1696. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber considers that […] there is no express time frame included in the foreseeability standard […][1] […]

1557. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber erred in law in concluding that for JCE III liability to arise, it must be foreseeable to the accused that the crime “would be committed”.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the jurisprudence subsequent to the Brđanin Decision[2] confirmed that JCE III liability arises even if the JCE member knows that the commission of the crime is only a “possible consequence” of the execution of the common purpose.[3] It is necessary “that the possibility a crime could be committed is sufficiently substantial as to be foreseeable to the accused.”[4] The correct legal standard for the JCE III mens rea requires that it was foreseeable to the accused that such a crime might be committed by a member of the JCE or one or more of the persons used by the accused (or by any other member of the JCE) in order to carry out the actus reus of the crimes forming part of the common purpose[5] and the accused willingly took the risk that such a crime might occur by joining or continuing to participate in the enterprise.[6] The Appeals Chamber discerns no cogent reason to depart from its jurisprudence on this matter.

1558. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber finds no merit in Šainović’s assertion that the Trial Chamber’s approach is “deeply compatible and consistent”[7] with the Appeals Chamber’s affirmation of the “possibility” standard. While it is necessary that the crime be foreseeable based on the “information available to the accused”,[8] this does not reflect the degree of foreseeability required. It is the degree of foreseeability that marks the difference between the “possibility” and “probability” standards. Šainović’s argument is therefore dismissed. The Appeals Chamber further considers that awareness of a higher likelihood of risk and a volitional element are reflected in the mens rea for JCE III. The Appeals Chamber recalls in this respect that “criminal responsibility may be imposed upon an actor for a crime falling outside [the common purpose], even where he only knew that the perpetration of such a crime was merely a possible consequence, rather than substantially likely to occur, and nevertheless participated in the [JCE]” because the accused already possesses the intent to participate and further the common criminal purpose of a group.[9] Lukić’s argument is accordingly dismissed.

[…]

1575. The question of whether persecution, through sexual assaults, committed in Beleg, Ćirez/Qirez, and Priština/Prishtina were foreseeable to Šainović and Lukić must be assessed in relation to their individual knowledge. Depending on the information available, what may be foreseeable to one member of a JCE, might not be foreseeable to another.[10] Consequently, the Appeals Chamber will consider whether it was foreseeable to them, individually, that sexual assaults could be committed and that they willingly took that risk. While the Appeals Chamber is cognisant that situations of widespread violence against the civilian population are conducive to the commission of a wide range of criminal acts, for JCE III liability to arise it must be established that the possibility of sexual violence being committed was sufficiently substantial as to be foreseeable to each accused.[11]

The Appeals Chamber affirmed that “an accused may be responsible for crimes committed beyond the common purpose of the systemic joint criminal enterprise, if they were a natural and foreseeable consequence thereof.” (para. 86). It then clarified the requirement that the crime be a natural and foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise: 

86. […] [I]t is to be emphasized that this question must be assessed in relation to the knowledge of a particular accused.  This is particularly important in relation to the systemic form of joint criminal enterprise, which may involve a large number of participants performing distant and distinct roles. What is natural and foreseeable to one person participating in a systemic joint criminal enterprise, might not be natural and foreseeable to another, depending on the information available to them. Thus, participation in a systemic joint criminal enterprise does not necessarily entail criminal responsibility for all crimes which, though not within the common purpose of the enterprise, were a natural or foreseeable consequence of the enterprise. A participant may be responsible for such crimes only if the Prosecution proves that the accused had sufficient knowledge such that the additional crimes were a natural and foreseeable consequence to him.     

623.   The Appeals Chamber recalls that convictions for deviatory crimes that are not part of the joint criminal enterprise’s common purpose are possible pursuant to the third or extended form of joint criminal enterprise. Convictions for such crimes require that the additional deviatory crimes were a “foreseeable” possible consequence of carrying out “the actus reus of the crimes forming part of the common purpose”, and that “the accused, with the awareness that such a [deviatory] crime was a possible consequence of the implementation of th₣eğ enterprise, decided to participate in that enterprise”.[1]

[…]

627.   The Appeals Chamber recalls that an accused can be held responsible for crimes beyond the common purpose of a joint criminal enterprise if they were a natural and foreseeable consequence thereof.[2] However, as recalled by the Appeals Chamber, what is natural and foreseeable to one person participating in a joint criminal enterprise, might not be natural and foreseeable to another, depending on the information available to them.[3] Thus, participation in a joint criminal enterprise does not necessarily entail criminal responsibility for all crimes which, though not within the common purpose of the enterprise, were a natural or foreseeable consequence of the enterprise.[4]

[…]

629.   A trial chamber must be satisfied that the only reasonable inference is that the accused, through his knowledge and through the level of his involvement in the joint criminal enterprise would foresee that the extended crime would possibly be perpetrated.[5] […]

See also para. 564.

433. […] For liability under the third form of joint criminal enterprise, it is required that an accused had the intent to commit the crimes that form part of the common purpose of the joint criminal enterprise and to participate in a common plan aimed at their commission, as well as that it was foreseeable to him or her that a crime falling outside the common purpose might be perpetrated by any other member of the joint criminal enterprise, or one or more of the persons used by the accused or other members of the joint criminal enterprise to further the common purpose, and that the accused willingly took the risk that the crime might occur by joining or continuing to participate in the enterprise.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the ICTY Appeals Chamber has consistently declined to apply a standard requiring foreseeability that the crime falling outside the common criminal purpose would “probably” be committed for liability under the third form of joint criminal enterprise to attach but recognized instead that the possibility that a crime could be committed must be sufficiently substantial.[2] The Appeals Chamber also reiterates that, although not bound by decisions of the ICTY and the ICTR Appeals Chambers, in the interests of legal certainty, it should follow such previous decisions and depart from them only for cogent reasons in the interests of justice.[3] This would be the case where the previous decision was decided on the basis of a wrong legal principle or was given per incuriam, that is, it was wrongly decided, usually because the judges were not well-informed about the applicable law.[4]

434. The Appeals Chamber observes that it is not bound by the findings of other courts – domestic, international, or hybrid – or by the extrajudicial writings, separate or dissenting opinions of its Judges, or by views expressed in academic literature.[5] On review of the judgement in [R v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen (“Jogee”)], the Appeals Chamber does not find any cogent reason for departing from the Appeals Chamber’s well-established jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Jogee changed the mens rea applicable in England and Wales and the jurisdictions bound by the jurisprudence of the Privy Council for accessorial liability resulting from participation in a joint enterprise.[6] However, the form of individual criminal responsibility under the third type of joint criminal enterprise is “commission”, resulting in liability as a perpetrator, not as an accessory.[7] In this sense, Jogee is not directly on point. […]

 435. In addition, the Appeals Chamber does not find persuasive arguments that the shift in the law of England and Wales on this point warrants reconsideration and possible reversal of established appellate jurisprudence of the ICTY. Although the common law notion of liability due to participation in a joint enterprise may have been influential in the development of ICTY case law, Karadžić’s argument that the relevant principles in ICTY jurisprudence were derived from English law is not accurate. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case extensively examined a series of post-World War II cases from various domestic jurisdictions concerning war crimes and concluded that the relevant actus reus and mens rea for liability under the three forms of joint criminal enterprise were firmly established in customary international law.[8] With regard to the mens rea standard for the third form of joint criminal enterprise, it found that customary international law required that: (i) the accused could foresee that the crime not agreed upon in the common plan “might be perpetrated” by one or other members of the group; and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk.[9] It also clarified that, what was required was intent to pursue the common plan in addition to “foresight that those crimes outside the criminal common purpose were likely to be committed”.[10] Thus, while the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić considered domestic case law in determining customary international law,[11] contrary to Karadžić’s claim, it found that the relevant principles were derived from customary international law, not the law of England and Wales.[12] A shift in the law of England and Wales and the jurisdictions bound by the Privy Council on this point therefore does not per se warrant the reversal of established appellate jurisprudence.

436. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić also assessed whether domestic legislation or case law could be relied upon as a source of international principles or rules under the doctrine of general principles of law recognized by the major legal systems of the world.[13] Its survey led it to conclude that, although the common purpose doctrine “was rooted in the national law of many States”, major domestic jurisdictions did not adopt a common approach with regard to the third form of joint criminal enterprise and that therefore “national legislation and case law cannot be relied upon as a source of international principles or rules” in this context.[14] The shift in the law in Jogee, which has not been followed in other common law jurisdictions,[15] confirms rather than undermines the conclusion in Tadić that different approaches at a domestic level reflect that domestic case law, in such circumstances, cannot be relied upon as a source of international principles.[16] The Appeals Chamber finds that the shift in Jogee does not provide a sufficient basis to revisit Tadić or the relevant mens rea standard as applied in established case law.