Intent
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
|---|---|---|
| Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 |
NAHIMANA et al. (Media case) (ICTR-99-52-A) |
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709. It is apparent from Paragraph 1001 of the Trial Judgement that the Trial Chamber employed the term “intent” with reference to the purpose of the speech, as evidenced, inter alia, by the language used, and not to the intent of its author.[1] The Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that the purpose of the speech is indisputably a factor in determining whether there is direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and it can see no error in this respect on the part of the Trial Chamber. It is plain that the Trial Chamber did not find that a speech constitutes direct and public incitement to commit genocide simply because its author had criminal intent. [1] See also Judgement, para. 1003 (“A critical distance was identified as the key factor in evaluating the purpose of the publication”). |
ICTR Statute Article 2(3)(c) ICTY Statute Article 4(3)(c) | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 |
MLADIĆ Ratko (MICT-13-56-A) |
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313. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the mens rea of the crime of terror consists of the intent to make the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of acts of violence or threats thereof, and of the specific intent to spread terror among the civilian population.[1] Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the acts or threats of violence, such as, inter alia, their nature, manner, timing, and duration.[2] Nothing precludes a reasonable trier of fact from relying on the same set of circumstances to infer that perpetrators willfully made civilians the object of acts or threats of violence, and, at the same time, that such acts or threats of violence were committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population. […] 315. The Appeals Chamber recalls that terror could be defined as “extreme fear”,[3] and that such fear was merely one of several factors from which the Trial Chamber inferred specific intent in this case.[4] […] [1] D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 37, referring to Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 104. [2] D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 37; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 104. [3] See Galić Appeal Judgement, n. 320. [4] See Trial Judgement, para. 3201. |
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