The Appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief after the deadline set by the Appeals Chamber and he did not submit a motion pursuant to Rule 127 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence requesting that it be considered as validly filed and showing good cause to justify the delay. The Appeals Chamber, nevertheless, held that the Appellant’s Brief was deemed to be validly filed:

5.       The Scheduling Order issued by the Appeals Chamber is unambiguous.  The Appellant’s Brief was to be filed on 17 June 2005.  If good cause justified Counsel filing the Appellant’s Brief after the time stipulated in that Order, then that good cause should be presented to the Appeals Chamber, and a request for an extension of time should have been made before the filing deadline or a request that the Appellant’s Brief be received as validly filed pursuant to Rule 127 of the Rules should have been made at the time of the filing of the Appellant’s Brief out of time, if not before.  The fact that Counsel for the Appellant has not sought to justify his late filing and has requested the Appeals Chamber to receive it as validly filed after the fact is sufficient grounds for the Appeals Chamber to strike the Appellant’s brief as not validly filed, as is requested by the Prosecution.  Indeed, when clear time limits are transgressed without justifiable explanation, the Appeals Chamber is hesitant to do other than reject the filing.  In this case, however, the Appeals Chamber has determined that the interests of justice warrant it receiving the brief as validly filed despite Counsel’s breach of its Order. 

6.       Contempt proceedings are ancillary to proceedings at the Tribunal and arise from the inherent power of the Judges of this Tribunal to protect the integrity of their own proceedings.  However, this particular contempt appeal also touches upon fundamental due process rights of an Accused, Mr Milošević, charged with  particularly serious offences in a way that other contempt proceedings heard at this Tribunal have not. 

7.       A central argument made by the Appellant in his grounds of appeal is that the Trial Chamber should not have allowed his cross-examination to continue in the absence of the Accused and that, as a result, he should never have been put in the position of refusing an order of the Tribunal and subsequently being charged with contempt of the Tribunal for such a refusal.  Prior to the commencement of the contempt proceedings against him, the Appellant requested the Trial Chamber to reconsider its ruling on this basis.  The Trial Chamber refused to do so on the basis that it was not its role to reconsider such a decision, one which it already had determined was warranted, in the context of a proceeding of contempt against the Appellant.

8.       In these circumstances, if the Appeals Chamber refuses due to a procedural irregularity to accept the Appellant’s Brief as validly filed, then the Appellant is placed in the unfortunate position of being charged with contempt but denied the opportunity to respond fully to that criminal charge. Upon this basis, the Appeals Chamber has determined that the possible implications of this contempt proceeding for the rights of the Accused Mr Milošević warrant some leniency to the Appellant despite his Counsel’s failure to abide by the Scheduling Order of the Appeals Chamber.

9.       On the basis of the foregoing, the Appellant’s Brief filed on 20 June 2005 is deemed to be validly filed. […]  

p. 3: NOTING that Pavković’s and Lukić’s Motions seek authorization to file their notices of appeal within 60 days from the filing of the B/C/S translation of the Trial Judgement on the ground that neither of them understand English;[1]

CONSIDERING that Counsel for Pavković and Lukić work in English;

RECALLING that, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules, the Appeals Chamber may, after the filing of the notice of appeal by a party and on good cause being shown by motion, authorize a variation of grounds of appeal;

CONSIDERING therefore that Pavković and Lukić will have the opportunity, if they so wish, to request variation of their grounds of appeal after having read the B/C/S translation of the Trial Judgement, provided that they show good cause under Rule 108 of the Rules;

FURTHER CONSIDERING that it would be unreasonable to delay the appellate proceedings until the filing of the B/C/S translation of the Trial Judgement;

FINDING therefore that Pavković and Lukić have not shown good cause for the requested extension;

pp. 3-4: CONSIDERING that the length of the Trial Judgement is unprecedented and that, in conjunction with the other factors referred by the Joint Motion, this case raises issues of significant complexity;[2]

CONSIDERING that it is in the interests of justice to ensure that the parties have sufficient time to prepare meaningful notices of appeal in full conformity with the applicable provisions;

FINDING that good cause exists for granting an extension on that basis[.]

See also, Decision on Joint Defence Motion Seeking Extension of Time to File Appeal Briefs, 29 June 2009.

24. As indicated above, Rule 65(E) establishes the procedure by which the Prosecution should indicate its intention to seek a stay of a decision of a Trial Chamber granting an accused’s provisional release application. However, while the Appeals Chamber is of the view that Rule 127 should not be relied upon by the Prosecution as a means of circumventing the correct procedure set out in the Rules, the Appeals Chamber is also not persuaded that the Trial Chamber erred in applying that Rule to receive the Prosecution’s application for a stay as validly filed. The sole purpose of Rule 127(A)(ii) is to allow for exception to a strict application of the Rules where “good cause” exists for allowing that exception.

25. In the Impugned Decision, the Trial Chamber did not provide clear reasons for its finding that “good cause” existed for the application of Rule 127(A)(ii) to the requirements of Rule 65(E), but it was clearly within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to do so. In its stay application, the Prosecution made clear its intention to appeal the Impugned Decision. The “good cause”, as recently recognised by the Appeals Chamber in Prlić when it granted the Prosecution’s application for a stay of provisional release orders of a Trial Chamber, is the preservation of the object of the Prosecution’s appeal against the provisional release of the accused.[1] Preservation of the object of the appeal was the “concrete motivation” of the Judges of the Trial Chamber in granting the Prosecution’s stay application.

17. […] The Appeals Chamber acknowledges that neither the Rules nor the relevant Practice Directions require the inclusion of a word count or provide for a time-limit for the filing of Registry submissions pursuant to Rule 33(B) of the Rules. However, the Appeals Chamber has previously imposed time-limits and required the inclusion of a word count in Registry submissions where it found it necessary for the efficient administration of the proceedings and for ensuring equality.[1] Guided by the same considerations, the Appeals Chamber requests the Registry to include a word count in future Rule 33(B) submissions in response to motions filed in the present case and to make such submissions within ten days of the filing of the respective motion.

14.     An appellant “may” file a reply within four days of the filing of the response.[1] […]

15.     […] Moreover, the Appeals Chamber considers that striking the Reply Brief does not run counter to the interests of justice in the same manner as striking the Appeal Brief would in this case.[2] In this context, the Appeals Chamber considers that a reply is an optional filing and finds that it is not necessary to the consideration of this appeal. In view of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber grants the Motion to Strike and shall not consider the Reply Brief.

16.     The Appeals Chamber emphasises that procedural time-limits are to be respected as they are indispensable to the proper functioning of the Mechanism.[3] Violations of time-limits, unaccompanied by any showing of good cause, will not be tolerated.[4] The Appeals Chamber warns Duty Counsel that failure to respect filing deadlines may result in a determination that Duty Counsel is ineligible to represent an accused or suspect before the Mechanism.[5]

12.     Even where counsel has failed to demonstrate good cause justifying the late filing, the Appeals Chamber may recognize submissions as validly filed where they are of such substantial importance to the appeal that doing so is in the interests of justice.[1] Extensions may also be granted where counsel’s conduct has not sufficiently protected the rights of the appellant.[2] The Appeals Chamber considers that the Appeal Brief is of substantial importance to the protection of the rights of the appellant. To reject it could result in the dismissal of Munyarugarama’s appeal.[3] Moreover, recognizing the Appeal Brief as validly filed would not prejudice the Prosecution, which responded to the Appeal Brief, or impact the timely consideration of this appeal.[4] Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that it is in the interests of justice to recognize the Appeal Brief as validly filed. 

23. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the factors cited in support of her Motion to Exceed Word Limit constitute exceptional circumstances. She has asserted the complexity of the legal and factual issues on appeal[1] without defining exactly what these complexities are. It is also well established that the number of grounds and sub-grounds of appeal,[2] the number of authorities cited,[3] and the extensiveness of the trial record and length of the trial[4] do not inevitably impede an appellant’s ability to present salient and cogent appeal briefs within the prescribed word limit, and that these factors do not therefore, in and of themselves, constitute exceptional circumstances. Regarding the Appellant’s assertion that an extension of the word limit is also necessitated by the Trial Chamber’s refusal to grant the Appellant’s requests for leave to appeal three of the Trial Chamber’s preliminary decisions, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Appellant has failed to explain precisely why this is the case. The mere fact that the Trial Chamber denied the requests for leave to appeal these three decisions does not invariably prevent the Appellant from concisely discussing the most relevant aspects of these decisions within the prescribed word limit.

24. While a number of the issues on appeal, including an examination of European and international law on freedom of expression, are important issues, the significance of the issues on appeal does not in and of itself prevent an appellant from presenting sound submissions on those issues within the set word limit.[5] The quality and effectiveness of an appellant’s brief are not contingent on the length of the submissions, but on the cogency and clarity of the arguments presented.[6] In the instant case the Appeal is somewhat unnecessarily repetitive.[7] Also, the discussion of certain related issues extending over numerous paragraphs could be consolidated into fewer paragraphs, and more concise phrasing used throughout the Appeal as a whole.[8]  In view of the foregoing therefore, the Appellant’s request for extension of the word limit is, by majority, Judge Morrison dissenting, denied.

The Appeals Chamber has expunged from the record appendixes to the Respondent’s brief which contained legal and factual arguments:

P. 2: NOTING that, pursuant to Paragraph 4 of the Practice Direction on the Length of Briefs and Motions on Appeal,[1] “[a]ny appendix or book of authorities does not count towards the page limit”;

P. 3: NOTING that, pursuant to the same provision, “[a]n appendix or book of authorities will not contain legal or factual arguments, but rather references, source materials, items from the record, exhibits and other relevant, non-argumentative material”;

CONSIDERING that Annexures A through G of Appendix A contain legal and factual arguments as follows […];

P. 4: FINDING that Annexures A through G of Appendix A to the Consolidated Respondent’s Brief cannot be considered as appendixes under Paragraph 4 of the Practice Direction;

CONSIDERING that Annexure H of Appendix A “Chart of Factual Findings” and Appendix B “Authorities Cited” were filed in compliance with Paragraph 4 of the Practice Direction;

REJECT the filings of Annexures A through G of Appendix A to the Consolidated Respondent’s Brief;

DIRECT the Registry to return the aforementioned Annexures to the Prosecution and to expunge them from the record [.]

CONSIDERING that […] in principle, Counsel must organise his commitments in such a way that he is able to meet deadlines […]

CONSIDERING that, in general, the Appeals Chamber need not take into account Counsel’s commitments when setting deadlines […]

14. […] However, Haxhiu has requested the Appeals Chamber to recognize the late filing as validly done pursuant to Rules 127(A)(ii) and 127(B) of the Rules. He concedes that “counsel’s unfamiliarity with the Appeals Chamber’s procedure does not constitute good cause for an extension of time.”[1] Indeed, the Appeals Chamber recalls that “counsel participating in appeals proceedings are expected to familiarize themselves with the procedural requirements.”[2]

15. […] Given the existence of only a few judgements on appeal in contempt proceedings before the International Tribunal, Counsel is expected to have acquainted himself with the relevant jurisprudence on this issue. Accordingly, no good cause has been shown that would allow the Appeals Chamber to exercise its discretion in recognizing the filing of the Notice of Appeal as validly done.

7. The Appeals Chamber recalls that “sufficient reasons constituting good cause” pursuant to Rule 127(A)(i) and (B) of the Rules are required to recognize a late filing as validly done.[1] Exceptionally, the Appeals Chamber has, in specific circumstances, found good cause to recognize a late filing as validly done in the interests of justice.[2] […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that Counsel “is under an obligation to give absolute priority to observe the time limits as foreseen in the Rules” and that “a trip abroad” does not constitute good cause for an extension of the time limit.[3] Absence from The Hague does not constitute good cause either.

See also the Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu and Judge Schomburg.

CONSIDERING that motions for clarification will be granted only in exceptional circumstances, for example, when the operative part of the decision made by the Appeals Chamber is involved, and more particularly where the motion does not request a reconsideration of the decision;

11. […] The Appeals Chamber notes that in the Blaškić case, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY considered that “the purpose of a response is to give a full answer to the issues raised in a motion by the moving party”.[1] […]

12. […] Most of the submissions in Mr. Ndayambaje’s Response relate solely to his case and challenge the Impugned Decision with regard to its order to him to file a revised witness list containing a maximum of thirty witnesses.[2] The Appeals Chamber finds that these arguments are inadmissible with respect to the appeal of the Appellant as they are not made in response to that appeal. For Mr. Ndayambaje to raise these arguments on his own behalf with respect to the restriction on the number of witnesses he is permitted to call, he needs to have obtained certification. He cannot attempt to appeal the Impugned Decision with the objective of having the Trial Chamber’s reduction of the number of his witnesses reversed by filing a response to a certified appeal of a co-accused.

13. […] Accordingly, Mr. Ntahobali’s Response challenges the Impugned Decision and the Trial Chamber’s use of its discretion.[3] The Appeals Chamber considers that, as Mr. Ntahobali did not seek and was not granted certification to appeal from the Impugned Decision, his arguments in this regard are inadmissible before the Appeals Chamber.

Fn. 881. […] Because Nizeyimana raised this contention for the first time in his Reply Brief, and thereby deprived the Prosecution of an opportunity to respond, the Appeals Chamber will not address it.

36. There is nothing in the Rules to suggest that different dates must be set for each party to file its closing brief.  […] [T]he purpose of a closing brief […] is not to respond to the other party’s closing brief, but to express its own position regarding the charges set out in indictment and the evidence led in the case. The practice generally followed at the ICTR and the ICTY is for both parties to file their closing brief at the same time.  […]

9. The Appeals Chamber notes that Uwinkindi understands neither English nor French.[1] However, the Pre-Appeal Judge has previously found that Uwinkindi’s counsel can work in English and is able to discuss the contents of legal documents with his client.[2] Moreover, the Appeals Chamber reiterates that, on appeal, counsel bear the main burden in preparing submissions,[3] allowing sufficient time to discuss relevant issues with their clients,[4] as well as ensuring the timely submission of all pleadings. The determination of potential grounds of appeal falls primarily within the purview of counsel and good cause for extending a deadline to file a notice of appeal is normally not present where the judicial determination, which is the subject of the appeal, is made in a language in which counsel can work.[5] Accordingly, Uwinkindi has not shown the existence of good cause warranting the late filing of his Notice of Appeal.

3. Mr. Renzaho now requests an extension of time to file his Appellant’s Brief within 75 days from the service to him and his Counsel of the French translation of the Trial Judgement.[1] In support of his request, Mr. Renzaho submits that because he is francophone and can neither speak nor read English, he is incapable of fully understanding the Trial Judgement, properly discussing grounds of appeal, and actively participating in the drafting of his Appellant’s Brief, particularly with respect to factual issues.[2] […]

4. Rule 116(A) of the Rules allows for the extension of time of any deadline on a showing of good cause. Pursuant to Rule 116(B) of the Rules, where the ability of the convicted person to make full answer and defence depends on the availability of a decision in an official language other than that in which it was issued, that circumstance shall be taken into account as a good cause. This provision may provide a basis for an extension of time, upon request, for the filing of the convicted person’s Appellant’s Brief pending the translation of the Trial Judgement into a working language of the Tribunal which he or she understands.[3]

5. Mr. Renzaho’s circumstances constitute good cause to extend the time for the filing of his Appellant’s Brief from the filing of the French translation of the Trial Judgement.

6. Mr. Renzaho’s Lead Counsel has the ability to work in both English and French,[4] and may therefore discuss the draft of the Appellant’s Brief with Mr. Renzaho, subject to his final approval once the French translation of the Trial Judgement is filed. It is therefore appropriate in this instance to allow a limited extension of time. 

See also, the “Decision on Tharcisse Renzaho’s Motion for Extension of Time for the Filing of Notice of Appeal and Brief in Reply” rendered in this case on 22 September 2009, where the Appeals Chamber held:

4. Pursuant to Rule 116(B) of the Rules, where the ability of the convicted person to make full answer and defence depends on the availability of a decision in an official language other than that in which it was issued, that circumstance shall be taken into account as a good cause. In practice, Rule 116(B) of the Rules does not provide a basis for an extension of time for the filing of a Notice of Appeal where the convicted person’s counsel can work in the language in which the Trial Judgement was pronounced.[5] This provision may, however, provide a basis for an extension of time, upon request, for the filing of the convicted person’s brief on appeal (“Appellant’s Brief”) pending the translation of the Trial Judgement into a working language of the Tribunal which he or she understands.[6]

5. In the present case, the information provided by the Registry shows that Mr. Renzaho’s Lead Counsel has indicated that French is his mother tongue and that he has a “good” knowledge of English, with the ability to read, speak, and write it fluently.[7] He is therefore able to discuss the contents of the Trial Judgement as well as any possible grounds of appeal with Mr. Renzaho. The determination of potential grounds of appeal falls primarily within the purview of Defence Counsel and, if an application is made after the Trial Judgement becomes available in French and good cause is shown, leave may be granted to vary the grounds of appeal under Rule 108 of the Rules.[8] For these reasons, Mr. Renzaho has not demonstrated good cause for an extension of time for the filing of his Notice of Appeal.

At para. 3, the ICTR Appeals Chamber confirmed the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s finding that the delay for filing an appeal brief in an appeal from a Rule 11bis decision is 15 days:

3. Rule 11bis(H) sets a time frame of fifteen days for the filing of a notice of appeal, but is silent on the period for filing an appeal brief. Under the equivalent provision of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber has followed a practice of allowing fifteen days from the filing of the notice of appeal for the filing of the appeal brief on the merits.[1] The Appeals Chamber sees no reason to depart from this practice in considering appeals under Rule 11bis in this Tribunal.

54. The Appeals Chamber recalls that “a party may, without requesting leave from the Appeals Chamber, file a corrigendum to their previously filed brief or motion whenever a minor or clerical error in said brief or motion is subsequently discovered and where correction of the error is necessary in order to provide clarification”.[1] Consequently, while the Appeals Chamber is cognizant of the lateness of such filing, there was no need for the Appellant to seize it with a Motion in this respect.

55. Having reviewed the proposed corrections, the Appeals Chamber notes that most of the submitted amendments indeed correct grammatical or typing errors, or inaccurate references. While corrections 5, 11, 15, 29, 54, 65, 66, 76 seem to go slightly beyond clerical corrections, the Appeals Chamber considers that they, while usefully providing clarifications to the respective sentences, do not amount to any substantial changes of the Appellant’s Brief and can thus be equally permitted.

14. [T]he Appeals Chamber notes that the Appellant filed the separate Corrigendum Motion to correct a clerical error in his Reply to the First Rule 115 Motion.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalls that “a party may, without requesting leave from the Appeals Chamber, file a corrigendum to their previously filed brief or motion whenever a minor or clerical error in said brief or motion is subsequently discovered and where correction of the error is necessary in order to provide clarification”.[2] Although it was unnecessary for the Appellant to file a motion to this extent, the Appeals Chamber finds that the submitted amendment indeed corrects an obvious clerical error and does not amount to any substantial change of the Appellant’s Reply to the First Rule 115 Motion. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Appellant’s Reply to the First Rule 115 Motion should be read in accordance with the amendments proposed by the Corrigendum Motion and allowed by the present decision.

13. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a brief in reply must be “limited to arguments in reply to the Respondent’s Brief” and therefore that it should not contain new allegations of error[1] Consequently, the Second Supplemental Reply Brief should have been limited to the Prosecution’s arguments in response to the Appellant’s supplemental arguments, which in turn should have been limited to the potential impact of the three elements of additional evidence admitted on appeal.[2] Without having sought leave from the Appeals Chamber, the Appellant chose to include in his Second Supplemental Reply Brief a “reply to assertions raised by the [P]rosecution for the first time during oral arguments that certain of Appellant’s factual arguments under the sub-heading 1.2(1) lack evidentiary support in the certified trial record”.[3] This procedure was improper.

6.         […] A heavy workload in other cases and inadequate resources to deal with them all is not an appropriate basis for seeking an extension of time.  Counsel for the prosecution in an appeal is expected to be provided by the Office of the Prosecutor with the resources necessary to carry the workload in the particular case, and his or her workload in other cases will ordinarily be rejected as the basis for an extension of time, just as it has ordinarily been rejected for counsel for the accused.  Where there are special circumstances personal to counsel in relation to the particular case (be it for the prosecution or the accused), the Appeals Chamber will always consider those circumstances in determining whether an extension of time will be granted.  However, a systemic failure by the Office of the Prosecutor to provide adequate resources for its counsel to do the work which is necessary in the particular case will not be considered.

17. […] The Appeals Chamber finds that Milošević’s Counsel’s failure to at least attempt to satisfy any of the requirements of Rule 115 of the Rules, especially after his previous motions filed under the same provision were rejected for similar reasons,[1] amounts to professional negligence. The Appeals Chamber thus finds the Motion frivolous in the sense of Rule 73(D) of the Rules[2] and issues a warning to Milošević’s counsel under Rule 46(A) of the Rules.

[…]

21. For the foregoing reasons, the Appeals Chamber DISMISSES the Motion in its entirety, FINDS the Motion to be frivolous and IMPOSES A SANCTION against Milošević’s Counsel, pursuant to Rule 73(D) of the Rules, in the form of non-payment of fees associated with the Motion.

CONSIDERING that the quality and effectiveness of appeal briefs does not depend on their length but on the clarity and cogency of the presented arguments and that, therefore, excessively long briefs do not necessarily serve the cause of an efficient administration of justice; 

70. Moreover, ordinarily a reply is restricted to dealing with issues raised in an opposing party’s response. If a party raises a new argument or request for the first time in a reply then the opposing party is deprived of an opportunity to respond. This could harm the fairness of the appeal proceedings.

CONSIDERING that determination of the potential grounds of appeal from a judgement, that may include errors of fact and law, are issues for the determination of both the appellant and his or her counsel;

15. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls the well-established practice at this Tribunal that allegations of partiality of trial judges are dealt with in the course of the normal appellate process, i.e., in the appeal judgement.[1] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that it has already made a determination, in the present case, that it will make its own assessment of the issues relating to the alleged partiality of Judge Harhoff in the course of the normal appellate process.[2]

16. With respect to the Applicants’ first argument, the Appeals Chamber recalls its previous finding that there has been no “general finding” or “final determination” regarding Judge Harhoff’s alleged partiality in this case and that thus there is no basis for a claim of “ongoing prejudice” during the appeal proceedings.[3] The fairness and validity of the Trial Judgement is yet to be determined by the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chamber therefore rejects the Applicants’ argument that the appeal proceedings are themselves improper and unfair because the Trial Judgement is invalid. In relation to the Applicants’ arguments that the Grounds of Appeal are “credible” based on the Appeals Chamber’s decision to admit the Letter as additional evidence on appeal, the Appeals Chamber notes that this decision was made in the context of, and is limited to Rule 115 of the Rules. The Appeals Chamber emphasises its previous conclusion that the Rule 115 Decision “pertain[s]] strictly to the admissibility [of the Letter ]] and not to the merits of the appeals filed by the parties”.^[4] The Appeals Chamber further emphasises that the credibility and merits of the appeals filed by the parties will be determined in due course by the Appeals Chamber. It is therefore not necessary to depart from the Tribunal’s well-established practice[5] on the basis that these proceedings “[flow] […] from an invalid Trial Judgement” as alleged by the Applicants.[6] The Applicants’ arguments in this regard are therefore without merit.

17. Regarding the Applicants’ second and third arguments, the Appeals Chamber notes that under Articles 20(1) and 21(4)(c) of the Statute, the Appeals Chamber has the primary obligation to ensure that a person convicted by a Trial Chamber has a fair and expeditious process on appeal. The Appeals Chamber is now seised of the fully briefed appeals. It is considering them and will deliver its judgement in due course.[7] The Appeals Chamber observes that the Applicants’ arguments of judicial economy and potential undue delay in the proceedings are based on a speculative premise as to the outcome of the appeals as a whole.[8] However, as previously emphasised, the outcome of the appeals lodged by the parties will be determined in the appeal judgement.[9] Therefore, the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that “possible remedies” which might be ordered by it merit a departure from the practice of this Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber further emphasises that proceeding through the normal appellate process in the present case does not prejudice the Applicants. For these reasons, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that judicial economy or the interests of justice require it to depart from the normal appellate process, i.e. considering the appeals as whole.

18. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds no justification to expedite adjudication of the Grounds of Appeal. 

46.     The Appeals Chamber further finds that the failure to file an Appellant’s brief in support of a notice of appeal carries serious consequences as to the admissibility of the entire appeal. Rule 111 states that an Appellant’s brief shall contain all the argument and authorities. An appeal, which consists of a Notice of Appeal that lists the grounds of Appeal but is not supported by an Appellant’s brief, is rendered devoid of all of the arguments and authorities; the right to appeal may therefore be considered as having been waived if the Notice of Appeal is not followed by the timely filing of an Appellant’s brief. The Appeals Chamber notes that procedural time-limits are to be respected, and that they are indispensable to the proper functioning of the Tribunal and to the fulfilment of its mission to do justice.[1] Violations of these time-limits, unaccompanied by any showing of good cause, will not be tolerated.[2]

18. […][T]he Appeals Chamber agrees that judicial economy may be a basis for rejecting a motion that is frivolous, wasteful, or that will cause duplication of proceedings.

468. As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Chamber clarifies that it considers that the Prosecution did not exceed the scope of its response brief by arguing that the Indictment was not defective regarding the count of conspiracy to commit genocide. The purpose of a response brief is to give a full answer to the issues raised in the relevant appeal brief[1] and there is nothing in the Rules or the relevant practice directions prohibiting a party from raising an allegation of error in the Trial Judgement in response to an issue raised by the other party. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber finds no merit in Nyiramasuhuko’s argument that the Prosecution should have requested leave to argue that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that the Indictment was defective as regards the charge of conspiracy to commit genocide.

32.     […] A three-stage process is established by the Rules and the relevant Practice Directions for the filing of written submissions before the International Tribunal. For motions filed during appeals from judgement, as is the case here, the moving party is requested to file a motion containing (i) the precise ruling or relief sought; (ii) the specific provision of the Rules under which the ruling or relief is sought; and (iii) the grounds on which the ruling or relief is sought.[1] The opposite party is entitled to file a response stating whether or not the motion is opposed and the grounds therefore,[2] and the moving party may file a reply[3] restricted to dealing with issues raised in the opposite party’s response.[4]  The Appeals Chamber recognizes that it is not possible to require a party to anticipate all the arguments made in response by the opposite party. The very purpose of a reply is to permit the moving party to rebut the arguments raised in opposition by the other party. Subject to a rejoinder, this can sometime necessitate submitting an argument not developed in the initial motion. However, this right to fully address the opposing party’s arguments does not allow the moving party to use its reply to make new claims or to raise totally new arguments. As the Appeals Chamber has already stated, if a party raises in a reply an argument or request for the first time, then the opposing party is deprived of an opportunity to respond and this can harm the fairness of the proceedings.[5] That is notably why the core of the moving party’s arguments must be provided in the initial motion and not raised for the first time in the reply.

FINDING that no explanation has been provided which would justify an extension of time or page limits to the Appellant for the filing of his reply, and that a request by a party for extension of time does not automatically amount to a showing of good cause by the opposing party;

Page 3:

CONSIDERING that Karadžić’s reply expands on his submissions made in the Motion to which the Prosecution had sufficient opportunity to respond;

FINDING, therefore, that Karadžić’s reply contains no new issue that would justify granting leave to file a sur-reply;

Footnote 42:

As concerns the Supplement [Supplement to Motion to Admit Additional Evidence, 2 December 2017] filed by Karadžić, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a party is to seek leave to file supplemental authorities. See Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Decision on Prosecution’s “Notice of Supplemental Authority”, 14 May 2007, p. 2. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Supplement, which concerns factual determinations based on a separate record reviewed by a separate trial chamber of the ICTY, does not present supplemental legal authority that would assist in the adjudication of the Motion.

Pages 2, 3:

RECALLING that, pursuant to Rule 3(F) of the Rules, if a party is required to take any action within a specified time after the filing or service of a document by another party, and pursuant to the Rules, that document is filed in a language other than one of the working languages of the Mechanism, time shall not run until the party required to take action has received from the Registrar a translation of the document into one of the working languages of the Mechanism;

RECALLING FURTHER that, pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Practice Direction, where a party applies to present additional evidence pursuant to Rule 142 of the Rules, the “relevant documents and exhibits, where applicable, shall be translated into one of the languages of the Mechanism”;

[…]

CONSIDERING that, pursuant to Rule 3(F) of the Rules, the time for the Prosecution to respond to the relevant Rule 142 Motions should not run until it has received a translation of the Affected Annexes into one of the working languages of the Mechanism;

CONSIDERING FURTHER that it is in the interests of justice and effective case management to synchronise the briefing schedule for the Rule 142 Motions;[1]

FINDING, therefore, that it is justified that the time for the filing of the Prosecution’s response(s), if any, to the Rule 142 Motions shall run from the date of service on the Prosecution of the final translation of the Affected Annexes;

[…]