12. […] There is nothing wrong in clarifying the law or providing guidelines and directing a party to re-file its submission rather than immediately ruling upon it, insofar as a Chamber provides sound reasons for doing so.[1] Furthermore, the Appeal Chamber recalls that:

[w]hile a Trial Chamber has an obligation to provide reasons for its decision, it is not required to articulate the reasoning in detail. The fact that the Trial Chamber did not mention a particular fact in its written order does not by itself establish that the Chamber has not taken that circumstance into its consideration.[2]

In addition, with respect to the amount of time alloted [sic] to a party for the presentation of its case, the Appeals Chamber has held that “although [a] Trial Chamber must justify its reduction in time by indicating the documents and the competing interests it considered, it does not need to specifically ‘itemise and justify’ all of the bases for this reduction”.[3] This principle is also applicable to a Trial Chamber’s determination on the number of witnesses. In the present case, the Trial Chamber provided adequate reasoning for placing a limit on the number of Rule 92 bis written statements or transcripts that Praljak could tender and sending back the Motions to him without ruling upon the admissibility of each and every Statement, based on a sufficiently particularised and comprehensive analysis of the Statements. [“Statements” or, individually, “Statement” are defined in paragraph 4 as the written statements and transcripts of 155 witnesses, in total, which Praljak requested the Trial Chamber on 14 September, 1 October and 16 October 2009 to admit into evidence pursuant to Rule 92 bis of the Rules]

143. […] While a trier of fact is not obliged to detail every step of its reasoning, in view of its concerns regarding the credibility of Witness KXX and its decision to accept his testimony only where corroborated,[1] the Trial Chamber was compelled to explain why it relied on the uncorroborated account of Witness KXX instead of Witness YH’s testimony with regard to the time of the Appellant’s arrival at Kaduha Parish. The Appeals Chamber will consider below whether, and if necessary, to what extent, the Trial Chamber’s error affects its findings relating to the Appellant’s participation in the attacks at MurambiTechnicalSchool and Kaduha Parish on 21 April 1994 within the time frame emerging from the relevant testimonies.

152. Turning to the issue of distance and driving time, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a Trial Chamber has the obligation to provide a reasoned opinion,[2] but is not required to articulate the reasoning in detail.[3] Although certain evidence may not have been referred to by a Trial Chamber, in the particular circumstances of a given case it may nevertheless be reasonable to assume that the Trial Chamber took it into account.[4] There is no guiding principle on the question to determine the extent to which a Trial Chamber is obliged to set out its reasons for accepting or rejecting a particular testimony.[5]

155. […] the Trial Chamber failed to expressly discuss the Defence evidence to the effect that it was impossible for the Appellant to travel from MurambiTechnicalSchool to Kaduha Parish within this time-frame. The issue was clearly controversial and the evidence presented by the parties in this respect was contradictory. The Trial Chamber should have been clearer in finding that the Appellant was at both MurambiTechnicalSchool and Kaduha Parish, which the Trial Chamber deemed geographically proximate, thereby rejecting his argument regarding impossibility. However, the failure to be more explicit does not indicate the lack of a reasoned judgement, particularly in light of the approximate nature of the evidence offered by Witnesses KSY, YH and AJT1 as discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

416. For the conclusion that the Appellant’s medical background could be cited as an aggravating factor, the Trial Chamber relied on what the Trial Chambers respectively held in the Kayishema and Ruzindana and Ntakirutimana Trial Judgements.[1] The Appeals Chamber does not, however, find that the two ICTR cases are persuasive precedents for the present case. In the Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber simply stated that as a medical doctor Kayishema owed a duty to the community and that this constituted an aggravating factor[2] but did not give any explanation as to the legal basis for its conclusion. The Trial Chamber in Ntakirutimana held that:

the Chamber notes that Gérard Ntakirutimana acknowledges that he departed the hospital leaving the Tutsi patients behind. He explained that the gendarmes had directed him to leave because of increasing lack of security. The Chamber is aware that the security situation was difficult and that, for instance, Oscar Giordano left a few days earlier. However, in the Chamber’s view it is difficult to imagine why the Accused was at particular risk, compared with the remaining persons. According to his own explanation, he did not return to the hospital to inquire as to the condition of patients and staff. The overall situation leaves the Chamber with the impression that the Accused simply abandoned the Tutsi patients. This behaviour is not in conformity with the general picture painted by the Defence of the Accused as a medical doctor who cared for his patients.[3]

This statement of the Trial Chamber as to the duty of a medical doctor appears to have been made in a context which is completely different from that of the case before this Appeals Chamber. Thus, while in that context the conclusion of the Trial Chamber may well be persuasive, the same is not true when the same reasoning is transplanted in a completely different context such as the case of the Appellant. Caution is needed when relying as a legal basis on statements made by Trial Chambers in the context of cases and circumstances that are wholly different. The Appeals Chamber considers that these statements by themselves provide too tenuous a basis for holding that the previous background of the Accused, and the ethical duties stemming from it, are an aggravating factor in international criminal law. While the Trial Chamber has discretion in determining factors in aggravation, the Trial Chamber must provide convincing reasons for its choice of factors. As the basis on which the Trial Chamber found the existence of this aggravating factor is rather tenuous, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber committed a discernible error in identifying the professional background of the Appellant as an aggravating factor. This error impacted on the Trial Chamber’s determination of the sentence and therefore the Appeals Chamber will take it into account when revising the Appellant’s sentence.

The Appeals Chamber recalled that, in reducing the time allocated for the presentation of evidence, Trial Chambers must provide a reasoned opinion:

16. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that a Trial Chamber must, at a minimum, provide reasoning in support of its findings on the substantive considerations relevant for a decision and considers that, in this case, the reasoning in the Impugned Decision in the absence of this assessment is insufficient in itself to support the reduction.[1] While it may be that, in light of the evidence presented to date, the reduction of 107 hours allocated to the Prosecution still permits it a fair opportunity to present its case, the Trial Chamber must specifically consider whether this is indeed so.

144. It is within a Trial Chamber’s discretion to assess any inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, and to determine whether, in the light of the overall evidence, the witnesses were nonetheless reliable and credible.[1] However, the Trial Chamber also has an obligation to provide a reasoned opinion.[2] From the discussion of the evidence in the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber cannot conclude whether a reasonable trier of fact could have relied on the testimony of Witnesses YAI and CCP to convict Muvunyi for this event. The Appeals Chamber is particularly troubled by the numerous inconsistencies in their testimonies as to the core details relating to Muvunyi’s alleged speech[3] and by the utter lack of any discussion of these inconsistencies in the Trial Judgement.[4] In view of this, the Appeals Chamber finds it impossible to assess the finding that the testimony of Witnesses YAI and CCP about the meeting was “strikingly similar” or consistent with respect to the material facts relating to this charge.

147. The Appeals Chamber recalls again that a Trial Chamber has an obligation to provide a reasoned opinion. In this instance, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber did not provide sufficient reasons for preferring the testimony of Witnesses YAI and CCP over that of Witness MO78. The Trial Chamber did not point to any inconsistencies in the evidence of Witness MO78 nor did it identify any reasons for doubting his credibility. The Trial Chamber appears to have deemed Witness MO78 unreliable solely on the basis that his evidence differed from that of Witnesses YAI and CCP. Such an approach is of particular concern given the Trial Chamber’s express recognition[5] of the need to treat the evidence of Witnesses YAI and CCP, unlike the evidence of Witness MO78, with caution.[6] The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that the Trial Chamber failed to provide a reasoned opinion on this point.

14. In addition, the Appeals Chamber emphasizes that the humanitarian and medical grounds advanced by Ngirumpatse in support of his application[1] were relevant factors in deciding whether he will return for trial.[2] As such, they deserved consideration in the assessment of whether Ngirumpatse is a flight risk. In limiting itself to concluding that Ngirumpatse would not receive a better medical treatment in Europe or anywhere else without considering the humanitarian and medical grounds put forward by Ngirumpatse,[3] the Trial Chamber erred in the exercise of its discretion.

15. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to take into account all the factors which were relevant to its taking a fully informed and reasoned decision as to whether, pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules, Ngirumpatse will appear for trial if provisionally released and, more generally, as to whether or not he should be granted provisional release. […]

6. A Trial Chamber is not obliged to deal with all possible factors which a Trial Chamber can take into account when deciding whether it is satisfied that, if released, an accused will appear for trial. It must, however, render a reasoned opinion.[1]  This obliges it to indicate all those relevant factors which a reasonable Trial Chamber would have been expected to take into account before coming to a decision. [...]

The Applicant claimed that the timing and brevity of the Impugned Decision revealed a hurried approach on the part of the Trial Chamber and its failure to adequately consider some important defence arguments. Having recalled its previous jurisprudence,[1] the Appeals Chamber observed:

11. […] The Appellant does not claim an error of law based on this alleged brevity, nor does he identify specific issues, findings or arguments which the Trial Chamber did not address. In view of this, the Appeals Chamber declines to consider this matter. It does note, however, that a Trial Chamber’s efficiency in dealing with the motions pending before it cannot be regarded as a symptom of superficiality, and that the brevity or length of a decision depends upon a number of factors, including the nature of the issue in dispute and the quality of the parties’ arguments.

18. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, under Article 22(2) of the Statute and Rule 88(C) of the Rules, trial chambers are required to provide a reasoned opinion.[1] Accordingly, a trial chamber should set out in a clear and articulate manner the factual and legal findings on the basis of which it reached the decision to convict or acquit an accused.[2] A reasoned opinion in the trial judgement is essential to ensuring that the Tribunal’s adjudications are fair, and, inter alia, allows for a meaningful exercise of the right of appeal by the parties, and enables the Appeals Chamber to understand and review the trial chamber’s findings.[3]

19. The Appeals Chamber finds that the absence of any relevant legal findings in the Trial Judgement constitutes a manifest failure to provide a reasoned opinion. Indeed, the Appeals Chamber considers the magnitude of this error to be unprecedented in the history of the Tribunal. Rather than engaging in “the most careful of analyses”, as it was required to do,[4] the Trial Chamber failed to even attempt to address in the Trial Judgement the most fundamental of issues: whether the evidence adduced was sufficient to prove Bizimungu’s individual criminal responsibility for genocide.[5]

20. In light of these omissions and to safeguard Bizimungu’s right to an effective appeal, the Appeals Chamber ordered that the appeals concerning Bizimungu be severed.[6] For these same reasons, the Appeals Chamber also ordered additional submissions from the parties on the evidentiary basis for Bizimungu’s conviction for genocide.[7]

[…]

23. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber’s failure to provide a reasoned opinion constitutes an error of law which allows the Appeals Chamber to consider the relevant evidence and factual findings in order to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have established beyond reasonable doubt the findings challenged by the appellant.[8]

24. Mindful of the extraordinary nature of the Trial Chamber’s omissions and the gravity of a conviction for genocide, the Appeals Chamber shall assess the findings and evidence relevant to each incident supporting Bizimungu’s genocide conviction to determine whether the elements of genocide are established beyond reasonable doubt.[9] In light of the additional submissions, Bizimungu has had a full and focused opportunity to appeal his genocide conviction and to respond to the Prosecution’s case in this regard. In these circumstances, considerations of fairness do not preclude the Appeals Chamber from conducting this review, and, given the Trial Chamber’s conclusions that genocide was committed and that Bizimungu was responsible for this crime, it is necessary in the interests of justice for the Appeals Chamber to determine whether such findings are sustained by the record.[10]

44. The second error of the Trial Chamber was its failure to provide a reasoned opinion in relation to the feasibility of travel between Kesho Hill and Kanombe. […]

45. The Appeals Chamber notes that “[t]here is a presumption that a Trial Chamber has evaluated all the evidence presented to it, as long as there is no indication that the Trial Chamber completely disregarded any particular piece of evidence.”[1] However, this presumption may be rebutted “when evidence which is clearly relevant to the findings is not addressed by the Trial Chamber’s reasoning.”[2] […]

69. The Appeals Chamber is mindful that evidence concerning specific travel details taken after several years can only be of limited assistance in establishing the time and exact itinerary purportedly taken by Zigiranyirazo on 12 and 17 April 1994. Nevertheless, the various estimates reflect that Rubaya in GisenyiPrefecture is not in close geographic proximity with the Kiyovu area of Kigali. As a result, the distance, time, and feasibility of travel are highly relevant factors in view of the evidence placing Zigiranyirazo at Rubaya on 12 April 1994 and 17 April 1994, as each trip would have resulted in a significant period of absence from Rubaya.[3] […]

70. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber did refer generally to the lengthy journey from Kanombe, which is near Kigali, to Rubaya in recounting the alibi evidence.[4] Therefore, it follows that it was aware of the significant distance in assessing the allegations related to the Kiyovu Roadblock. In such circumstances, the Trial Chamber should have provided clear reasons as to why the alibi did not account for the time when Zigiranyirazo was seen at the Kiyovu Roadblock. This is especially so given the alibi evidence that Witness Bararengana saw Zigiranyirazo on 12 April 1994,[5] evidence which is not easily reconciled with Zigiranyirazo’s presence, according to Witness BCW, at the Kiyovu Roadblock around 11.00 a.m. or 12.00 p.m. on 12 April 1994. As noted above, the brief absences in the area surrounding Rubaya did not provide a reasonable basis for discounting the alibi. While the Trial Chamber might have reasonably rejected Witness Bararengana’s testimony for a number of other reasons when weighed against that of Witness BCW, it did not do so. Rather, it expressly stated that it did not discount Witness Bararengana’s evidence.[6]

When examining the Trial Chamber’s finding that it was satisfied that the Accused, if released, will not pose a danger to victims, witnesses or other persons, the Appeals Chamber held:

11. The Trial Chamber “consider[ed] that there is nothing to suggest that, if released, the Accused will pose” such a danger, and “that the Trial Chamber thereby previously [only] identified the [question of whether the Accused would appear for trial] as being in issue”.[1]  The Trial Chamber is not obliged to deal with all possible factors when deciding whether it is satisfied the requirements of Rule 65(B) are fulfilled, but at a minimum, the Trial Chamber must provide reasoning to support its findings regarding the substantive considerations relevant to its decision.[2]  Here, the Trial Chamber appears, in effect, to have switched the burden to the Prosecution to show that the Accused would pose a danger if released.  In the putative absence of such information, the Trial Chamber appears to have assumed the lack of a danger posed by the Accused’s release.  If the Trial Chamber found, as it must have done so here, that the Accused upon release will pose no danger to persons, then it must provide the reasons for reaching that finding.

In paragraph 20, the Appeals Chamber recalled the essence of the right of an accused to a reasoned opinion and its limits with references to Limaj et al. and Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgements. It also clarified that

20. […] Additionally, a Trial Chamber does not need to set out in detail why it accepted or rejected a particular testimony.[1] This is equally applicable to all evidence, including that tendered by the accused person.

69. The right of an accused under Article 23 of the Statute to a reasoned opinion is an aspect of the fair trial requirement embodied in Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute.  The case-law that has developed under the European Convention on Human Rights establishes that a reasoned opinion is a component of the fair hearing requirement, but that “the extent to which this duty . . . applies may vary according to the nature of the decision” and “can only be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case.”[1]  The European Court of Human Rights has held that a “tribunal’ is not obliged to give a detailed answer to every argument.[2]

23. The Appeals Chamber recalls that every accused has the right to a reasoned opinion under Article 23 of the Statute and Rule 98ter(C) of the Rules.[1]  However, this requirement relates to the Trial Chamber’s Judgement; the Trial Chamber is not under the obligation to justify its findings in relation to every submission made during the trial. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is in the discretion of the Trial Chamber as to which legal arguments to address. With regard to the factual findings, the Trial Chamber is required only to make findings of those facts which are essential to the determination of guilt on a particular count. It is not necessary to refer to the testimony of every witness or every piece of evidence on the trial record.[2] It is to be presumed that the Trial Chamber evaluated all the evidence presented to it, as long as there is no indication that the Trial Chamber completely disregarded any particular piece of evidence. There may be an indication of disregard when evidence which is clearly relevant to the findings is not addressed by the Trial Chamber’s reasoning, but not every inconsistency which the Trial Chamber failed to discuss renders its opinion defective. Considering the fact that minor inconsistencies commonly occur in witness testimony without rendering it unreliable, it is within the discretion of the Trial Chamber to evaluate it and to consider whether the evidence as a whole is credible, without explaining its decision in every detail.[3] If the Trial Chamber did not refer to the evidence given by a witness, even if it is in contradiction to the Trial Chamber’s finding, it is to be presumed that the Trial Chamber assessed and weighed the evidence, but found that the evidence did not prevent it from arriving at its actual findings. It is therefore not possible to draw any inferences about the quality of a judgement from the length of particular parts of a judgement in relation to other judgements or parts of the same judgement.

24. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in certain cases, the requirements to be met by the Trial Chamber are higher. As an example of a complex issue, the Appeals Chamber considered the appraisal of witness testimony with regard to the identity of the accused:

While a Trial Chamber is not obliged to refer to every piece of evidence on the trial record in its judgement, where a finding of guilt is made on the basis of identification evidence given by a witness under difficult circumstances, the Trial Chamber must rigorously implement its duty to provide a “reasoned opinion”. In particular, a reasoned opinion must carefully articulate the factors relied upon in support of the identification of the accused and adequately address any significant factors impacting negatively on the reliability of the identification evidence. [4]

But even in those cases, the Trial Chamber is only expected to identify the relevant factors, and to address the significant negative factors. If the Defence adduced the evidence of several other witnesses, who were unable to make any meaningful contribution to the facts of the case, even if the conviction of the accused rested on the testimony of only one witness, the Trial Chamber is not required to state that it found the evidence of each Defence witness irrelevant. On the contrary, it is to be presumed that the Trial Chamber took notice of this evidence and duly disregarded it because of its irrelevance. In general, as the Furundžija Appeals Chamber stated:

The case-law that has developed under the European Convention on Human Rights establishes that a reasoned opinion is a component of the fair hearing requirement, but that “the extent to which this duty ... applies may vary according to the nature of the decision” and “can only be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case”.[5]

25. The Appeals Chamber therefore emphasizes that it is necessary for any appellant claiming an error of law because of the lack of a reasoned opinion to identify the specific issues, factual findings or arguments, which he submits the Trial Chamber omitted to address and to explain why this omission invalidated the decision.[6] General observations on the length of the Judgement, or of particular parts of the Judgement, or of the discussion of certain parts of the evidence, do not qualify, except in particularly complex cases, as the basis of a valid ground of appeal.[7]

65. With respect to the argument that the Trial Judgement failed to address the destruction of the Rwankuba sector office or the sites requested to be visited by the parties, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber must provide a reasoned opinion in the trial judgement; however, this requirement relates to the trial judgment as a whole, not to each submission made at trial.

21.     […] The Appeals Chamber affirms that it is not necessary for a Trial Chamber to give formal oral or written reasons in response to each and every objection raised by the parties. To require reasons for all objections would place an unreasonable burden on the resources of the Trial Chamber. […]

138.    The Appeals Chamber first turns to Stanišić’s submission that the Trial Chamber failed to indicate the evidence relied upon or excluded in the section of the Trial Judgement addressing Stanišić’s contribution and as such failed to provide a reasoned opinion. The Appeals Chamber notes that the section of the Trial Judgement on Stanišić’s contribution to the JCE indeed does not refer to the evidence relied upon by the Trial Chamber to support its findings. Neither does it include any cross references to its earlier findings where the Trial Chamber analysed the evidence.[1] The Appeals Chamber, however, recalls that a trial judgement must be read as a whole.[2] Furthermore, there is a presumption that a trial chamber has evaluated all the evidence presented to it, as long as there is no indication that the trial chamber completely disregarded any particular piece of evidence.[3] As Stanišić acknowledges in his own submission,[4]  in the section of the Trial Judgement addressing his contribution to the JCE, the Trial Chamber summarised the evidence that it had relied on in other sections of the Trial Judgement. While the Appeals Chamber considers the Trial Chamber’s approach regrettable, [5] it does not, in its view, amount to a failure to provide a reasoned opinion in and of itself. The Appeals Chamber therefore dismisses Stanišić’s argument.

537.    The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber’s failure to explicitly refer to particular evidence will not often amount to an error of law, especially where there is significant contrary evidence on the record.[1] This is because a trial chamber cannot be presumed to have ignored a particular piece of evidence simply because it did not mention it in its judgement.[2] Rather, it could be presumed, in the absence of particular circumstances suggesting otherwise, that a trial chamber chose not to rely on an unmentioned piece of evidence, meaning that it considered the evidence but was of the view that it was either not reliable or otherwise not worth citing in its judgement.[3] In the Appeals Chamber’s view, this reflects a corollary of the overarching principle of deference to the discretion of a trial chamber. The Appeals Chamber therefore concludes that only where it is shown within the substance of a trial chamber’s reasoning that clearly relevant evidence has been disregarded, should the Appeals Chamber intervene in order to assess whether that evidence would have changed the factual basis supporting the trial chamber’s conclusion.

152. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, in the case of complex issues, such as the assessment of identification evidence, the reasoned opinion requirement to be met by a Trial Chamber is higher.[1] The Appeals Chamber has held that, “where a finding of guilt is made on the basis of identification evidence given by a witness under difficult circumstances, the Trial Chamber must rigorously implement its duty to provide a ‘reasoned opinion’.”[2] In these instances, the Trial Chamber is required to “carefully articulate the factors relied upon in support of the identification of the accused and adequately address any significant factors impacting negatively on the reliability of the identification evidence.”[3] The Appeals Chamber observes that, in such cases:

[w]here the record, including the reasons for judgment, discloses a lack of appreciation of relevant evidence and more particularly the complete disregard of such evidence, then it falls upon the reviewing tribunal to intercede.[4]

155. The Appeals Chamber recalls that Trial Chambers must consider the difficulties associated with identification evidence in a particular case and carefully evaluate it before accepting it as the sole basis for sustaining a conviction. In particular, Trial Chambers must exercise extreme caution before convicting a person based on the identification evidence of a single witness made under difficult circumstances in light of the frailties of human perception and the risk that a miscarriage of justice might result from reliance upon even the most confident witnesses who purport to identify an accused without an adequate opportunity to verify their observations.[5]

156. Factors relevant to the Appeals Chamber’s determination of whether a Trial Chamber’s decision to rely upon identification evidence was unreasonable or renders a conviction unsafe include:

[…] identifications of defendants by witnesses who had only a fleeting glance or an obstructed view of the defendant; identifications occurring in the dark and as a result of a traumatic event experienced by the witness; inconsistent or inaccurate testimony about the defendant’s physical characteristics at the time of the event; misidentification or denial of the ability to identify followed by later identification of the defendant by a witness; the existence of irreconcilable witness testimonies; and a witness’ delayed assertion of memory regarding the defendant coupled with the “clear possibility” from the circumstances that the witness had been influenced by suggestions from others.[6]

Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber recalls that identification evidence may be affected by the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.[7]

57.    […] The Appeals Chamber observes that, in the present case, the Trial Chamber did not explicitly set out the legal requirements applicable to the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity. However, contrary to the Prosecution’s submission, this per se does not amount to a failure by the Trial Chamber to provide a reasoned opinion. While, in practice, trial chambers usually state the law that they intend to apply, the duty to provide a reasoned opinion does not necessarily entail a formal requirement to set out the applicable law. Accordingly, while it would have been preferable for the Trial Chamber to explicitly set out the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity, the Prosecution fails to show that the Trial Chamber’s omission to do so amounts to an error of law.

See also para. 160.

243. […] Of even greater significance, there is no legal requirement that a trial chamber’s analysis as to an accused’s mens rea and actus reus be done separately […]. To the contrary, trial chambers are free to organize their judgements as they see fit so long as they fulfil their obligation to provide a reasoned opinion.[1]

[…] 

247. […] The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber used this practice of cross-referencing throughout the Trial Judgement instead of re‑summarizing its findings of fact or summaries of evidence.[2] The Appeals Chamber recalls that trial chambers need not unnecessarily repeat considerations reflected elsewhere in the trial judgement.[3] Furthermore, nothing prevents a trial chamber from relying on the same evidence when making findings as to an accused’s actus reus and mens rea. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber used its finding of mens rea to substantiate its finding of his significant contribution or committed any error in this respect. […] 

396. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber need not refer to the testimony of every witness or every piece of evidence on the trial record.[1] It is to be presumed that a trial chamber evaluated all the evidence presented to it, as long as there is no indication that the trial chamber completely disregarded any particular piece of evidence.[2] There may be an indication of disregard when evidence which is clearly relevant to the findings is not addressed by the trial chamber’s reasoning.[3] If a trial chamber did not refer to specific evidence it is to be presumed that the trial chamber assessed and weighed the evidence, but found that the evidence did not prevent it from arriving at its actual finding.[4] […]

See also paras. 533, 562, 563.

[…]

700. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber is required to provide a reasoned opinion under Article 23(2) of the ICTY Statute and Rule 98 ter (C) of the ICTY Rules.[5] Consequently, a trial chamber should set out in a clear and articulate manner the factual and legal findings on the basis of which it reached the decision to convict or acquit an accused.[6] In particular, a trial chamber is required to provide clear, reasoned findings of fact as to each element of the crime charged.[7]

See also para. 701.

[…]

702. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, in claiming an error of law on the basis of the lack of a reasoned opinion, a party is required to identify the specific issues, factual findings, or arguments that the trial chamber omitted to address and explain why this omission invalidates the decision.[8] […] [A] trial chamber is not required to articulate every step of its reasoning, that a trial judgement must be read as a whole, and that there is a presumption that the trial chamber has evaluated all the relevant evidence as long as there is no indication that it completely disregarded any particular piece of evidence.[9] There may be an indication of disregard when evidence which is clearly relevant to the findings is not addressed by the trial chamber’s reasoning.[10]

[…]

721. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber need not spell out every step of its analysis or unnecessarily repeat considerations reflected elsewhere in the trial judgement.[11] […]