Obligation to plead at trial

Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 20.10.2010 RUKUNDO Emmanuel
(ICTR-2001-70-A)

255. Pursuant to Rule 101(B)(ii) of the Rules, a Trial Chamber is required to take into account any mitigating circumstances in determining a sentence.[1] However, the accused bears the burden of establishing mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.[2] If an accused fails to put forward relevant information, the Appeals Chamber considers that, as a general rule, a Trial Chamber is not under an obligation to seek out information that counsel did not see fit to put before it at the appropriate time.[3] Rule 86(C) of the Rules clearly indicates that sentencing submissions shall be addressed during closing arguments, and it was therefore Rukundo’s prerogative to identify any mitigating circumstances at the time. The Appeals Chamber notes that Rukundo made no sentencing submissions at trial.[4] This in itself would suffice for the Appeals Chamber to dismiss his argument.

[1] See also Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 387; Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 231.

[2] Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 231; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 294.

[3] Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 231; See also Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1103.

[4] Rukundo Final Trial Brief; T. 20 February 2008.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

165. […][W]hilst a Trial Chamber is required to take into account any mitigating circumstances in determining a sentence, it is the accused who bears the burden of establishing mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.[1] It was the Appellant’s prerogative to address sentencing submissions during closing arguments and to identify any mitigating circumstances in the trial record.[2] Having failed to specifically refer, in his Final Trial Brief or Closing Arguments, to the Defence evidence adduced during trial that he assisted several Tutsis in a camp in Mugunga after the genocide as a mitigating circumstance, the Appellant cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.[3] The Trial Chamber was not under an obligation to seek out information that Counsel did not put before it at the appropriate time.[4] The Appellant’s arguments in this respect are dismissed.

[1] Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 231.

[2] Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 388, referring to Rule 86(C) of the Rules.

[3] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1049, citing Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 231; Bralo Appeal Judgement, para. 29; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 354; Deronjić Appeal Judgement, para. 150; Babić Appeal Judgement, para. 62.

[4] Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 388; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 414.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 02.02.2009 KARERA François
(ICTR-01-74-A)

388. The Appellant made no sentencing submissions during closing arguments. In such circumstances, the Trial Chamber was not under an obligation to seek out information that counsel did not see fit to put before it at the appropriate time.[1] Rule 86(C) of the Rules clearly indicates that sentencing submissions shall be addressed during closing arguments, and it was therefore the Appellant’s prerogative to identify any mitigating circumstances instead of directing the Trial Chamber’s attention to the record in general.

[1] Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 414.

Download full document
ICTR Rule Rule 86(C) ICTY Rule Rule 86(C)