Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Interlocutory Appeal contain the ratio of the Decision, finding that the Trial Chamber had not gone beyond the discretion allocated to it on evidentiary and procedural matters:

12. The Defence for Mr. Ntahobali argues that this procedure adopted by the Trial Chamber was impermissibly informal[1] since prior statements of an accused should be subject to an inquiry conducted “in accordance with pre-established rules of law which are known to the parties”[2] and not by merely requiring the parties to indicate their views on whether the Rules were complied with in taking the Previous Statements.[3] The Defence for Mr. Ntahobali has not identified any error in the procedure adopted by the Trial Chamber. The voir dire procedure originates from the common law and does not have a strictly defined process in this Tribunal.[4] There are no provisions in the Rules which direct Trial Chambers to adopt a formal procedure for determining whether they should conduct a voir dire. Instead, Rule 89(B) of the Rules provides that reference may be made to evidentiary rules “which will best favour a fair determination of the matter”. This discretion can extend to the conduct of a voir dire procedure when it is determined appropriate by the Trial Chamber.[5] The procedure conducted by the Trial Chamber permitted the parties to make submissions as to whether the Prosecution and Co-Accused could use the Previous Statements to impeach Mr. Ntahobali. The Trial Chamber considered the submissions of the parties on whether it was necessary to grant the request for a voir dire procedure by the Defence of Mr. Ntahobali, and after finding that it was not necessary, the Trial Chamber determined the admissibility of the Previous Statements on the basis of the submissions made by the parties. At several stages during the hearing[6] the Trial Chamber affirmed that this was the procedure to be followed, in particular when it stated:

We would like to hear the challenge, the basis of the challenge [to the admissibility of the Previous Statements]. And in the process, certainly, the Trial Chamber will examine the [admissibility] issue, including whether to determine the issue as presently presented, or whether there would be any need for voir – for trial within a trial, voir dire.[7]   

13. Therefore, the parties were informed of the procedure the Trial Chamber was adopting and made submissions pursuant to this procedure.[8] Indeed, the procedure adopted by the Trial Chamber, while characterised as one adopted to determine whether a voir dire procedure was necessary, was very similar to a voir dire. The Trial Chamber heard the parties on the circumstances surrounding the taking of the Previous Statements, admitting a written affidavit from Mr. Ntahobali into evidence on that issue, and decided that no further evidence was required to determine whether the Previous Statements were in accordance with the Rules. The Appeals Chamber does not see any abuse of the Trial Chamber’s discretion in the way that it chose to proceed.

1405.            With respect to Ntahobali’s argument regarding the lack of caution exercised by the Trial Chamber in assessing his co-accused’s evidence, the Appeals Chamber considers that Ntahobali does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber was required, as a matter of law, to treat all the evidence presented by his co-accused with caution[1] […]

See also para. 1292.

363. The Appeals Chamber will address Karadžić’s allegations in turn. Before doing so, the Appeals Chamber recalls that trial chambers have a broad discretion in weighing evidence[1] and are best placed to assess the credibility of a witness and the reliability of the evidence adduced.[2] In the context of the deference accorded to a trier of fact with respect to the assessment of evidence, it is within a trial chamber’s discretion, inter alia, to: (i) evaluate any inconsistencies that may arise within or among witnesses’ testimonies and consider whether the evidence taken as a whole is reliable and credible, and to accept or reject the fundamental features of the evidence;[3] (ii) decide, in the circumstances of each case, whether corroboration of evidence is necessary or to rely on uncorroborated, but otherwise credible, witness testimony;[4] and (iii) accept a witness’s testimony, notwithstanding inconsistencies between the said testimony and the witness’s previous statements, as it is for the trial chamber to determine whether an alleged inconsistency is sufficient to cast doubt on the evidence of the witness concerned.[5]

See also para. 530.

[…]

376. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that the mere assertion that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to evidence or that it should have interpreted evidence in a particular manner is liable to be summarily dismissed.[6]