212. […] Thus, while the report and testimony of an expert witness may be based on facts narrated by ordinary witnesses or facts from other evidence, an expert witness cannot, in principle, testify himself or herself on the acts and conduct of accused persons[1] without having been called to testify also as a factual witness and without his or her statement having been disclosed in accordance with the applicable rules concerning factual witnesses.[2] However, an expert witness may testify on certain facts relating to his or her area of expertise. […]

509. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the role of expert witnesses is to assist the Trial Chamber in its assessment of the evidence before it, and not to testify on disputed facts as would ordinary witnesses. […]

492. A person commits the crime of genocide (Article 2(3)(a) of the Statute) if he or she commits one of the acts enumerated in Article 2(2) of the Statute (actus reus) with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such (“genocidal intent”).[1] Furthermore, even if an accused has not committed genocide himself, his responsibility may be established under one of the modes of responsibility provided for in Article 6(1) and (3) of the Statute. Where a person is accused of having planned, instigated, ordered or aided and abetted the commission of genocide by one or more other persons pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute, the Prosecutor must establish that the accused’s acts or omissions substantially contributed to the commission of acts of genocide.[2]

595. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that, for the Appellant to be convicted under Article 6(1) of the Statute, it must have been established that specific acts or omissions of the Appellant themselves constituted an instigation to the commission of genocide. An alternative would be that specific acts or omissions of the Appellant may have substantially contributed to instigation by others.

322. Under Articles 17(4), 20(2), 20(4)(a) and 20(4)(b) of the Statute and Rule 47(C) of the Rules, the Prosecutor must state the material facts underpinning the charges in the indictment, but not the evidence by which such facts are to be proved.[1] The indictment is pleaded with sufficient particularity only if it sets out the material facts of the Prosecution case with enough detail to inform a defendant clearly of the charges against him or her so that he or she may prepare his or her defence.[2] An indictment which fails to duly set forth the specific material facts underpinning the charges against the accused is defective.[3] The Appeals Chamber emphasises that the issue as to whether a fact is material or not cannot be determined in the abstract: whether or not a fact is considered “material” depends on the nature of the Prosecution's case.[4]

325. Where the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber tried the accused on the basis of a defective indictment, it must consider whether the accused has nevertheless been accorded a fair trial, in other words, whether the defect noted caused prejudice to the Defence.[1] In some cases, a defective indictment can indeed be “cured” and a conviction handed down if the Prosecutor provided the accused with timely, clear and consistent information detailing the factual basis underpinning the charges against him.[2] This information could, inter alia and depending on the circumstances, be supplied in the Prosecutor’s pre-trial brief or opening statement.[3] The Appeals Chamber would nonetheless emphasize that the possibility of curing defects in the indictment is not unlimited. A clear distinction has to be drawn between vagueness or ambiguity in the indictment and an indictment which omits certain charges altogether. While it is possible to remedy ambiguity or vagueness in an indictment by providing the defendant with timely, clear and consistent information detailing the factual basis underpinning the charges, omitted charges can be incorporated into the indictment only by formal amendment under Rule 50 of the Rules.[4]

326. The Appeals Chamber reaffirms that a vague or imprecise indictment which is not cured of its defects by providing the accused with timely, clear and consistent information constitutes a prejudice to the accused. The defect can be deemed harmless only if it is established that the accused's ability to prepare his defence was not materially impaired.[5] Where the failure to give sufficient notice of the legal and factual reasons for the charges against him violated the right to a fair trial, no conviction can result.[6]

460. […] However, as the Appeals Chamber has emphasized, when the Prosecutor relies on material facts which are not stated in the Indictment and, which on their own, could constitute distinct charges, which is the case here, the Prosecutor must seek leave to amend the Indictment in order to add the new material facts:

the Appeals Chamber stresses that the possibility of curing the omission of material facts from the indictment is not unlimited. Indeed, the “new material facts” should not lead to a “radical transformation” of the Prosecution’s case against the accused. The Trial Chamber should always take into account the risk that the expansion of charges by the addition of new material facts may lead to unfairness and prejudice to the accused. Further, if the new material facts are such that they could, on their own, support separate charges, the Prosecution should seek leave from the Trial Chamber to amend the indictment and the Trial Chamber should only grant leave if it is satisfied that it would not lead to unfairness or prejudice to the Defence.[7] […]

347. With respect to mens rea, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the indictment may either (i) plead the state of mind of the accused, in which case the facts by which that matter is to be established are matters of evidence, and need not be pleaded; or (ii) the evidentiary facts from which the state of mind is to be inferred.[1]

480. The actus reus of “instigating” implies prompting another person to commit an offence.[1] It is not necessary to prove that the crime would not have been perpetrated without the involvement of the accused; it is sufficient to demonstrate that the instigation was a factor substantially contributing to the conduct of another person committing the crime.[2] The mens rea for this mode of responsibility is the intent to instigate another person to commit a crime or at a miminum the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of the act or omission instigated.[3]

660. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, for a defendant to be convicted of instigation to commit a crime under Article 6(1) of the Statute, it must be established that the acts charged contributed substantially to the commission of the crime, but they need not be a sine qua non condition for its commission. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that, contrary to what the Appellant appears to contend,[4] the accused does not need to be actually present when the instigated crime is committed.

985. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that “the crime of persecution consists of an act or omission which discriminates in fact and which: denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in international customary or treaty law (the actus reus); and was carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on one of the listed grounds, specifically race, religion or politics (the mens rea).”[1] However, not every act of discrimination will constitute the crime of persecution: the underlying acts of persecution, whether considered in isolation or in conjunction with other acts, must be of a gravity equal to the crimes listed under Article 3 of the Statute.[2] Furthermore, it is not necessary that these underlying acts of persecution amount to crimes in international law.[3] Accordingly, there is no need to review here the Appellants’ arguments that mere hate speech does not constitute a crime in international criminal law.

314. […] However, as will now be explained, it was open to the Trial Chamber to rely, for certain purposes, on evidence in respect of events prior to 1994.

315. It is well established that the provisions of the Statute on the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal do not preclude the admission of evidence on events prior to 1994, if the Chamber deems such evidence relevant and of probative value[1] and there is no compelling reason to exclude it. For example, a Trial Chamber may validly admit evidence relating to pre-1994 acts and rely on it where such evidence is aimed at:

- Clarifying a given context;[2]

- Establishing by inference the elements (in particular, criminal intent) of criminal conduct occurring in 1994;[3]

- Demonstrating a deliberate pattern of conduct.[4]

316. The Appeals Chamber accordingly dismisses the Appellants’ contentions that the Trial Chamber exceeded its jurisdiction or that it breached the fairness of the trial simply because it relied on evidence concerning pre-1994 events.

561. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it has already considered the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction and reaffirmed that Article 7 of the Statute does not prevent the admission of evidence of events prior to 1 January 1994, insofar as the Trial Chamber deemed such evidence relevant and of probative value, and there was no compelling reason to exclude it. This applies inter alia to evidence of criminal intent.[5] […]

647. […] The Appeals Chamber considers that paragraph 975 of the Judgement is ambiguous because it does not clearly explain whether the Appellant’s participation in CDR meetings prior to 1 January 1994 is cited as a material element of instigation for which the Appellant incurs individual responsibility pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute – which would be ultra vires – or whether this fact is simply mentioned as a contextual fact, or as evidence demonstrating the Appellant’s criminal intent in 1994 – which is permissible.[6] […]

1073. The Appeals Chamber observes at the outset that, in pleading the excessive length of the proceedings, the Appellant is in fact raising a substantive issue going to the regularity of the trial. However, inasmuch as the Appellant raises this issue in his appeal against sentence with a view to having it reduced, and a reduction of sentence is one of the remedies available to redress the alleged violation, the Appeals Chamber will examine these arguments in this section. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber notes that the length of the proceedings is not one of the factors that a Trial Chamber must consider, even as a mitigating circumstance, in the determination of the sentence.

1074. The right to be tried without undue delay is provided in Article 20(4)(c) of the Statute. This right only protects the accused against undue delays.[3] Whether there was undue delay is a question to be decided on a case by case basis.[4] The following factors are relevant:

- the length of the delay;

- the complexity of the proceedings (the number of counts, the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the quantity of evidence, the complexity of the facts and of the law);

- the conduct of the parties;

- the conduct of the authorities involved; and

- the prejudice to the accused, if any.[5]

1086. […] The precise remedy to be granted was thus left to the discretion of the Trial Chamber, since the Appeals Chamber could not anticipate at that time whether the Appellant would be found guilty or, a fortiori, what sentence he would receive. Hence the Appeals Chamber could not give the Trial Chamber more detailed instructions. Nor can the Appeals Chamber discern in what way the disposition of the Decision of 31 May 2000 in the Semanza case, as cited by the Appellant, was more precise than that of the Decision of 31 March 2000: the only difference is the express reference to Article 23 of the Statute in the Semanza decision.[6] Finally, the fact that the violation of the defendant’s rights was not treated as a mitigating circumstance did not constitute an error. What was important was that the sentence should be reduced in order to take account of the rights violation, and this was done.[7] The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that the violation of the Appellant’s rights was not a mitigating circumstance in the true sense of the term.

1095. […] The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that the remedy ordered in the Judgement did constitute a significant reduction of the sentence, which adequately compensated the Appellant for the violation of his fundamental rights. […]

Having set aside the convictions of Appellant Nahimana under Article 6(1) of the Statute for conspiracy to commit genocide, genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, extermination (crime against humanity) and persecution (crime against humanity), and having upheld his convictions under Article 6(3) of the Statute for direct and public incitement to commit genocide and persecution (crime against humanity), the Appeals Chamber reduced Nahimana’s sentence from life to 30 years of imprisonment.

Having set aside the convictions of Appellant Barayagwiza for conspiracy to commit genocide, convictions relating to RTLM broadcasts and those for direct and public incitement to commit genocide (under Article 6(1) of the Statute), and having upheld his convictions under Article 6(1) of the Statute for genocide (instigation), extermination (crime against humanity) and persecution (crime against humanity), the Appeals Chamber reduced Barayagwiza’s sentence from 35 to 32 years of imprisonment, noting that the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber already reflected the reduction granted for various violations of his rights.

Having set aside the convictions of Appellant Ngeze for conspiracy to commit genocide, as well those with respect to Kangura publications under Article 6(1) for genocide and persecution (crimes against humanity), and those with respect to crimes in Gisenyi for genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, extermination (crime against humanity) and persecution (crime against humanity); and having upheld his convictions for direct and public incitement to commit genocide (Kangura), genocide (aiding and abetting) and extermination (aiding and abetting), the Appeals Chamber reduced Ngeze’s sentence from life to 35 years of imprisonment.

481. With respect to ordering, a person in a position of authority[1] may incur responsibility for ordering another person to commit an offence,[2] if the person who received the order actually proceeds to commit the offence subsequently. Responsibility is also incurred when an individual in a position of authority orders an act or omission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of that order, and if that crime is effectively committed subsequently by the person who received the order.[3]