No cumulative responsibility under Articles 7(1) and 7(3) / Articles 6(1) and 6(3)
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
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Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 |
SETAKO Ephrem (ICTR-04-81-A) |
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266. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is inappropriate to convict an accused for a specific count under both Article 6(1) and Article 6(3) of the Statute.[1] When, for the same count and the same set of facts, the accused’s responsibility is pleaded pursuant to both provisions and the accused could be found liable under both, the Trial Chamber should enter a conviction on the basis of Article 6(1) of the Statute alone and consider the superior position of the accused as an aggravating factor in sentencing.[2] The Trial Chamber correctly recalled these principles.[3] 268. The Appeals Chamber finds that, since the Amended Indictment charged Setako cumulatively under Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the Statute, the Trial Chamber was required to make a finding as to whether Setako incurred superior responsibility for the purpose of sentencing. The Trial Chamber’s failure to make such a finding constituted an error of law. […] [1] Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 564; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 487. [2] Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 564; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 487. [3] Trial Judgement, para. 474. |
ICTR Statute Article 6(1) ICTY Statute Article 7(1) | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 01.04.2011 |
RENZAHO Tharcisse (ICTR-97-31-A) |
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564. Although neither Party raised the issue, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber’s language in rendering its convictions against Renzaho may give the impression that it entered double convictions under Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is inappropriate to convict an accused for a specific count under both Article 6(1) and Article 6(3) of the Statute.[1] When, for the same count and the same set of facts, the accused’s responsibility is pleaded pursuant to both provisions and the accused could be found liable under both, the Trial Chamber should enter a conviction on the basis of Article 6(1) of the Statute alone and consider the superior position of the accused as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing.[2] 565. The Trial Chamber found Renzaho guilty of genocide under Article 6(1) of the Statute for aiding and abetting as well as ordering the killing of Tutsis at roadblocks throughout Kigali from April to July 1994; for aiding and abetting and ordering killings at CELA on 22 April 1994; and for his orders in relation to crimes committed at Sainte Famille on 17 June 1994.[3] The Trial Chamber also found Renzaho “liable” as a superior for these crimes,[4] indicating that it would take this liability into account in sentencing.[5] 566. The Trial Chamber also found Renzaho guilty of murder as a serious violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II under Article 6(1) of the Statute for ordering the killing of at least 17 Tutsi men at Sainte Famille church on 17 June 1994.[6] The Trial Chamber found Renzaho “liable” as a superior for these murders as well.[7] The Trial Chamber indicated that it would take Renzaho’s liability as a superior into account in sentencing.[8] 567. In addition, the Trial Chamber found Renzaho guilty of murder as a crime against humanity under Article 6(1) of the Statute for aiding and abetting and ordering the killing of Charles, Wilson, and Déglote Rwanga, who had been removed from CELA on 22 April 1994.[9] The Trial Chamber likewise found Renzaho “guilty” as a superior based on Article 6(3) of Statute, for the killing of Charles, Wilson, and Déglote Rwanga as well as the other mostly Tutsi men removed from CELA on that date.[10] The Trial Chamber indicated in connection with these crimes that it would take Renzaho’s liability as a superior into account in sentencing. [11] 568. While it is clear that the Trial Chamber considered Renzaho’s superior position as an aggravating circumstance,[12] the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber should have refrained from using language which is suggestive of double convictions based on both Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the Statute. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the Trial Chamber impermissibly convicted Renzaho twice for the same facts where it found him to be “liable” as a superior. Likewise, and despite the unfortunate use of the term “guilty” when finding Renzaho liable as a superior for murder as a crime against humanity for the killings of Charles, Wilson, and Déglote Rwanga, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the Trial Chamber impermissibly convicted Renzaho twice for the same facts.[13] [1] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 487. [2] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 487, referring to Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 186, Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, paras. 23-28, Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 81, Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 104, Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras. 34, 35, and Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 91. [3] Trial Judgement, para. 779. [4] Trial Judgement, para. 779. [5] Trial Judgement, para. 779. See also Trial Judgement, para. 823. [6] Trial Judgement, para. 807. [7] Trial Judgement, para. 807. [8] Trial Judgement, para. 807. See also Trial Judgement, para. 823. [9] Trial Judgement, para. 789. [10] Trial Judgement, para. 789. [11] Trial Judgement, para. 789. See also Trial Judgement, para. 823. [12] Trial Judgement, para. 823. [13] The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber convicted Renzaho solely under Article 6(3) of the Statute for murder as a crime against humanity for the killing of a group of mostly Tutsi men also removed from CELA on 22 April 1994. See Trial Judgement, para. 789. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 |
NAHIMANA et al. (Media case) (ICTR-99-52-A) |
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487. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is inappropriate to convict an accused for a specific count under both Article 6(1) and Article 6(3) of the Statute. When, for the same count and the same set of facts, the accused’s responsibility is pleaded pursuant to both Articles and the accused could be found liable under both provisions, the Trial Chamber should rather enter a conviction on the basis of Article 6(1) of the Statute alone and consider the superior position of the accused as an aggravating circumstance.[1] [See also para. 667 of the Appeal Judgement] [1] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 186; Jokić Appeal Judgement, paras. 23-28; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 104; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras. 34-35; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 91. |
ICTR Statute
Article 6(1); Article 6(3) |