9. While it is true that, save for Rule 115(A) allowing parties to file supplemental briefs on the impact of the additional evidence admitted by the Appeals Chamber, no specific provision of the Rules explicitly regulates the possibility for the parties to supplement their briefs on appeal, it has been recognised in the jurisprudence that an appellant may supplement his or her brief, pursuant to Rule 127(A)(ii) and (B) of the Rules, by filing the said supplement with sufficient reasons constituting good cause for the Appeals Chamber to recognize it as validly filed.[1] In particular, the appellant must show that the proposed supplemental submissions are relevant to his grounds of appeal[2] and add substantial new information to the submissions which have already been made.[3]The new information at stake must be of sufficiently compelling importance to justify the admission of a supplemental brief at the stage where the briefing on appeal is completed.[4]

The Appeals Chamber considered whether there was discernible error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the progress of the trial constituted changed circumstances that made flight risk more likely than it had been at the pre-trial stage (where the Defendants were granted release).  It held in paragraph 15:

The Trial Chamber is the body best positioned to assess whether circumstances at trial have materially affected the possibility that accused will not return from provisional release.  The Appeals Chamber finds it reasonable for the Trial Chamber to have concluded that the Defendants’ incentives to flee increased over the course of a trial as they heard first-hand the evidence against them.[1]  This is not to say this is the only reasonable conclusion.  In some cases, the incentives to flee might decrease over time;[2] in other cases, these incentives might stay the same; and in still other cases these incentives might not shift enough to affect materially the approach taken in earlier provisional release decisions regarding the same accused.   These are matters that are best assessed by the Trial Chamber that is hearing the case, and the Appeals Chamber will not reverse the Trial Chamber’s considered judgement or decision absent a discernible error.  Here, while the Trial Chamber could have done a more complete job in explaining how the proceedings thus far have increased the Defendants’ incentives to flee, it provided enough reasoning to justify its conclusion.

The Appeals Chamber discussed for the first time whether Rule 65 applies to provisional release requests made during the course of a trial or instead only to pre-trial and pre-appeal provisional release requests.  In paragraphs 9-10, it rejected the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Rule 65 applied only to pre-trial (and pre-appeal) proceedings:

Moreover, the Appeals Chamber disagrees with the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the language “will appear for trial” in Rule 65(B) “ma[kes] it clear that the application of the Rule is confined to the provisional release of an accused whose trial has not yet begun”.[1]  First, the language of the Rule does not read “will appear for the beginning of trial” but rather reads “will appear for trial” – language which could refer to any stage of the trial.  Second, the purpose behind Rule 65(B) is best fulfilled if its language is read broadly.  Its goal of permitting provisional release only if the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the accused will return and will do no harm is not logically limited to the pre-trial stage.  Rather, this goal is equally important at other stages of the proceedings, as Rule 65(I) demonstrates in identifying the same criteria for the pre-appeal stage.  Finally, the Appeals Chamber notes that the practice of Trial Chambers in the past supports the view that Rule 65(B) is best read as applying to all provisional release applications before the Trial Chamber.[2]

Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber holds that Rule 65 applies to provisional release issues arising during the course of trial, just as it applies during pre-trial and pre-appeal proceedings.

7. Rule 115(A) of the Rules provides that rebuttal material may be presented by any party affected by a motion to present additional evidence before the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chamber recalls that rebuttal material is admissible if it directly affects the substance of the additional evidence admitted by the Appeals Chamber[1] and, as such, has a different test of admissibility from additional evidence under Rule 115 of the Rules.[2] […]

14. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that Rule 66(B) applies to appellate proceedings and that, consequently, the Prosecution, on request of the Defence, “has to permit the inspection of any material which is capable of being admitted on appeal or which may lead to the discovery of material which is capable of being admitted on appeal”.[1] In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that “purely inculpatory material is not necessarily immaterial for the preparation of the Defence”[2] and that the Prosecution shall provide the Defence with access to any documents that are material to the preparation of the Defence, with the exception of Rule 70 material and, if necessary, request from the Appeals Chamber permission to withhold any information provided by these sources under Rule 66(C) of the Rules.[3] […]

Where, at the appellate stage, a party moves for translation of a trial exhibit (in parts or in its entirety), it must show that it was impossible to obtain the said translations at trial despite the exercise of due diligence and that absence of such translation would entail a miscarriage of justice. In the present case, the Appeals Chamber was not satisfied that the above criteria had been met.

13. […] S’agissant de la demande aux fins de traduction d’enregistrements et de passages d’émissions non traduits lors du procès en première instance, la Chambre d’appel n’y donnera suite que si l’Appelant démontre qu’il n’a pu obtenir leur traduction en dépit de la diligence exercée ou que le défaut de traduction de ces documents entraînerait un déni de justice[1].

26. S’agissant d’éléments de preuve versés au dossier bien avant la clôture du procès en première instance (contrairement à la pièce C7), la Chambre d’appel considère qu’il appartenait à l’Appelant de faire une demande de traduction avant la fin du procès en première instance. En l’espèce, la Chambre d’appel observe que l’Appelant a formulé cette demande plus de deux ans après le prononcé du Jugement et qui plus est, après le dépôt de son Mémoire d’appel. Par conséquent, la Chambre d’appel n’est pas satisfaite que l’Appelant ait fait preuve de la diligence exigée.

27. De ce fait, la Chambre n’accordera une telle demande que si elle considère, au vu des traductions proposées par l’Appelant, que l’exclusion de ces documents conduirait à un déni de justice.[2] De manière générale, la Chambre d’appel constate que l’Appelant se contente de soumettre des passages dont la traduction est prétendument absente des documents composant la pièce à conviction C7 sans se référer aux conclusions de la Chambre de première instance auxquelles ils se rapporteraient.[3] Par ailleurs, il appartient à l’Appelant de démontrer, dans le cadre de son appel au fond, si certains extraits de la pièce à conviction C7 démontrent que la Chambre de première instance a commis une erreur de fait[4]. Il n’y a pas lieu à ce stade d’ordonner la traduction sollicitée car l’Appelant, maîtrisant les langues kinyarwandaise et française, dispose de tous les éléments nécessaires à la préparation de sa défense ; il est notamment en mesure de proposer sa version des traductions en articulant ses arguments en appel. Si, en se prononçant sur ces arguments, la Chambre d’appel conclut à l’existence d’une erreur ayant entraîné un déni de justice,[5] elle ordonnera, proprio motu, le cas échéant, la traduction des passages pertinents.

The Appeals Chamber determined that due to extraordinary circumstances and the grave condition of Šešelj’s health, it would depart from the requirements of the Practice Decision and consider Šešelj’s Appeal on the merits.

13. […] The Appeals Chamber does not find that there is any reason why Šešelj should not be permitted to file the Appeal despite the fact that it does not conform with the Practice Direction on filing of appeals before the Appeals Chamber.[1]  In this instance, Šešelj has sought to appeal by filing a letter before the Appeals Chamber requesting that it take into account all arguments he has made in prior submissions filed before the Appeals Chamber, the President and the Bureau with respect to his right to self-representation and his opposition to standby counsel and counsel as forming the grounds of his appeal.[2]

14.  […] [T]he Appeals Chamber recognises that there are extraordinary circumstances justifying its departure from the requirements of its own Practice Direction.  Šešelj has persisted in his refusal to take food or medicine since 11 November 2006.  He has also since that time refused to be medically assessed by doctors assigned to his care.  The only doctors that have been able to make any assessment of Šešelj’s condition could only make a rudimentary assessment.  However, it is abundantly clear to the Appeals Chamber that the action taken by Šešelj is seriously damaging his health and could have grave consequences.  Šešelj has made a choice to undertake this action, and he has purportedly done so because of his opposition to the decision of the Trial Chamber to impose standby counsel following the Appeal Decision.  That opposition of Šešelj caused the Trial Chamber to take the further step of assigning counsel, but Šešelj’s opposition leading to that decision of the Trial Chamber was based in the first instance on his strong belief that the Appeal Decision, which reinstated his right to self-representation, left no room for the imposition of standby counsel by the Trial Chamber as an immediate response to the Appeal Decision, without establishing any obstructionist behaviour on his part. Upon that basis, and in light of the fact that the Trial Chamber certified its decision to assign counsel for appeal, the Appeals Chamber will consider the Appeal on the merits.

The Appeals Chamber examined whether the Appeal Decision which re-instated Šešelj’s presumptive right to self-representation allowed the Trial Chamber to immediately assign standby counsel, in light of the fact that the Appeal Decision did not specifically note the extent of the Trial Chamber’s discretion in this matter.  The Appeals Chamber concluded that the imposition of standby counsel by the Trial Chamber had the practical effect of undermining the Appeal Decision.

19.     […] Article 21(4) of the Statute of the International Tribunal.  Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute grants the right of an accused “to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing”  The jurisprudence of this Tribunal has interpreted this provision of Article 21 as providing an accused with “the presumptive right to self-representation”.[1]  However, a presumptive right to self-representation does not translate into an absolute right and there are circumstances in which this right may be curtailed.  Of relevance to this appeal, a Trial Chamber may place restrictions on the right of an accused to self-representation where “a defendant’s self-representation is substantially and persistently obstructing the proper and expeditious conduct of his trial”.[2]

20.     The Appeals Chamber has already indicated […] what it considers to  be the real issue for it to determine […], whether the Appeal Decision, wherein Šešelj’s right to self-representation was re-instated, allowed the Trial Chamber to immediately order the assignment of standby counsel without establishing any persistent or obstructionist behaviour on his part.  Šešelj’s view is that it did not and it is in light of that view that Šešelj has undertaken action, which resulted in the Trial Chamber determining that it had the right to impose Counsel in the Impugned Decision.  […]

22.     […] [I]t would have been better if the Appeals Chamber in returning to Šešelj the right to self-representation would have made clearer what it considered that to mean with respect to the discretion on the part of the Trial Chamber to immediately impose standby counsel with a right to jump in and take over the proceedings in the circumstances identified by the Trial Chamber in its Decision to Assign Standby Counsel. This is particularly so given that the Appeals Chamber was made abundantly aware of Šešelj’s opposition to standby counsel during his pre-trial proceedings.

23.     […] Having just had its decision on the assignment of counsel overturned on appeal the Trial Chamber viewed [imposing standby counsel] as a necessary move to preserve Šešelj’s right to a fair and expeditious trial in light of the history of proceedings in his case pre-trial.

24.     […] The Appeals Chamber […] must […] acknowledge that its decision restoring the right of Šešelj to self-representation was not clear as to whether the restoration of that right to self-representation allowed the Trial Chamber to restore the status quo by immediately reassigning standby counsel, following the Appeal Decision without establishing any obstructionist conduct on the part of Šešelj.  The Appeals Chamber notes that standby counsel is not assigned counsel, and there are clear limits on the ability of standby counsel to participate in the proceedings, including that such participation did depend upon the conduct of Šešelj.  However, the fact that the Registry appointed former assigned counsel to act as standby counsel following the Appeal Decision, and then following the protest by Šešelj to that appointment, the Trial Chamber ordered the reassignment of standby counsel to act as assigned counsel in the Impugned Decision[3]  further entrenched Šešelj’s belief that the Trial Chamber had not respected the right restored to him by the Appeals Chamber.  He was not given a clean slate by the Trial Chamber following the Appeal Decision.

26.     While the Appeals Chamber did not explicitly state that the Trial Chamber was prohibited from imposing standby counsel, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber decision to do so, immediately upon the issuing of its decision and without establishing any additional obstruction by Šešelj, did have the practical effect of undermining the practical implementation of that decision. 

The Appeals Chamber reiterated that Rule 66(B) applies to appellate proceedings and that, consequently, the Prosecution, on request of the Defence, has to permit the inspection of any material which is capable of being admitted on appeal or which may lead to the discovery of material which is capable of being admitted on appeal. It also noted that purely inculpatory material is not necessarily immaterial for the preparation of the Defence.

9. La Chambre d’appel rappelle que l’article 66(B) du Règlement s’applique en appel à la condition que les éléments de preuve visés par la demande d’examen de la Défense aient été indisponibles lors du procès[1]. L’applicabilité de l’article 66(B) à la procédure d’appel implique que le Procureur doive permettre à la Défense de prendre connaissance des éléments qui « soit sont nécessaires à la préparation de la défense de l’accusé, soit seront utilisés par le Procureur comme moyens de preuve au procès, soit ont été obtenus de l’accusé ou lui appartiennent »[2]. A cet égard, la Chambre d’appel rappelle que les pièces exclusivement à charge ne sont pas nécessairement inutiles à la préparation de la défense de l’accusé et que le Procureur devrait déterminer si « les questions auxquelles se rapportent les pièces en question sont […] l’objet d’un motif d’appel » ou si « les pièces en question peuvent raisonnablement permettre à la Défense de faire de nouvelles investigations et donner lieu à la découverte de moyens supplémentaires admissibles en vertu de l’article 115 du Règlement »[3]. Par conséquent, il appartient au Procureur de permettre à l’Appelant de prendre connaissance de « tout élément susceptible d’être admis en appel ou qui pourrait donner lieu à la découverte d’éléments de preuve susceptibles de l’être »[4].

The Appeals Chamber further specified that the burden of proving an alleged breach of the disclosure obligations lies on the Defence who must identify specifically the materials sought, and prove the Prosecutor's custody or control of the materials requested. Finally, before ordering any remedy for a proven breach of such obligations, the Appeals Chamber will still examine whether the Defence has actually been prejudiced. In the present case, the Appeals Chamber found that the Prosecution correctly exercised its discretion and that the Appellant failed to show that the material at stake could fall under Rule 68 of the Rules.

7. […] Lorsque la Défense estime qu’une violation de l’article 68 du Règlement a été commise, il lui appartient de soumettre à la Chambre tout commencement de preuve de nature à rendre vraisemblable le caractère disculpatoire des éléments de preuve en question ainsi que leur détention par le Procureur[1]. Même si un appelant démontre que sa demande a été suffisamment précise et que le Procureur ne s’est pas acquitté de ses obligations, la Chambre d’appel n’envisagera d’émettre une ordonnance de communication que s’il est démontré que ces manquements ont porté préjudice à l’appelant[2].

8. […] La Chambre d’appel relève que le Procureur a déterminé que les documents demandés ne répondaient pas aux critères énoncés par l’article 68 du Règlement[3] et que l’Appelant n’a pas démontré en quoi le jugement du Procureur, selon lequel ces documents ne contiennent pas de moyens de preuve disculpatoires, est abusif en l’espèce. A cet égard, la Chambre d’appel relève notamment que l’Appelant se réfère lui-même à ces documents comme étant « pertinents » à son affaire et « nécessaires à la défense » et se contente d’affirmer qu’ils « contiennent des éléments à décharge » [4] sans expliquer davantage en quoi ils peuvent le « mettre hors de cause »[5] ou atténuer sa responsabilité individuelle.