296. […] The Appeals Chamber reiterates that in most cases the good character of a convicted person carries little weight in the determination of the sentence.[1] Ntabakuze does not submit any argument demonstrating a discernible error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment. His contention in this respect is therefore rejected.

48. The paragraphs of the Sentencing Judgement at issue under this ground of appeal read as follows:

The Tribunal has jurisdiction over crimes committed during the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, where ordinary citizens were involved in horrendous events. The Trial Chamber is of the view that the prior good character of a convicted person (understood against a common standard of behaviour) does not as such count in mitigation, although in exceptional circumstances, for which there is no evidence in this case, it may.[1]

The Trial Chamber does not accept that this proposed ground of mitigation should be given any effect in this case.[2]

49. The Appeals Chamber notes that, while it is correct to say that good character has been recognised as a mitigating circumstance in most cases, this is not a constant practice but instead varies with the circumstances; e.g., in the Tadić Sentencing Judgement, the Trial Chamber noted that the Accused was “a law abiding citizen and seemingly enjoyed the respect of his community” and “was an intelligent, responsible and mature adult […] capable of compassion towards and sensitivity for his fellows” but noted that this, “if anything, aggravates more than it mitigates: for such a man to have committed these crimes requires an even greater evil will on his part than for a lesser man.”[3]

50. Even when personal factors or circumstances – including prior good character – have been considered as mitigating circumstances, they have been given little weight in mitigation. In the Furundžija Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that the accused had “no previous conviction and [was] the father of a young child” but noted that “this might be said of many accused persons and cannot be given significant weight in a case of this gravity”.[4] The same approach was taken in the Jelisić Trial Judgement.[5] The statement of the Trial Chamber in the present case to the effect that the International Tribunal “has jurisdiction over crimes committed during the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, where ordinary citizens were involved in horrendous events” – read in conjunction with the limitation that the prior good character of a convicted person would in isolation only count in mitigation in exceptional circumstances – follows the same line of reasoning.

759. As to Karadžić’s submissions relating to his good conduct during the war, the Appeals Chamber recalls that this may be a relevant factor in sentencing,[1] but that good character or conduct of a convicted person often carries little weight in the determination of the sentence.[2] The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber noted Karadžić’s submission on this point, recalled the relevant jurisprudence, and found that, given the gravity of his crimes and his central involvement in them, it did not “consider his conduct during the war to be mitigating in any way”.[3] The Appeals Chamber also recalls the Trial Chamber’s findings that Karadžić’s participation was integral to crimes committed in furtherance of four joint criminal enterprises, as well as a finding, in one instance, that his “contribution was so instrumental that, without his support, the SRK’s attacks on civilians could not have in fact occurred”.[4] In light of the above, Karadžić has failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in not giving weight to his submission of good conduct during the war in mitigation of his sentence.