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| Appeal Judgement - 17.07.2008 |
STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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322. Whether the same conduct violates two or more distinct statutory provisions is a question of law.[1] Thus, “the Čelebići test focuses on the legal elements of each crime that may be the subject of a cumulative conviction rather than on the underlying conduct of the accused”.[2] 323. The Appeals Chamber notes that the test applicable to cumulative convictions was correctly set out by the Trial Chamber.[3] However, after finding that the offences at stake each “theoretically” contained materially distinct elements from each other,[4] the Trial Chamber determined that “Counts 4 and 5 really add no materially distinct element, given the particular circumstances in which these offences were committed.”[5] Therefore, the Trial Chamber ruled that the “interests of justice and the purposes of punishment” would be better served by entering a conviction only in respect of Count 6.[6] 324. The Appeals Chamber finds that by subjecting the application of the Čelebići test to the “particular circumstances” of the case, the Trial Chamber exercised discretion and that such exercise of discretion constitutes an error of law. As the Appeals Chamber stated in the Stakić Appeal Judgement, [w]hen the evidence supports convictions under multiple counts for the same underlying acts, the test as set forth in Čelebići and Kordić does not permit the Trial Chamber discretion to enter one or more of the appropriate convictions, unless the two crimes do not possess materially distinct elements.[7] [1] Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 174. See also Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 356; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 1032. [2] Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 356. [3] Trial Judgement, para. 447. [4] Ibid., para. 452. [5] Ibid., para. 454 (emphasis added). [6] Ibid., para. 454. [7] Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 358. |
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STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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58. Considering that it is for the Trial Chamber to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the contribution of an expert witness, the Appeals Chamber concludes that a Trial Chamber’s decision with respect to evaluation of evidence received pursuant to Rule 94 bis of the Rules is a discretionary one.[1] When assessing an expert report, a Trial Chamber generally evaluates whether it contains sufficient information as to the sources used in support of its conclusions and whether those conclusions were drawn independently and impartially.[2] […] [1] See Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 164; Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 304; see also The Prosecutor v. Sylvester Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Decision on Expert Witnesses for the Defence - Rules 54, 73, 89 and 94 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 November 2003, para. 8. [2] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 198-199; see also Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No IT-98-29/1-T, Decision on Admission of Expert Report of Robert Donia, 15 February 2007, paras 8-9; Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No IT-95-11-T, Decision on Defence’s Submission of the Expert Report of Professor Smilja Avramov pursuant to Rule 94 bis, 9 November 2006, paras 9-10; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No IT-99-36-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Submission of Statement of Expert Witness Ewan Brown, 3 June 2003, p. 4. |
ICTR Rule Rule 94 bis ICTY Rule Rule 94 bis | |
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| Appeal Judgement - 17.07.2008 |
STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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56. Finally, the Appeals Chamber notes its agreement with the Trial Chamber’s finding that an accused claiming to be unfit to stand trial bears the burden of so proving by a preponderance of the evidence.[1] In this regard, the Appeals Chamber notes that this approach is consistent with the one used in common law jurisdictions where the burden of proof generally lies on the party which alleges the accused’s unfitness to stand trial and is considered to be discharged if this party can show its claim on the balance of probabilities.[2] [1] Decision of 26 May 2004, para. 38; see supra, para. 43. [2] R. v. Podola [1959] 3 W.L.R. 718. The Appeals Chamber also takes note of the aforementioned Nahak Decision in which the SPSC determined that the preponderance standard governs determinations of an accused’s fitness to stand trial (Nahak Decision, paras 57-59 referring to the Decision of 26 May 2004, para. 38: “[…] competence to stand trial is not an element of the offence with which the Defendant is charged” and, consequently, “it is not required that a defendant’s competence be proved by 'a higher standard as is required of the prosecutor when proving guilt in criminal cases’”; and paras 59-60, 67, 152 referring to the requirement that “proof that it is more probable than not […] has been demonstrated.”). The Appeals Chamber finally notes that the SPSC declined to define who bears the burden of proof and decided to evaluate the evidence on the matter “without depending on any 'onus of proof’ that might otherwise be imposed on the Defendant.” (ibid., paras 61-67). |
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STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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34. The Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that the issue of an accused’s fitness to stand trial is of such importance that it may generally be regarded as “an issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial” under Rule 73(B) of the Rules.[1] Absent certain exceptions, such as when an accused’s submissions in support of his inability to stand trial are frivolous or manifestly without merit, the immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber of any question of fitness would appear to be essential in that any decision that an accused is not fit to stand trial would necessarily materially advance the proceedings. Correspondingly, the prejudice to the accused resulting from continuing the trial while he or she is unfit to stand would amount to a miscarriage of justice.[2] [1] The Appeals Chamber notes that in a different case, Trial Chamber III also denied a request for certification against a decision concerning the accused’s fitness to stand trial (Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Motion Re Fitness to Stand Trial, 10 March 2008 (confidential and ex parte) (“Stanišić Decision of 10 March 2008”)) on the grounds that the Defence in that case did not show that the criteria of Rule 73(B) of the Rules had been met - Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Defence Motion Requesting Certification for Leave to Appeal, 16 April 2008, paras 4-6. [2] Cf. R. v. Podola [1959] Cr. App. 3 W.L.R. 718: “If a convicted person appeals against his conviction on the ground that the hearing of the preliminary issue was open to objection for error in law, so that he should never have been tried on the substantive charge at all, we are of opinion that this court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. […] [A] convicted person is entitled to contend […] that he 'should not have been given in charge to the jury as he was, or have been made the subject of any verdict at all, but should have had the proceedings stopped at the outset.’” Ngatayi v. R [1980] 147 CLR 1, High Court of Australia, p. 14: “Before any trial on an issue of guilt, the issue of capacity is to be decided by a jury empanelled specially to try that issue of capacity […] The question of whether Mr Ngatayi was capable of understanding the proceedings was not an issue on the trial of his guilt. It is not satisfactory to excuse the holding of a trial at which this would be the issue because of conclusions based on evidence given at trial in which it was not an issue, Special leave to appeal should be granted. Because the statutory procedure intended for the applicant’s protection has not been followed, the appeal should be allowed.” Kesavarajah v. R [1994], 181 CLR 230, High Court of Australia, pp. 246-248: “There is simply no point in embarking on a lengthy trial with all the expense and inconvenience to jurors that it may entail if it is to be interrupted by reason of some manifestation or exacerbation of a debilitating condition which can affect the accused’s fitness to be tried. Of course, that is not to exclude from the jury’s consideration the question whether the condition is such that difficulties can be accommodated by an adjournment if and when they arise. […] For our part, although the charge to the jury was almost complete, we do not consider that the appellant’s fitness to be tried became an immaterial consideration. […] Notwithstanding that the trial was drawing to its close, the possibility remained that the appellant might be called upon to participate in the proceedings to protect his own interests. […] Consequently, at this late stage of the trial, a serious question as to the appellant’s fitness to be tried again arose, requiring the determination of a jury. […] The object of s 393 is to ensure that a trial does not proceed in the case of an accused who is unfit to be tried; in other words, a person who is unfit to be tried should not be subject to trial resulting in the risk of his or her conviction. […] In the result, the appeal should be allowed, the conviction quashed and a new trial ordered.” Malaysia, High Court of Muar, Public Prosecutor v. Misbah Bin Saat [1997] 3 MLJ 495, p. 504: “It should be observed that though s 342(1) of the CPC appears to cover a situation where the question of the accused's unsoundness of mind arises when the trial has already commenced, the inquiry by the court as to the fitness of the accused person ought to be determined forthwith when it comes to the knowledge of the court, and ought not to be postponed until after the close of the prosecution's case. It is the duty of the court either at the commencement of the trial, or at any stage during the course of the trial, when the question of fitness to stand trial is raised, to determine that issue immediately.” |
ICTR Rule Rule 73(B) ICTY Rule Rule 73(B) | |
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| Appeal Judgement - 17.07.2008 |
STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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To arrive at the conclusion below, the Appeals Chamber relied on a variety of legal sources. These sources include the ICTY & ICTR jurisprudence;[1] IMT decisions;[2] ECtHR decisions;[3] normative provisions of the ICC,[4] ECCC,[5] SCSL;[6] SCSL[7] and SPSC jurisprudence;[8] as well as numerous national sources (normative and jurisprudential) from civil and common law systems (for detailed analysis, see paras 44-54 of the Appeal Judgement). 55. In light of the discussion above, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that, in assessing Strugar’s fitness to stand trial, the Trial Chamber correctly identified the non-exhaustive list of rights which are essential for determination of an accused’s fitness to stand trial.[9] The Appeals Chamber is further satisfied that, on this basis, the Trial Chamber applied the correct legal standard. This is not changed by the Trial Chamber’s reference to a “minimum standard of overall capacity”[10] which the Appeals Chamber finds is not the best way of enumerating the correct standard. As noted above, the applicable standard is that of meaningful participation which allows the accused to exercise his fair trial rights to such a degree that he is able to participate effectively in his trial, and has an understanding of the essentials of the proceedings.[11] In this regard, the Trial Chamber applied the standard correctly, as evidenced by its conclusion that an accused’s fitness to stand trial should turn on whether his capacities, “viewed overall and in a reasonable and commonsense manner, at such a level that it is possible for [him or her] to participate in the proceedings (in some cases with assistance) and sufficiently exercise the identified rights”.[12] 60. […] In particular, the Trial Chamber was correct in rejecting the approach according to which an accused “should have capacity to fully comprehend the course of the proceedings in the trial, so as to make a proper defense, and to comprehend details of the evidence”.[13] The Appeals Chamber emphasizes that fitness to stand trial should be distinguished from fitness to represent oneself.[14] An accused represented by counsel cannot be expected to have the same understanding of the material related to his case as a qualified and experienced lawyer.[15] Even persons in good physical and mental health, but without advanced legal education and relevant skills, require considerable legal assistance, especially in cases of such complex legal and factual nature as those brought before the Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber therefore agrees with the Trial Chamber that what is required from an accused to be deemed fit to stand trial is a standard of overall capacity allowing for a meaningful participation in the trial, provided that he or she is duly represented by Counsel.[16] 61. […] However, considering that the test for fitness to stand trial is quite different from the definition of a mental or physical disorder,[17] the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber correctly emphasized that medical diagnoses alone, no matter how numerous, do not suffice to assess a person’s competency to stand trial.[18] […] For application of the legal standard to the facts of the present case, see paras 57-63. [1] Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Motion Re Fitness to Stand Trial, 10 March 2008 (confidential and ex parte); Prosecutor v. Milorad Trbić, Case No. IT-05-88/1-PT, Order in Regard to the Preparation for Trial, 21 March 2007 (confidential), p. 3; Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Stanišić Defence’s Motion on the Fitness of the Accused to Stand Trial with Confidential Annexes, 27 April 2006, pp. 3-5; Prosecutor v. Vladimir Kovačević, Case No. IT-01-42/2-I, Public Version of the Decision on Accused’s Fitness to Enter a Plea and Stand Trial, 12 April 2006, paras 21-29; Prosecutor v. Momir Talić, Case No. IT-99-36/1-T, Decision regarding Fitness of the Accused to Stand Trial, 29 April 2003 (confidential); Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Order on the Prosecution’s Request for a Formal Finding of the Trial Chamber that the Accused Landžo Is Fit to Stand Trial, 23 June 1997; Nahimana et al. Trial Judgement, para. 52, referring to Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, [Decision on] Motion by the Defence in Accordance with Rule 74 bis, 20 February 2001 (confidential). [2] The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Göring et al., Order of the Tribunal Granting Postponement of Proceedings Against Gustav Krupp Von Bohlen, 15 November 1945, 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 143; Order of the Tribunal Regarding a Psychiatric Examination of Defendant Streicher, 17 November 1945, 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 153 and Proceedings, Third Day, 22 November 1945, 2 Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 156; Order of the Tribunal Rejecting the Motion on Behalf of Defendant Hess and Designating a Commission to Examine Defendant Hess with Reference to his Mental Competence and Capacity to Stand Trial, 24 November 1945, 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 166-167 and Proceedings, Ninth Day, 30 November 1945, 2 Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 478-496, Proceedings, Tenth Day, 1 December 1945, 3 Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 1; The United States of America, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Commonwealth of Australia, Canada, the Republic of France, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zeland, India, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines against Sadao Araki et al., 42 Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The Records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 19637-19638 (R. John Pritchard ed., 1998). [3] S.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60958/00, para. 29, ECHR 2004-IV; T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24724/94, para. 83, 16 December 1999; V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94, para. 90, ECHR 1999-IX; Stanford v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 23 February 1994, Series A no. 282-A, para. 26. [4] Rules 133 and 135 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICC-ASP/1/3). [5] Rule 32 of the Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, adopted on 12 June 2007. [6] Rule 74 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, adopted on 16 January 2002 (last amended on 19 November 2007). [7] The Prosecutor against Foday Saybana Sankoh a.k.a Popay a.k.a. Papa a.k.a. Pa, Case No. SCSL-2003-02-I, Order for Further Physiological and Psychiatric Examination, 21 March 2003, p. 1; The Prosecutor against Foday Saybana Sankoh a.k.a Popay a.k.a. Papa a.k.a. Pa, Case No. SCSL-2003-02-I, Ruling on the Motion for a Stay of Proceedings Filed by the Applicant, 22 July 2003 (“Sankoh Decision of 22 July 2003”), p. 5. [8] Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes v. Joseph Nahak, Case No. 01A/2004, Findings and Order on Defendant Nahak’s Competence to Stand Trial, 1 March 2005 (“Nahak Decision”), paras 54-56, 135. [9] See supra, para. 41 [to plead, to understand the nature of the charges, to understand the course of the proceedings, to understand the details of the evidence, to instruct counsel, to understand the consequences of the proceedings, and to testify]. [10] Decision of 26 May 2004 [Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision re Strugar Motion to Terminate Proceedings, 24 May 2004], para. 37. [11] See Stanišić Decision of 10 March 2008, para. 60. Cf. also, see also Hansard 2 March 2000 col 665-667; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte The Kingdom of Belgium; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Amnesty International Limited and others, Queen’s Bench Division, CO/236/2000, CO/238/2000, 15 February 2000, 2000 WL 461 (QBD) (“Pinochet Decision of 15 February 2000”), para. 20: “In referring to Senator Pinochet's fitness to stand trial, the Secretary of State is referring to his capacity to participate meaningfully in a trial. The Home Secretary has proceeded on the footing that the decisive criteria are the quality of his memory, his ability to process verbal information and to follow the proceedings, his ability to understand the content and implications of questions put to him, his ability to express himself coherently and comprehensibly, and his ability to instruct his legal representatives” (emphasis added); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960),pp. 402-403: “the 'test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him’”; R. v. Presser [1958] VR 45, p. 48: “[…] [the accused] need not, of course, understand the purpose of all the various court formalities”; “[h]e need not, of course, be conversant with court procedure and he need not have the mental capacity to make an able defence […] The question is whether "the accused, because of mental defect, fails to come up to certain minimum standards which he needs to equal before he can be tried without unfairness or injustice to him". See also supra, paras 47, 52 (fn. 140) and infra, para. 60. [12] See supra, paras 41-42. [13] Decision of 26 May 2004, para 48, citing Lečić-Toševski Report, p. 14, as well as the relevant passage of the New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry referred to therein, which in reality reads as follows: “In its traditional formulation the test of unfitness to plead is whether the defendant is of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the proceedings in the trial, so as to make a proper defence, to know that he might challenge jurors, and to comprehend detail of the evidence”. [14] Cf. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Concerning Further Medical Report, 11 November 2005 (confidential), p. 2: “[A]ny further report should […] distinguish between the degree of fitness necessary to attend courts as an Accused person, and that required to additionally conduct one’s own case.” See also, Milošević Decision of 1 November 2004, para 14: “How should the Tribunal treat a defendant whose health, while good enough to engage in the ordinary and non-strenuous activities of everyday life, is not sufficiently robust to withstand all the rigors of trial work – the late nights, the stressful cross-examinations, the courtroom confrontations – unless the hearing schedule is reduced to one day a week, or even one day a month? Must the Trial Chamber be forced to choose between setting that defendant free and allowing the case to grind to an effective halt? In the Appeals Chamber’s view, to ask that question is to answer it.” (footnotes omitted). [15] See supra, para. 52 (fn. 140). [16] See supra, para. 55. Cf. S.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60958/00, para. 29, ECHR 2004-IV: “Given the sophistication of modern legal systems, many adults of normal intelligence are unable fully to comprehend all the intricacies and exchanges which take place in the courtroom.” The representation by skilled and experience lawyers can however be found insufficient to guarantee effective participation of an accused in the proceedings against him where he or she is incapable to cooperate with his or her lawyers for the purposes of his or her defence due to, for example, his or her immaturity and/or disturbed emotional state (T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24724/94, para. 83, 16 December 1999; V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94, para. 90, ECHR 1999-IX); German Federal Constitutional Court holding that the impact of psychological or physical shortcomings on the actual exercise of the accused’s procedural rights can be sufficiently compensated by counsel support (NJW 1995, p. 1952); Japanese Supreme Court holding that even if the relevant abilities of the accused are considerably limited he may not be considered to lack them if he enjoys the appropriate assistance of his counsel and/or interpreters who play the role of his guardians (Japanese Supreme Court Judgement 1996(A)No.204, pp. 23-24). [17] See supra, paras 52, 55; cf. R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914; Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (1968); see also Missouri Institute of Mental Health Policy Brief, June 2003, p. 1: “no psychological symptoms (e.g., sensory hallucinations, dementia, or amnesia) can be considered an automatic bar to competency”; Steele c. R. Cour d’appel du Québec, No. 500-10-0004418-853, 12 February 1991, p. 59. [18] Decision of 26 May 2004, para. 46; See also Pinochet Decision of 15 February 2000, paras 20-21 stating with approval that the criteria set by the Home Secretary for determination of Augusto Pinochet’s fitness to stand trial were not used in the sense of “general physical debility”. |
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| Appeal Judgement - 17.07.2008 |
STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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391. The Appeals Chamber recalls its previous finding in Jelisić that it “will not substitute its sentence for that of a Trial Chamber unless the Trial Chamber […] has failed to follow applicable law”.[1] In the case at hand, the Trial Chamber committed such an error with respect to the scope of Strugar’s criminal liability from 12:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. on 6 December 1991. Although this legal error has not been found to have had an impact on the sentence, the criminal conduct for which the Trial Chamber convicted Strugar has changed, as it now also comprises his failure to prevent the unlawful shelling of the Old Town before it had ever begun. As such, taking into consideration this legal error of the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber considers that it is resentencing Strugar for his failure to prevent and punish the unlawful shelling of the Old Town on 6 December 1991 and that it thus has the mandate to revise the sentence without remitting it to the Trial Chamber.[2] 392. With respect to the evidence relating to the deterioration of Strugar’s health since the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber admits the relevant material before it[3] in evidence pursuant to Rules 89 and 98 of the Rules. Having considered this evidence the Appeals Chamber accepts that Strugar’s health has deteriorated since the rendering of the Trial Judgement and will take this into account as a mitigating circumstance in its revision of the sentence imposed on him. [1] Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 99. [2] See Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 181 (with further references). The Appeals Chamber notes that neither party submits that the matter be be remitted to a Trial Chamber. [3] Medical Report prepared by Dr. Falke as per the then Pre-Appeal Judge and submitted to the Appeals Chamber by the Deputy Registrar, 7 July 2005; Medical Report submitted to the Appeals Chamber by the Deputy-Regitrar, 17 August 2005; Confidential Annex to Defence Notice, 11 September 2006; Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-Misc.1, Confidential Annexes to Defence Request for Providing Medical Aid, 10 May 2007; Annex to Defence Notice Relevant to Appeals Chamber’s Public “Order to the Defence of Pavle Strugar for Filing of Medical Report”, 27 June 2008 (confidential). |
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STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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365. In order to be a factor in mitigation, the remorse expressed by an accused must be genuine and sincere.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalls that it has previously held that an accused can express sincere regrets without admitting his participation in a crime.[2] In such circumstances, remorse nonetheless requires acceptance of some measure of moral blameworthiness for personal wrongdoing, falling short of the admission of criminal responsibility or guilt. This follows from the ordinary meaning of the term remorse[3] as well as the approach taken in the few cases where expressions of remorse made by accused who maintained their innocence have been accepted in mitigation.[4] 366. However, beyond such expressions of remorse, an accused might also express sympathy, compassion or sorrow for the victims of the crimes with which he is charged. Although this does not amount to remorse as such, it may nonetheless be considered as a mitigating factor. The Appeals Chamber notes that such expressions of sympathy or compassion have been accepted as mitigating circumstances by Trial Chambers of both the ICTR and this Tribunal.[5] [1] See Jokić Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, para. 89 (and sources cited therein). [2] Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 177. [3] The Oxford English Dictionary defines remorse as “a feeling of compunction, or of deep regret and repentance, for a sin or wrong committed.” [4] Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 705 (finding that “the integrity of the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the Appellant has demonstrated remorse is in fact unchallenged by the contradiction putatively identified by the Trial Chamber.”); Blaškić Trial Judgement, para. 775 (“The Trial Chamber points out that, from the very first day of his testimony, Tihomir Blaškić expressed profound regret and avowed that he had done his best to improve the situation although this proved insufficient.”); Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 869 (“his statement that he felt guilty about the fact that FWS-75 was gang-raped while he was raping D.B. in an adjoining room may be interpreted as a statement of remorse, and is considered in mitigation.”); Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 1279 (“The Trial Chamber does not consider Mr. Landžo’s belated partial admissions of guilt, or any expressions of remorse, to significantly mitigate, in the circumstances, the crimes committed by him. […] Mr. Landžo did address a written statement to the Trial Chamber after the end of his trial, stating that he was sorry for his conduct in the Čelebići prison-camp and that he wished to express his regrets to his victims and their families. Such expression of remorse would have been more appropriately made in open court, with these victims and witnesses present, and thus this ostensible, belated contrition seems to merely have been an attempt to seek concession in the matter of sentence.”). [5] Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 1139 (“throughout the trial there were a few instances when, through Defence counsel, he told witnesses that he felt sorry for what they had suffered. The Trial Chamber has no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Accused in offering his regret, and will take these instances into consideration as a mitigating factor for the purpose of sentencing the Accused.”); Orić Trial Judgement, para. 752 (“throughout the trial, there were a few instances when Defence counsel on his behalf expressed compassion to witnesses for their loss and suffering. The Trial Chamber does not doubt the sincerity of the Accused in expressing empathy with the victims for their loss and suffering, and has taken this sincerity into consideration as a mitigating factor.”); Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 922 (“The Trial Chamber considers as a mitigating factor Dr. Stakić’s behaviour towards certain witnesses. For example, on 27 June 2002, he directed his counsel not to cross-examine Nermin Karagić 'because of the suffering of this witness and his pretty bad mental state.’”); Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 45 (“Akayesu expressed sympathy for the many victims of the genocide and of the war and he identified with the survival of the events of 1994.”); Musema Trial Judgement, para. 1005 (“The Chamber, amongst the mitigating circumstances, takes into consideration that Musema admitted the genocide against the Tutsi people in Rwanda in 1994, expressed his distress about the deaths of so many innocent people, and paid tribute to all victims of the tragic events in Rwanda.”); Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 396 (accepting the Trial Chamber’s findings on mitigating circumstances). |
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STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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348. The Appeals Chamber has held that sentences of like individuals in like cases should be comparable.[1]While similar cases do not provide a legally binding tariff of sentences, they can be of assistance in sentencing if they involve the commission of the same offences in substantially similar circumstances.[2] The relevance of previous sentences is however often limited as a number of elements, relating, inter alia, to the number, type and gravity of the crimes committed, the personal circumstances of the convicted person and the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, dictate different results in different cases such that it is frequently impossible to transpose the sentence in one case mutatis mutandis to another.[3] This follows from the principle that the determination of the sentence involves the individualisation of the sentence so as to appropriately reflect the particular facts of the case and the circumstances of the convicted person.[4] 349. As a result, previous sentencing practice is but one factor among a host of others which must be taken into account when determining the sentence. Nonetheless, as held by the Appeals Chamber in Jelisić, a disparity between an impugned sentence and another sentence rendered in a like case can constitute an error if the former is out of reasonable proportion with the latter. This disparity is not in itself erroneous, but rather gives rise to an inference that the Trial Chamber must have failed to exercise its discretion properly in applying the law on sentencing: The Appeals Chamber agrees that a sentence should not be capricious or excessive, and that, in principle, it may be thought to be capricious or excessive if it is out of reasonable proportion with a line of sentences passed in similar circumstances for the same offences. Where there is such disparity, the Appeals Chamber may infer that there was disregard of the standard criteria by which sentence should be assessed, as prescribed by the Statute and set out in the Rules. But it is difficult and unhelpful to lay down a hard and fast rule on the point; there are a number of variable factors to be considered in each case.[6] [1] Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 681. [2] Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 250. See also Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 721, 756-757; Jelisić Appeal Judgement, paras 96, 101; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 681. [3] Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 681. See also Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 719, 721; Furund‘ija Appeal Judgement, para. 250; Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 135, Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 333, Momir Nikolić Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, para. 38, Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 387. [4] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 717, 821; Dragan Nikolić Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, para. 19; Babić Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, para. 32; Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 615; Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 238; Bralo Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, para. 33; Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 101. [5] Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 248. [6] Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 96. |
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STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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252. Although this sub-ground of appeal is presented as relating to an alleged error of law, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that it is more accurately characterized as a mixed error of law and fact. Hence, the Appeals Chamber will determine whether the conclusion reached by the Trial Chamber was one which no reasonable trier of fact could have reached. However, before doing so, the Appeals Chamber will clarify the legal standard employed by the Trial Chamber in the Trial Judgement. 269. At the outset, the Appeals Chamber notes that, although Strugar qualifies the relevant alleged errors of the Trial Chamber as errors of law, it understands him to challenge both the Trial Chamber’s legal and factual conclusions with respect to defining the mens rea requirement of the crimes in question and its application to the conduct of JNA forces in the region of Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991.[1] Hence, the Appeals Chamber will first examine the applicable law and then determine whether the factual conclusion reached by the Trial Chamber was one which no reasonable trier of fact could have reached. [1] The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber made legal and factual findings with respect to Count 3 (attacks on civilians) and Count 5 (attacks on civilian objects) simultaneously (Trial Judgement, paras 277 et seq.). Strugar has not presented any argument concerning the Trial Chamber’s findings in relation the mens rea element of the crime of attack on civilian objects, given that, in light of its conlusion on cumulation, the Trial Chamber did not enter a conviction under Count 5. Both parties clarified that, in their views, the mens rea requirement of the crime of attack on civilians and the crime of attack on civilian objects are identical (AT. 137; AT. 212). |
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| Appeal Judgement - 17.07.2008 |
STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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The Appeals Chamber has identified 6 categories of arguments relevant to this case, which can be summarily dismissed: i. challenges to factual findings on which a conviction does not rely (paras 18-19); For the application of these categories, see paras 66-74, 90-92, 100-101, 115-116, 121-124, 145-146, 162-163, 190-191, 221-222, 240-244. |
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| Appeal Judgement - 17.07.2008 |
STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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After reiterating (at paras 297-301) the legal standard set out in the Hadžihasanović and Kubura Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber made the following findings: 303. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber found that prior to the commencement of the attack against Srđ, Strugar had reason to know of the risk that the forces under his command might repeat their previous conduct and unlawfully shell the OldTown.[1] The Trial Chamber characterised this risk as “a real and obvious prospect”, “a clear possibility”, “a risk that was not slight or remote”, and a “real risk”.[2] The Appeals Chamber moreover notes that the Trial Chamber found that the mens rea element of Article 7(3) of the Statute was not met before the commencement of the attack against Srđ because it found that it had not been established that Strugar “had reason to know that [unlawful shelling] would occur”,[3] that the risk of such shelling was shown “to have been so strong as to give rise, in the circumstances, to knowledge that his forces were about to commit an offence”[4] or that “there was a substantial likelihood of the artillery” unlawfully shelling the Old Town.[5] In addition, the Trial Chamber held that it was “not apparent that additional investigation before the attack could have put the Accused in any better position”.[6] The Appeals Chamber finally notes that the Trial Chamber found that Strugar’s notice, after the commencement of the attack against Srđ, of a “clear and strong risk”[7] or a “clear likelihood”[8] that his forces were repeating its previous conduct and unlawfully shelling the Old Town did however meet the mens rea requirement under Article 7(3). 304. Taking into consideration the relevant factual findings of the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber committed an error of law by not applying the correct legal standard regarding the mens rea element under Article 7(3) of the Statute. The Trial Chamber erred in finding that Strugar’s knowledge of the risk that his forces might unlawfully shell the Old Town was not sufficient to meet the mens rea element under Article 7(3) and that only knowledge of the “substantial likelihood” or the “clear and strong risk” that his forces would do so fulfilled this requirement. In so finding, the Trial Chamber erroneously read into the mens rea element of Article 7(3) the requirement that the superior be on notice of a strong risk that his subordinates would commit offences. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that under the correct legal standard, sufficiently alarming information putting a superior on notice of the risk that crimes might subsequently be carried out by his subordinates and justifying further inquiry is sufficient to hold a superior liable under Article 7(3) of the Statute.[9] [1] Ibid. [Trial Judgement], paras 347, 416-417, 420. [2] Ibid., paras 347, 416-417, 420. [3] Ibid., para. 417 (emphasis original). [4] Ibid., para. 417 (emphasis added). [5] Ibid., para. 420 (emphasis added). [6] Ibid., para. 417. [7] Ibid., para. 418. [8] Ibid., para. 422. [9] See supra, paras 297-301. |
ICTR Statute Article 6(3) ICTY Statute Article 7(3) | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 17.07.2008 |
STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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253. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a superior’s authority to issue orders does not automatically establish that a superior had effective control over his subordinates, but is one of the indicators to be taken into account when establishing the effective control.[1] As the Appeals Chamber held in Halilović, in relation to such capacity, “the orders in question will rather have to be carefully assessed in light of the rest of the evidence in order to ascertain the degree of control over the perpetrators”.[2] For instance, in Blaškić, the Appeals Chamber found that “the issuing of humanitarian orders does not by itself establish that the Appellant had effective control over the troops that received the orders”.[3] 254. Indeed, as held by the Appeals Chamber in Blaškić, “the indicators of effective control are more a matter of evidence than of substantive law, and those indicators are limited to showing that the accused had the power to prevent, punish, or initiate measures leading to proceedings against the alleged perpetrators where appropriate”. Therefore, whether a given form of authority possessed by a superior amounts to an indicator of effective control depends on the circumstances of the case.[5] For example, with respect to the capacity to issue orders, the nature of the orders which the superior has the capacity to issue, the nature of his capacity to do so as well as whether or not his orders are actually followed would be relevant to the assessment of whether a superior had the material ability to prevent or punish. 256. The Appeals Chamber recalls that whether a superior’s orders are in fact followed can be indicative of a superior’s effective control over his subordinates.[6] […] [1] Cf. Halilović Appeal Judgement, paras 68, 70, 139. [2] Ibid., para. 204. [3] Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 485. [4] Ibid., para. 69. See also Hadžihasanović and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 199. [5] Cf. Halilović Appeal Judgement, paras 191-192; Hadžihasanović and Kubura Appeal Judgement, paras 199-201. [6] See Halilović Appeal Judgement, para. 207. |
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| Appeal Judgement - 17.07.2008 |
STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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270. The Appeals Chamber has previously ruled that the perpetrator of the crime of attack on civilians must undertake the attack “wilfully” and that the latter incorporates “wrongful intent, or recklessness, [but] not ‘mere negligence’”.[1] In other words, the mens rea requirement is met if it has been shown that the acts of violence which constitute this crime were wilfully directed against civilians, that is, either deliberately against them or through recklessness.[2] The Appeals Chamber considers that this definition encompasses both the notions of “direct intent” and “indirect intent” mentioned by the Trial Chamber, and referred to by Strugar, as the mens rea element of an attack against civilians. 271. As specified by the Trial Chamber in the Galić case, For the mens rea recognized by Additional Protocol I to be proven, the Prosecution must show that the perpetrator was aware or should have been aware of the civilian status of the persons attacked. In case of doubt as to the status of a person, that person shall be considered to be a civilian. However, in such cases, the Prosecution must show that in the given circumstances a reasonable person could not have believed that the individual he or she attacked was a combatant.[3] The intent to target civilians can be proved through inferences from direct or circumstantial evidence.[4] There is no requirement of the intent to attack particular civilians; rather it is prohibited to make the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, the object of an attack.[5] The determination of whether civilians were targeted is a case-by-case analysis, based on a variety of factors, including the means and method used in the course of the attack, the distance between the victims and the source of fire, the ongoing combat activity at the time and location of the incident, the presence of military activities or facilities in the vicinity of the incident, the status of the victims as well as their appearance, and the nature of the crimes committed in the course of the attack.[6] 275. […] The Appeals Chamber, moreover, has held on various occasions that the absolute prohibition against attacking civilians “may not be derogated from because of military necessity”.[7] Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber recalls that, depending on the circumstances of the case, the indiscriminate character of an attack can be indicative of the fact that the attack was indeed directed against the civilian population.[8] For application of this legal standard to the facts, see paras 272-276. [1] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 140, citing Galić Trial Judgement, para. 54. [2] Cf. Commentary AP I, para. 3474 which defines the term “wilfully” in the following way: “the accused must have acted consciously and with intent, i.e., with his mind on the act and its consequences, and willing them ('criminal intent’ or 'malice aforethought’); this encompasses the concepts of 'wrongful intent’ or 'recklessness’, viz., the attitude of an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility of it happening; on the other hand, ordinary negligence or lack of foresight is not covered, i.e., when a man acts without having his mind on the act or its consequences.” [3] Galić Trial Judgement, para. 55; see also Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 48; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 111. [4] Galić Appeal Judgement, fn. 707. [5] Ibid., fn. 709, citing Additional Protocol I, Article 52 (2). [6] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 132, citing Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 91; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 106; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 133. Cf. Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 438. [7] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 130 citing Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 109, and Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 54. In this sense, the fighting on both sides affects the determination of what is an unlawful attack and what is acceptable collateral damage, but not the prohibition itself (Galić Appeal Judgement, fn. 704). It has also been held that even the presence of individual combatants within the population attacked does not necessarily change the legal qualification of this population as civilian in nature (Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 136). [8] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 132 and fn. 706. In that case, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s finding that attacks which employ certain means of combat which cannot discriminate between civilians and civilian objects and military objectives were “tantamount to direct targeting of civilians” (Galić Trial Judgement, fn. 101). See also Galić Appeal Judgement, fn. 706: “Attacking anything that moves in a residential building, before determining whether the mover is a civilian or a combatant, is a paradigmatic example of not differentiating between targets.” |
ICTY Statute Article 3 | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 17.07.2008 |
STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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277. The crime of destruction or wilful damage of cultural property under Article 3(d) of the Statute is lex specialis with respect to the offence of unlawful attacks on civilian objects.[1] The mens rea requirement of this crime is therefore also met if the acts of destruction or damage were wilfully (i.e. either deliberately or through recklessness) directed against such “cultural property”.[2] [1] Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 89-91; Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, para. 361. [2] See Hadžihasanović and Kubura Trial Judgement, para. 59; Krajišnik Trial Judgement, para. 782; Naletilić and Martinović Trial Judgement, paras 603-605, citing Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, para. 358 and Blaškić Trial Judgement, para. 185. |
ICTY Statute Article 3(d) | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 17.07.2008 |
STRUGAR Pavle (IT-01-42-A) |
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178. On the basis of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber holds that in order to establish the existence of a violation of Common Article 3 under Article 3 of the Statute, a Trial Chamber must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim of the alleged offence was not participating in acts of war which by their nature or purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the enemy’s armed forces. Such an enquiry must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the individual circumstances of the victim at the time of the alleged offence.[1] As the temporal scope of an individual’s participation in hostilities can be intermittent and discontinuous, whether a victim was actively participating in the hostilities at the time of the offence depends on the nexus between the victim’s activities at the time of the offence and any acts of war which by their nature or purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the adverse party.[2] If a reasonable doubt subsists as to the existence of such a nexus, then a Trial Chamber cannot convict an accused for an offence committed against such a victim under Article 3 of the Statute.[3] 179. When dealing with crimes pursuant to Common Article 3, it may be necessary for a Trial Chamber to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged offence committed against the victim was not otherwise lawful under international humanitarian law.[4] The need for such an additional enquiry will depend on the applicability of other rules of international humanitarian law, which is assessed on the basis of the scope of application of these rules[5] as well as the circumstances of the case.[6] Indeed, if the victim of an offence was a combatant[7] or if the injury or death of such a victim was the incidental result of an attack which was proportionate in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage,[8] his injury or death would not amount to a violation of international humanitarian law even if he was not actively participating in hostilities at the time of the alleged offence. See paras 172 – 177 for a detailed overview of underlying legal sources, as well as a non-exhaustive list of examples of direct and indirect forms of participation in hostilities. For the application of this legal standard to the facts of the case, see paras 180-188. [1] Tadić Trial Judgement, para. 616; Halilović Trial Judgement, para. 34. See, e.g., in relation to the direct participation in the hostilities of a member of the armed forces, Commentary GC III, p. 39: “The discussions at the Conference brought out clearly that it is not necessary for an armed force as a whole to have laid down its arms for its members to be entitled to protection under [Article 3]. The Convention refers to individuals and not to units of troops, and a man who has surrendered individually is entitled to the same humane treatment as he would receive if the whole army to which he belongs had capitulated. The important thing is that the man in question will be taking no further part in the fighting.” [2] Cf. United States of America v. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, U.S. Military Commission, 19 December 2007, p. 6: “The Commission also finds that the accused directly participated in those hostilities by driving a vehicle containing two surface-to-air missiles in both temporal and spatial proximity to both ongoing combat operations. [...] Although Kandahar was a short distance away, the accused’s past history of delivering munitions to Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters, his possession of a vehicle containing surface to air missiles, and his capture while driving in the direction of a battle already underway, satisfies the requirement of 'direct participation’.” [3] The Appeals Chamber notes that for the purposes of establishing an accused’s criminal responsibility, the burden of proof of whether a victim was not taking active part in the hostilities rests with the Prosecution. Cf. Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 111. [4] The Appeals Chamber observes that this is in line with the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals in relation to Common Article 3 crimes. In the Čelebići Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber merely set out a non-exhaustive list of the elements of the crime “cruel treatment” under Article 3 of the Statute for the purpose of comparing it with the crime of torture under Article 2 of the Statute in application of the test on cumulative convictions (Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 424). The Appeals Chamber moreover observes that Trial Chambers have made a finding on the civilian status of victims of Common Article 3 crimes or found that this was not necessary given the facts of the respective case. In the Tadić Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber found that all of the victims were detained by the accused and as such the issue of whether they were combatants or civilians did not arise because even if they were combatants, they had been placed hors de combat by detention (Tadić Trial Judgement, para. 616). In the Stakić Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber found that the victims were hors de combat or civilians (Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 589). In the Naletilić and Martinović Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber found that the victims were all civilians or prisoners of war (Naletilić and Martinović Trial Judgement, para. 229). In the Akayesu Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber found that the victims were civilians (Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 175). [5] The scope of application of international humanitarian law primarily depends on the nature of the armed conflict, the customary or conventional status of a given rule or set of rules and the status of the victim. In conflicts where Common Article 3 is the only applicable provision, the more elaborate rules regarding civilian and combatant status outlined in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I would not be applicable. See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 420; Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, para. 91; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1986), para. 218. [6] For instance, if a victim was found to be detained by an adverse party at the time of the alleged offence against him, his status as either a civilian or combatant would no longer be relevant because a detained person cannot, by definition, directly participate in hostilities. Therefore, an attack against such person would automatically be unlawful. [7] Combatants constitute lawful military objectives unless they are hors de combat. On the definition of combatant, see: Additional Protocol I, Articles 43, 44, 50(1); Geneva Convention III, Article 4; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 50-51. On the definition of military objectives, see: Additional Protocol I, Article 52; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 53. On the definition of hors de combat, see: Additional Protocol I, Article 41(2). See also Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 114: “As a result, the specific situation of the victim at the time the crimes are committed may not be determinative of his civilian or non-civilian status. If he is indeed a member of an armed organization, the fact that he is not armed or in combat at the time of the commission of crimes, does not accord him civilian status.” [8] Additional Protocol I, Articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b). See Galić Trial Judgement, para. 58 (and sources cited therein) and Galić Appeal Judgement, paras 191-192. |
ICTY Statute Article 3 | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 03.07.2008 |
ORIĆ Naser (IT-03-68-A) |
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43. The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber found Atif Krdžić responsible for aiding and abetting by omission.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalls that omission proper may lead to individual criminal responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute where there is a legal duty to act.[2] The Appeals Chamber has never set out the requirements for a conviction for omission in detail.[3] However, at a minimum, the offender’s conduct would have to meet the basic elements of aiding and abetting. Thus, his omission must be directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a crime and have a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime (actus reus).[4] The aider and abettor must know that his omission assists in the commission of the crime of the principal perpetrator[5] and must be aware of the essential elements of the crime which was ultimately committed by the principal (mens rea).[6] [1] Prosecution Response Brief, para. 126, 151; Prosecution Written Submissions of 25 March 2008, paras. 1-4; AT. 1 April 2008, pp. 9-11. Orić disputes the existence of a notion of aiding and abetting by “pure omission” in international humanitarian law and that a superior can be held responsible for subordinates who aid and abet by omission: AT. 1 April, pp. 60-62, 131-136. [2] Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 274; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 175; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 334, 370; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 663. [3] Cf. Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 85, fn. 259; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 47. [4] See, e.g., Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 482; Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 85. [5] See for the general definition of aiding and abetting, e.g., Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 56; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 482; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 127. [6] Cf. Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 86; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 162. |
ICTR Statute Article 6(1) ICTY Statute Article 7(1) | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 03.07.2008 |
ORIĆ Naser (IT-03-68-A) |
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43. The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber found Atif Krdžić responsible for aiding and abetting by omission.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalls that omission proper may lead to individual criminal responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute where there is a legal duty to act.[2] The Appeals Chamber has never set out the requirements for a conviction for omission in detail.[3] However, at a minimum, the offender’s conduct would have to meet the basic elements of aiding and abetting. Thus, his omission must be directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a crime and have a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime (actus reus).[4] The aider and abettor must know that his omission assists in the commission of the crime of the principal perpetrator[5] and must be aware of the essential elements of the crime which was ultimately committed by the principal (mens rea).[6] [1] Prosecution Response Brief, para. 126, 151; Prosecution Written Submissions of 25 March 2008, paras. 1-4; AT. 1 April 2008, pp. 9-11. Orić disputes the existence of a notion of aiding and abetting by “pure omission” in international humanitarian law and that a superior can be held responsible for subordinates who aid and abet by omission: AT. 1 April, pp. 60-62, 131-136. [2] Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 274; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 175; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 334, 370; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 663. [3] Cf. Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 85, fn. 259; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 47. [4] See, e.g., Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 482; Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 85. [5] See for the general definition of aiding and abetting, e.g., Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 56; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 482; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 127. [6] Cf. Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 86; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 162. |
ICTR Statute Article 6(1) ICTY Statute Article 7(1) | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 03.07.2008 |
ORIĆ Naser (IT-03-68-A) |
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41. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber did not hold Atif Krdžić criminally responsible for commission by omission. At a minimum, the actus reus of commission by omission requires an elevated degree of “concrete influence”.[1] Such was not the case here, where the Trial Chamber merely found that Atif Krdžić’s absence from the detention facilities “coincide[d] with more killings and more maltreatment”.[2] Furthermore, the Trial Chamber clearly distinguished Atif Krdžić from the principal perpetrators who physically committed the crimes.[3] [1] See Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 664. [2] Trial Judgement, para. 496. [3] See supra, paras. 24, 25, 27-30. |
ICTR Statute Article 6(1) ICTY Statute Article 7(1) | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 03.07.2008 |
ORIĆ Naser (IT-03-68-A) |
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18. […] For a superior to incur criminal responsibility under Article 7(3), in addition to establishing beyond reasonable doubt that his subordinate is criminally responsible, the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt: i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; ii) that the superior knew or had reason to know that his subordinate was about to commit a crime or had done so; and iii) that the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent his subordinate’s criminal conduct or punish his subordinate.[1] [1] See Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 484; Halilović Appeal Judgement, para. 59; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 484; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 72. See also Trial Judgement, para. 294. |
ICTR Statute Article 6(3) ICTY Statute Article 7(3) | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 03.07.2008 |
ORIĆ Naser (IT-03-68-A) |
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91. It is well established that the Prosecution must prove effective control beyond reasonable doubt in establishing a superior-subordinate relationship within the meaning of Article 7(3) of the Statute.[1] For that purpose, de jure authority is not synonymous with effective control.[2] Whereas the possession of de jure powers may certainly suggest a material ability to prevent or punish criminal acts of subordinates, it may be neither necessary nor sufficient to prove such ability.[3] If de jure power always results in a presumption of effective control, then the Prosecution would be exempted from its burden to prove effective control beyond reasonable doubt.[4] The Appeals Chamber is therefore unable to agree with the Prosecution’s proposed legal presumption. 92. The Appeals Chamber acknowledges that its jurisprudence might have suggested otherwise, using the terms “presume” or “prima facie evidence of effective control”.[5] The import of such language has not always been clear. Although in some common law jurisdictions “prima facie evidence” leads by definition to a burden-shifting presumption,[6] the Appeals Chamber underscores that before the International Tribunal the Prosecution still bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had effective control over his subordinates.[7] The possession of de jure authority, without more, provides only some evidence of such effective control. Before the International Tribunal there is no such presumption to the detriment of an accused. [1] As most recently recalled in Hadžihasanović and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 20. [2] Halilović Appeal Judgement, para. 85. [3] See Halilović Appeal Judgement, para. 85: “In fact, [de jure power] may not in itself amount to [effective control].” Cf. also Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 625 and 787, fn. 1837. [4] See Hadžihasanović and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 21. [5] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 197; Hadžihasanović and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 21 [6] See Brian Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (St. Paul: Thomson West, 2004). [7] Hadžihasanović and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 21. |
ICTR Statute Article 6(3) ICTY Statute Article 7(3) | |