Where, at the appellate stage, a party moves for translation of a trial exhibit (in parts or in its entirety), it must show that it was impossible to obtain the said translations at trial despite the exercise of due diligence and that absence of such translation would entail a miscarriage of justice. In the present case, the Appeals Chamber was not satisfied that the above criteria had been met.

13. […] S’agissant de la demande aux fins de traduction d’enregistrements et de passages d’émissions non traduits lors du procès en première instance, la Chambre d’appel n’y donnera suite que si l’Appelant démontre qu’il n’a pu obtenir leur traduction en dépit de la diligence exercée ou que le défaut de traduction de ces documents entraînerait un déni de justice[1].

26. S’agissant d’éléments de preuve versés au dossier bien avant la clôture du procès en première instance (contrairement à la pièce C7), la Chambre d’appel considère qu’il appartenait à l’Appelant de faire une demande de traduction avant la fin du procès en première instance. En l’espèce, la Chambre d’appel observe que l’Appelant a formulé cette demande plus de deux ans après le prononcé du Jugement et qui plus est, après le dépôt de son Mémoire d’appel. Par conséquent, la Chambre d’appel n’est pas satisfaite que l’Appelant ait fait preuve de la diligence exigée.

27. De ce fait, la Chambre n’accordera une telle demande que si elle considère, au vu des traductions proposées par l’Appelant, que l’exclusion de ces documents conduirait à un déni de justice.[2] De manière générale, la Chambre d’appel constate que l’Appelant se contente de soumettre des passages dont la traduction est prétendument absente des documents composant la pièce à conviction C7 sans se référer aux conclusions de la Chambre de première instance auxquelles ils se rapporteraient.[3] Par ailleurs, il appartient à l’Appelant de démontrer, dans le cadre de son appel au fond, si certains extraits de la pièce à conviction C7 démontrent que la Chambre de première instance a commis une erreur de fait[4]. Il n’y a pas lieu à ce stade d’ordonner la traduction sollicitée car l’Appelant, maîtrisant les langues kinyarwandaise et française, dispose de tous les éléments nécessaires à la préparation de sa défense ; il est notamment en mesure de proposer sa version des traductions en articulant ses arguments en appel. Si, en se prononçant sur ces arguments, la Chambre d’appel conclut à l’existence d’une erreur ayant entraîné un déni de justice,[5] elle ordonnera, proprio motu, le cas échéant, la traduction des passages pertinents.

The Appeals Chamber determined that due to extraordinary circumstances and the grave condition of Šešelj’s health, it would depart from the requirements of the Practice Decision and consider Šešelj’s Appeal on the merits.

13. […] The Appeals Chamber does not find that there is any reason why Šešelj should not be permitted to file the Appeal despite the fact that it does not conform with the Practice Direction on filing of appeals before the Appeals Chamber.[1]  In this instance, Šešelj has sought to appeal by filing a letter before the Appeals Chamber requesting that it take into account all arguments he has made in prior submissions filed before the Appeals Chamber, the President and the Bureau with respect to his right to self-representation and his opposition to standby counsel and counsel as forming the grounds of his appeal.[2]

14.  […] [T]he Appeals Chamber recognises that there are extraordinary circumstances justifying its departure from the requirements of its own Practice Direction.  Šešelj has persisted in his refusal to take food or medicine since 11 November 2006.  He has also since that time refused to be medically assessed by doctors assigned to his care.  The only doctors that have been able to make any assessment of Šešelj’s condition could only make a rudimentary assessment.  However, it is abundantly clear to the Appeals Chamber that the action taken by Šešelj is seriously damaging his health and could have grave consequences.  Šešelj has made a choice to undertake this action, and he has purportedly done so because of his opposition to the decision of the Trial Chamber to impose standby counsel following the Appeal Decision.  That opposition of Šešelj caused the Trial Chamber to take the further step of assigning counsel, but Šešelj’s opposition leading to that decision of the Trial Chamber was based in the first instance on his strong belief that the Appeal Decision, which reinstated his right to self-representation, left no room for the imposition of standby counsel by the Trial Chamber as an immediate response to the Appeal Decision, without establishing any obstructionist behaviour on his part. Upon that basis, and in light of the fact that the Trial Chamber certified its decision to assign counsel for appeal, the Appeals Chamber will consider the Appeal on the merits.

The Appeals Chamber examined whether the Appeal Decision which re-instated Šešelj’s presumptive right to self-representation allowed the Trial Chamber to immediately assign standby counsel, in light of the fact that the Appeal Decision did not specifically note the extent of the Trial Chamber’s discretion in this matter.  The Appeals Chamber concluded that the imposition of standby counsel by the Trial Chamber had the practical effect of undermining the Appeal Decision.

19.     […] Article 21(4) of the Statute of the International Tribunal.  Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute grants the right of an accused “to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing”  The jurisprudence of this Tribunal has interpreted this provision of Article 21 as providing an accused with “the presumptive right to self-representation”.[1]  However, a presumptive right to self-representation does not translate into an absolute right and there are circumstances in which this right may be curtailed.  Of relevance to this appeal, a Trial Chamber may place restrictions on the right of an accused to self-representation where “a defendant’s self-representation is substantially and persistently obstructing the proper and expeditious conduct of his trial”.[2]

20.     The Appeals Chamber has already indicated […] what it considers to  be the real issue for it to determine […], whether the Appeal Decision, wherein Šešelj’s right to self-representation was re-instated, allowed the Trial Chamber to immediately order the assignment of standby counsel without establishing any persistent or obstructionist behaviour on his part.  Šešelj’s view is that it did not and it is in light of that view that Šešelj has undertaken action, which resulted in the Trial Chamber determining that it had the right to impose Counsel in the Impugned Decision.  […]

22.     […] [I]t would have been better if the Appeals Chamber in returning to Šešelj the right to self-representation would have made clearer what it considered that to mean with respect to the discretion on the part of the Trial Chamber to immediately impose standby counsel with a right to jump in and take over the proceedings in the circumstances identified by the Trial Chamber in its Decision to Assign Standby Counsel. This is particularly so given that the Appeals Chamber was made abundantly aware of Šešelj’s opposition to standby counsel during his pre-trial proceedings.

23.     […] Having just had its decision on the assignment of counsel overturned on appeal the Trial Chamber viewed [imposing standby counsel] as a necessary move to preserve Šešelj’s right to a fair and expeditious trial in light of the history of proceedings in his case pre-trial.

24.     […] The Appeals Chamber […] must […] acknowledge that its decision restoring the right of Šešelj to self-representation was not clear as to whether the restoration of that right to self-representation allowed the Trial Chamber to restore the status quo by immediately reassigning standby counsel, following the Appeal Decision without establishing any obstructionist conduct on the part of Šešelj.  The Appeals Chamber notes that standby counsel is not assigned counsel, and there are clear limits on the ability of standby counsel to participate in the proceedings, including that such participation did depend upon the conduct of Šešelj.  However, the fact that the Registry appointed former assigned counsel to act as standby counsel following the Appeal Decision, and then following the protest by Šešelj to that appointment, the Trial Chamber ordered the reassignment of standby counsel to act as assigned counsel in the Impugned Decision[3]  further entrenched Šešelj’s belief that the Trial Chamber had not respected the right restored to him by the Appeals Chamber.  He was not given a clean slate by the Trial Chamber following the Appeal Decision.

26.     While the Appeals Chamber did not explicitly state that the Trial Chamber was prohibited from imposing standby counsel, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber decision to do so, immediately upon the issuing of its decision and without establishing any additional obstruction by Šešelj, did have the practical effect of undermining the practical implementation of that decision. 

The Appeals Chamber reiterated that Rule 66(B) applies to appellate proceedings and that, consequently, the Prosecution, on request of the Defence, has to permit the inspection of any material which is capable of being admitted on appeal or which may lead to the discovery of material which is capable of being admitted on appeal. It also noted that purely inculpatory material is not necessarily immaterial for the preparation of the Defence.

9. La Chambre d’appel rappelle que l’article 66(B) du Règlement s’applique en appel à la condition que les éléments de preuve visés par la demande d’examen de la Défense aient été indisponibles lors du procès[1]. L’applicabilité de l’article 66(B) à la procédure d’appel implique que le Procureur doive permettre à la Défense de prendre connaissance des éléments qui « soit sont nécessaires à la préparation de la défense de l’accusé, soit seront utilisés par le Procureur comme moyens de preuve au procès, soit ont été obtenus de l’accusé ou lui appartiennent »[2]. A cet égard, la Chambre d’appel rappelle que les pièces exclusivement à charge ne sont pas nécessairement inutiles à la préparation de la défense de l’accusé et que le Procureur devrait déterminer si « les questions auxquelles se rapportent les pièces en question sont […] l’objet d’un motif d’appel » ou si « les pièces en question peuvent raisonnablement permettre à la Défense de faire de nouvelles investigations et donner lieu à la découverte de moyens supplémentaires admissibles en vertu de l’article 115 du Règlement »[3]. Par conséquent, il appartient au Procureur de permettre à l’Appelant de prendre connaissance de « tout élément susceptible d’être admis en appel ou qui pourrait donner lieu à la découverte d’éléments de preuve susceptibles de l’être »[4].

The Appeals Chamber further specified that the burden of proving an alleged breach of the disclosure obligations lies on the Defence who must identify specifically the materials sought, and prove the Prosecutor's custody or control of the materials requested. Finally, before ordering any remedy for a proven breach of such obligations, the Appeals Chamber will still examine whether the Defence has actually been prejudiced. In the present case, the Appeals Chamber found that the Prosecution correctly exercised its discretion and that the Appellant failed to show that the material at stake could fall under Rule 68 of the Rules.

7. […] Lorsque la Défense estime qu’une violation de l’article 68 du Règlement a été commise, il lui appartient de soumettre à la Chambre tout commencement de preuve de nature à rendre vraisemblable le caractère disculpatoire des éléments de preuve en question ainsi que leur détention par le Procureur[1]. Même si un appelant démontre que sa demande a été suffisamment précise et que le Procureur ne s’est pas acquitté de ses obligations, la Chambre d’appel n’envisagera d’émettre une ordonnance de communication que s’il est démontré que ces manquements ont porté préjudice à l’appelant[2].

8. […] La Chambre d’appel relève que le Procureur a déterminé que les documents demandés ne répondaient pas aux critères énoncés par l’article 68 du Règlement[3] et que l’Appelant n’a pas démontré en quoi le jugement du Procureur, selon lequel ces documents ne contiennent pas de moyens de preuve disculpatoires, est abusif en l’espèce. A cet égard, la Chambre d’appel relève notamment que l’Appelant se réfère lui-même à ces documents comme étant « pertinents » à son affaire et « nécessaires à la défense » et se contente d’affirmer qu’ils « contiennent des éléments à décharge » [4] sans expliquer davantage en quoi ils peuvent le « mettre hors de cause »[5] ou atténuer sa responsabilité individuelle.

The Appeals Chamber recalled that a party seeking authorization for additional investigation on appeal under Rule 115 of the Rules has to show that the potential evidence at issue could not have been discovered at trial even through the exercise of due diligence. It also reiterated that it would only allow for funding of such investigations on appeal in exceptional circumstances and in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. In the present case, the Appeals Chamber was not satisfied that the required criteria were met.

23. La Requête du 10 octobre 2006 vise l’autorisation d’une enquête complémentaire au stade de l’appel au titre de l’article 115 du Règlement. Dans ce cas, le requérant doit démontrer que la preuve recherchée était indisponible lors du procès en première instance, bien qu’il ait alors exercé la diligence requise[1]. La Chambre d’appel rappelle également que ce n’est que dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, qu’elle ordonnera au Greffe de prendre en charge les frais afférents aux enquêtes lors de la procédure d’appel. De telles circonstances pourront être constatées, par exemple, si la partie requérante établit qu’elle est en possession d’une information spécifique, qui n’était pas disponible au moment du procès et n’aurait pu être découverte malgré l’exercice de la diligence requise, nécessitant une enquête plus approfondie afin d’éviter un déni de justice[2]. Or, en l’espèce la Chambre d’appel considère que l’Appelant n’a pas démontré qu’il existe de telles circonstances exceptionnelles justifiant l’autorisation de l’enquête sollicitée.

24. Premièrement, le critère de l’indisponibilité de la pièce lors du procès en première instance et de diligence requise en vue de se la procurer, implique nécessairement que la partie en question doit démontrer avoir cherché à utiliser à bon escient tous les mécanismes de protection et de contrainte prévus par le Statut et le Règlement afin de pouvoir présenter les moyens de preuve à la Chambre de première instance[3]. […] Dans ces conditions, quand bien même la Chambre d’appel considère que les démarches de l’Appelant en première instance manquaient de précision et de promptitude, elle est satisfaite que l’enregistrement en question était indisponible au procès en dépit de la diligence exercée à l’époque par l’Appelant.

25. Toutefois, la Chambre d'appel n'est pas convaincue que l'Appelant justifie de circonstances exceptionnelles permettant de faire droit à sa demande. En effet, l’Appelant ne fait état d’aucune démarche ultérieure auprès des autorités rwandaises en vue d’obtenir l’enregistrement litigieux et ce n’est que le 10 avril 2006, soit presque deux ans après le dépôt de son Acte d’appel, qu’il a introduit sa première demande, depuis le prononcé du Jugement, visant à ordonner aux autorités rwandaises de transmettre l’intégralité de l’enregistrement en question. […] L’Appelant, à qui il appartient de démontrer, dans le cadre de son appel au fond, que la Chambre de première instance aurait commis une erreur en admettant cette pièce au dossier et/ou en s’y appuyant dans le Jugement, se devait d’évaluer lors de la rédaction de son Acte d’appel et de son Mémoire d’appel l’intérêt de renouveler les démarches entreprises au procès en vue d’obtenir l’enregistrement litigieux. La Chambre d’appel réitère que la présente décision ne préjuge pas de son appréciation ultérieure au fond à ce sujet[4].

26. Par ailleurs, la Chambre d’appel ne voit pas en quoi les enquêtes nécessitent le déplacement au Rwanda du conseil principal, du co-conseil et d’un assistant pour obtenir une copie de l’enregistrement alors que l’Appelant se prévaut d’en connaître la source exacte et qu’il pourrait adresser sa demande aux détenteurs de celui-ci directement par voie écrite.

27. Au vu de ce qui précède, la Chambre d’appel est d’avis que l’Appelant n’a pas établi l’existence de circonstances exceptionnelles justifiant l’assistance du Greffe en vue d’entamer, plus de deux ans et demi après le prononcé du Jugement, une enquête complémentaire au stade de l’appel.

8. Review proceedings are governed by Article 25 of the Statute and Rules 120 and 121 of the Rules. Review of a final judgement is an exceptional procedure and is not meant to provide an additional opportunity for a party to remedy its failings at trial or on appeal.[1] Review may be granted only when the moving party satisfies the following cumulative criteria: (1) there is a new fact; (2) the new fact was not known to the moving party at the time of the original proceedings; (3) the lack of discovery of that new fact was not the result of lack of due diligence by the moving party; and (4) the new fact could have been a decisive factor in reaching the original decision.[2] In wholly exceptional circumstances, the Appeals Chamber may grant review, even where the second or third criteria are not satisfied, if ignoring the new fact would result in a miscarriage of justice.[3]

9. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a “new fact” refers to new information of an evidentiary nature of a fact that was not in issue during the trial or appeal proceedings.[4] By the phrase “not in issue”, the Appeals Chamber has held that “it must not have been among the factors that the deciding body could have taken into account in reaching its verdict.”[5] In other words, what is relevant is whether the deciding body knew about the fact or not in arriving at the decision.[6]

10. [T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that a request for reconsideration of a decision in one case filed by an appellant who is not party to that case must fail for lack of standing to seek such reconsideration.[1][…]

11. […] The Appeals Chamber […] stresses the need for a clear distinction between the issue of the existence of genocide in Rwanda in 1994, a fact judicially noticed by the Appeals Chamber in the Karemera Decision,[1] from the separate questions regarding the existence of a conspiracy to commit genocide between the three co-appellants in the present case, and the Appellant’s participation in such a conspiracy. The Appeals Chamber finds that there is nothing in the Appellant’s arguments to suggest that the judicially noticed facts in the Karemera Decision would prevent him either from challenging the existence of a conspiracy to commit genocide or from disputing his participation therein. The Karemera Decision is clear in that its direction to the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge does not shift the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains on the Prosecution,[2] with respect to the personal responsibility of each accused. It has been subsequently specified by the Appeals Chamber that with regard to the Karemera Decision, “taking of judicial notice of this fact does not imply the existence of a plan to commit genocide”.[3] Therefore, the Appeals Chamber, noting that the Appellant indeed challenges the Trial Chamber’s findings of conspiracy, both in his Notice of Appeal and in his Appeal Brief,[4] considers that he has failed to demonstrate how the Karemera Decision, if applicable to his case, could impact on his ability to dispute that “he was party to a plan to commit genocide”.

12. […] The Appeals Chamber, finding that the Appellant has failed to raise on appeal any argument challenging the occurrence of genocide, considers therefore that he has not shown how the judicially noticed facts in the Karemera Decision, if applicable to his case, could adversely affect his appeal. His request for clarification in this regard is therefore denied as unfounded.

30. […] In light of the evidence adduced at trial, the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that the Trial Chamber would have arrived at a different conclusion upon examination of the two messages in question. The Appellant has not shown that the Trial Chamber would necessarily opt for the evidence that he now proffers instead of the totality of the evidence that it chose to rely on to conclude that Barayagwiza held the position of a superior in the CDR including that, after the assassination of Bucyana in February 1994, Barayagwiza succeeded him as President of the CDR at the national level.[1]