35.     The critical issue is whether Rule 90(E) of the Rules adequately protects an accused or appellant from the direct and indirect use against him of any compelled self-incriminating information, arising as a result of deliberate or inadvertent self-incrimination. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber notes Tolimir’s contention that Rule 90(E) of the Rules “is not a complete protection from self-incrimination”,[1] and that compelling him to testify pursuant to Rule 90(E) of the Rules would constitute a violation of his right against self-incrimination under Article 21(4)(g) of the Statute.[2]

[…]

43.     The immunity from prosecution guaranteed under Rule 90(E) of the Rules clearly prohibits the subsequent direct use of any self-incriminating statements compelled under the provision against the witness in criminal proceedings other than those concerned with false testimony. Thus, where an accused or appellant is compelled to make self-incriminating statements under Rule 90(E) of the Rules, the Prosecution is prohibited from directly relying on such statements in the accused’s or appellant’s own case. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the underlying purpose of the immunity under Rule 90(E) of the Rules is to protect a witness from the subsequent use of such statements against him, and considering that the laws of various national and international jurisdictions reflect that incriminating statements may be compelled from a witness only where adequate safeguards exist against the subsequent use of such statements against the witness, the Appeals Chamber finds that the immunity under Rules 90(E) of the Rules must be interpreted also as a prohibition against the derivative or indirect use of the compelled statements in any subsequent prosecution of the witness other than for false testimony. Testimony compelled under Rule 90(E) of the Rules therefore cannot be used by the Prosecution as a basis for subsequent investigations from which other incriminating evidence may be derived and then used against the accused or appellant.

44.     Furthermore, regarding the issue of inadvertent self-incrimination, the Appeals Chamber emphasizes that in the Impugned Decision the Trial Chamber expressed that it “will be cognisant of the fact that Tolimir is currently involved in appeals proceedings before the Appeals Chamber and will ensure his rights are safeguarded.”[3] Moreover, in the interests of justice in this particular case, particularly in view of the fact that Tolimir is a self-represented appellant, any self-incriminating testimony inadvertently provided during Tolimir’s testimony in the Karadžić case shall not be used as evidence during his appeal or any subsequent proceedings against him, except for false testimony.

45.     Accordingly, […] considering that national and international jurisdictions have recognised that the right against self-incrimination is adequately protected if adequate immunity from prosecution for compelled self-incriminating statements is provided and taking into account the nature of the protection provided by Rule 90(E) of the Rules, the Appeals Chamber finds that the compulsion of an accused’s or appellant’s testimony under Rule 90(E) of the Rules in another case before the Tribunal is not inconsistent with the right against self-incrimination under Article 21(4)(g) of the Statute. Any self-incriminating information potentially emerging during Tolimir’s testimony in the Karadžić case, therefore, could not be used directly or indirectly against Tolimir in his own case. Thus the Prosecution would be prohibited from attempting, pursuant to Rule 115 of the Rules, to tender into evidence in the Tolimir case any self-incriminating information derived from Tolimir’s testimony in the Karadžić case, or any evidence derived therefrom. […]

576. The Appeals Chamber underlines that trial chambers are tasked with determining the guilt or innocence of the accused and must do so in light of the entirety of the evidence admitted into the record and that neither the Statute nor the Rules prevent a trial chamber from relying on the testimony of the accused to convict that accused, unless the accused’s self-incriminating evidence was compelled in violation of Article 20(4)(g) of the Statute.[1] […]