Motive
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
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| Appeal Judgement - 08.05.2012 |
KANYARUKIGA Gaspard (ICTR-02-78-A) |
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262. The Appeals Chamber notes that motive, as opposed to mens rea, is not an element of any crime.[1] The question whether Kanyarukiga lacked a motive to participate in the crimes for which he was convicted thus does not have the potential to invalidate the verdict and the Appeals Chamber declines to consider it.[2] [1] Cf. Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 109. [2] See supra, para. 7 (setting out the standards of appellate review). |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 28.02.2005 |
KVOČKA et al. (IT-98-30/1-A) |
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106. [The Appeals Chamber] notes that it has repeatedly confirmed the distinction between intent and motive: The Appeals Chamber further recalls the necessity to distinguish specific intent from motive. The personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime of genocide may be, for example, to obtain personal economic benefits, or political advantage or some form of power. The existence of a personal motive does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to commit genocide. In the Tadic appeal judgement the Appeals Chamber stressed the irrelevance and ‘inscrutability of motives in criminal law’.[1] Shared criminal intent does not require the co-perpetrator’s personal satisfaction or enthusiasm or his personal initiative in contributing to the joint enterprise.[2] Therefore, the Appellants’ argument in this regard is rejected. [1] Jelesić Appeal Judgement, para. 49, referring to Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 269; see also Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 102. [2] Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 100. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 27.09.2007 |
LIMAJ et al. (IT-03-66-A) |
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109. The Appeals Chamber notes that motive is generally not an element of criminal liability. The Appeals Chamber has repeatedly confirmed the “‘inscrutability of motives in criminal law’ insofar as liability is concerned, where an intent […] is clear”.[1] […] [1] Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 71, reference to Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 269. See also Kvočka Appeal Judgement, para. 106. Motive may have a direct impact at sentencing as a mitigating or aggravating circumstance, Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 269. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2001 |
KAYISHEMA & RUZINDANA (ICTR-95-1-A) |
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161. […] The Appeals Chamber notes that criminal intent (mens rea) must not be confused with motive and that, in respect of genocide, personal motive does not exclude criminal responsibility providing that the acts proscribed in Article 2(2)(a) through to (e) were committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”.[1] [1] See also Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 269. |
ICTR Statute Article 2 ICTY Statute Article 4 | |