Tu quoque
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
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Appeal Judgement - 08.10.2008 |
MARTIĆ Milan (IT-95-11-A) |
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Martić claimed that his actions were in response to persecution of the Serb population by the Croatian authorities. Accordingly, he submitted defences of reciprocity or tu quoque; reprisal; and self-defence. The Appeals Chamber held that reciprocity or tu quoque could not be used to justify a serious violation of international humanitarian law. 109. Martić argues that Serbs in SAO Krajina, for historical reasons, had a right to claim self-determination in accordance with international law and that instead of being able to exercise this right, they ended up being persecuted by the Croatian authorities in the 1990s in a way similar to the persecutions and massacres of Serbs by Croats during the 1940s.[1] […] 111. To the extent that Martić’s argument is an attempt to plead a defence of tu quoque, i.e., to plead that the acts for which he was found responsible should not be considered criminal because they were in response to crimes committed against him and his people, it must be rejected. It is well established in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal that arguments based on reciprocity, including the tu quoque argument, are no defence to serious violations of international humanitarian law.[2] [1] Defence Appeal Brief, paras 80-85 and 91. See also AT. 41-42. [2] See, for example, Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, paras 515-520, as confirmed by Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 25. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 12.11.2009 |
MILOŠEVIĆ Dragomir (IT-98-29/1-A) |
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250. […] Moreover, with respect to Milošević’s allegation that the bombing was “a legal response to ABiH attacks”, the Appeals Chamber re-emphasizes that reciprocity or tu quoque defence may not be used to justify a serious violation of international humanitarian law.[1] [1] Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 111; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 25. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 19.03.2019 |
KARADŽIĆ Radovan (MICT-13-55-A) |
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321. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, pursuant to Rule 89(C) of the ICTY Rules, trial chambers have discretion to admit relevant evidence that has probative value.[1] The admissibility of evidence related to crimes committed by adversaries depends on the purpose for which it is adduced and whether it tends to refute allegations made in the indictment, while it is for the defence to clarify to the trial chamber the purpose of tendering such evidence.[2] In determining the admissibility of evidence, trial chambers enjoy considerable discretion and the Appeals Chamber must accord deference to their decisions in this respect.[3] The Appeals Chamber’s examination of challenges concerning a trial chamber’s refusal to admit material into evidence is limited to establishing whether the trial chamber abused its discretion by committing a discernible error.[4] 322. […] Considering that it is for the party tendering material to show the indicia of relevance required for it to be admissible under Rule 89(C) of the ICTY Rules,[5] […]. 323. […] [C]onsidering that the criteria for admission of evidence set out in Rule 89(C) of the Rules are cumulative, that the tendering party bears the burden of showing that these are met, and the deference accorded to trial chambers on matters related to the admissibility of evidence,[6] […]. [1] Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 564; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 31. [2] See, e.g., Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 88, n. 104. Cf. Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-T, Decision on Praljak Defence Motion for Admission of Documentary Evidence, 1 April 2010 (originally filed in French, English translation filed on 23 April 2010), para. 80; Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura, Case No. IT‑01-47-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Clarification of the Oral Decision of 17 December 2003 Regarding the Scope of Cross-Examination Pursuant to Rule 90 (H) of the Rules, 28 January 2004 (originally filed in French, English translation filed on 4 February 2004), p. 4; Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Decision on Evidence of the Good Character of the Accused and the Defence of Tu Quoque, 17 February 1999, p. 5. [3] Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 143, 151; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 152, 161. [4] Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 152, 161, referring to [Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR73.13, Decision on Jadranko Prlić’s Consolidated Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Orders of 6 and 9 October 2008 on Admission of Evidence, 12 January 2009 (“Prlić et al. Decision of 12 January 2009”)], para. 5. [5] Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 162, referring to Prlić et al. Decision of 12 January 2009, para. 17. [6] Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 143; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 163, referring to Prlić et al. Decision of 12 January 2009, para. 17. |
ICTY Rule Rule 89(C) |