At paras 219-220 of the Judgement, the Appeals Chamber recalled that when reviewing a Trial Chamber’s finding of fact based on inference, the standard is the same at that applied for direct evidence: the question before the Appeals Chamber is whether no reasonable trier of fact could have excluded or ignored other inferences that lead to the conclusion that an element of the crime was not proven.[1]

219. A Trial Chamber may only find an accused guilty of a crime if the Prosecution has proved each element of that crime (as defined with respect to the relevant mode of liability) beyond a reasonable doubt.[2] This standard applies whether the evidence evaluated is direct or circumstantial.[3] Where the challenge on appeal is to an inference drawn to establish a fact on which the conviction relies, the standard is only satisfied if the inference drawn was the only reasonable one that could be drawn from the evidence presented.[4] In such instances, the question for the Appeals Chamber is whether it was reasonable for the Trial Chamber to exclude or ignore other inferences that lead to the conclusion that an element of the crime was not proven.[5] If no reasonable Trial Chamber could have ignored an inference which favours the accused, the Appeals Chamber will vacate the Trial Chamber’s factual inference and reverse any conviction that is dependent on it.[6]

See also Ntagerura Appeal Judgement, paras 304-306.

120. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that the standard of proof to be applied is beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden lies on the Prosecution as the accused enjoys the benefit of the presumption of innocence. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the test adopted by the Trial Chamber according to which, when the Prosecution relies upon proof of the state of mind of an accused by inference, that inference must be the only reasonable inference available on the evidence.[1]

458. A circumstantial case consists of evidence of a number of different circumstances which, taken in combination, point to the guilt of the accused person because they would usually exist in combination only because the accused did what is alleged against him […].  Such a conclusion must be established beyond reasonable doubt.  It is not sufficient that it is a reasonable conclusion available from that evidence.  It must be the only reasonable conclusion available.  If there is another conclusion which is also reasonably open from that evidence, and which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, he must be acquitted.

91.       In rejecting these alternative explanations, the Trial Chamber considered evidence that the war-front was relatively far from ButarePrefecture, that there was no legitimate threat of invasion by the RPF from neighbouring Burundi, and that the evidence of RPF infiltration in the area was general or pre-dated 1994.[1] The Appeals Chamber is not convinced, Judge Liu dissenting, that the considerations identified by the Trial Chamber eliminate the reasonable possibility that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza agreed to remove Habyalimana for political or administrative reasons rather than for the purpose of furthering the killing of Tutsis in Butare Prefecture. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Liu dissenting, that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza possessed the requisite mens rea for a conviction for conspiracy to commit genocide.

[…]

138.     The Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence on the record is that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza knew that Sindikubwabo’s speech at the ceremony would be aimed at sparking the killing of Tutsis and that, therefore, their presence at the ceremony demonstrates their shared genocidal intent. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes the Trial Chamber’s acknowledgment that there was no direct evidence that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza met with Sindikubwabo immediately prior to the ceremony or any other direct evidence of “pre-planning”.[2] Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber considers that, given that Mugenzi spoke at the ceremony before Sindikubwabo, it was unreasonable for the Trial Chamber to rely on the fact that Mugenzi did not contradict Sindikubwabo in support of its finding that Mugenzi must have known the intended message of the president’s speech.[3]

139.     The Appeals Chamber also considers that, based on the record, no reasonable trier of fact could have excluded the reasonable possibility that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza attended the installation ceremony for reasons other than because they shared a common criminal purpose of killing Tutsis in Butare Prefecture. Notably, Mugenzi and Mugiraneza submit that they attended the ceremony as a result of obligations arising from their positions as ministers.[4] Indeed, the Trial Chamber recounted evidence from Mugiraneza and Defence Witness André Ntagerura, a former minister, that their attendance at the installation ceremony resulted from obligations of protocol and custom.[5] The Trial Chamber did not discount this evidence and, in fact, took it into account in rejecting Mugenzi’s claim that Sindikubwabo’s attendance at the ceremony was unexpected.[6] Moreover, a review of the Trial Judgement reflects that Mugenzi also attended the installation ceremony of the new prefect of Gisenyi Prefecture on 20 April 1994 and that there is evidence that Kambanda and other ministers attended the installation ceremony of the prefect of Ruhengeri Prefecture in the second half of April 1994.[7]

140.     Furthermore, the Trial Chamber relied on its finding that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza acted with genocidal intent in agreeing on 17 April 1994 to remove Habyalimana as the prefect of Butare Prefecture to reinforce its conclusion that they would have thus known that Sindikubwabo’s message would be aimed at sparking the killings in Butare Prefecture in view of the coordinated nature of the events.[8] The Appeals Chamber recalls that it has reversed, Judge Liu dissenting, the Trial Chamber’s finding that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza possessed genocidal intent in taking the decision to replace Habyalimana.[9] The Appeals Chamber thus considers that Mugenzi’s and Mugiraneza’s participation in the decision could not support the finding of their mens rea for direct and public incitement to commit genocide.

141.     Accordingly, Mugenzi and Mugiraneza have demonstrated that the Trial Chamber erred in its assessment of the evidence related to their mens rea for convictions for direct and public incitement to commit genocide. The Appeals Chamber therefore dismisses their remaining arguments as moot.[10]

The standard for appellate review as set out in the Judgement was based on the standard set out in the Stakić Appeal Judgement, with a slight amendment, in para. 9, pertaining to the reasonableness standard, which has been made clearer (emphasis added in bold):

9. When considering alleged errors of fact on appeal from the Defence, the Appeals Chamber will determine whether no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the verdict of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[1] The Appeals Chamber applies the same reasonableness standard to alleged errors of fact regardless of whether the finding of fact was based on direct or circumstantial evidence.[2] In determining whether or not a Trial Chamber’s finding was one that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached, the Appeals Chamber “will not lightly disturb findings of fact by a Trial Chamber”.[3] The Appeals Chamber recalls, as a general principle, the approach adopted by the Appeals Chamber in Kupreškić, which stated:

Pursuant to the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, the task of hearing, assessing and weighing the evidence presented at trial is left primarily to the Trial Chamber. Thus, the Appeals Chamber must give a margin of deference to a finding of fact reached by a Trial Chamber. Only where the evidence relied on by the Trial Chamber could not have been accepted by any reasonable tribunal of fact or where the evaluation of the evidence is “wholly erroneous” may the Appeals Chamber substitute its own finding for that of the Trial Chamber.[4]