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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

36. [...] [T]he charges against Mladić did not implicate him as a physical perpetrator, concerned a vast amount of territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and spanned over three years. Relevant jurisprudence dictates that, while an indictment is required to plead material facts through which the Prosecution seeks to establish an accused’s criminal liability, as the proximity of the accused person to those events becomes more distant, less precision is required in relation to those particular details, and greater emphasis is placed upon the conduct of the accused person himself upon which the Prosecution relies to establish his responsibility as an accessory or a superior to the persons who personally committed the acts giving rise to the charges against him. Indeed, in cases concerning extensive and continuous criminality, specificity with respect to the timing, victims, and location of “representative” incidents of criminality may satisfy the obligation of providing sufficient notice of the nature of the crime to effectively prepare his defence.

[1] [Footnote omitted].

[2] Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 65.

[3] Cf. Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 3, 222, 223, nn. 636, 637 (noting that in a case charging an accused with conducting a campaign of shelling and sniping for nearly two years, the Prosecution was bound to provide details about some of the sniping and shelling incidents in the indictment but was under no obligation to list all the specific incidents in order to satisfy its obligation in pleading material facts so as to provide the accused notice of the nature of the case he had to meet).

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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

40. The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of approximately 2,000 adjudicated facts pursuant to Rule 94(B) of the ICTY Rules. Mladić challenged the taking of judicial notice of adjudicated facts, including adjudicated facts relating to the acts or conduct of his alleged subordinates. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in this case reviewed the Trial Chamber’s approach and found that it was consistent with the applicable jurisprudence. Relying primarily on a decision in the Karemera et al. case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber, on 12 November 2013, held that it is within a trial chamber’s discretion to take judicial notice of “facts relating to the existence of a joint criminal enterprise, the conduct of its members other than an accused, and facts related to the conduct of physical perpetrators of crimes for which an accused is alleged to be criminally responsible”.

[…]

45. In examining whether there is a clear error of reasoning in the Appeal Decision on Adjudicated Facts, the Appeals Chamber considers Mladić’s argument that the Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006 overlooked the relevance of the Galić Decision of 7 June 2002 when considering whether to take judicial notice of adjudicated facts relating to the acts or conduct of proximate subordinates. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Galić Decision of 7 June 2002 does not preclude admission of written evidence in lieu of oral testimony relating to the acts and conduct of proximate subordinates. Rather, it only precludes the admission of such evidence pertaining to the acts and conduct or mental state of the accused. In that decision, the ICTY Appeals Chamber expressly noted that the ICTY rule on the admission of written statements in lieu of oral testimony did not exclude the admission of such statements going to the acts and conduct of others for which the accused is charged with responsibility. Even with respect to admission of written evidence that is “so pivotal to the prosecution case, and where the person whose acts and conduct […] is so proximate to the accused”, the Galić Decision of 7 June 2002 recognizes that this is a matter within the discretion of the trial chamber, observing that, in such circumstances, the trial chamber “may decide that it would not be fair to the accused” to permit its admission.

46. A review of the Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006 shows that the ICTR Appeals Chamber explicitly considered as applicable in the context of judicial notice of adjudicated facts the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s analysis in the Galić Decision of 7 June 2002. In particular, the Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006 recalled the distinction drawn therein between “‘(a) the acts and conduct of those others who commit the crimes for which the indictment alleges that the accused is individually responsible, and (b) the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment which establish his responsibility for the acts and conduct of those others’”, to emphasize that only adjudicated facts going to the latter warrant complete exclusion from judicial notice. With respect to all other adjudicated facts relating to the accused’s criminal responsibility, the ICTR Appeals Chamber adopted a cautious approach by declaring that “it is for the [t]rial [c]hambers, in the careful exercise of their discretion, to assess each particular fact in order to determine whether taking judicial notice of it – and thus shifting the burden of producing evidence rebutting it to the accused – is consistent with the accused’s rights under the circumstances of the case”. Upon review of both decisions, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006 evinces a consistent approach with the Galić Decision of 7 June 2002. The Appeals Chamber further considers that Mladić’s position fails to recognize that adjudicated facts within the meaning of Rule 94(B) of the ICTR and ICTY Rules are presumptions and are not equivalent to the untested evidence at issue in the Galić Decision of 7 June 2002, and that this decision is therefore inapposite when considering what restrictions should be placed on a trial chamber when relying on adjudicated facts under Rule 94(B) of the ICTY Rules. In particular, adjudicated facts under Rule 94(B) of the ICTY Rules are rebuttable presumptions that can only be accepted where, inter alia, they have been tested and established in another trial proceeding whereas the reliability and credibility requirements for admission of untested evidence pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92 bis of the ICTY Rules are far less onerous.

47. […] In view of the above, Mladić fails to demonstrate that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Appeal Decision on Adjudicated Facts erred in relying on the Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006 or that it committed any other error.

[…]

134. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that taking judicial notice of an adjudicated fact serves only to relieve the Prosecution of its initial burden to produce evidence on the point, and the defence may then put the point into question by introducing reliable and credible evidence to the contrary. […]

[1] See Trial Judgement, paras. 16, 5262, referring to Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, First Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 28 February 2012 (“First Decision on Adjudicated Facts”), Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Second Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 21 March 2012 (“Second Decision on Adjudicated Facts”), Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Third Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 13 April 2012 (“Third Decision on Adjudicated Facts”), Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Fourth Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Concerning the Rebuttal Evidence Procedure, 2 May 2012 (“Fourth Decision on Adjudicated Facts”), Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-T, Decision on Proprio Motu Taking Judicial Notice of Two Adjudicated Facts, 5 June 2012. 

[2] Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-AR73.1, Defense Interlocutory Appeal Brief Against the Trial Chamber Decisions on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 4 July 2012 (“Defence Interlocutory Appeal Brief of 4 July 2012”), para. 26.

[3] Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-AR73.1, Decision on Ratko Mladić’s Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decisions on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 12 November 2013 (“Appeal Decision on Adjudicated Facts”), para. 85. See also Appeal Decision on Adjudicated Facts, paras. 82-84, 86, 87.

[4] Appeal Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 85, referring to, inter alia, The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 16 June 2006 (“Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006”), paras. 52, 53. See also Appeal Decision on Adjudicated Facts, paras. 81, 83.

[5] See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 64, 65, 69, 76, 80, 82, 85, 86, 94; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 28-30.

[6] See [Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis (C), 7 June 2002 (“Galić Decision of 7 June 2002”)], paras. 9, 13-16.

[7] See Galić Decision of 7 June 2002, paras. 9-11.

[8] Galić Decision of 7 June 2002, para. 10.

[9] Galić Decision of 7 June 2002, para. 13.

[10] See Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006, para. 52.

[11] Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006, para. 52, quoting Galić Decision of 7 June 2002, para. 9.

[12] See Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006, paras. 50-53.

[13] Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006, para. 52 (emphasis added).

[14] See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 452, n. 1189.

[15] See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, n. 1189 (citations omitted).

[16] See Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006, paras. 42, 49; Karemera et al. Decision of 29 May 2009, paras. 13, 14; D. Milošević Decision of 26 June 2007, paras. 16, 17.

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ICTY Rule Rule 94(B)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

84. The Appeals Chamber recalls that decisions concerning the scheduling of trials and their modalities are discretionary decisions of the trial chamber to which the Appeals Chamber accords deference.[1] The trial chamber’s discretion, however, must be exercised in accordance with Articles 20(1) and 21 of the ICTY Statute, which require trial chambers to ensure that trials are fair and conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused.[2]

[1] Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-AR73.5, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Against the 27 March 2015 Trial Chamber Decision on Modality for Prosecution Re-Opening, 22 May 2015, para. 6; [Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-AR73.3, Decision on Mladić’s Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Modification of Trial Sitting Schedule Due to Health Concerns, 22 October 2013 (“Decision of 22 October 2013”)], para. 11. [Footnote omitted].

[2] See, e.g., Karadžić Appeal Judgement, paras. 26, 72; Ndahimana Appeal Judgement, para. 14; Decision of 22 October 2013, para. 12; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 18. [Footnote omitted].

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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

98. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, pursuant to Rule 97 of the ICTY Rules, all communications between lawyer and client shall be regarded as privileged, and consequently not subject to disclosure at trial, unless: (i) the client consents to such disclosure; or (ii) the client has voluntarily disclosed the content of the communication to a third party, and that third party then gives evidence of that disclosure. This privilege is vital to the defence of an accused or appellant by allowing for open communication between counsel and client that is necessary for effective legal assistance as guaranteed under Article 21(4)(d) of the ICTY Statute.[1]

See also paras. 99-103. Wherein the Appeals Chamber addressed, inter alia, the waiving of lawyer-client privilege when “loud and audible” statements are made by an accused in the courtroom and are overheard by the Prosecution team.

[1] See Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al., Case No. IT 05-88-A, Decision on Prosecution Motion for the Appointment of Independent Counsel to Review Material Potentially Subject to Lawyer-Client Privilege, 16 July 2012 (public redacted version) (“Popović et al. Decision of 16 July 2012”), para. 7.

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ICTY Rule Rule 97
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

186. The Appeals Chamber recalls that for an accused to be found criminally liable on the basis of joint criminal enterprise liability, a trial chamber must be satisfied that the accused acted in furtherance of the common purpose of a joint criminal enterprise in the sense that he significantly contributed to the commission of the crimes involved in the common purpose.[1] An accused’s contribution need not be necessary or substantial,[2] it need not involve the commission of a crime,[3] and the law does not foresee specific types of conduct which per se could not be considered a contribution to a joint criminal enterprise.[4]

[…]

228.  […] [T]heAppeals Chamber recalls that for an accused to be found criminally liable on the basis of joint criminal enterprise liability, it is sufficient that he acted in furtherance of the common purpose of a joint criminal enterprise in the sense that he significantly contributed to the commission of the crimes involved in the common purpose.[5] Beyond that, the law does not foresee specific types of conduct which per se could not be considered a contribution to a joint criminal enterprise.[6] Within these legal confines, the question of whether a failure to act could be taken into account to establish that the accused significantly contributed to a joint criminal enterprise is a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis.[7] It is also recalled that the relevant failures to act or acts carried out in furtherance of a joint criminal enterprise need not involve carrying out any part of the actus reus of a crime forming part of the common purpose, or indeed any crime at all.[8] That is, an accused’s contribution to a joint criminal enterprise need not be in and of itself criminal, as long as the accused performs (or fails to perform) acts that in some way contribute significantly to the furtherance of the common purpose.[9]

229. […] The Appeals Chamber observes that, in the jurisprudence of the ICTY, a failure to take effective and genuine measures to discipline, prevent, and/or punish crimes committed by subordinates, despite having knowledge thereof, has been taken into account in assessing, inter alia, an accused’s mens rea and contribution to a joint criminal enterprise where the accused had some power and influence or authority over the perpetrators sufficient to prevent or punish the abuses but failed to exercise such power.[10] […]

[1] See, e.g., Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, paras. 110, 136; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1378; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 987; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, paras. 215, 695.  

[2] See, e.g., Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 136; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1378; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 215; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 430.

[3] See, e.g., Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 1378, 1615; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, paras. 215, 695.

[4] See, e.g., Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 696.

[5] See, e.g., Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, paras. 110, 136; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1378; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 987, 1177; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, paras. 215, 695.

[6] See, e.g., Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 696.

[7] See Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110. See also, e.g., Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 1233, 1242.

[8] See, e.g., Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 1615, 1653; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, paras. 215, 695.

[9] See, e.g., Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 1615, 1653; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 985; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, paras. 215, 695.

[10] Cf. Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 111; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 1233, 1242; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 216(e).

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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

193. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber further recalls that members of a joint criminal enterprise may be held responsible for crimes carried out by principal perpetrators, provided that the crimes can be imputed to at least one member of the joint criminal enterprise and that the latter – when using the principal perpetrators – acted in accordance with the common objective.[1]

[1] See Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 119; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1256; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 225; Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 168; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 413.

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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

200. […] The Appeals Chamber […] recalls that a trial chamber has the discretion to select which legal arguments to address.[1]

[1] See Trial Judgement, para. 4293, n. 15467; Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 989; Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 101; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23.

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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

 243. […] In any event, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber’s determinations are not binding on other trial chambers or on the Appeals Chamber.[1]

 

[1] See Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 52; Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 260.

 

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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

243. […] Of even greater significance, there is no legal requirement that a trial chamber’s analysis as to an accused’s mens rea and actus reus be done separately […]. To the contrary, trial chambers are free to organize their judgements as they see fit so long as they fulfil their obligation to provide a reasoned opinion.[1]

[…] 

247. […] The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber used this practice of cross-referencing throughout the Trial Judgement instead of re‑summarizing its findings of fact or summaries of evidence.[2] The Appeals Chamber recalls that trial chambers need not unnecessarily repeat considerations reflected elsewhere in the trial judgement.[3] Furthermore, nothing prevents a trial chamber from relying on the same evidence when making findings as to an accused’s actus reus and mens rea. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber used its finding of mens rea to substantiate its finding of his significant contribution or committed any error in this respect. […] 

[1] See Article 23 of the ICTY Statute; Rule 98 ter (C) of the ICTY Rules.

[2] See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 3051, 3068, 3122, 3133, 3210, 3217-3220, 3222, 3224-3226, 3230, 3241, 3267, 3287, 3325, 3360, 3381, 3388, 3406, 3419, 3556, 3577, 3665, 3676, 3690, 3691, 3704, 3708, 3722, 4614, 4615, 4623, 4624, 4630, 4631, 4635-4639, 4644, 4646, 4685.

[3] See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 721; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 47.

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ICTY Statute Article 23 of the ICTY Statute ICTY Rule Rule 98 ter (C) of the ICTY Rules
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

252. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence in reaching its findings.[1]

[1] See, e.g., Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1709; Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 172; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 971.

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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

272. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt requires a finder of fact to be satisfied that there is no reasonable explanation of the evidence other than the guilt of the accused.[1] It is further recalled that a trial chamber does not have to discuss every possible hypothesis or inference it may have considered, as long as it is satisfied that the inference it retained was the only reasonable one.[2]

[1] See Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 220.

[2] See Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 967. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 599; Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 220.

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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

283.   The Appeals Chamber recalls that the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Galić case determined, by majority, that the ICTY had subject-matter jurisdiction over the crime of terror under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.[1] The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the same case confirmed, by majority, the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of terror, clarifying that customary international law imposed individual criminal responsibility for violations of the prohibition of terror against the civilian population at the time of the commission of the crimes for which Galić was convicted.[2] The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the D. Milošević case, by majority, subsequently reaffirmed the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of terror.[3] In light of this jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber considers that the matter of the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of terror was settled by the ICTY Appeals Chamber and was therefore binding on the Trial Chamber in the present case.[4] As it was not open to the Trial Chamber to depart from the existing jurisprudence in this respect, the Appeals Chamber rejects Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to give sufficient weight to his submissions that there exist cogent reasons to do so.

284.   As to whether there exist cogent reasons for the Appeals Chamber to depart from the jurisprudence in this regard, the standards of appellate review require Mladić to demonstrate that the decision to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of terror was made on the basis of a wrong legal principle or was “wrongly decided, usually because the judge or judges were ill‑informed about the applicable law”.[5] […] 

285.  A review of the Galić Appeal Judgement reveals that the judges of the majority applied the same legal principles as Judge Schomburg in the Galić case and Judge Liu in the D. Milošević case in reaching their conclusions, namely that: (i) the ICTY has jurisdiction to prosecute a violation of a rule of international humanitarian law under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute when four conditions are fulfilled, including when “the violation of the rule must entail, under customary international law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule” (“Fourth Condition”);[6] and (ii) the fulfilment of the Fourth Condition may be inferred from, inter alia, state practice indicating an intention to criminalize the violation.[7] 

286. In concluding that the Fourth Condition was fulfilled, the judges of the majority in the Galić case considered, inter alia, that: (i) references to terror as a war crime could be found in national and multinational documents as early as 1919 and 1945;[8] (ii) numerous states, including the former Yugoslavia, had criminalized terrorizing civilians as a method of warfare or in a time of war;[9] and (iii) a court in Croatia had entered a conviction under, inter alia, Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II for acts of terror against civilians which occurred between March 1991 and January 1993.[10] Judge Schomburg in the Galić case and Judge Liu in the D. Milošević case, by contrast, expressed doubt as to whether the evidence referred to by the majority in the Galić case was sufficiently extensive and uniform to establish customary international law.[11]

287. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, Judge Schomburg in the Galić case and Judge Liu in the D. Milošević case applied the same legal principles as the majority in the Galić case in determining the sufficiency of the evidence of state practice before them and merely disagreed on the result.[12] Bearing in mind that “two judges, both acting reasonably, can come to different conclusions on the basis of the same evidence, both of which are reasonable”,[13] the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the finding by the ICTY Appeals Chamber that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of terror was made on the basis of a wrong legal principle or was wrongly decided. In the absence of cogent reasons to depart from the controlling jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s determination that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of terror in the present case. 

288.   As to Mladić’s contention that the definition of the crime of terror nonetheless violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege for lack of specificity and foreseeability,[14] the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber set out the elements of the crime in accordance with the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s definition in the Galić Appeal Judgement, as clarified in the D. Milošević Appeal Judgement.[15] In particular, the Trial Chamber stated that the crime of terror requires proof of, inter alia, acts or threats of violence committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population and directed against the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities causing the victims to suffer grave consequences.[16]

289.   Relying on Judge Shahabuddeen’s separate opinion in the Galić Appeal Judgement stating that “there is neither the required opinio juris nor state practice to support the view that customary international law knows of a comprehensive definition [of terror]”,[17] Mladić argues that the ICTY was not in a position to define the elements of the crime.[18] He further contends that the definition adopted by the ICTY, particularly the requirement that victims suffer “grave consequences” from the acts or threats of violence, did not provide a clear gravity threshold and was improperly determined through a jurisdictional analysis which was developed after the Indictment period.[19]   

290.   The Appeals Chamber recalls that the principle of nullum crimen sine lege requires that a person may only be found guilty of a crime in respect of acts which constituted a violation of a norm which existed at the time of their commission.[20] Moreover, the criminal liability in question must have been sufficiently foreseeable and the law providing for such liability must have been sufficiently accessible at the relevant time.[21] This principle does not, however, prevent a court from interpreting and clarifying the elements of a particular crime, nor does it preclude the progressive development of the law by the court.[22]

291.   The Appeals Chamber notes that Judge Shahabuddeen specified in his separate opinion in the Galić Appeal Judgement that: (i) he agreed with the view that terror as charged is a crime known to customary international law;[23] (ii) the ICTY could recognize that customary international law does know of a core or predominant meaning of “terror” for which there was individual criminal responsibility at the material times;[24] and (iii) he was satisfied that a serious violation of the laws or customs of war within the meaning of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, namely, by resorting to the core of terror, gives rise to such responsibility, which existed at the time of the alleged acts of the appellant.[25] In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Galić and D. Milošević cases merely clarified the elements of the crime of terror, which existed in customary international law, for the purposes of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.[26] The Appeals Chamber considers that this is consistent with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, as recalled above. Consequently, Mladić fails to show any error in the Trial Chamber’s application of the elements of the crime of terror as clarified by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.[27]

292.   As to foreseeability, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the accused must be able to appreciate that his conduct was criminal in the sense generally understood, without reference to any specific provision.[28] Although the ICTY did not apply the law of the former Yugoslavia to the definition of the crimes and forms of liability within its jurisdiction, it had recourse to domestic law for the purpose of establishing that the accused could reasonably have known that the offence in question or the offence committed in the way charged in the Indictment was prohibited and punishable.[29]

See also para. 293.

294. […] [I]n the Appeals Chamber’s view, the specification that, for the purposes of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, the crime of terror also requires that victims suffered “grave consequences”,[30] in no way detracts from the conclusion that Mladić could reasonably have known that the commission of acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population was prohibited and punishable.[31] […]

[1] Galić Trial Judgement, para. 138. See Galić Trial Judgement, paras. 63-138. See also Galić Trial Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Nieto-Navia, paras. 108-113.

[2] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 98. See Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 86-98. See also Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, paras. 2, 4-22, 24.

[3] D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 30. See also D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 1-13. The Appeals Chamber notes that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Prlić et al. case, by majority, upheld convictions for the crime of terror. See Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 424, 562-564, 1774-1789, 2017-2026, 2400-2402, 2406, 2800-2802; Prlić et al. Trial Judgement, Volume 3, paras. 1689-1692. See also Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, Partially Dissenting, Dissenting Opinions and Declaration of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 8-10 (wherein Judge Liu reiterated his position that the ICTY does not have jurisdiction over the crime of terror and that such convictions should therefore have been vacated because the crime did not exist under customary international law at the relevant time). In addition, despite opposition to the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of terror by Karadžić at trial, the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Karadžić case reiterated that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute covers the crime of terror, and entered a conviction for it, which was upheld on appeal. See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 777; Karadžić Trial Judgement, paras. 458, 6008, 6022, 6071; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-05/18-PT, Karadžić Pre-Trial Brief, 29 June 2009, paras. 24, 25.

[4] See Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 113. See also [Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak, and Mladen Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-AR73.6, Decision on Ivan Čermak and Mladen Markač Interlocutory Appeals Against Trial Chamber’s Decision to Reopen the Prosecution Case, 1 July 2010], para. 24.

[5] See supra [Mladić Appeal Judgement], para. 14 and references cited therein.

[6] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 91; Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 5; D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, para. 2. See also Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 94.

[7] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 92; Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 7; D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 6, 10. See also [Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a Dule”, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995], para. 128.

[8] See Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 93 and references cited therein.

[9] See Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 94-96 and references cited therein.

[10] See Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 97 and references cited therein.

[11] D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 6-8; Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, paras. 8-10.

[12] See D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 6-8; Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 94, 95; Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, paras. 7-11.

[13] See Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgement, para. 15 and references cited therein.

[14] See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 350, 352-371; T. 25 August 2020 p. 64.

[15] See Trial Judgement, paras. 3186-3188.

[16] See Trial Judgement, para. 3186.

[17] Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 3.

[18] See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 354-358.

[19] See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 359-370, referring to, inter alia, Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 94.

[20] See Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003 (“Milutinović et al. Decision of 21 May 2003”), para. 37; Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR77, Judgment on Appeal by Anto Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt, 30 May 2001 (“Aleksovski Contempt Appeal Judgement”), para. 38; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 576; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 126. See also Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović et al., Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003 (“Hadžihasanović et al. Decision of 16 July 2003”), para. 51.

[21] Milutinović et al. Decision of 21 May 2003, paras. 37, 38. In the case of an international tribunal such as the ICTY, accessibility does not exclude reliance being placed on a law which is based on custom. Hadžihasanović et al. Decision of 16 July 2003, para. 34.

[22] Milutinović et al. Decision of 21 May 2003, para. 38; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 173, 576; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras. 126, 127.

[23] Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 3.

[24] Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 4.

[25] Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 5.

[26] See D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, paras. 31-37; Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 100-104.

[27] Trial Judgement, paras. 3186-3188.

[28] Hadžihasanović et al. Decision of 16 July 2003, para. 34.

[29] Milutinović et al. Decision of 21 May 2003, paras. 40, 41.

[30] See Trial Judgement, para. 3186. See also D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, paras. 32, 33.

[31] Mladić’s contention that the definition of the crime of terror adopted by the ICTY provided an unclear gravity threshold creating “two distinct sets of victims” (see Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 365, 366) also does not demonstrate an error. The “grave consequences” requirement to which Mladić points in this respect is jurisdictional, meaning that the crime of terror victim group remains the same: “the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities”, but that the ICTY could only exercise its jurisdiction over the crime where the grave consequences requirement is met. See Trial Judgement, para. 3186. See also D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, paras. 31-33.

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299.   The Appeals Chamber recalls that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute sets out a non-exhaustive list of punishable violations of the laws or customs of war, including, inter alia, under Article 3(c), the “attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings” (“crime of attacking undefended locales”).[1] The crime of attacking undefended locales is thus one of the violations of the laws or customs of war within the jurisdiction of the ICTY pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, which include, for instance, the crimes of murder, terror, unlawfully attacking civilians, or hostage-taking.[2]

[1] Article 3(c) of the ICTY Statute.

[2] Cf. Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, paras. 698, 742.

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313. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the mens rea of the crime of terror consists of the intent to make the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of acts of violence or threats thereof, and of the specific intent to spread terror among the civilian population.[1] Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the acts or threats of violence, such as, inter alia, their nature, manner, timing, and duration.[2] Nothing precludes a reasonable trier of fact from relying on the same set of circumstances to infer that perpetrators willfully made civilians the object of acts or threats of violence, and, at the same time, that such acts or threats of violence were committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.

[…] 

315. The Appeals Chamber recalls that terror could be defined as “extreme fear”,[3] and that such fear was merely one of several factors from which the Trial Chamber inferred specific intent in this case.[4] […]

[1] D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 37, referring to Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 104.

[2] D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 37; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 104.

[3] See Galić Appeal Judgement, n. 320.

[4] See Trial Judgement, para. 3201.

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356. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that forcible transfer entails the displacement of persons from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.[1] The requirement that the displacement be forced is not limited to physical force but can be met through the threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, or taking advantage of a coercive environment. It is the absence of genuine choice that makes the displacement unlawful. While fear of violence, use of force, or other such circumstances may create an environment where there is no choice but to leave, the determination as to whether a transferred person had a genuine choice is one to be made in the context of a particular case being considered.[2] Displacement may be permitted by international law in certain limited circumstances,[3] provided it is temporary in nature[4] and conducted humanely.[5] Notably, however, displacement is not permissible where the humanitarian crisis that caused the displacement is the result of the accused’s own unlawful activity.[6] In addition, the participation of a non-governmental organization in facilitating displacements does not in and of itself render an otherwise unlawful transfer lawful.[7]

[1] See Šešelj Appeal Judgement, para. 150, nn. 538, 541 and references cited therein; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 308.

[2] See Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 918 and references cited therein (internal citations omitted).

[3] See Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 308; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 284.

[4] See Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 597, referring to Article 49(2) of Geneva Convention IV.

[5] See Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 599, referring to Article 49(3) of Geneva Convention IV, Article 17(1) of Additional Protocol II.

[6] Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 287.

[7] Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 180; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 286.

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393.  [T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that an accused’s contribution to a joint criminal enterprise need not be in and of itself criminal, as long as he or she performs acts that in some way contribute to the furtherance of the common purpose.[1] Thus, in the Appeals Chamber’s view, whether Mladić’s orders were legitimate in the military context is not relevant to determining his significant contribution to the common purpose. What matters is that the accused significantly contributed to the commission of the crimes involved in the joint criminal enterprise.[2] Considering the above, Mladić’s assertion that his orders were consistent with legitimate military operations in light of the military context of Srebrenica[3] cannot serve to demonstrate an error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Mladić significantly contributed to achieving the common objective.[4]

See also paras. 395, 429.

[…]

414. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the law does not foresee specific types of conduct which per se cannot be considered a contribution to the common purpose of a joint criminal enterprise.[5] What matters is that the accused performs acts that in some way contribute to the furtherance of the common purpose.[6] Within these legal confines, the question of whether a failure to act could be taken into account to establish that the accused significantly contributed to a joint criminal enterprise is a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis.[7] Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber recalls that failures to act or acts carried out in furtherance of a joint criminal enterprise need not involve carrying out any part of the actus reus of a crime forming part of the common purpose, or indeed any crime at all.[8]

[1] See, e.g., Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1653; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 695.

[2] See, e.g., Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 696; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, paras. 430, 431.

[3] See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 623. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 71, 72, 82, 83; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 45, 46.

[4] See Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1615 (in which the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the fact that the participation of an accused amounted to no more than his or her “routine duties” will not exculpate the accused).

[5] Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 696. […].

[6] Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1653; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 695. See also Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 427.

[7] Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110. See also Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 1233, 1242.

[8] Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 215; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 427.

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Footnote 1560. […] While the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity require the attack to be committed against a civilian population, it is well-established jurisprudence that victims of the underlying acts of crimes against humanity need not be civilians and can be individuals hors de combat. See Tolimir Appeal Judgement, paras. 141, 142; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 569; Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 29; Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 307. […]

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488.  […] The Appeals Chamber recalls ICTY Appeals Chamber jurisprudence holding that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute is a general and residual clause which refers to a broad category of offences, namely all “violations of the laws or customs of war”, not limited to the list of violations enumerated therein.[1] The ICTY Appeals Chamber has consistently held that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute may cover all violations of international humanitarian law not falling under Articles 2, 4, or 5 of the ICTY Statute, including violations of Common Article 3,[2] which contains a prohibition of hostage-taking.[3] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case examined, inter alia, findings of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, domestic prosecutions, military manuals and legislation – including the law of the former Yugoslavia – and Security Council resolutions, and confirmed the formation of opinio juris to the effect that customary international law imposes criminal liability for those who commit serious violations of Common Article 3.[4] Furthermore, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has previously rejected arguments that there are cogent reasons to depart from the Tadić jurisprudence on the questions of whether Common Article 3 is included in the scope of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute[5] and whether breaches of its provisions give rise to individual criminal responsibility.[6] The ICTY Appeals Chamber has stated that the acts enumerated in Common Article 3 were intended to be criminalized within the international legal order as early as 1949.[7]

489.  Furthermore, the ICTY has exercised its jurisdiction under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute to try individuals for violations of Common Article 3,[8] including on the basis of hostage-taking.[9] In this respect, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Karadžić case upheld the ICTY Trial Chamber’s determination that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.[10] The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that, under Common Article 3, there is an absolute prohibition of taking hostage of any person taking no active part in hostilities as well as detained individuals irrespective of their status prior to detention.[11] It has also rejected the submission that the crime of hostage-taking is limited under customary international law to the taking of civilians hostage.[12] In light of this jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber considers that the matter of the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking was settled by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.

490.  In attempting to demonstrate that there are cogent reasons to depart from this well established jurisprudence, Mladić submits that during the Indictment period, with the exception of the killing of hostages or the taking of civilians hostage, the taking of “non-civilians” hostage was not prohibited and did not entail individual criminal responsibility under customary international law. Mladić’s argument that the laws and norms applicable to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg only apply to the killing of hostages[13] does not undermine the fact that the prohibition of hostage-taking of any person taking no active part in the hostilities was nevertheless well established in customary international law during the period covered by the Indictment and entailed individual criminal responsibility. The Appeals Chamber recalls that Article 4 of the ICTR Statute, which was adopted in 1994, expressly prohibits hostage-taking as a violation of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has stated that the ICTR applies existing customary international law and that it was established to prosecute crimes which were already the subject of individual criminal responsibility.[14] Furthermore, an analysis of state practice confirms the formation of opinio juris that customary international law imposes individual criminal responsibility for violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II during the Indictment period. For example, legislation and military manuals of a number of states prohibited such violations,[15] and Additional Protocol II, which specifically contains the prohibition against hostage-taking of “[a]ll persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted”, was adopted in 1977 by consensus and had been ratified by over 120 states at the time of the events included in the Indictment.[16]

[1] Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 68; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 125; Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, paras. 87, 89. See also Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, para. 47.

[2] Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 68; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 125, 136; Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, paras. 87, 89, 91. See also Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, para. 47.

Common Article 3 provides, in relevant part, that:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a)     […]

(b)    taking of hostages; […]

 

[4] See Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, paras. 128-136. See also Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 153-156, 160, 162-168, 174.

[5] See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 129-136. The ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected the submissions that violations of Common Article 3 are not within the jurisdiction of the ICTY on the basis, inter alia, that: (i) the Security Council never intended to permit prosecutions under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute for violations of Common Article 3; (ii) Article 3 of the ICTY Statute is limited to the “Hague law”; and (iii) unlike the ICTR Statute, the ICTY Statute does not explicitly include Common Article 3. See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 130-133, 136, 178.

[6] See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 157-174. The ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected, inter alia, the submissions that: (i) the evidence presented in the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995 did not establish that Common Article 3 is customary international law that creates individual criminal responsibility on the basis that there is no showing of state practice and opinio juris; (ii) the exclusion of Common Article 3 from the Geneva Conventions grave breaches system demonstrates that it entails no individual criminal responsibility; (iii) Common Article 3 imposes duties on states only and is meant to be enforced by domestic legal systems; and (iv) there is evidence demonstrating that Common Article 3 is not a rule of customary law which imposes liability on individuals. See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 157, 158, 163, 167-170, 174. Similarly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić’s assertion that the lack of mention of the prohibition against hostage-taking in the ICTY Statute, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations, and the “grave breaches provisions” of the three 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I does not undermine that hostage-taking entailed individual criminal responsibility in customary international law at the time of the events in question. As discussed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Čelebići case, the Geneva Conventions impose an obligation on State Parties to implement the conventions in their domestic legislation, including by taking measures necessary for the suppression of all breaches of the Geneva Conventions, including those outside the grave breaches provisions. See Article 49 of Geneva Convention I, Article 50 of Geneva Convention II, Article 129 of Geneva Convention III, Article 146 of Geneva Convention IV (“Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.”). See also ICRC, Commentary of 1958 on Article 146(3) of Geneva Convention IV, p. 594 (“[…]This shows that all breaches of the Convention should be repressed by national legislation. […] [T]he authorities of the Contracting Parties […] should institute judicial or disciplinary punishment for breaches of the Convention.”). See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 164-166.

[7] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 163.

[8] See, e.g., Strugar Appeal Judgement, paras. 164, 171-179, p. 146; Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, paras. 38, 47, 53; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 51, 66-70.

[9] See, e.g., Karadžić Trial Judgement, paras. 5951, 5993, 6010. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, paras. 654, 659-661, 775, 777.

[10] See [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR72.5, Decision on Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on Preliminary Motion to Dismiss Count 11 of the Indictment], 9 July 2009 (“Karadžić Decision of 9 July 2009”)], paras. 2-4, 6, 22-27, 29. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 777; Karadžić Trial Judgement, paras. 467, 468.

[11] [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR-73.9, Decision on Appeal From Final Judgement of Acquittal for Hostage-Taking, 11 December 2012 (“Karadžić Decision of 11 December 2012”)], paras. 16, 21; Karadžić Decision of 9 July 2009, para. 22. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 659; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 794; Ɖorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 747; Strugar Appeal Judgement, n. 460.

[12] Karadžić Decision of 9 July 2009, paras. 3, 6, 22, 27. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 659; Karadžić Decision of 11 December 2012, paras. 9, 10, 16, 20, 21.

[13] Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 704.

[14] See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 170, 178.

[15] See, e.g., Ireland, Geneva Conventions Act as amended (1962), Sections 4(1) and 4(4) (providing that, in addition to grave breaches, any “minor breaches” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of Common Article 3, are punishable offences); Belgium, Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la répression des infractions graves aux Conventions internationales de Genève du 12 août 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8 juin 1977 additionnels à ces Conventions (1993), Article 1(7) (implementing the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols and providing that Belgian courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes under international law such as hostage-taking); France, Décret n°75-675 du 28 juillet 1975 portant règlement de discipline générale dans les armées (1975), as amended in 1982, Article 9(1) (prohibiting hostage-taking of persons placed hors de combat and providing that they be treated humanely); Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual (1992), para. 1209 (qualifying as an “indictable offence” hostage-taking of persons protected by Common Article 3); The Netherlands, Military Manual (1993), pp. VIII-3, XI-1, XI-4 (restating the prohibition of hostage-taking found in Common Article 3 and Article 4 of Additional Protocol II).

[16] Additional Protocol II, Articles 4(1), 4(2)(c). See also ICRC, Commentary of 1987 on Additional Protocol II, paras. 4417, 4418 (“[…] Protocol II was adopted as a whole by consensus on 8 June 1977.”).

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494.  The Appeals Chamber notes that in finding that it had jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking, the Trial Chamber recalled the four conditions set out in the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995 to satisfy Article 3 of the ICTY Statute’s “residual jurisdiction”, namely that: (i) the offence charged must violate a rule of international humanitarian law; (ii) the rule must bind the parties at the time of the alleged offence; (iii) the rule must protect important values and its violation must have grave consequences for the victim; and (iv) that such a violation must entail the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator.[1] The Trial Chamber relied, inter alia, on the ICTY Appeals Chamber jurisprudence in the Tadić, Čelebići, and Karadžić cases and concluded that hostage-taking under Article 3(1)(b) common to the Geneva Conventions met these conditions as the rules in Common Article 3 are part of customary international law in international and non-international armed conflicts, the acts prohibited by Common Article 3 breach rules protecting important values and involve grave consequences for the victims, and violations of such rules entail individual criminal responsibility.[2] In light of the established jurisprudence on this matter, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber correctly relied on the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995 and other consistent ICTY Appeals Chamber jurisprudence in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking and, contrary to Mladić’s argument, it was not required to conduct a more detailed analysis in this respect.[3]

495.  With respect to Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, the Appeals Chamber recalls that this principle prescribes that a person may only be found guilty of a crime in respect of acts which constituted a violation of a norm which existed at the time of their commission.[4] In light of the well-established jurisprudence that hostage-taking was a crime under customary international law during the period covered by the Indictment, the Appeals Chamber rejects Mladić’s contention that, by relying on the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, the Trial Chamber breached the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.

[1] Trial Judgement, para. 3009, referring to [The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995 (“Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995”], paras. 94, 143.

[2] Trial Judgement, para. 3010, referring to, inter alia, Karadžić Decision of 9 July 2009, paras. 23, 25, 26, Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 138, 139, 143, 147, 167, 173, 174, Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, paras. 89, 98, 134.

[3] The Appeals Chamber finds without merit Mladić’s argument that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Čelebići and Kunarac et al. cases “implicitly” affirmed the need for a trial chamber to conduct a detailed analysis of its jurisdiction where jurisdiction may be in issue. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 699, referring to Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 67, 68, Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 167, 168. The relevant jurisprudence to which he refers shows that the ICTY Appeals Chamber relied on the Tadić jurisprudence and reaffirmed that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute encompasses violations of Common Article 3. See Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 68, nn. 60-62; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 168, 169.

[4] See [Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović and Dragoljub Ojdanić, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003 (“Milutinović et al. Decision of 21 May 2003”)], para. 37; Aleksovski Contempt Appeal Judgement, para. 38; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 576; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 126. […].

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529.   In convicting and sentencing Mladić for crimes under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, the Trial Chamber stated that his superior responsibility was “encapsulated” within his joint criminal enterprise liability.[1] The Appeals Chamber considers that this statement on Mladić’s superior responsibility falls short of a reasoned opinion.[2] The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber should set out in a clear and articulate manner the factual and legal findings on the basis of which it reached the decision to convict or acquit an accused. In particular, a trial chamber is required to provide clear, reasoned findings of fact as to each element of the crime charged.[3] Notwithstanding, the Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić confuses superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute with abuse of authority as an aggravating factor in sentencing. These two issues are distinct and the consideration of abuse of an accused’s position of authority as an aggravating factor in sentencing does not require a finding of superior responsibility.[4] The Appeals Chamber therefore dismisses Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber should have made findings on the elements of Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute in order to consider his abuse of authority as an aggravating factor in sentencing.[5]  

[1] See Trial Judgement, para. 5166.

[2] See Article 23(2) of the ICTY Statute and Rule 98 ter (C) of the ICTY Rules.

[3] See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 700; Ndindiliyimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 293; Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 320. See also Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1778.

[4] Cf. Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 170; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, paras. 347, 348; Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, paras. 80, 81; Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 336. According to the ICTR Appeals Chamber, “[t]he question of criminal responsibility as a superior is analytically distinct from the question of whether an accused’s prominent status should affect his or her sentence”. See Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 336. Indeed, while an accused’s superior position per se does not constitute an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes, the abuse of authority may. See Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 3264; D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 302; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 411. See also Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 347.

[5] [Footnote omitted].

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