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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

212. […] Thus, while the report and testimony of an expert witness may be based on facts narrated by ordinary witnesses or facts from other evidence, an expert witness cannot, in principle, testify himself or herself on the acts and conduct of accused persons[1] without having been called to testify also as a factual witness and without his or her statement having been disclosed in accordance with the applicable rules concerning factual witnesses.[2] However, an expert witness may testify on certain facts relating to his or her area of expertise. […]

509. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the role of expert witnesses is to assist the Trial Chamber in its assessment of the evidence before it, and not to testify on disputed facts as would ordinary witnesses. […]

[1] Also, it should be recalled that an expert witness cannot pronounce on the criminal responsibility of the accused: see D. Milošević Decision of 15 February 2007, para. 11; Martić Decision of 13 November 2006, p. 5; The Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al., Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on the admissibility of the expert testimony of Binaifer Nowrojee, 8 July 2005, para. 12.

[2] In this regard, see Rules, 66(A)(ii), 73 bis (B)(iv)(b) and 73 ter (B)(iii)(b).

[3] See supra IV. B. 2. (b).

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

181. The Appeals Chamber accepts the view that the concept of a fair trial includes equal opportunity to present one’s case and the fundamental right that criminal proceedings should be adversarial in nature, with both prosecution and accused having the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed or evidence adduced by either party.[1] Considering the latter right under the principle of equality of arms, the Appeals Chamber of ICTY held that Article 21(4)(e) of the Statute of ICTY:

serves to ensure that the accused is placed in a position of procedural equality in respect of obtaining the attendance and examination of witnesses with that of the Prosecution. In other words, the same set of rules must apply to the right of the two parties to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses.[2]

[1] Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14-/2-A, Decision on Application by Mario Čerkez for Extension of Time to File his Respondent’s Brief, 11 September 2001, para. 5. Even though the French version – the original being the English text – refers to “what is described as the fundamental right that criminal proceedings are accusatoire in nature – defined as meaning the opportunity for both the prosecution and the accused to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed or evidence adduced by either party […]” (emphasis added), the term “accusatoire” is a wrong translation of the term “adversarial” and, in view of the references on which this relies, the term “contradictoire” should have been used.

[2] Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-AR73.3, Decision on Appeal by Dragan Papić against Ruling to Proceed by Deposition, 15 July 1999, para. 24.

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Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

492. A person commits the crime of genocide (Article 2(3)(a) of the Statute) if he or she commits one of the acts enumerated in Article 2(2) of the Statute (actus reus) with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such (“genocidal intent”).[1] Furthermore, even if an accused has not committed genocide himself, his responsibility may be established under one of the modes of responsibility provided for in Article 6(1) and (3) of the Statute. Where a person is accused of having planned, instigated, ordered or aided and abetted the commission of genocide by one or more other persons pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute, the Prosecutor must establish that the accused’s acts or omissions substantially contributed to the commission of acts of genocide.[2]

595. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that, for the Appellant to be convicted under Article 6(1) of the Statute, it must have been established that specific acts or omissions of the Appellant themselves constituted an instigation to the commission of genocide. An alternative would be that specific acts or omissions of the Appellant may have substantially contributed to instigation by others.

[1] Other terms are also used, such as “special intent”, “specific intent”, “particular intent” or “dolus specialis. Genocidal intent is examined infra XII. C.

[2] Supra XI. A.

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ICTR Statute Article 2(3)(a) ICTY Statute Article 4(3)(a)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

496. […][T]he acts committed against Hutu political opponents cannot be perceived as acts of genocide, because the victim of an act of genocide must have been targeted by reason of the fact that he or she belonged to a protected group. In the instant case, only the Tutsi ethnic group may be regarded as a protected group under Article 2 of the Statute and Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,[1] since the group of “Hutu political opponents” or the group of “Tutsi individuals and Hutu political opponents” does not constitute a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group” under these provisions.[2] Furthermore, although the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals acknowledges that the perception of the perpetrators of the crimes may in some circumstances be taken into account for purposes of determining membership of a protected group,[3] in this instance neither the Trial Chamber nor the Prosecutor cited any evidence to suggest that the Appellants or the perpetrators of the crimes perceived Hutu political opponents as Tutsi. In other words, in the present case Hutu political opponents were acknowledged as such and were not “perceived” as Tutsi. Even if the perpetrators of the genocide believed that eliminating Hutu political opponents was necessary for the successful execution of their genocidal project against the Tutsi population, the killing of Hutu political opponents cannot constitute acts of genocide.

[1] UN GA Resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 (“Genocide Convention”).

[2] In this regard, see Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 22, which recalls that the drafters of the Genocide Convention declined to include destruction of political groups within the definition of genocide.

[3] See Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 25; Muhimana Trial Judgement, para. 500; Ndindabahizi Trial Judgement, para. 468; Gacumbitsi Trial Judgement, para. 255; Kajelijeli Trial Judgement, para. 813; Bagilishema Trial Judgement, para. 65; Musema Trial Judgement, para. 161; Rutaganda Trial Judgement, para. 56.

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ICTR Statute Article 2(3)(a) ICTY Statute Article 4(3)(a)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

322. Under Articles 17(4), 20(2), 20(4)(a) and 20(4)(b) of the Statute and Rule 47(C) of the Rules, the Prosecutor must state the material facts underpinning the charges in the indictment, but not the evidence by which such facts are to be proved.[1] The indictment is pleaded with sufficient particularity only if it sets out the material facts of the Prosecution case with enough detail to inform a defendant clearly of the charges against him or her so that he or she may prepare his or her defence.[2] An indictment which fails to duly set forth the specific material facts underpinning the charges against the accused is defective.[3] The Appeals Chamber emphasises that the issue as to whether a fact is material or not cannot be determined in the abstract: whether or not a fact is considered “material” depends on the nature of the Prosecution's case.[4]

[1] See, inter alia, Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 20; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 21; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 88.

[2] Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 20; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 22; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 88.

[3] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 22; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 195; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 114.

[4] Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 16; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23.

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ICTR Statute Article 17(4) ICTY Statute Article 18(4) ICTR Rule Article 47(C) ICTY Rule Article 47(C)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

323. The Appeals Chamber has, however, made it clear that, whenever an accused is charged with superior responsibility on the basis of Article 6(3) of the Statute, the material facts which must be pleaded in the indictment are: (i) that the accused is the superior of sufficiently identified subordinates over whom he had effective control – in the sense of material ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct – and for whose acts he is alleged to be responsible; (ii) the criminal acts committed by those others for whom the accused is alleged to be responsible; (iii) the conduct of the accused by which he may be found to have known or had reason to know that the crimes were about to be committed or had been committed by his subordinates; and (iv) the conduct of the accused by which he may be found to have failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the persons who committed them.[1] As regards this last element, it will be sufficient in many cases to plead that the accused did not take any necessary and reasonable measure to prevent or punish the commission of criminal acts.

324. An indictment may also be defective when the material facts that the Prosecutor invokes are pleaded without sufficient specificity.[2] In this regard, the Prosecutor's characterization of the alleged criminal conduct and the proximity between the accused and the crime charged are decisive factors in determining the degree of specificity with which the Prosecutor must plead the material facts of his case in the indictment.[3]

[1] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 26, citing Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 67, and Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 218.

[2] Muhimana Appeal Judgement, paras. 76, 167, 195 and 217; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 27.

[3] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23, referring to Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 28. See also Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, paras. 73-74; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 89.

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Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

325. Where the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber tried the accused on the basis of a defective indictment, it must consider whether the accused has nevertheless been accorded a fair trial, in other words, whether the defect noted caused prejudice to the Defence.[1] In some cases, a defective indictment can indeed be “cured” and a conviction handed down if the Prosecutor provided the accused with timely, clear and consistent information detailing the factual basis underpinning the charges against him.[2] This information could, inter alia and depending on the circumstances, be supplied in the Prosecutor’s pre-trial brief or opening statement.[3] The Appeals Chamber would nonetheless emphasize that the possibility of curing defects in the indictment is not unlimited. A clear distinction has to be drawn between vagueness or ambiguity in the indictment and an indictment which omits certain charges altogether. While it is possible to remedy ambiguity or vagueness in an indictment by providing the defendant with timely, clear and consistent information detailing the factual basis underpinning the charges, omitted charges can be incorporated into the indictment only by formal amendment under Rule 50 of the Rules.[4]

326. The Appeals Chamber reaffirms that a vague or imprecise indictment which is not cured of its defects by providing the accused with timely, clear and consistent information constitutes a prejudice to the accused. The defect can be deemed harmless only if it is established that the accused's ability to prepare his defence was not materially impaired.[5] Where the failure to give sufficient notice of the legal and factual reasons for the charges against him violated the right to a fair trial, no conviction can result.[6]

460. […] However, as the Appeals Chamber has emphasized, when the Prosecutor relies on material facts which are not stated in the Indictment and, which on their own, could constitute distinct charges, which is the case here, the Prosecutor must seek leave to amend the Indictment in order to add the new material facts:

the Appeals Chamber stresses that the possibility of curing the omission of material facts from the indictment is not unlimited. Indeed, the “new material facts” should not lead to a “radical transformation” of the Prosecution’s case against the accused. The Trial Chamber should always take into account the risk that the expansion of charges by the addition of new material facts may lead to unfairness and prejudice to the accused. Further, if the new material facts are such that they could, on their own, support separate charges, the Prosecution should seek leave from the Trial Chamber to amend the indictment and the Trial Chamber should only grant leave if it is satisfied that it would not lead to unfairness or prejudice to the Defence.[7] […]

[1] Article 24(1)(a) of the Statute.

[2]Muhimana Appeal Judgement, paras. 76, 195 and 217;  Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 23; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 28.

[3] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 130. See also Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 27; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 34; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 219.

[4] Ntagerura et al., para. 32.

[5] Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 24; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 30; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 58.

[6] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 28; Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 26; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 58.

[7] The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al, Case No. ICTR-98-41-AR 73, Decision on Aloys Ntabakuze’s Interlocutory Appeal on Questions of Law Raised by the 29 June 2006 Trial Chamber I Decision on Motion for Exclusion of Evidence, 18 September 2006, para. 30 (footnotes omitted). See also Rutaganda Judgement, para. 303:

Indeed, the Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the charge against him and the right to have adequate time for the preparation of his defence imply that an accused must be able to identify the criminal acts and conduct alleged in the indictment in all circumstances. Before holding that an event charged is immaterial or that there are minor discrepancies between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial, a Chamber must normally satisfy itself that no prejudice shall, as a result, be caused to the accused. An example of such prejudice is the existence of inaccuracies likely to mislead the accused as to the nature of the charges against him (footnotes omitted). 

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

326. When the Appellant raises a defect in the indictment for the first time on appeal, then he bears the burden of showing that his ability to prepare his defence was materially impaired. When, however, an accused has previously raised the issue of lack of notice before the Trial Chamber, the burden rests on the Prosecutor to prove on appeal that the ability of the accused to prepare a defence was not materially impaired.[1] All of this is subject to the inherent jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber to do justice in the case.[2]

[1] Muhimana Appeal Judgement, paras. 80 and 199; Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 25; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 31; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement., para. 35; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 200.

[2] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 31; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 200.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

347. With respect to mens rea, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the indictment may either (i) plead the state of mind of the accused, in which case the facts by which that matter is to be established are matters of evidence, and need not be pleaded; or (ii) the evidentiary facts from which the state of mind is to be inferred.[1]

[1] Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 219.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

483. The Appeals Chamber concludes by recalling that the modes of responsibility under Article 6(1) of the Statute are not mutually exclusive and that it is possible to charge more than one mode in relation to a crime if this is necessary in order to reflect the totality of the accused’s conduct.[1]

[1] Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 122; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 77. 

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Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

480. The actus reus of “instigating” implies prompting another person to commit an offence.[1] It is not necessary to prove that the crime would not have been perpetrated without the involvement of the accused; it is sufficient to demonstrate that the instigation was a factor substantially contributing to the conduct of another person committing the crime.[2] The mens rea for this mode of responsibility is the intent to instigate another person to commit a crime or at a miminum the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of the act or omission instigated.[3]

660. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, for a defendant to be convicted of instigation to commit a crime under Article 6(1) of the Statute, it must be established that the acts charged contributed substantially to the commission of the crime, but they need not be a sine qua non condition for its commission. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that, contrary to what the Appellant appears to contend,[4] the accused does not need to be actually present when the instigated crime is committed.

[1] Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 117; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 27.

[2] Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 129; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 27. Once again, although the French version of the Kordić and Čerkez Judgement reads “un élément déterminant, the English version – which is authoritative – reads “factor substantially contributing to”.

[3] Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras. 29 and 32.

[4] See Barayagwiza Appellant’s Brief, para. 232.

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ICTR Statute Article 6(1) ICTY Statute Article 7(1)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

986. The Appeals Chamber considers that hate speech targeting a population on the basis of ethnicity, or any other discriminatory ground, violates the right to respect for the dignity[1] of the members of the targeted group as human beings,[2] and therefore constitutes “actual discrimination”. In addition, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that speech inciting to violence against a population on the basis of ethnicity, or any other discriminatory ground, violates the right to security[3] of the members of the targeted group and therefore constitutes “actual discrimination”. However, the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that hate speech alone can amount to a violation of the rights to life, freedom and physical integrity of the human being. Thus other persons need to intervene before such violations can occur; a speech cannot, in itself, directly kill members of a group, imprison or physically injure them.

987. The second question is whether the violation of fundamental rights (right to respect for human dignity, right to security) is as serious as in the case of the other crimes against humanity enumerated in Article 3 of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber is of the view that it is not necessary to decide here whether, in themselves, mere hate speeches not inciting violence against the members of a group are of a level of gravity equivalent to that for other crimes against humanity. As explained above, it is not necessary that every individual act underlying the crime of persecution should be of a gravity corresponding to other crimes against humanity: underlying acts of persecution can be considered together. It is the cumulative effect of all the underlying acts of the crime of persecution which must reach a level of gravity equivalent to that for other crimes against humanity. Furthermore, the context in which these underlying acts take place is particularly important for the purpose of  assessing their gravity.

[1] On the content of this right, see for example the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Preamble of which expressly refers to the recognition of dignity inherent to all human beings, while the Articles set out its various aspects.

[2] In this regard, it should be noted that, according to the Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement (paras. 323-325), violations of human dignity (such as harassment, humiliation and psychological abuses) can, if sufficiently serious, constitute acts of persecution.

[3] On the right to security, see for example Article 3 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”).

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ICTR Statute Article 3(h) ICTY Statute Article 5(h)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

985. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that “the crime of persecution consists of an act or omission which discriminates in fact and which: denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in international customary or treaty law (the actus reus); and was carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on one of the listed grounds, specifically race, religion or politics (the mens rea).”[1] However, not every act of discrimination will constitute the crime of persecution: the underlying acts of persecution, whether considered in isolation or in conjunction with other acts, must be of a gravity equal to the crimes listed under Article 3 of the Statute.[2] Furthermore, it is not necessary that these underlying acts of persecution amount to crimes in international law.[3] Accordingly, there is no need to review here the Appellants’ arguments that mere hate speech does not constitute a crime in international criminal law.

[1] Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 185 (citing with approval Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 431), reiterated in Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 177; Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras. 327-328; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 320; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 101; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 131; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement , para. 113.

[2] Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 296; Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 177; Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 574; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 321; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 102; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 135; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, paras. 199, 221.

[3] Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 296; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 323. Contrary to what the Appellants contend, this is not a breach of the legality principle, since the crime of persecution as such is sufficiently defined in international law.

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ICTR Statute Article 3(h) ICTY Statute Article 5(h)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

With references to Articles 1 and 7 of the Statute, the Appeals Chamber held that an accused could only be held responsible by the Tribunal for a crime referred to in Article 2 to 4 of the Statue having been committed in 1994.[1] However, given the lack of clarity in the jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber felt the need to elucidate the question of the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction “in a situation where an accused did not personally commit the crime, his acts or omissions establishing his responsibility for such a crime (pursuant to one or more of the modes of responsibility provided for in Article 6(1) and (3) of the Statute) must also have occurred in 1994”. Having examined the Statute’s travaux préparatoires and the 13 February 1995 UN Secretary-General’s Report, the Appeals Chamber held:

313. […] that it was the intention of the framers of the Statute that the Tribunal should have jurisdiction to convict an accused only where all of the elements required to be shown in order to establish his guilt were present in 1994.  Further, such a view accords with the principle that provisions conferring jurisdiction on an international tribunal[2] or imposing criminal sanctions should be strictly interpreted. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that it must be shown that:

    1. The crime with which the accused is charged was committed in 1994;
    2. The acts or omissions of the accused establishing his responsibility under any of the modes of responsibility referred to in Article 6(1) and (3) of the Statute occurred in 1994, and at the time of such acts or omissions the accused had the requisite intent (mens rea) in order to be convicted pursuant to the mode of responsibility in question.

314. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber was wrong insofar as it convicted the Appellants on the basis of criminal conduct which took place prior to 1994;  the Appeals Chamber will review those convictions below. […]

[1] In this regard, see Decision of 5 September 2000 [Hassan Ngeze and Ferdinand Nahimana v. The Prosecutor, Cases No. ICTR-97-27-AR72 and ICTR-96-11-AR72, Décision sur les appels interlocutoires, 5 September 2000], p. 6 (which states that no one may be indicted for a crime that was not committed between 1 January and 31 December 1994, even though an indictment can make reference, “as an introduction, to crimes previously committed by an accused”). See also Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 298; Aloys Simba v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-AR72.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Temporal Jurisdiction, 29 July 2004, p. 3; Emmanuel Rukundo v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-AR72, Decision (Appeal against Decision of 26 February 2003 on the Preliminary Objections), 17 October 2003, p. 5; Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T [sic], Appeal Judgement (Notice of Appeal against the Decision Dismissing the Defence Motion Objecting to the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal), 16 November 2001, p. 4; Aloys Ntabakuze v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-34-A, Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal against the Decision of 13 April 2000 of Trial Chamber III, 13 November 2000, p. 5; Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Interlocutory Appeals against the Decision of the Trial Chamber dated 11 April and 6 June 2000), 14 September 2000 (“Decision of 14 September 2000 on the Interlocutory Appeals”), p. 4.

[2] In this regard, see Decision of 5 September 2000, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Lal Chand Vohrah and Rafael Nieto-Navia, para. 17 and footnote 22.

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ICTR Statute Article 1
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

314. […] However, as will now be explained, it was open to the Trial Chamber to rely, for certain purposes, on evidence in respect of events prior to 1994.

315. It is well established that the provisions of the Statute on the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal do not preclude the admission of evidence on events prior to 1994, if the Chamber deems such evidence relevant and of probative value[1] and there is no compelling reason to exclude it. For example, a Trial Chamber may validly admit evidence relating to pre-1994 acts and rely on it where such evidence is aimed at:

- Clarifying a given context;[2]

- Establishing by inference the elements (in particular, criminal intent) of criminal conduct occurring in 1994;[3]

- Demonstrating a deliberate pattern of conduct.[4]

316. The Appeals Chamber accordingly dismisses the Appellants’ contentions that the Trial Chamber exceeded its jurisdiction or that it breached the fairness of the trial simply because it relied on evidence concerning pre-1994 events.

561. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it has already considered the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction and reaffirmed that Article 7 of the Statute does not prevent the admission of evidence of events prior to 1 January 1994, insofar as the Trial Chamber deemed such evidence relevant and of probative value, and there was no compelling reason to exclude it. This applies inter alia to evidence of criminal intent.[5] […]

647. […] The Appeals Chamber considers that paragraph 975 of the Judgement is ambiguous because it does not clearly explain whether the Appellant’s participation in CDR meetings prior to 1 January 1994 is cited as a material element of instigation for which the Appellant incurs individual responsibility pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute – which would be ultra vires – or whether this fact is simply mentioned as a contextual fact, or as evidence demonstrating the Appellant’s criminal intent in 1994 – which is permissible.[6] […]

[1] Rule 89(C) of the Rules. See also Aloys Simba v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-AR72.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Temporal Jurisdiction, 29 July 2004, p. 4 (“[…] it will be for the Trial Chamber to decide whether to admit evidence relating to events falling outside the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal in accordance with Rule 89(C) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal”).

[2] Aloys Simba v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-AR72.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Temporal Jurisdiction, 29 July 2004, p. 3; Aloys Ntabakuze v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-34-A, Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal against the Decision of 13 April 2000 of Trial Chamber III, 13 November 2000, p. 5; Decision of 14 September 2000 on the Interlocutory Appeals [Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Interlocutory Appeals Against the Decisions of the Trial Chamber Dated 11 April and 6 June 2000), 14 September 2000), p. 4; Decision of 5 September 2000, p. 6, and Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, paras. 21, 26, 32.

[3] Aloys Simba v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-AR72.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Temporal Jurisdiction, 29 July 2004, p. 3; Emmanuel Rukundo v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-AR72, Decision (Notice of Appeal against Decision of 26 February 2003 on the Preliminary Objections), 17 October 2003, p. 5; Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T [sic], Appeal Judgement (Appeal against the Decision of 13 March 2001 dismissing the Defence Motion Objecting to the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal), 16 November 2001, p. 4; Decision of 5 September 2000,  Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, paras. 9-17.

[4] Rule 93 of the Rules. See also The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Admissibility of Proposed Testimony of Witness DBY, 18 September 2003, paras. 11-14; Decision of 5 September 2000, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, paras. 20-26. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that there is a difference between trying to establish a specific deliberate pattern of conduct (expressly permitted under Rule 93 of the Rules) and trying to demonstrate an accused’s propensity to commit crimes (which is impermissible, in view of the low probative value of such a demonstration and its prejudicial effect: See The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Cases Nos. ICTR-98-41-AR93 and ICTR-98-41-AR93.2, Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeals Regarding the Exclusion of Evidence, 19 December 2003, paras. 13-14).

[5]Idem, citing Aloys Simba v. the Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-AR72.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Temporal Jurisdiction, 29 July 2004, p. 3; Emmanuel Rukundo v. the Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-AR72, Décision (Acte d’appel relatif à la Décision du 26 février 2003 relative aux exceptions préjudicielles) [Decision (Notice of Appeal from the Decision of 26 February 2003 on the Preliminary Objections)], 17 October 2003, p. 5; Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T [sic], Appeal Judgement (Appel de la Décision du 13 mars 2001 rejetant la “Defence Motion Objecting to the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal” [Appeal from the Decision of 13 March 2001 dismissing the “Defence Motion Objecting to the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal”]), 16 November 2001, p. 4; Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen to the Decision of 5 September 2000, paras. 9-17.

[6] See supra VIII. B.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

317. The Appeals Chamber has held above that the Tribunal may only convict an accused for criminal conduct having occurred in 1994. The existence of continuing conduct is no exception to this rule. Contrary to what the Trial Chamber appears to have held in paragraph 104 of the Judgement, even where such conduct commenced before 1994 and continued during that year, a conviction may be based only on that part of such conduct having occurred in 1994.[1]  Judge Pocar dissents from this finding.

[1] In this respect, see Decision of 5 September 2000, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Lal Chand Vohrah and Rafael Nieto-Navia, paras. 6,9 and 10.

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ICTR Statute Article 1
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

1073. The Appeals Chamber observes at the outset that, in pleading the excessive length of the proceedings, the Appellant is in fact raising a substantive issue going to the regularity of the trial. However, inasmuch as the Appellant raises this issue in his appeal against sentence with a view to having it reduced, and a reduction of sentence is one of the remedies available to redress the alleged violation, the Appeals Chamber will examine these arguments in this section. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber notes that the length of the proceedings is not one of the factors that a Trial Chamber must consider, even as a mitigating circumstance, in the determination of the sentence.

1074. The right to be tried without undue delay is provided in Article 20(4)(c) of the Statute. This right only protects the accused against undue delays.[3] Whether there was undue delay is a question to be decided on a case by case basis.[4] The following factors are relevant:

- the length of the delay;

- the complexity of the proceedings (the number of counts, the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the quantity of evidence, the complexity of the facts and of the law);

- the conduct of the parties;

- the conduct of the authorities involved; and

- the prejudice to the accused, if any.[5]

1086. […] The precise remedy to be granted was thus left to the discretion of the Trial Chamber, since the Appeals Chamber could not anticipate at that time whether the Appellant would be found guilty or, a fortiori, what sentence he would receive. Hence the Appeals Chamber could not give the Trial Chamber more detailed instructions. Nor can the Appeals Chamber discern in what way the disposition of the Decision of 31 May 2000 in the Semanza case, as cited by the Appellant, was more precise than that of the Decision of 31 March 2000: the only difference is the express reference to Article 23 of the Statute in the Semanza decision.[6] Finally, the fact that the violation of the defendant’s rights was not treated as a mitigating circumstance did not constitute an error. What was important was that the sentence should be reduced in order to take account of the rights violation, and this was done.[7] The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that the violation of the Appellant’s rights was not a mitigating circumstance in the true sense of the term.

1095. […] The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that the remedy ordered in the Judgement did constitute a significant reduction of the sentence, which adequately compensated the Appellant for the violation of his fundamental rights. […]

Having set aside the convictions of Appellant Nahimana under Article 6(1) of the Statute for conspiracy to commit genocide, genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, extermination (crime against humanity) and persecution (crime against humanity), and having upheld his convictions under Article 6(3) of the Statute for direct and public incitement to commit genocide and persecution (crime against humanity), the Appeals Chamber reduced Nahimana’s sentence from life to 30 years of imprisonment.

Having set aside the convictions of Appellant Barayagwiza for conspiracy to commit genocide, convictions relating to RTLM broadcasts and those for direct and public incitement to commit genocide (under Article 6(1) of the Statute), and having upheld his convictions under Article 6(1) of the Statute for genocide (instigation), extermination (crime against humanity) and persecution (crime against humanity), the Appeals Chamber reduced Barayagwiza’s sentence from 35 to 32 years of imprisonment, noting that the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber already reflected the reduction granted for various violations of his rights.

Having set aside the convictions of Appellant Ngeze for conspiracy to commit genocide, as well those with respect to Kangura publications under Article 6(1) for genocide and persecution (crimes against humanity), and those with respect to crimes in Gisenyi for genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, extermination (crime against humanity) and persecution (crime against humanity); and having upheld his convictions for direct and public incitement to commit genocide (Kangura), genocide (aiding and abetting) and extermination (aiding and abetting), the Appeals Chamber reduced Ngeze’s sentence from life to 35 years of imprisonment.

[1] As the Appeals Chamber notes infra, other remedies are possible, such as the termination of proceedings against the accused or the award of compensation (see infra, footnote 2451).

[2] See supra XVII.A.

[3] The Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-A, Decision on Defence Motion for Prompt Scheduling of Appeal Hearing, 27 October 2006 (“Halilović Decision”), para. 17.

[4] Halilović Decision, para. 17; The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal against Trial Chamber III Decision of 8 October 2003 Denying Leave to File an Amended Indictment, 19 December 2003, para. 14; The Prosecutor v. Milan Kovačević, Case No. IT-97-24-AR73, Decision Stating Reasons for Appeals Chamber’s Order of 29 May 1998, 2 July 1998, para. 28. See also The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-PT, Decision on Defence Motion for Stay of Proceedings, 3 June 2005, paras. 19 et seq.

[5] The Prosecutor v. Prosper Mugiraneza, Case No. ICTR-99-50-AR73, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Interlocutory Appeal from Trial Chamber II Decision of 2 October 2003 Denying the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, Demand Speedy Trial and for Appropriate Relief, 27 February 2004.

[6] See Laurent Semanza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, 31 May 2000, point 6 of the Disposition:

DECIDES that for the violation of his rights, the Appellant is entitled to a remedy which shall be given when judgement is rendered by the Trial Chamber, as follows:

(a)        If he is found not guilty, the Appellant shall be entitled to financial compensation;

(b)        If he is found guilty, the Appellant’s sentence shall be reduced to take into account the violation of his rights, pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute.

[7] Judgement, para. 1107.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

1108. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in general, the Tribunal and the ICTY do not accord great weight to the family situation of the accused, given the gravity of the crimes committed.[1] Therefore, even if the Trial Chamber had erred, such error could not have had any impact in this particular case, given the gravity of the crimes committed by the Appellant and the absence of exceptional family circumstances. […]

[1] Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 62; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 413; Jelisić Trial Judgement, para. 124; Furundžija Trial Judgement, para. 284.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

481. With respect to ordering, a person in a position of authority[1] may incur responsibility for ordering another person to commit an offence,[2] if the person who received the order actually proceeds to commit the offence subsequently. Responsibility is also incurred when an individual in a position of authority orders an act or omission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of that order, and if that crime is effectively committed subsequently by the person who received the order.[3]

[1] It is not necessary to demonstrate the existence of an official relationship of subordination between the accused and the perpetrator of the crime: Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 176; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 182; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 75; Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 361; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 28.

[2] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 176; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 365; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras. 28-29.

[3] Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 152 and 157; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 30; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 42.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

479. The actus reus of “planning” requires that one or more persons design the criminal conduct constituting one or more statutory crimes that are later perpetrated.[1] It is sufficient to demonstrate that the planning was a factor substantially contributing to such criminal conduct.[2] The mens rea for this mode of responsibility entails the intent to plan the commission of a crime or, at a minimum, the awareness of substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of the acts or omissions planned.[3]

[1] Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 26.

[2] Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 26. Although the French version of the Judgement uses the terms “un élément determinant”, the English version – which is authoritative – uses the expression “factor substantially contributing to”.

[3] Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras. 29 and 31. 

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