The Appeals Chamber recalled that a party seeking authorization for additional investigation on appeal under Rule 115 of the Rules has to show that the potential evidence at issue could not have been discovered at trial even through the exercise of due diligence. It also reiterated that it would only allow for funding of such investigations on appeal in exceptional circumstances and in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. In the present case, the Appeals Chamber was not satisfied that the required criteria were met.

23. La Requête du 10 octobre 2006 vise l’autorisation d’une enquête complémentaire au stade de l’appel au titre de l’article 115 du Règlement. Dans ce cas, le requérant doit démontrer que la preuve recherchée était indisponible lors du procès en première instance, bien qu’il ait alors exercé la diligence requise[1]. La Chambre d’appel rappelle également que ce n’est que dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, qu’elle ordonnera au Greffe de prendre en charge les frais afférents aux enquêtes lors de la procédure d’appel. De telles circonstances pourront être constatées, par exemple, si la partie requérante établit qu’elle est en possession d’une information spécifique, qui n’était pas disponible au moment du procès et n’aurait pu être découverte malgré l’exercice de la diligence requise, nécessitant une enquête plus approfondie afin d’éviter un déni de justice[2]. Or, en l’espèce la Chambre d’appel considère que l’Appelant n’a pas démontré qu’il existe de telles circonstances exceptionnelles justifiant l’autorisation de l’enquête sollicitée.

24. Premièrement, le critère de l’indisponibilité de la pièce lors du procès en première instance et de diligence requise en vue de se la procurer, implique nécessairement que la partie en question doit démontrer avoir cherché à utiliser à bon escient tous les mécanismes de protection et de contrainte prévus par le Statut et le Règlement afin de pouvoir présenter les moyens de preuve à la Chambre de première instance[3]. […] Dans ces conditions, quand bien même la Chambre d’appel considère que les démarches de l’Appelant en première instance manquaient de précision et de promptitude, elle est satisfaite que l’enregistrement en question était indisponible au procès en dépit de la diligence exercée à l’époque par l’Appelant.

25. Toutefois, la Chambre d'appel n'est pas convaincue que l'Appelant justifie de circonstances exceptionnelles permettant de faire droit à sa demande. En effet, l’Appelant ne fait état d’aucune démarche ultérieure auprès des autorités rwandaises en vue d’obtenir l’enregistrement litigieux et ce n’est que le 10 avril 2006, soit presque deux ans après le dépôt de son Acte d’appel, qu’il a introduit sa première demande, depuis le prononcé du Jugement, visant à ordonner aux autorités rwandaises de transmettre l’intégralité de l’enregistrement en question. […] L’Appelant, à qui il appartient de démontrer, dans le cadre de son appel au fond, que la Chambre de première instance aurait commis une erreur en admettant cette pièce au dossier et/ou en s’y appuyant dans le Jugement, se devait d’évaluer lors de la rédaction de son Acte d’appel et de son Mémoire d’appel l’intérêt de renouveler les démarches entreprises au procès en vue d’obtenir l’enregistrement litigieux. La Chambre d’appel réitère que la présente décision ne préjuge pas de son appréciation ultérieure au fond à ce sujet[4].

26. Par ailleurs, la Chambre d’appel ne voit pas en quoi les enquêtes nécessitent le déplacement au Rwanda du conseil principal, du co-conseil et d’un assistant pour obtenir une copie de l’enregistrement alors que l’Appelant se prévaut d’en connaître la source exacte et qu’il pourrait adresser sa demande aux détenteurs de celui-ci directement par voie écrite.

27. Au vu de ce qui précède, la Chambre d’appel est d’avis que l’Appelant n’a pas établi l’existence de circonstances exceptionnelles justifiant l’assistance du Greffe en vue d’entamer, plus de deux ans et demi après le prononcé du Jugement, une enquête complémentaire au stade de l’appel.

8. Review proceedings are governed by Article 25 of the Statute and Rules 120 and 121 of the Rules. Review of a final judgement is an exceptional procedure and is not meant to provide an additional opportunity for a party to remedy its failings at trial or on appeal.[1] Review may be granted only when the moving party satisfies the following cumulative criteria: (1) there is a new fact; (2) the new fact was not known to the moving party at the time of the original proceedings; (3) the lack of discovery of that new fact was not the result of lack of due diligence by the moving party; and (4) the new fact could have been a decisive factor in reaching the original decision.[2] In wholly exceptional circumstances, the Appeals Chamber may grant review, even where the second or third criteria are not satisfied, if ignoring the new fact would result in a miscarriage of justice.[3]

9. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a “new fact” refers to new information of an evidentiary nature of a fact that was not in issue during the trial or appeal proceedings.[4] By the phrase “not in issue”, the Appeals Chamber has held that “it must not have been among the factors that the deciding body could have taken into account in reaching its verdict.”[5] In other words, what is relevant is whether the deciding body knew about the fact or not in arriving at the decision.[6]

10. [T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that a request for reconsideration of a decision in one case filed by an appellant who is not party to that case must fail for lack of standing to seek such reconsideration.[1][…]

11. […] The Appeals Chamber […] stresses the need for a clear distinction between the issue of the existence of genocide in Rwanda in 1994, a fact judicially noticed by the Appeals Chamber in the Karemera Decision,[1] from the separate questions regarding the existence of a conspiracy to commit genocide between the three co-appellants in the present case, and the Appellant’s participation in such a conspiracy. The Appeals Chamber finds that there is nothing in the Appellant’s arguments to suggest that the judicially noticed facts in the Karemera Decision would prevent him either from challenging the existence of a conspiracy to commit genocide or from disputing his participation therein. The Karemera Decision is clear in that its direction to the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge does not shift the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains on the Prosecution,[2] with respect to the personal responsibility of each accused. It has been subsequently specified by the Appeals Chamber that with regard to the Karemera Decision, “taking of judicial notice of this fact does not imply the existence of a plan to commit genocide”.[3] Therefore, the Appeals Chamber, noting that the Appellant indeed challenges the Trial Chamber’s findings of conspiracy, both in his Notice of Appeal and in his Appeal Brief,[4] considers that he has failed to demonstrate how the Karemera Decision, if applicable to his case, could impact on his ability to dispute that “he was party to a plan to commit genocide”.

12. […] The Appeals Chamber, finding that the Appellant has failed to raise on appeal any argument challenging the occurrence of genocide, considers therefore that he has not shown how the judicially noticed facts in the Karemera Decision, if applicable to his case, could adversely affect his appeal. His request for clarification in this regard is therefore denied as unfounded.

30. […] In light of the evidence adduced at trial, the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that the Trial Chamber would have arrived at a different conclusion upon examination of the two messages in question. The Appellant has not shown that the Trial Chamber would necessarily opt for the evidence that he now proffers instead of the totality of the evidence that it chose to rely on to conclude that Barayagwiza held the position of a superior in the CDR including that, after the assassination of Bucyana in February 1994, Barayagwiza succeeded him as President of the CDR at the national level.[1]

25. With respect to availability of the proffered evidence at trial, the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that the Appellant was unable to obtain it in spite of the exercise of due diligence. As, the Prosecution points out, the declassifying process of U.S. documents started in 1998 and many unclassified documents were accessible on the National Security Archive webpage in 2001.[1] The Appeals Chamber finds that the Appellant’s reply to this argument, that the Prosecution failed to prove that the documents were declassified before his trial,[2] is misguided; it is for the Appellant to show that the documents were available to him only recently. On the contrary, the Appellant’s own arguments seem to suggest that the documents were accessible earlier than 2003: the compilation of documents which the Appellant received is the result of research carried out between 1994 and 2003.[3]

26. In addition, the Appeals Chamber notes that both messages in their relevant parts refer to conversations between the Appellant and Ambassador Rawson.[4] […] Given the Appellant’s contacts with Ambassador Rawson, the Appellant could have attempted to contact Ambassador Rawson, either to learn about his reports to the U.S. government in 1994 as a reliable and independent source of political information on Rwanda, or with the objective to adduce his live testimony about the Appellant’s role in the CDR at trial.

27. Regarding the letter signed by Théoneste Nahimana, the Appellant’s submissions show that he was aware of the existence of this letter at trial. The Appeals Chamber also notes that the report by Ambassador Rawson dated 28 March 1994 suggests that the Appellant was at least involved in the drafting of the letter signed by Théoneste Nahimana, as he was informed about his content before it was signed and took suggestions from Ambassador Rawson as to its content.[5] Furthermore, it was the Appellant himself who gave a copy of this letter to Ambassador Rawson in 1994.[6] The Appeals Chamber notes that a number of CDR documents were adduced at trial on behalf of the Appellant.[7] The Appellant has thus not shown that the letter was unavailable to him at trial or that he had made efforts to obtain a copy thereof in the exercise of due diligence.

28. In light of the above, while the Appeals Chamber finds that the proffered evidence is prima facie relevant and credible, it will admit it as additional evidence on appeal only if it concludes that its exclusion would result in a miscarriage of justice, i.e. it would have had an impact on the verdict if it had been adduced at trial. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Appellant only suggests the proffered evidence could have been a decisive factor for the Trial Chamber’s finding with respect to the Appellant’s position in the CDR.[8]

40. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the party adducing additional evidence must establish that the said evidence was not available at trial in any form whatsoever.[9] As in the Second Rule 115 Motion, the Appellant again merely asserts that the documents “have been declassified only recently” without giving any further details about the declassification process or any earlier attempts to access the material.[10] As the Prosecution points out, unclassified U.S. documents were available during the Appellant’s trial, and the possibility to access classified documents through a Freedom of Information Act application also existed.[11] Further, the Appellant has not shown that he tried to contact Ambassador Rawson to adduce his live testimony at trial. Finally, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Appellant acknowledges that other evidence concerning the date of the demonstration, the most important point of the documents proffered as additional evidence, was available to him.[12]

14. [T]he Appeals Chamber notes that the Appellant filed the separate Corrigendum Motion to correct a clerical error in his Reply to the First Rule 115 Motion.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalls that “a party may, without requesting leave from the Appeals Chamber, file a corrigendum to their previously filed brief or motion whenever a minor or clerical error in said brief or motion is subsequently discovered and where correction of the error is necessary in order to provide clarification”.[2] Although it was unnecessary for the Appellant to file a motion to this extent, the Appeals Chamber finds that the submitted amendment indeed corrects an obvious clerical error and does not amount to any substantial change of the Appellant’s Reply to the First Rule 115 Motion. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Appellant’s Reply to the First Rule 115 Motion should be read in accordance with the amendments proposed by the Corrigendum Motion and allowed by the present decision.

34. [T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that “material will fall within the ambit of Rule 68 if it tends to suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused, or affects the credibility of Prosecution evidence”.[1] The determination of what material meets Rule 68 disclosure requirements is primarily a fact-based judgement made by and under the responsibility of the Prosecution.[2] Therefore, as noted previously, the Appeals Chamber will not intervene in the exercise of the Prosecution’s discretion, unless it is shown that the Prosecution abused it and, where there is no evidence to the contrary, will assume that the Prosecution is acting in good faith.[3] […]

P. 3: NOTING that in the Motion, the Appellant provides reasons in support of his argument that the Appeals Hearing should be scheduled for a later date than provided in the Scheduling Order including, inter alia, his intention to file a new motion under Rule 115 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”) as well to invite the Bar Counsel of England and Wales Human Rights Committee to attend and observe the Appeals Hearing;[1]

CONSIDERING that under Rule 115(A) of the Rules, the parties may file motions for admission of additional evidence on appeal after the appeal hearing, provided that cogent reasons are shown for such a delay;

CONSIDERING that a party’s intention to invite a third-party observer to the appeals hearing and the availability of that third-party on certain dates are not factors that the Appeals Chamber is required to take into consideration when setting the date for an appeals hearing;

CONSIDERING that since the Appeals Chamber’s Decision of 23 November 2006[2] upheld the President’s decision to refuse the withdrawal of the Appellant’s Co-Counsel, the arguments in the Motion in relation to the absence of the Co-Counsel[3] are moot;

CONSIDERING that in light of the amendments to the Rules, which entered into force on 10 November 2006, the Appellant’s arguments with respect to logistical problems in relation to the preparation of the Appeal Books on or before 18 December 2006[4] are moot, since the Rules no longer place such an obligation on the parties;[5]

FINDING therefore that the Appellant has failed to establish good cause for the Appeals Chamber delaying the Appeals Hearing as set in the Scheduling Order […]

P. 4: RECALLING that the parties are to focus their oral arguments on the grounds of appeal raised in their briefs[1] and that the appeals hearing is not the occasion for presenting new arguments on the merits of the case;

RECALLING further that, during the hearing of an appeal, the parties are expected “to prepare themselves in such a way as not simply to recount what has been set out in their written submission, but to confine their oral arguments to elaborating on points relevant to this appeal that they wish to bring to the Appeals Chamber’s attention”;[2]