disposing of contempt cases only.”[2]

14. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Haxhiu’s Notice of Appeal was filed outside the prescribed time-limits. […]

[1] Prosecutor v. Ivica Marijačić and Markica Rebić, Case No. IT-95-14-R77.2-A, Judgement, 27 September 2006, para. 14.

[2] Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR77.1, Decision on Vojislav Šešelj’s Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 19 July 2007, 14 December 2007, p. 2, with further references (emphasis added).

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ICTR Rule Rule 77;
Rule 108
ICTY Rule Rule 77;
Rule 108
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Admissibility of Notice of Appeal - 04.09.2008 HAXHIU Baton
(IT-04-84-R77.5-A)

16. The Appeals Chamber stresses once again that time-limits in the Rules must be observed. Finality is an important component of any criminal trial. Parties cannot reopen the proceedings at will. As the ICTR Appeals Chamber held in The Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, rejecting the entire appeal lodged by the Prosecution in that case:

Procedural time-limits are to be respected, … they are indispensable to the proper functioning of the Tribunal and the fulfilment of its mission to do justice. Violations of these time-limits, unaccompanied by any showing of good cause, will not be tolerated.[1]

[1] The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgement (Reasons), para. 46 (footnotes omitted). See also fn. 54 of that Judgement, which by referring to Rule 127 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that “[t]he fact that an act performed after the expiration of a prescribed time may be recognized as validly done illustrates the following principle: timely filing is the rule, and filing after the expiration of a time-limit constitutes late filing, which is normally not permitted. However, if good cause is shown, the Rule establishes that despite the expiration of time and tardy filing, an act may be recognized as validly done, as a permitted derogation from the usual rule. Thus, the Rule reinforces the principle that procedural time-limits are to be respected.”

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ICTR Rule Rule 116 ICTY Rule Rule 127
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Admissibility of Notice of Appeal - 04.09.2008 HAXHIU Baton
(IT-04-84-R77.5-A)

14. […] However, Haxhiu has requested the Appeals Chamber to recognize the late filing as validly done pursuant to Rules 127(A)(ii) and 127(B) of the Rules. He concedes that “counsel’s unfamiliarity with the Appeals Chamber’s procedure does not constitute good cause for an extension of time.”[1] Indeed, the Appeals Chamber recalls that “counsel participating in appeals proceedings are expected to familiarize themselves with the procedural requirements.”[2]

15. […] Given the existence of only a few judgements on appeal in contempt proceedings before the International Tribunal, Counsel is expected to have acquainted himself with the relevant jurisprudence on this issue. Accordingly, no good cause has been shown that would allow the Appeals Chamber to exercise its discretion in recognizing the filing of the Notice of Appeal as validly done.

[1] Response, p. 7.

[2] Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Decision on Motion by Radivoje Miletić for Access to Confidential Information, 9 September 2005, p. 2.   

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ICTR Rule Rule 116 ICTY Rule Rule 127
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Additional Evidence - 01.09.2008 KANYARUKIGA Gaspard
(ICTR-2002-78-R11bis)

The Appeals Chamber recalls the criteria of admissibility of additional evidence on appeal under Rule 115:

5. Rule 115 of the Rules provides a mechanism for admission of additional evidence on appeal where a party is in possession of material that was not before the court of first instance and which is additional evidence of a fact or issue litigated at trial.[1] According to Rule 115(A) of the Rules, a motion for additional evidence shall clearly identify with precision the specific finding of fact made by the Trial Chamber to which the additional evidence is directed. In addition, Rule 115(B) of the Rules provides that the additional evidence must not have been available at trial and must be relevant and credible. When determining the availability at trial, the Appeals Chamber will consider whether the party tendering the evidence has shown that it sought to make “appropriate use of all mechanisms of protection and compulsion available under the Statute and the Rules of the International Tribunal to bring evidence […] before the Trial Chamber.” Once it has been determined that the additional evidence meets these conditions, the Appeals Chamber will determine in accordance with Rule 115(B) of the Rules whether it could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision at trial.

6. Furthermore, in accordance with established jurisprudence, where the proffered evidence is relevant and credible, but was available at trial, or could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, the Appeals Chamber may still allow it to be admitted on appeal provided the moving party can establish that its exclusion would amount to a miscarriage of justice.[3] That is, it must be demonstrated that had the additional evidence been adduced at trial, it would have had an impact on the verdict.[4]

The Appeals Chamber also noted, in footnote 24, that:

The Appeals Chamber notes that a party seeking the admission of additional evidence on appeal must provide to the Appeals Chamber the evidence sought to be admitted to allow it to determine whether the evidence meets the requirements of relevance and credibility. See Muvunyi Decision, para. 8; Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion for Leave to Present Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115, 5 May 2006, para. 18; Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Appellant Hassan Ngeze’s Motion for Leave to Present Additional Evidence, 14 February 2005, p. 3. See also Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, “Decision on the Motions of Drago Josipović, Zoran Kupreškić and Vlatko Kupreškić to Admit Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115 and for Judicial Notice to Be Taken Pursuant to Rule 94(B)”, 8 May 2001, para. 5.

It therefore held that:

9. The affidavits that Kanyarukiga seeks to have admitted may be relevant to establishing that the witnesses’ fear about testifying is not simply subjective, but that there is evidence of actual interference by the Rwandan security services in the administration of justice, and thus that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that witnesses will not generally face risks if they testify. However, Kanyarukiga has not attached the affidavits to his Motion, nor has he described the content of these affidavits in sufficient detail which would allow the Appeals Chamber to assess whether they are relevant to demonstrating actual interference in the administration of justice, or whether they simply address the witnesses’ subjective fears, which would be relevant only in the sense of supporting the Trial Chamber’s findings rather than in showing that it erred. The Appeals Chamber also does not have enough information to assess the credibility of the affidavits.

[1] The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-00-55A-A, Decision on a Request to Admit Additional Evidence, 27 April 2007, para. 6 (“Muvunyi Decision”); Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motions for Leave to Present Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 8 December 2006, para. 4 (“Nahimana et al. Rule 115 Decision”).

[2] See Muvunyi Decision, para. 6 and Nahimana et al. Rule 115 Decision, para. 5, quoting The Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Additional Evidence, 10 December 2004, para. 9 (internal references omitted).

[3] Muvunyi Decision, para. 7; Nahimana et al. Rule 115 Decision, para. 6 (with further references).

[4] Muvunyi Decision, para. 7; Nahimana et al. Rule 115 Decision, para. 6.

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ICTR Rule Rule 115 ICTY Rule Rule 115
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Amicus Curiae Brief - 01.09.2008 KANYARUKIGA Gaspard
(ICTR-2002-78-R11bis)

CONSIDERING that granting leave to make submissions under Rule 74 of the Rules is a matter within the discretion of the Appeals Chamber;[1]

CONSIDERING that the primary criterion in determining whether to grant leave to an amicus curiae to make submissions is whether this would assist the Appeals Chamber in its consideration of the appeal;[2]

[1] See The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on the Admissibility of the Amicus Curiae Brief Filed by the “Open Society Justice Initiative” and on its Request to be Heard at the Appeals Hearing, 12 January 2007 (“Nahimana Decision”), p. 3. See also Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-80-AR108bis.1, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Strike Request for Review under Rule 108bis, 13 December 2006, para. 7.

[2] Nahimana Decision, p. 3; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Association of Defence Counsel Request to Participate in Oral Argument, 7 November 2005, p. 3. See also Laurent Semanza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision on Amicus Curiae Application of Paul Bisengimana, 30 March 2004, p. 3.

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ICTR Rule Rule 74 ICTY Rule Rule 74
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Amicus Curiae Brief - 01.09.2008 KANYARUKIGA Gaspard
(ICTR-2002-78-R11bis)

The Appeals Chamber held that although Rwanda had been granted leave to appear as an amicus curiae during the referral proceedings, Rwanda proposed to make submissions on matters not covered by the amicus curiae brief it submitted during those proceedings. At page 3, the Appeals Chamber granted Rwanda’s request, on the following basis:

RECALLING that the Appeals Chamber granted Rwanda permission to file an amicus curiae brief in Munyakazi on the basis that Rwanda had a practical interest in the determination of the appeal, and that the Appeals Chamber would be assisted in the determination of the appeal by further amicus curiae submissions from Rwanda on issues relevant to the determination of the appeal;[1]

CONSIDERING that Rwanda also has a practical interest in the determination of the appeal in this case;

CONSIDERING that the issues identified by Rwanda in the Motion as matters about which it could provide further detail are relevant to the determination of the appeal and that the Appeals Chamber may therefore be assisted by further amicus curiae submissions from Rwanda;

[1] See The Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on Request from the Republic of Rwanda for Permission to File an Amicus Curiae Brief, 18 July 2008, p. 3.

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ICTR Rule Rule 74
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement I - 29.08.2008 MUVUNYI Tharcisse
(ICTR-2000-55A-A)

123. A review of the trial record, including the evidence of Witness YAQ, reveals that Muvunyi did not object to the form of this paragraph before trial or during the witness’s testimony. Nonetheless, he challenged the form of paragraph 3.24 of the Indictment at the trial stage in his motion for judgement of acquittal, although his submissions did not take specific issue with the evidence of Witness YAQ.[1] In this respect, the Appeals Chamber has held:

[O]bjections based on lack of notice should be specific and timely. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Prosecution that blanket objections that “the entire indictment is defective” are insufficiently specific. As to timeliness, the objection should be raised at the pre-trial stage (for instance in a motion challenging the indictment) or at the time the evidence of a new material fact is introduced. However, an objection raised later at trial will not automatically lead to a shift in the burden of proof: the Trial Chamber must consider relevant factors, such as whether the Defence provided a reasonable explanation for its failure to raise the objection earlier in the trial.[2]

The Trial Chamber did not consider Muvunyi’s objection to the form of paragraph 3.24 of the Indictment to be timely.[3] Muvunyi has not advanced any reason suggesting that this conclusion was erroneous. It therefore falls to him to demonstrate that the preparation of his defence was prejudiced by the omission from the Indictment of the approximate time and place of the Gikonko meeting.[4]

124. Muvunyi has failed to make such a demonstration. Indeed, the Appellant’s Brief does not address the question of prejudice suffered from the leading of evidence about the Gikonko meeting.[5] In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber finds that Muvunyi has not discharged his burden to demonstrate prejudice. Consequently, this sub-ground of appeal is dismissed.

[1] Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, para. 59 (“With respect to the sensitization meetings, the Prosecutor offered the testimony of Witnesses CCP, YAI, CCR, YAP. These sensitizing meetings as alleged in the indictment are not sufficiently plead as to victims of the crimes of genocide in each instance or what specific acts of genocide occurred in order to give the Accused notice of what Count 1 or Count 2 acts he must specifically defend against.”).

[2] Bagosora et al., Decision on Aloys Ntabakuze’s Interlocutory Appeal on Questions of Law Raised by the 29 June 2006 Trial Chamber I Decision on Motion for Exclusion of Evidence, para. 46 (internal citation omitted).

[3] Muvunyi, Decision on Tharcisse Muvunyi’s Motion for Judgement of Acquittal pursuant to Rule 98bis [The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-00-55A-T, Decision on Tharcisse Muvunyi’s Motion for Judgement of Acquittal pursuant to Rule 98bis, 13 October 2005], para. 41.

[4] Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 51, quoting Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, paras. 199, 200. See also Bagosora et al., Decision on Aloys Ntabakuze’s Interlocutory Appeal on Questions of Law Raised by the 29 June 2006 Trial Chamber I Decision on Motion for Exclusion of Evidence, paras. 45-47.

[5] Muvunyi Appeal Brief, paras. 80-81 (where he simply objects to the lack of notice). A similar situation occurred in Niyitegeka. In that case, the Appeals Chamber found that the Indictment was defective, that Niyitegeka had not objected to this during trial, and that the burden of showing prejudice was therefore on him. Since he had made no submissions as to how he was prejudiced, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber did not err in convicting him. Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, paras. 200, 207, 211.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement I - 29.08.2008 MUVUNYI Tharcisse
(ICTR-2000-55A-A)

20. An indictment lacking this precision is defective; however, the defect may be cured if the Prosecution provides the accused with timely, clear, and consistent information detailing the factual basis underpinning the charge. However, the principle that a defect in an indictment may be cured is not without limits. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber has previously emphasized:

[T]he “new material facts” should not lead to a “radical transformation” of the Prosecution’s case against the accused. The Trial Chamber should always take into account the risk that the expansion of charges by the addition of new material facts may lead to unfairness and prejudice to the accused. Further, if the new material facts are such that they could, on their own, support separate charges, the Prosecution should seek leave from the Trial Chamber to amend the indictment and the Trial Chamber should only grant leave if it is satisfied that it would not lead to unfairness or prejudice to the Defence.[2]

While the Appeals Chamber has previously held that a pre-trial brief can, in certain circumstances, cure a defect in an indictment,[3] the circumstances presented in this instance are different. The Pre-Trial Brief and the annexed witness summaries do not simply add greater detail in a consistent manner with a more general allegation already pleaded in the Indictment. Rather, the Pre-Trial Brief and the annexed witness summaries expand the charges specifically pleaded in the Indictment by charging additional attacks involving ESO Camp soldiers, based on superior responsibility, other than the one specifically mentioned in paragraph 3.29 of the Indictment. This does not amount to clear and consistent notice adding specificity to a vague paragraph; rather it is a de facto amendment of the Indictment.

26. The Prosecution’s contention that the variances between the Indictment and the evidence at trial are minor or that any resulting defect was cured fails to address the fundamental problem with paragraph 3.29 of the Indictment and the related conviction: the paragraph is not vague; it specifically alleges a different event and form of criminal conduct from the one for which Muvunyi was convicted by the Trial Chamber. The differences in the dates as well as the nature of the attack (abductions from the hospital and killings elsewhere versus separations and killings at the hospital), in addition to Muvunyi’s alleged role, underscore this point. Paragraph 3.29 of the Indictment, therefore, did not properly inform Muvunyi of the material facts for the crime for which he was ultimately convicted.

155. The Prosecution’s contention that any defect in the Indictment was cured by the Schedule of Particulars and the summaries of anticipated testimony annexed to its Pre-Trial Brief fails to address the fundamental problem with Count 5 of the Indictment: the count is not vague; it is narrowly tailored and charges the crime of other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity based on one specific event which is described in paragraph 3.44 of the Indictment. By adding paragraph 3.47 of the Indictment as support for Count 5 in the Schedule of Particulars, the Prosecution essentially amended the Indictment and expanded the charge of other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity from a single event alleged in paragraph 3.44 where ESO Camp soldiers allegedly prevented wounded refugees from going to the Butare University Hospital to acts of cruel treatment by ESO and Ngoma Camp soldiers during every event alleged in the Indictment as pleaded in paragraph 3.47.

156. As noted above, the Indictment does not list paragraph 3.47 in support of any count. The Appeals Chamber has previously observed in this case that the Prosecution’s failure to expressly state that a paragraph in the Indictment supports a particular count in the Indictment is indicative that the allegation is not charged as a crime.[4] The Appeals Chamber therefore considers that the mistreatment underlying Muvunyi’s conviction for other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity was not charged in his Indictment. The omission of a count or charge from an indictment cannot be cured by the provision of timely, clear, and consistent information.[5]

[1] Seromba Appeal Judgement [The Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgement, 12 March 2008], para 100; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 64; Muhimana Appeal Judgement [Mikaeli Muhimana v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-A, Judgement, 21 May 2007], paras. 76, 195, 217; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement [Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Judgement, 7 July 2006], para. 49. See also Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 28, 65.

[2] Bagosora et al., Decision on Aloys Ntabakuze’s Interlocutory Appeal on Questions of Law Raised by the 29 June 2006 Trial Chamber I Decision on Motion for Exclusion of Evidence, para. 30 (internal citations omitted).

[3] Muhimana Appeal Judgement, paras. 82, 201, 223, citing Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, paras. 57, 58; Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement [Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić and Vinko Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-A, Judgement, 3 May 2006], para. 45; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement [The Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana, Cases Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgement, 13 December 2004], para. 48.

[4] Muvunyi, Decision on Prosecution Interlocutory Appeal against Trial Chamber II Decision of 23 February 2005 [The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-00-55A-A, Decision on Prosecution Interlocutory Appeal against Trial Chamber II Decision of 23 February 2005, 12 May 2005], para. 33 (“The Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the allegation of the Accused’s involvement in the detention and disappearance of Habyalimana could constitute a new charge against the Accused. In the current indictment, the relevant paragraph is contained in the section titled “Concise Statement of Facts” and not in the section of specific allegations against the Accused. Further, the Prosecution does not reference this paragraph of the current indictment as a material fact underpinning any of the charges made in the indictment. If the proposed amendment is allowed, it is presumed that the Prosecution would include this allegation under Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, in support of the charges of genocide, or alternatively complicity to genocide. But this does not change the fact that this fresh allegation could support a separate charge against the Accused.”) (emphasis added).

[5] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement [The Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Judgement, 7 July 2006], para. 32; Bagosora et al., Decision on Aloys Ntabakuze’s Interlocutory Appeal on Questions of Law Raised by the 29 June 2006 Trial Chamber I Decision on Motion for Exclusion of Evidence [The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No ICTR 98-41-AR73, Decision on Aloys Ntabakuze’s Interlocutory Appeal on Questions of Law Raised by the 29 June 2006 Trial Chamber I Decision on Motion for Exclusion of Evidence, 18 September 2006], para. 29.

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Appeal Judgement I - 29.08.2008 MUVUNYI Tharcisse
(ICTR-2000-55A-A)

144. It is within a Trial Chamber’s discretion to assess any inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, and to determine whether, in the light of the overall evidence, the witnesses were nonetheless reliable and credible.[1] However, the Trial Chamber also has an obligation to provide a reasoned opinion.[2] From the discussion of the evidence in the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber cannot conclude whether a reasonable trier of fact could have relied on the testimony of Witnesses YAI and CCP to convict Muvunyi for this event. The Appeals Chamber is particularly troubled by the numerous inconsistencies in their testimonies as to the core details relating to Muvunyi’s alleged speech[3] and by the utter lack of any discussion of these inconsistencies in the Trial Judgement.[4] In view of this, the Appeals Chamber finds it impossible to assess the finding that the testimony of Witnesses YAI and CCP about the meeting was “strikingly similar” or consistent with respect to the material facts relating to this charge.

147. The Appeals Chamber recalls again that a Trial Chamber has an obligation to provide a reasoned opinion. In this instance, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber did not provide sufficient reasons for preferring the testimony of Witnesses YAI and CCP over that of Witness MO78. The Trial Chamber did not point to any inconsistencies in the evidence of Witness MO78 nor did it identify any reasons for doubting his credibility. The Trial Chamber appears to have deemed Witness MO78 unreliable solely on the basis that his evidence differed from that of Witnesses YAI and CCP. Such an approach is of particular concern given the Trial Chamber’s express recognition[5] of the need to treat the evidence of Witnesses YAI and CCP, unlike the evidence of Witness MO78, with caution.[6] The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that the Trial Chamber failed to provide a reasoned opinion on this point.

[1] See e.g., Bagilishema Appeal Judgement [The Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Judgement (Reasons), 3 July 2002], para. 78.

[2] Simba Appeal Judgement [The Prosecutor v. Aloys Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, Judgement, 27 November 2007], para. 152; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement [Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-A, Judgement, 19 September 2005], para. 32; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement [Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A], Judgement, 23 May 2005, para. 59; Semanza Appeal Judgement [Laurent Semanza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Judgement, 20 May 2005], paras. 130, 149; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement [Eliézer Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Judgement, 9 July 2004], para. 124; Rutaganda Appeal Judgement [Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgement, 26 May 2003], para. 536; Musema Appeal Judgement [Alfred Musema v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement, 16 November 2001], paras. 18, 277; Čelebići Case Appeal Judgement [Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, 20 February 2001], para. 481; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement [Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, Judgement, 23 October 2001], para. 224.

[3] Compare T. 25 May 2005 pp. 4-16 (Witness YAI) with T. 9 June 2005 pp. 1-14 (Witness CCP).

[4] See Trial Judgement, para. 209.

[5] See Trial Judgement, paras. 206, 208.

[6] Cf. Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 143.

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Appeal Judgement I - 29.08.2008 MUVUNYI Tharcisse
(ICTR-2000-55A-A)

The Appeals Chamber ordered a retrial for one count of direct and public incitement to commit genocide:

148. These aggregate errors in addressing the apparently inconsistent testimony of Witnesses YAI, CCP, and MO78 prevent the Appeals Chamber from determining whether the Trial Chamber assessed the entire evidence on this point exhaustively and properly. In such circumstances, the Appeals Chamber is forced to conclude that Muvunyi’s conviction for direct and public incitement to commit genocide on the basis of his alleged speech at the GikoreTradeCenter is not safe and, accordingly, quashes it. The Appeals Chamber further finds that the present situation gives rise to appropriate circumstances for retrial pursuant to Rule 118(C) of the Rules, limited to the allegations considered under this ground of appeal. The Appeals Chamber stresses that an order for retrial is an exceptional measure to which resort must necessarily be limited. In the present situation, the Appeals Chamber is well aware that Muvunyi has already spent over eight years in the Tribunal’s custody. At the same time, the alleged offence is of the utmost gravity and interests of justice would not be well served if retrial were not ordered to allow the trier of fact the opportunity to fully assess the entirety of the relevant evidence and provide a reasoned opinion. 

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Appeal Judgement I - 29.08.2008 MUVUNYI Tharcisse
(ICTR-2000-55A-A)

The Appeals Chamber also held that:

170. […] [G]iven that the order for retrial originated in the appeal by Muvunyi, the Appeals Chamber considers that the principle of fairness[1] demands that in the event that a new Trial Chamber was to enter a conviction for the respective charge, any sentence could not exceed the twenty-five years of imprisonment imposed by the first Trial Chamber.

[1] In some jurisdictions also specifically referred to as prohibition of reformatio in peius, meaning that a court solely seized of an appeal lodged by the accused cannot increase the sentence. See for instance for the United Kingdom: Criminal Appeal Act of 1968, Schedule 2, Section 2(1); Germany: Strafprozeßordnung (Code of Criminal Procedure), Sections 331 and 358(2); Austria: Strafprozeßordnung (Code of Criminal Procedure), Sections 290(2) and 293(3); Denmark: Retsplejeloven, Fjerde bog, Strafferetsplejen (Administration of Justice Act, Fourth Chapter, Criminal Proceedings), Sections 960(3)(2) and 965a(2).

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Decision on Additional Evidence - 20.08.2008 KRAJIŠNIK Momčilo
(IT-00-39-A)

With respect to the exercise of the applicant’s and counsel’s duty to act with due diligence in relation to the availability of evidence at trial, the Appeals Chamber recalled:

 5. For additional evidence to be admissible under Rule 115 of the Rules it must satisfy the following requirements. The applicant must first demonstrate that the additional evidence tendered on appeal was not available to him at trial in any form, or discoverable through the exercise of due diligence.[1] The applicant’s duty to act with reasonable diligence includes making “appropriate use of all mechanisms of protection and compulsion available under the Statute and the Rules of the International Tribunal to bring evidence on behalf of an accused before the Trial Chamber.”[2] With respect to the exercise of counsel’s due diligence during trial the Appeals Chamber recalls its finding in Tadić that

[c]ounsel may have chosen not to present the evidence at trial because of his litigation strategy or because of the view taken by him of the probative value of the evidence. The determination which the Chamber has to make, except in cases where there is evidence of gross negligence, is whether the evidence was available at the time of trial. Subject to that exception, counsel’s decision not to call evidence at trial does not serve to make it unavailable.[3]

The Applicant argued that a number of documents he sought to be admitted on appeal were not tendered into evidence at trial due to oversight by his former Counsel. When considering whether these documents were unavailable to the Applicant at trial, the Appeals Chamber first analysed documents which could demonstrate Counsel’s incompetence to conduct the defence:

12. With respect to the alleged unavailability at trial of the statements in document 69-K-0005, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a defence counsel has the duty to act with reasonable diligence to bring evidence on behalf of an accused before the Trial Chamber.[4] The information contained in the four statements could be considered as having been available at trial, because it could have been gathered with reasonable diligence.[5] However, failure of Counsel to exercise due diligence in order to obtain documents which could demonstrate his own incompetence to conduct the defence should not be to the detriment of the Appellant.[6] Moreover, whether or not the Appellant himself had a duty to act with reasonable diligence to make the Trial Chamber aware of the information contained in the four statements, the Appeals Chamber considers that in his oral request for self-representation at trial, the Appellant stated that his Defence team was unable to assist him because of the conditions prevailing at the time, adding that if the Trial Chamber wished that he provide more detailed explanations, he would gladly do so.[7] However, he was never requested to do so. In light of these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber finds that the information contained in the four statements was unavailable to the Appellant at trial. Consequently, they can be admitted if they are relevant, credible and could have had an impact on the verdict had they been considered at trial.

        […]

18. In addition, it appears that the Trial Chamber was never fully informed of the Appellant’s complaints regarding his former Counsel. […]

19. The Appeals Chamber considers that, as a general principle, an accused’s right to a fair trial is infringed when counsel admittedly does not understand the case of his client and fails to prepare a proper defence strategy. […]

 The Appeals Chamber then analysed the documents which were not aimed at proving the alleged incompetence of Counsel to conduct the defence:

21. As previously noted, the Appellant argues in relation to a number of documents that his former Counsel failed to tender them as evidence at trial, although for many of them the Appellant told him to do so.[8] The Appeals Chamber will only consider these documents as being unavailable at trial where the Appellant can show gross negligence of Counsel.[9]

22. The Appeals Chamber considers that […].it does not necessarily follow that former Counsel acted with gross negligence in all the respects now alleged. Indeed, “[c]ounsel may have chosen not to present the evidence at trial because of his litigation strategy or because of the view taken by him of the probative value of the evidence”.[10] Moreover, the Appellant does not substantiate his assertion that the documents at issue were unavailable at trial beyond bare assertions that former Counsel failed to tender them. Therefore, he fails to sufficiently demonstrate that these documents were unavailable at trial. As such, the other admissibility criteria being met, they will only be admitted if the Appellant can show that they would have affected the verdict.

[1] Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-AR65.4, Decision on Prosecution Appeal of Decision on Provisional Release and Motions to Present Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115, 26 June 2008 (“Stanišić Rule 115 Decision”), para. 6; Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-A, Decision on Blagoje Simić’s Motion for Admission of Additional Evidence, Alternatively for Taking of Judicial Notice, 1 June 2006 (“Simić Rule 115 Decision”), para. 12; Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Decision on Applications for Admission of Additional Evidence on Appeal, 5 August 2003 (“Krstić Rule 115 Decision”), p. 3; Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Decision on Evidence, 31 October 2003 (“Blaškić Rule 115 Decision”), p. 2.

[2] Simić Rule 115 Decision, para. 12; Krstić Rule 115 Decision, p. 2; Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgement, 23 October 2001 (“Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement”), para. 50; Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time-Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, 16 October 1998 (“Tadić Decision on Extension of Time Limit”), para. 47.

[3] Tadić Decision on Extension of Time Limit, para. 50. See also, Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motions for Leave to Present Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 8 December 2006 (“Nahimana et al. Decision”), para. 31.

[4] Simić Rule 115 Decision, para. 12; Krstić Rule 115 Decision, p. 2; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 50; Tadić Decision on Extension of Time Limit, para. 47.

[5] Because the information contained in the statements concern events which all occurred during the trial, such information could have been put to the attention of the Trial Chamber at trial.

[6] Cf. Nahimana et al. Decision, para. 31: “[…] the interests of justice require that an appellant not be held responsible for the failures of counsel”.

[7] Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Reasons for Oral Decision Denying Mr. Krajišnik’s Request to Proceed Unrepresented by Counsel, 18 August 2005 (“Decision 18 August 2005”), para. 2, referring to Momčilo Krajišnik, T.13399.

[8] See supra fn. 34.

[9] Tadić Decision on Extension of Time Limit, para. 50.

[10] Tadić Decision on Extension of Time Limit, para. 50.

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ICTR Rule Rule 115 ICTY Rule Rule 115
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Decision on Additional Evidence - 20.08.2008 KRAJIŠNIK Momčilo
(IT-00-39-A)

23. As for the remainder of the documents sought to be admitted, the Appeals Chamber finds that, with the exception of documents 40-K-0066 and 49-K-0208, the Appellant fails to demonstrate that they were not available to him at trial in any form, or discoverable through the exercise of due diligence. The Appellant either merely states that he did not have, or was not aware of the respective document at trial.[1] However, the Appellant does not provide any further information as to why he did not have, or was not aware of, documents at trial such as to establish that despite the exercise of due diligence he failed to uncover the documents. A simple assertion that the Appellant was unaware of the documents is insufficient to demonstrate that due diligence was exercised. Accordingly, in the circumstances, the Appeals Chamber is not persuaded that the Appellant has met his burden of establishing that the documents were in fact unavailable to him at trial.

[1] The Appeals Chamber notes that some of the documents in question were disclosed to the Appellant by the Prosecution at trial, see Response [Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Prosecution Response to Krajišnik’s Motion to Present Additional Evidence and Supplement, 18 July 2008], Appendix B.

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ICTR Rule Rule 115 ICTY Rule Rule 115
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Decision on Additional Evidence - 20.08.2008 KRAJIŠNIK Momčilo
(IT-00-39-A)

The Appeals Chamber found that a statement made by Radovan Karadžić and given to one of the Applicant’s investigators lacked credibility for the purposes of Rule 115:

108. With respect to the statement’s credibility, the Appeals Chamber notes that according to the Appellant, “it was impossible to get in direct contact with Mr Karadžić”.[1] Apart from this reference, the Appellant provides no further information as to the circumstances under which this document was produced and how it was communicated to him. As a result, the Appeals Chamber finds that 33-K-0088 is still of dubious credibility. The Appeals Chamber notes that it is yet unknown whether Radovan Karadžić will provide evidence in relation to the credibility of his alleged statement. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber dismisses the request to have the statement admitted at this juncture. This is, however, without prejudice to any renewed request to admit it in the context of a potential motion under Rule 115 of the Rules relating to evidence by Radovan Karadžić.[2]

[1] Motion [Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Motion to Present Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115 to the Appeal By Momčilo Krajišnik to the ICTY Judgement of 27 September 2006, 29 May 2008], para. 33(A).

[2] [Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A] Motion to interview Radovan Karadžić with a view to then calling him as a witness pursuant to Rule 115, 13 August 2008.

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ICTR Rule Rule 115 ICTY Rule Rule 115
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Decision on Instigating Contempt Proceedings - 25.07.2008 ŠEŠELJ Vojislav
(IT-03-67-AR77.2)

8. Rule 77(J) of the Rules provides that “[a]ny decision rendered by a Trial Chamber” under Rule 77 is subject to appeal.  The Appeals Chamber has interpreted this provision as allowing for appeals against decisions disposing of the contempt case only.[1]

12. The Appeals Chamber considers that a decision dismissing a request to initiate contempt proceedings is a decision disposing of the contempt case within the meaning of Rule 77(J) of the Rules. The Appeals Chamber notes that in the Impugned Decision, the Trial Chamber held that sufficient grounds did not exist to instigate contempt proceedings against Vučič which in effect dismissed the Prosecution Request to initiate contempt proceedings.[2] The Appeals Chamber accordingly finds that an appeal as of right lies from the Impugned Decision under Rule 77(J) of the Rules.

13. The Appeals Chamber also considers that a party in proceedings before the International Tribunal has the right to request the Trial Chamber to exercise its discretionary power to initiate contempt proceedings for alleged conduct that, if proven, would harm that party’s right to a fair trial. The Appeals Chamber further considers that the right to make such a request, by implication, gives rise to a corresponding right to challenge any incorrect application of the legal standard governing such requests. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that, in light of the Prosecution’s submission that the Trial Chamber applied an incorrect legal standard when considering the Prosecution Request, which denied the Prosecution a fair opportunity to present its case and thus implicated the Prosecution’s right to a fair trial,[3] the Prosecution can challenge the Impugned Decision under Rule 77(J) of the Rules.

[1] See Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR77.1, Decision on Vojislav Šešelj’s Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 19 July 2007, 14 December 2007, p. 2.

[2] Impugned Decision, para. 51.

[3] Appeal [Confidential Prosecution’s Appeal Brief, 26 June 2008], paras 7, 18, and 35.

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ICTR Rule Rule 77 ICTY Rule Rule 77