Cumulative charging

Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

1029. It is established case-law that cumulative convictions for genocide and crime against humanity are permissible on the basis of the same acts, as each has a materially distinct element from the other, namely, on the one hand, “the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”, and, on the other, “a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population”.[1]

[1] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 426; Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 318. With specific reference to cumulative convictions for genocide and extermination, see Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 542; Musema Appeal Judgement, paras. 366-367, 370. 

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 20.02.2001 DELALIĆ et al. (Čelebići)
(IT-96-21-A)

400. Cumulative charging is to be allowed in light of the fact that, prior to the presentation of all of the evidence, it is not possible to determine to a certainty which of the charges brought against an accused will be proven. The Trial Chamber is better poised, after the parties’ presentation of the evidence, to evaluate which of the charges may be retained, based upon the sufficiency of the evidence.  In addition, cumulative charging constitutes the usual practice of both this Tribunal and the ICTR.  

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 16.11.2001 MUSEMA Alfred
(ICTR-96-13-A)

369.   On the issue of cumulative charges, ICTY Appeals Chamber in Čelebići held:

[c]umulative charging is to be allowed in light of the fact that, prior to the presentation of all of the evidence, it is not possible to determine to a certainty which of the charges brought against an accused will be proven.  The Trial Chamber is better poised, after the parties’ presentation of the evidence, to evaluate which of the charges may be retained, based upon the sufficiency of the evidence.  In addition, cumulative charging constitutes the usual practice of both this Tribunal and ICTR.[1]

The Appeals Chamber finds that the above holding on cumulative charges reflects a general principle and is equally applicable to ICTR.  As a result, the Appeals Chamber confirms that cumulative charging is generally permitted.

370.   […] The Appeals Chamber further holds that cumulative charging is generally permitted.

[1] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 400.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 19.03.2019 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(MICT-13-55-A)

56. The Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s determination that the Indictment sufficiently pleaded the crime of deportation and recalls that, in relation to the alleged forcible displacements of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats […] the Indictment stated that such displacements occurred “either across a de facto or de jure border or internally without the crossing of a de facto or de jure border”.[1] The Appeals Chamber further considers that the allegations were pleaded with sufficient specificity, particularly considering that the expulsions resulted from a number of attacks over a prolonged period of time and that Karadžić was not alleged to have directly participated in such expulsions.[2] The Appeals Chamber likewise considers, in view of the established practice allowing cumulative charging, that the Prosecution was not required to distinguish in the Indictment which events resulted in deportation as opposed to inhumane acts (forcible transfer).[3]

[1] See Indictment, paras. 48, 69, 71, 72.

[2] Cf. Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 24 (“Whether particular facts are material depends on the nature of the Prosecution case. […] [L]ess detail may be acceptable if the sheer scale of the alleged crimes makes it impracticable to require a high degree of specificity in such matters as the identity of the victims and the dates for the commission of the crimes.”) (internal quotations and references omitted). See also Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 91 (“A decisive factor in determining the degree of specificity with which the Prosecution is required to particularise the facts of its case in the indictment is the nature of the alleged criminal conduct of the accused.”).

[3] See Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 276; Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 103.

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