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Decision on Provisional Release - 23.04.2008 |
PRLIĆ et al. (IT-04-74-AR65.6) |
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12. […] Rule 65(B) of the Rules does not mandate humanitarian justification for provisional release. Unlike for convicted persons seeking provisional release under Rule 65(I), there is no requirement of additional “special circumstances”[1] justifying release under Rule 65(B) because the burden borne by a duly convicted person after full evaluation and adjudication is necessarily distinct from the burden borne by an individual who is still presumed innocent. Of course, if the two requirements of Rule 65(B) are met, the existence of humanitarian reasons warranting release can be a salient and relevant factor in assessing whether to exercise discretion to grant provisional release. In this respect, “the weight attached to humanitarian reasons as justification for provisional release will differ from one defendant to another depending upon all the circumstances of a particular case”.[2] 15. Because Rule 65(B) of the Rules does not require “sufficiently compelling” humanitarian reasons for provisional release, this Bench understands the Prlić Decision of 11 March 2008[3] to have ruled that it is only when a Trial Chamber, having considered all the circumstances of the case and the impact of the significant change of circumstances constituted by the 98bis decision, cannot exclude the existence of flight risk or danger, that “sufficiently compelling” humanitarian reasons, coupled with necessary and sufficient measures to alleviate any flight risk or danger, can constitute a basis for resolving uncertainty and doubt in favour of provisional release. Indeed, in the Prlić Decision of 11 March 2008, the Appeals Chamber asked for the existence of sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons after having found that the Trial Chamber did not evaluate the impact of its 98bis Decision pursuant to the two requirements of Rule 65(B) of the Rules, thus amounting to a lack of clarity as to the existence of a flight risk or danger. Only then did the Appeals Chamber, faced with a situation in which such a risk or danger could not be excluded, require sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons. This is not the situation in the present instance. As mentioned above, the Trial Chamber stated that its 98bis Decision “may not be considered as a 'pre-judgement' increasing the flight risk of the Accused”[4] and seriously tightened the conditions of Pušić’s provisional release,[5] thus alleviating any risk of flight or danger to victims, witnesses or other persons. “Sufficiently compelling” humanitarian reasons are thus not required here. […] [1] Rule 65(I)(iii) of the Rules. See also Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Decision on Defence Request Seeking Provisional Release on the Grounds of Compassion, 2 April 2008, paras 11, 12, in which the Appeals Chamber stated that “[t]he specificity of the appeal stage is reflected by Rule 65(I)(iii) of the Rules, which provide for an additional criterion, i.e. that 'special circumstances exist warranting such release' [and that] the notion of acute justification [is] inextricably linked to the scope of special circumstances for the purposes of Rule 65(I)(iii) of the Rules”. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that the criterion of “exceptional circumstances” that used to be required by the Rules for provisional release of an accused pending trial has been abrogated by amendment of 17 November 1999 (IT/32/REV.17). Before this amendment of the Rules, Rule 65(B) stated (IT/32/REV.16, 2 July 1999 (emphasis added)): (B) Release may be ordered by a Trial Chamber only in exceptional circumstances, after hearing the host country and only if it is satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and, if released, will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person. [2] Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-AR65.3, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision Denying Ljubomir Borovčanin Provisional Release, 1 March 2007, para. 20. [3] Prlić Decision of 11 March 2008, para. 21. [4] Impugned Decision, p. 6. [5] Impugned Decision, pp. 7-8, 10. |
ICTR Rule Rule 65 ICTY Rule Rule 65 | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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13. Pursuant to Article 23(2) of the Statute and Rule 98ter(C) of the Rules, Trial Chambers have an obligation to set out a reasoned opinion in writing.[1] This right is one of the elements of the fair trial requirement embodied in Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute. In the Furundzija Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber held that Article 23 of the Statute treats the right of an accused to a reasoned opinion as one of the elements of the fair trial requirement embodied in Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute.[2] With regard to legal findings, this obligation does not require a Trial Chamber to discuss at length all of the case-law of the International Tribunal on a given legal issue but only to identify the precedents upon which its findings are based. With regard to factual findings, a Trial Chamber is required only to make findings on those facts which are essential to the determination of guilt on a particular count. It is not necessary to refer to the testimony of every witness or every piece of evidence on the trial record.[3] In short, a Trial Chamber should limit itself to indicating in a clear and articulate, yet concise manner, which, among the wealth of jurisprudence available on a given issue and the myriad of facts that emerged at trial, are the legal and factual findings on the basis of which it reached the decision either to convict or acquit an individual. A reasoned opinion consistent with the guidelines provided here allows for a useful exercise of the right of appeal by the Parties and enables the Appeals Chamber to understand and review the Trial Chamber’s findings as well as its evaluation of the evidence.[4] While the Appeals Chamber appreciates the care with which the Trial Chamber has expressed itself in the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber is constrained to observe that the Trial Chamber might have been more sparing in its efforts in this respect. [1] Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 603; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 41; Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 69. [2] Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 69. See also Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 603; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 41. [3] Kvocka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 382; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 39; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 498. [4] Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 41. |
ICTR Statute
Article 19; Article 20; Article 22(2) ICTY Statute Article 23(2) ICTR Rule Rule 88(C) ICTY Rule Rule 98 ter(C) |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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20. In Čelebići, the Appeals Chamber underscored that effective control is the ultimate standard and that a showing of effective control is required in cases involving both de jure and de facto superiors.[1] The Appeals Chamber further noted: In determining questions of responsibility it is necessary to look to effective exercise of power or control and not to formal titles. […] In general, the possession of de jure power in itself may not suffice for the finding of command responsibility if it does not manifest in effective control, although a court may presume that possession of such power prima facie results in effective control unless proof to the contrary is produced.[2] 21. Even when a superior is found to have de jure authority over his subordinates, the Prosecution still has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that this superior exercised effective control over his subordinates, unless the accused does not challenge having exercised such control.[3] By holding that “a court may presume that possession of [de jure] power prima facie results in effective control”,[4] the Appeals Chamber in Čelebići did not reverse the burden of proof. It simply acknowledged that the possession of de jure authority constitutes prima facie a reasonable basis for assuming that an accused has effective control over his subordinates. Thus, the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had effective control over his subordinates ultimately rests with the Prosecution. [1] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 196. See also para. 256 (“[t]he concept of effective control over a subordinate – in the sense of a material ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct, however that control is exercised – is the threshold to be reached in establishing a superior-subordinate relationship for the purpose of Article 7(3) of the Statute”); para. 266 (“[C]ustomary law has specified a standard of effective control”); Halilović Appeal Judgement, para. 59. [2] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 197. [3] Depending on the circumstances of the case, a finding that an accused had de jure authority will not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he had effective control over his subordinates. In Blagojević, for example, the Trial Chamber found that Vidoje Blagojević was in command and control of all units of the Brutanac Brigade. This conclusion reflected its assessment of his de jure authority over all the members of the brigade, including Momir Nikolić (Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 419). The Trial Chamber however concluded that, in light of the actual facts on the ground, Vidoje Blagojević lacked effective control over Momir Nikolić (Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 795). The Appeals Chamber in Blagojević found that it did not consider the conclusions regarding the scope of Vidoje Blagojević’s authority irreconcilable with the finding that he did not exercise effective control over Momir Nikolić (Blagojević Appeal Judgement, para. 302). See also Halilović Appeal Judgement, para. 85 (the Appeals Chamber held that “de jure power is not synonymous with effective control” and that “the former may not in itself amount to the latter”). [4] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 197. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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30. While a superior’s knowledge of and failure to punish his subordinates’ past offences is insufficient, in itself, to conclude that the superior knew that similar future offences would be committed by the same group of subordinates, this may, depending on the circumstances of the case, nevertheless constitute sufficiently alarming information to justify further inquiry.[1] In making such an assessment, a Trial Chamber may take into account the failure by a superior to punish the crime in question. Such failure is indeed relevant to the determination of whether, in the circumstances of a case, a superior possessed information that was sufficiently alarming to put him on notice of the risk that similar crimes might subsequently be carried out by subordinates and justify further inquiry. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber stresses that a superior’s failure to punish a crime of which he has actual knowledge is likely to be understood by his subordinates at least as acceptance, if not encouragement, of such conduct with the effect of increasing the risk of new crimes being committed. 31. In the present case, the Trial Chamber, when it reviewed the Appeals Chamber’s application of the “had reason to know” standard in the Krnojelac case, found that “[o]ver and beyond the conclusions of the Appeals Chamber, the Chamber is of the opinion that by failing to take measures to punish crimes of which he has knowledge, the superior has reason to know that there is a real and reasonable risk those unlawful acts might recur”.[2] It further found that “by failing to punish, the superior (Krnojelac) did not prevent subsequent criminal acts”.[3] Those findings could be read as implying that a superior’s failure to punish a crime of which he has knowledge automatically constitutes sufficiently alarming information under the “had reason to know” standard, irrespective of the circumstances of the case. Such reading would amount to an error of law. However, the Trial Chamber also found that “from the moment a certain amount of information was available to Krnojelac which, taken as a whole, was sufficiently alarming and such as to alert him to the risk of murders being committed inside the prison, he had an obligation to intervene and at the least should have carried out an investigation”.[4] It also referred to the “had reason to know” standard as requiring an assessment of whether a superior had sufficiently alarming information which would have alerted him to the risk that crimes might be committed by his subordinates.[5] This demonstrates that the Trial Chamber correctly understood that standard as requiring an assessment, in the circumstances of each case, of whether a superior had sufficiently alarming information to put him on notice that crimes might be committed. […]. See also paras 267-268. [1] Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 169. [2] Trial Judgement, para. 133. The Trial Chamber’s reliance on these findings appears to be misplaced. Indeed, the Appeals Chamber did not rely on Milorad Krnojelac’s failure to punish the acts of torture committed by his subordinate against Ekrem Zeković when determining whether he had reason to know that his subordinates had committed or might commit crimes of torture other than those related to Ekrem Zeković. However, it seems likely that this may be due to the particular context of that case, in which Milorad Krnojelac was not charged with criminal responsibility for the torture inflicted upon Ekrem Zeković, rather that for any legal reasons. [3] Trial Judgement, para. 156, citing Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 172. See also para. 166: “by failing to punish crimes of which he has knowledge, the superior has reason to know that there is a real and reasonable risk that the unlawful acts will be committed again”. [4] Trial Judgement, para. 135, citing Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, paras 178-179. [5] Trial Judgement, para. 132. |
ICTR Statute Article 6(3) ICTY Statute Article 7(3) | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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33. As the Appeals Chamber previously held, “what constitutes [necessary and reasonable] measures is not a matter of substantive law but of evidence”;[1] the assessment of whether a superior fulfilled his duty to prevent or punish under Article 7(3) of the Statute has to be made on a case-by-case basis, so as to take into account the “circumstances surrounding each particular situation”.[2] Under Article 86 of Additional Protocol I, for example, superiors have a duty to take “all feasible measures within their power” to prevent or punish a breach of the laws of war and, under Article 87 of Additional Protocol I, such “feasible measures” may take the form of both “disciplinary or penal” measures.[3] It cannot be excluded that, in the circumstances of a case, the use of disciplinary measures will be sufficient to discharge a superior of his duty to punish crimes under Article 7(3) of the Statute. In other words, whether the measures taken were solely of a disciplinary nature, criminal, or a combination of both, cannot in itself be determinative of whether a superior discharged his duty to prevent or punish under Article 7(3) of the Statute. The Prosecution’s argument is dismissed. 142. As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Judgment and the Parties’ arguments on appeal place undue emphasis on the nature of the measures taken. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Hadžihasanović took measures to punish the perpetrators which were “necessary and reasonable” in the circumstances of the case,[4] not whether those measures were of a disciplinary or criminal nature. 154. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a superior need not dispense punishment personally and may discharge his duty to punish by reporting the matter to the competent authorities.[5] Here, the Appeals Chamber finds that the reporting of the 5 August 1993 Slavonija Furniture Salon crimes to the Bugojno municipal public prosecutor, in conjunction with the disciplinary sanctions imposed by the military disciplinary organ in Bugojno, constituted necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators. The Appeals Chamber recognises that the District Military Prosecutor’s Office, rather than that of the municipal public prosecutor, would have likely been a more appropriate forum for the filing of a criminal report,[6] but finds that Hadžihasanović’s responsibility should not turn on the Bugojno municipal public prosecutor’s possible failure to initiate criminal proceedings or to refer the matter to the District Military Prosecutor.[7] The Appeals Chamber notes that Witness Sead Zerić, the former Travnik District Military Prosecutor, testified that municipal public prosecutors had an obligation to pass on criminal reports they received regarding army personnel to the military prosecutor’s office when these dealt with crimes outside their jurisdiction.[8] [1] Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 72. See also Halilović Appeal Judgement, paras 63-64. [2] Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 417. [3] Article 86 of Additional Protocol I states that superiors are responsible if, inter alia, they did not take “all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach”. Article 87 of Additional Protocol I states that superiors have a duty to “initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations […] and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof” (emphasis added). [4] Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 417. See also supra para. 33. [5] See Blaskić Trial Judgement, para. 335, cited with approval by the Blaskić Appeal Judgement, para. 72. [6] The district military courts, including the Travnik District Military Court, operated independently of the ABiH and were established primarily to try criminal offences committed by military personnel (Trial Judgement, paras 907-938) while the civilian court system, including the office of the municipal public prosecutor, had jurisdiction to try criminal offences committed by civilians and, in some limited cases, members of the military (Trial Judgement, paras 953-957). [7] See Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 395 (stating that a superior may only be held criminally responsible for failing to take such measures that are within his powers). See also Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 417. [8] Witness Sead Zerić, T. 5594. |
ICTR Statute Article 6(3) ICTY Statute Article 7(3) | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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228. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that the fact that a superior is compelled to use force to control some of his subordinates does not automatically lead to the conclusion that this superior does not exercise effective control over them.[1] The Appeals Chamber concurs with the Trial Chamber’s finding that this issue must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.[2] Further, there might be situations in which a superior has to use force against subordinates acting in violation of international humanitarian law. A superior may have no other alternative but to use force to prevent or punish the commission of crimes by subordinates. This kind of use of force is legal under international humanitarian law insofar as it complies with the principles of proportionality and precaution and may even demonstrate that a superior has the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of crimes. The issue in the present case, however, is whether those modalities in which force should have been used, in the Trial Chamber’s view, to rescue the hostages, confirm the absence of Hadžihasanović’s effective control over the El Mujahedin detachment. [1] Trial Judgement, para. 86. [2] In the Appeals Chamber’s view, the fact that Vahid Karavelić, Commander of the 1st Corps from July 1993 to August 1995, had to attack some of his subordinates at the end of 1993 demonstrates that, in exceptional circumstances, a superior may have to use military assets against his subordinates. See Witness Karavelić, T. 17620-17621 and T. 17877-17885; Hadžihasanović Appeal Brief, para. 385; AT. 189 (“General Karavelić is the officer who defended Sarajevo against the worst possible blockage in years. […] [H]e had to attack […] subordinates who […] suddenly became out of control. […] He went to see the President of Bosnia and he said […] ‘I need to attack these people, but I’m not going to do it unless I get the proper authority’, and the President […] gave [him] the authority after doing the proper political analysis”). |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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51. The Appeals Chamber agrees that the legal sufficiency test in a decision pursuant to Rule 98bis of the Rules – that is, the question of whether a reasonable trier of fact could convict the accused on the Prosecution evidence – is not applicable in an appeal against judgement. Rather, in an appeal against judgement, the test to be applied in determining whether the evidence is factually sufficient to sustain a conviction is whether the conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is one which no reasonable trier of fact could have reached.[1] Here, however, the issue raised by Hadžihasanović regards the alleged violation of his right to a fair trial resulting from a wrong statement and the application of the legal sufficiency test by the Trial Chamber in its Rule 98bis Decision. Insofar as an infringement on his right to a fair trial is concerned, this issue is therefore not redundant on appeal. 52. Regarding Hadžihasanović’s second and third grounds of appeal concerning the Rule 98bis Decision, which the Prosecution also contends cannot be raised in an appeal against judgement, the Appeals Chamber notes that an appellant is not, as a matter of law, prevented from challenging a finding of the Trial Chamber in a decision pursuant to Rule 98bis of the Rules. The Prosecution’s reliance to the contrary on the Appeals Chamber’s finding in Čelebići is misplaced. In Čelebići, the Appeals Chamber clarified the applicable test on appeal for alleged errors of fact, for which the legal sufficiency test applied in the Rule 98bis Decision is indeed redundant in an appeal against judgement. The allegation at hand, however, is that the Trial Chamber committed an error in its Rule 98bis Decision, which as a consequence violated Hadžihasanović’s rights to a fair trial. [1] Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 7. See also Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 10; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 18; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 18; Blaskić Appeal Judgement, para. 16; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 435; Bagilishema Appeal Judgement, para. 13. [2] Prosecution Response Brief, paras 94, 128. [3] Prosecution Response Brief, para. 17. [4] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 435. |
ICTR Rule Rule 98 bis ICTY Rule Rule 98 bis | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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55. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber’s finding that it “did not consider evidence which might be favourable to the Accused”,[1] if interpreted as implying that it completely ignored the evidence presented by the Defence in its favour during the Prosecution case, would amount to an error of law. For example, where the Defence has cross-examined a witness to good effect or has obtained evidence in an accused’s favour during cross-examination, this evidence must be used to assess whether the Prosecution evidence is incapable of belief. In the present case, the Trial Chamber not only recognised this principle,[2] but also referred in its Rule 98bis Decision to the entirety of the testimonies without excluding the cross-examination of the witnesses. Further, the Rule 98bis Decision is replete with references to Hadžihasanović’s Motion for Acquittal, which in turn is replete with references to evidence adduced by the Defence during the Prosecution case.[3] [1] Rule 98bis Decision, para. 18. [2] Rule 98bis Decision, paras 16-17. [3] Motion for Acquittal of Enver Hadžihasanović (“Hadžihasanović’s Motion for Acquittal”), 11 August 2004. |
ICTR Rule Rule 98 bis ICTY Rule Rule 98 bis | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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130. Further, the Appeals Chamber recalls that “[w]here a party alleges on appeal that the right to a fair trial has been infringed, it must prove that the violation caused such prejudice to it as to amount to an error of law invalidating the judgement”.[1] Thus, the element of prejudice forms an essential aspect of proof required of an appellant in relation to the appeal alleging a violation of his fair trial rights. […]. [1] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 21; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 119. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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189. The ultimate question under this ground of appeal is whether Hadžihasanović exercised effective control over the El Mujahedin detachment. Since de jure authority is only one factor that helps to establish effective control, and because the present question is resolvable on the basis of effective control alone, the Appeals Chamber declines to address whether Hadžihasanović had de jure authority over the El Mujahedin detachment. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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199. The Appeals Chamber recognises that the power to give orders and have them executed can serve as an indicium of effective control.[1] […]. 203. At the outset, the Appeals Chamber points out that, if taken literally, there is little basis in the jurisprudence of this International Tribunal for considering what the Trial Chamber termed as the “conduct of combat operations involving the forces in question”[2] as an indicium of effective control.[3] A reading of the relevant sections of the Trial Judgement suggests that what the Trial Chamber sought to demonstrate by defining this criterion was the degree of subordination of the El Mujahedin detachment to the OG Bosanska Krajina during combat operations.[4] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber will discuss the Trial Chamber’s findings within this latter context. 209. These findings confirm that the El Mujahedin detachment took part in several combat operations in September and October 1993 and that this occurred within the framework established by the OG Bosanska Krajina and the 3rd Corps. This, however, does not in itself necessarily provide sufficient support for the conclusion that Hadžihasanović had effective control over the El Mujahedin detachment in the sense of having the material ability to prevent or punish its members should they commit crimes.[5] […]. 210. The Appeals Chamber notes that the El Mujahedin detachment took part in combat operations alongside 3rd Corps formations, including the OG Bosanska Krajina, as of the second half of 1992.[6] The Appeals Chamber stresses that, with respect to the period before 13 August 1993, the Trial Chamber found that the relationship between the El Mujahedin detachment and the 3rd Corps was one of cooperation, not effective control. The Trial Chamber found that “frequent cooperation in itself [did] not allow the conclusion that the mujahedin were subordinated to the 3rd Corps […] and were under [its] effective control”.[7] Neither the 6 September Order nor the conduct of combat operations demonstrate that the relationship between the 3rd Corps and the mujahedin, later officially renamed the El Mujahedin detachment, evolved from cooperation to effective control. 213. In its concluding remarks on the issue of Hadžihasanović’s effective control, the Trial Chamber stated the following: It must be noted, however, that this exceptional position was in fact accepted by the 3rd Corps, insofar as it did not in effect prevent the 3rd Corps and its units from using the detachment in combat and benefiting militarily from its existence. It should also be noted that nothing forced the 3rd Corps commanders to use the detachment in combat. In so doing, they accepted all the consequences of their decisions and inevitably assumed full responsibility for them.[8] The Appeals Chamber does not dispute that the 3rd Corps may have benefited from the El Mujahedin detachment, and that a circumstance of this kind may entail some form of responsibility, if the particulars of such responsibility are adequately pleaded in an Indictment.[9] The Appeals Chamber nevertheless questions the relevance of that consideration for demonstrating the existence of Hadžihasanović’s effective control over the El Mujahedin detachment. The Appeals Chamber clarifies, however, given that the expression “full responsibility” adopted by the Trial Chamber may be somewhat misleading, that the responsibility of a superior under Article 7(3) of the Statute is only triggered by a superior’s failure to prevent and punish the crimes of his subordinates of which he has the requisite knowledge. Thus, even if Hadžihasanović benefited militarily from the El Mujahedin detachment, his responsibility as a superior under Article 7(3) of the Statute would be, eventually, triggered only upon a showing that the members of the El Mujahedin detachment were his subordinates. As the Trial Chamber made its remark in the context of its discussion on effective control, it presumably used the remark as an argument to justify attributing Hadžihasanović with effective control. This argument, however, does not provide support for the existence of effective control. 214. Thus, while these Trial Chamber’s findings indicate that the 3rd Corps cooperated with the El Mujahedin detachment, they are insufficient to establish the existence of effective control. The Appeals Chamber will examine whether any of the Trial Chamber’s additional findings provide a proper basis for its conclusion that Hadžihasanović exercised effective control over the El Mujahedin detachment. 217. Assuming that the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that there was no other authority over the El Mujahedin detachment is correct, the Appeals Chamber disputes the relevance of the criterion identified by the Trial Chamber as an indicator of the existence of effective control. Hadžihasanović’s effective control cannot be established by process of elimination. The absence of any other authority over the El Mujahedin detachment in no way implies that Hadžihasanović exercised effective control in this case. [1] Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 69. [2] Trial Judgement, paras 83, 851. [3] See Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 69 (“[the indicators of effective control] are limited to showing that the accused had the power to prevent, punish, or initiate measures leading to proceedings against the alleged perpetrators where appropriate”). In a footnote appended to justify this criterion, the Trial Chamber referred to paragraph 398 of the Strugar Trial Judgement. Upon review of that judgement, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber in the Strugar case did not devise a new indicator of effective control, but simply analysed the effect of certain orders in the context of combat operations. [4] See Trial Judgement, paras 825-827, 848, 851-852. [5] See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 256. [6] See Trial Judgement, para. 537 (the El Mujahedin detachment expressed their readiness to conduct combat operations in the zone of responsibility of the 333rd Brigade). See also Trial Judgement, para. 530 (T. 17233, Closed Session). The El Mujahedin detachment took part in combat operations alongside the 7th and the 17th units during the combat operations in April 1993 on Mt Zmajevac, south of Zenica (Trial Judgement, para. 532); in the Bijelo Bučje and Mravinjac sectors in June 1993 (Trial Judgement, paras 534-535); and at Kaćuni south-east of Busovača in July 1993 (Trial Judgement, para. 537). [7] Trial Judgement, para. 795. [8] Trial Judgement, para. 850. [9] Trial Judgement, para. 1483. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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260. The failure to prevent and the failure to punish are not only legally distinct, but are factually distinct in terms of the type of knowledge that is involved for each basis of superior responsibility.[1] The duty to prevent arises for a superior from the moment he knows or has reason to know that a crime is about to be committed, while the duty to punish only arises after the commission of the crime. Thus, knowledge which is relevant to a superior’s duty to punish may or may not be relevant to his duty to prevent depending on when the superior acquired actual knowledge or had reason to know about it. […]. [1] See Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilović, Case No. IT 01-48-PT, Trial Chamber Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Indictment, 17 December 2004, para. 32. |
ICTR Statute Article 6(3) ICTY Statute Article 7(3) | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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264. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber considered the duty to suppress to be part and parcel of a superior’s duty to prevent,[1] such that knowledge acquired by Kubura while his subordinates had begun and were still engaged in committing the acts of plunder in Vareš would be relevant to his duty to prevent those crimes.[2] [1] Trial Judgement, para. 127: “The duty to suppress should be considered part of the superior’s duty to prevent, as its aim is to prevent further unlawful acts”. [2] See Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 527: “The duty to prevent arises from the time a superior acquires knowledge, or has reasons to know that a crime is being or is about to be committed, while the duty to punish arises after the superior acquires knowledge of the commission of the crime”. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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313. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that, when assessing the gravity of a crime in the context of a conviction under Article 7(3) of the Statute, two matters must be taken into account: (1) the gravity of the underlying crime committed by the convicted person’s subordinate; and (2) the gravity of the convicted person’s own conduct in failing to prevent or punish the underlying crimes.[1] Thus, in the context of a conviction under Article 7(3) of the Statute, the gravity of a subordinate’s crime remains, contrary to Hadžihasanović’s assertion, an “essential consideration” in assessing the gravity of the superior’s own conduct at sentencing.[2] [1] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 732 (emphasis added). See also para. 741 (“a consideration of the gravity of offences committed under Article 7(3) of the Statute involves, in addition to a consideration of the gravity of the conduct of the superior, a consideration of the seriousness of the underlying crimes” (emphasis added). [2] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 741. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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320. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a position of authority does not in and of itself attract a harsher sentence.[1] Further, in the context of a conviction under Article 7(3) of the Statute, use of the superior’s position of authority as an aggravating circumstance would be inappropriate since it is itself an element of criminal liability.[2] Nor would a high level of authority, to echo the Prosecution’s distinction, necessarily attract greater responsibility were it to be considered. Rather, it is the superior’s abuse of that level of authority which could be taken into consideration at sentencing.[3] […]. 321. In any event, the principle of graduation upon which the Prosecution relies is not absolute. Indeed, the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Musema qualified its statement that sentences should be graduated by noting that this principle “is, however, always subject to the proviso that the gravity of the offence is the primary consideration for a Trial Chamber in imposing sentence”.[4] The Prosecution’s contention that Hadžihasanović must receive a harsher sentence based on his high level of authority is not substantiated by the practice of the International Tribunal. [1] Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 411; Babić Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, para. 80. [2] See Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 626; Miodrag Jokić Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, para. 30. [3] See Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 412 (discussing the abuse of a high level of authority in the context of the mode of liability of ordering). [4] Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 382. |
ICTR Rule Rule 101(B)(i) ICTY Rule Rule 101(B)(i) | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 22.04.2008 |
HADŽIHASANOVIĆ & KUBURA (IT-01-47-A) |
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328. The Appeals Chamber recognises that intelligence and good education have been considered to be possible aggravating factors.[1] This does not mean, however, that these factors should only be considered aggravating factors. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that whether certain factors going to a convicted person’s character constitute mitigating or aggravating factors depends largely on the particular circumstances of each case.[2] The Appeals Chamber previously underlined that “[c]aution is needed when relying as a legal basis on statements made by Trial Chambers in the context of cases and circumstances that are wholly different”.[3] […]. [1] Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 1114; Milan Simić Sentencing Judgement, paras 103-105. [2] Babić Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, para. 49. [3] Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 416 (as to Milomir Stakić’s professional background). See also Babić Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, para. 49 (as to Milan Babić’s good character). |
ICTR Rule Rule 101(B) ICTY Rule Rule 101(B) | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Provisional Release - 21.04.2008 |
PRLIĆ et al. (IT-04-74-AR65.7) |
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15. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber did explicitly address the impact of its 98bis Ruling in granting the Accused provisional release. The Trial Chamber recalled the holding of the Appeals Chamber Decision that the 98bis Ruling constituted a significant change in circumstances, which warranted a renewed and thorough evaluation of the risk of flight of each of the co-Accused in this case. The Trial Chamber expressly considered that, in order to satisfy itself that the Accused still met the requirements of Rule 65, that if released they would appear for trial and not intervene with any victims and witnesses, it was required to consider whether the Accused had offered sufficient guarantees to offset that risk of flight. In such circumstances, even if the Trial Chamber was satisfied that sufficient guarantees were offered, it should not exercise its discretion in favour of a grant of provisional release unless compelling humanitarian grounds were present which caused to tip the balance in favour of allowing provisional release.[1] [1] [Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-T, Décision Relative à la Demande de Mise en Liberté Provisoire de l’Accusé Petković, with a Confidential Annex, 31 March 2008, (“Impugned Decision”)], p. 5. |
ICTR Rule Rule 65 ICTY Rule Rule 65 | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Provisional Release - 21.04.2008 |
PRLIĆ et al. (IT-04-74-AR65.7) |
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17. Concerning the humanitarian reasons sufficient to justify provisional release, the Appeals Chamber notes that the development of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence implies that an application for provisional release brought at a late stage of proceedings, and in particular after the close of the Prosecution case, will only be granted when serious and sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons exist.[1] Before granting provisional release, a Trial Chamber should take into consideration the position of victims and witnesses living in the same region where the accused, when released, will return. The perception that persons accused of international crimes are released, for a prolonged period of time, after a decision that a reasonable trier of fact could make a finding beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty (this being the meaning of a decision dismissing a Rule 98bis motion), could have a prejudicial effect on victims and witnesses. Therefore, provisional release should only be granted at a late stage of the proceedings when sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons exist to justify the release. Furthermore, even when provisional release is found to be justified in light of the nature of the circumstances, the length of the release should nonetheless be proportional to these circumstances[2]—for example, the need to visit a seriously ill family member in the hospital would justify provisional release of a sufficient time to visit the family member. The Appeals Chamber finds that there is no reason to establish a precedent pursuant to which accused are granted provisional release for the period between the Prosecution and Defence case, absent sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the existence of compelling humanitarian reasons will only become relevant if the accused has met the prerequisite requirements of Rule 65(B), which must be satisfied for the Trial Chamber to have the discretion to consider granting that provisional release.[3] [1] [Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.5, Decision on Prosecution’s Consolidated Appeal against Decisions to Provisionally Release the Accused Prlić, Stojić, Praljak, Petković and Ćorić, 11 March 2008, (“Appeals Chamber Decision”)], para. 21. See also, inter alia, Prosecutor v. Ademi, Order on Motion for Provisional Release, 20 February 2002, which considered that the proximity of a prospective judgment may weigh against a decision to release, para. 22; Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No IT-01-48-T, Decision on Motion for Provisional Release, 21 April 2005, whereby Trial Chamber I denied provisional release to the Accused considering “that the facts submitted by the Defence in support of the Motion do not amount to exceptional circumstances”, and “the advanced stage of the Prosecution case where most of the evidence in support of the Prosecution case has been presented and further Prosecution witnesses are still to be heard”, pp. 3-4; Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84-T, Decision on Defence Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj for Urgent Provisional Release, Confidential, 3 October 2007 (“Haradinaj Decision”), p. 3; Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-T, Décision Relative à la Demande de Mise en Liberté Provisoire de l’Accusé Prlajak, with a Confidential Annex, 1 April 2008, pp. 6-8; Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Case No IT-07-85-T, Decision on Šainović Motion for Temporary Provisional Release, 4 April 2008, paras 7-9; Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-T, Décision Relative à la Demande de Mise en Liberté Provisoire de l’Accusé Čorić, with a Confidential Annex, 8 April 2008, pp. 6-7; Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Case No IT-07-85-T, Decision on Lazarević Motion for Temporary Provisional Release, 15 April 2008 (“Lazarević Decision”). [2] See, for example, Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No IT-01-47-T, Decision on Motions by Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura for Provisional Release, 19 July 2005, rendered between the close of the Defence case and the delivery of the judgment, whereby Trial Chamber II considered that “at this stage of the trial there is an increased risk of flight, particularly after the Prosecution requested a finding of guilt on all charges”; “the Prosecution’s final arguments and the sentences requested therein […] may exert considerable psychological pressure on the Accused”; “other Chambers of the Tribunal held that the proximity of a prospective judgment date may weigh against a decision to release”; “the Chamber shares this view and holds that release for the entire period preceding the entry of judgment would be inappropriate and would create too great a risk of flight”; “a period of 12 days for each of the Accused significantly reduces the risk of flight as opposed to a longer period”; pp. 7-9. See also, Lazarević Decision, whereby Trial Chamber II considered that “based upon the compelling humanitarian considerations set forth in the Motion […] it would be appropriate for the Accused to be provisionally released for a limited duration”, specifically, seven days, paras 16 and 18. See, further, Haradinaj Decision, p. 3. [3] See, for example, Prosecutor v. Boškoški and Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-AR65.4, Decision on Johan Tarčulovski’s Interlocutory Appeal on Provisional Release, 27 July 2007 (“Tarčulovski Decision”), para. 14, whereby the Appeals Chamber recalled that “a Trial Chamber may grant provisional release only if it is satisfied that the accused will return for trial and that he will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person. It is in this context that any humanitarian grounds have to be assessed”. In applying the above principle of law, the Appeals Chamber proceeded in considering that “[t]he Trial Chamber considered the birth of his second child in the Impugned Decision and found that 'the arrival of a baby is not a strong weight in the assessment of the likelihood of the Accused’s future attendance at the trial or of the interests of justice in this case'. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Appellant has not established that the Trial Chamber erred in denying the Appellant’s request for provisional release despite his family situation, since in light of other relevant factors it was not satisfied that the Appellant would appear for trial, if provisional released”. |
ICTR Rule Rule 65 ICTY Rule Rule 65 | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Admission of Exhibits - 15.04.2008 |
DELIĆ Rasim (IT-04-83-AR73.1) |
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The Prosecution sought to confront a Defence witness, during cross-examination, with two documents. Delić objected on the basis that these documents were not included in the list of exhibits the Prosecution intended to offer under Rule 65 ter(E)(iii) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Following the cross-examination of the witness on the content of the two documents, the Trial Chamber proceeded to admit them into evidence. Delić appealed the admission because it was done during the Defence case. The Appeals Chamber found: 20. According to Rule 89(C) of the Rules, a “Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value”. More specifically, Rule 90(F)(i) of the Rules states that a “Trial Chamber shall exercise control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (i) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth; and (ii) avoid needless consumption of time”. Within the discretion afforded to it, a Trial Chamber may admit any evidence which it deems relevant and of probative value, provided that the right of the accused to a fair trial is ensured in the process.[1] 21. In the present case, the Prosecution contends that it could not have ascertained the importance of the Exhibits until Delić had disclosed its own list of witnesses pursuant to Rule 65 ter (G)(i). However, the Prosecution did not proceed to disclose the Exhibits immediately after this list was filed, but just prior to the beginning of the testimony of [the] witness […] 22. In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Impugned Decision does not clarify whether the Exhibits were admitted as evidence probative of guilt or only for impeachment purposes of the witness in question. This may cause confusion, prejudicing Delić in the organization of his case. According to the principles enshrined in the Statute – in particular in Article 21(4)(b) and (e) – on the rights of the accused, when evidence is tendered by the Prosecution there must be a fair opportunity for the accused to challenge it; this is all the more true if evidence is tendered after the close of the Prosecution case. In situations where the accused opposes the admission of evidence during cross-examination due to alleged breach of his right to a fair trial, a Trial Chamber must consider how it intends to strike the appropriate balance between the need to ensure the rights of the accused and its decision to admit such evidence. 23. The Trial Chamber therefore erred in not specifying the purpose for which the Exhibits were admitted despite the request by Delić and, consequently, in not addressing how the prejudice caused by the admission of the Exhibits, if any, could be redressed. Only after having considered the mode of disclosure of the documents in question, the purpose of their admission, the time elapsed between disclosure and examination of the witness, the languages known to Counsel and the accused, as well as any other relevant factual considerations, the Trial Chamber will be able to provide a reasoned opinion on the prejudice, if any, caused by the admission of the Exhibits and on the measures to address such prejudice – for example providing more time for cross-examination, adjourning the session, or granting the possibility of re-calling the witness if Delić shows it is necessary. Having failed to give sufficient weight to relevant considerations in reaching its decision, the Trial Chamber committed a discernible error. [1] Rule 89(D) of the Rules. |
ICTR Rule
Rule 89(C); Rule 90(F) ICTY Rule Rule 89(C); Rule 90(F) |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Barayagwiza's Motion - 11.04.2008 |
BARAYAGWIZA Jean-Bosco (ICTR-99-52A-R) |
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Following the issuance of the Appeal Judgement in this case, Barayagwiza requested that the Appeals Chamber order the Registrar to assign, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules, his former Lead Counsel on appeal as his counsel to assist him in the preparation of a motion for review and/or reconsideration of the Appeal Judgement. While the Registrar did not object to the assistance of the Counsel as pro bono counsel (provided that the counsel files a power of attorney pursuant to Rule 44 of the Rule[1]), he objected to the assignment under the legal aide scheme (Rule 45), in the absence of judicial determination on the admissibility of the request for review and/or reconsideration. The Appeals Chamber ruled that the request for assignment of counsel for the purpose of preparing a motion for reconsideration was without merit considering that a final judgement cannot be reconsidered. As for the preparation of a motion for review, the Appeals Chamber held: pp. 3-4: RECALLING that review of a final judgement is an exceptional remedy and that an indigent applicant is only entitled to assigned counsel, at the Tribunal’s expense, if the Appeals Chamber authorizes the review or if it deems it necessary in order to ensure the fairness of the proceedings at the preliminary examination stage;[2] CONSIDERING that the Motion fails to provide any information on the basis for a potential request for review;[3] CONSIDERING further that in the absence of information as to the potential grounds for review, the Appeals Chamber cannot conclude that it would be necessary in order to ensure the fairness of the proceedings to authorize assignment of counsel to the Applicant under the Tribunal’s legal aid scheme; FINDING therefore, that the Applicant has not shown that he should receive the assistance of counsel at the expense of the Tribunal; NOTING that in any event the Applicant may be assisted by counsel in connection with a request for review at his own expense, at the expense of a third party or on a pro bono basis, provided that counsel files a power of attorney with the Registrar and satisfies the requirements to appear before the Tribunal; Subsequently, on 9 September 2008, the Appeals Chamber rendered its decision on Barayagwiza’s motion for reconsideration of the present Decision,[4] holding inter alia that: p. 4: CONSIDERING that the Impugned Decision is not premised on the understanding that Mr. Herbert would assist the Applicant in the preparation of a motion for review on a pro bono basis, but merely informs the Applicant that, while he failed to demonstrate that assignment of a counsel under the Tribunal’s legal aid scheme was justified in the present circumstances, he may still, subject to certain conditions, be assisted by counsel in connection with a request for review at his own expense, at the expense of a third party or on a pro bono basis, and;[5] CONSIDERING that the Applicant merely reiterates his request for a blanket assignment of counsel under the Tribunal’s legal aid scheme; CONSIDERING that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate a clear error of reasoning in the Impugned Decision or that reconsideration is necessary to prevent an injustice; [1] See fn. 7 and p. 4 of the present Decision. [2] See Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-03-R, Decision on Requests for Reconsideration, Review, Assignment of Counsel, Disclosure, and Clarification, 8 December 2006 (“Rutaganda Decision of 8 December 2006”) para. 41; Eliézer Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-R, Decision on Niyitegeka’s Urgent Request for Legal Assistance, 20 June 2005, p. 4; Hassan Ngeze v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-R, Decision On Hassan Ngeze’s Motion To Obtain Assistance From Counsel, 28 February 2008, p. 2. [3] In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that review of a final judgement is not meant to provide an additional opportunity for a party to remedy its failings at trial or on appeal. Review may only be granted when the moving party satisfies the following cumulative criteria: (i) there is a new fact; (ii) the new fact was not known to the moving party at the time of the original proceedings; (iii) the lack of discovery of that new fact was not the result of lack of due diligence by the moving party; and (iv) the new fact could have been a decisive factor in reaching the original decisions, Rutaganda Decision of 8 December 2006, para. 8. [4] Decision on Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion of 2 May 2008, 9 September 2008. [5] Impugned Decision, p. 4. |
ICTR Rule Rule 45 ICTY Rule Rule 45 |