1103. […] The Appeals Chamber considers that the component pieces of circumstantial evidence on the issue of identification are to be considered in relation to all other pieces of circumstantial evidence bearing on the issue, and not in isolation.[1] Whereas the assessment of an evidentiary factor in a vacuum might fail to establish an essential matter, the weight of all relevant evidence taken together can conclusively prove the same matter beyond reasonable doubt.[2] […]

See also para. 1150.

375. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the purpose of expert testimony is to supply specialised knowledge that might assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence before it, and that in the ordinary case an expert witness offers a view based on specialised knowledge regarding a technical, scientific or otherwise discrete set of ideas or concepts that is expected to fall outside the lay person’s ken.[1] […]

382. The Appeals Chamber recalls that where a finding of guilt is made on the basis of identification evidence given by a witness under difficult circumstances, the Trial Chamber needs to “carefully articulate the factors relied upon in support of the identification of the accused and adequately address any significant factors impacting negatively on the reliability of the identification evidence”.[1] The Appeals Chamber stresses that this is required only when a witness’s identification was made under difficult circumstances, such as in the dark or as a result of a fleeting glance.[2] […]

392. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that identification hearsay evidence may, depending on the circumstances of the case, require other credible or reliable evidence in order to support a finding of fact beyond reasonable doubt.[3] […]

1741. Finally, it is recalled that whether an act or omission had a substantial effect on the commission of a crime is a fact-based inquiry,[1] and further, this aspect of aiding and abetting by omission has been interpreted to mean that had the accused acted the commission of the crime would have been substantially less likely.[2]

430. In holding that the crime of genocide does not require the existence of a State policy, the Trial Chamber relied on, inter alia, the Krstić, Jelisić, and Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgements.[1] […] In the Jelisić Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber held that “the existence of a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime”,[2] while in Kayishema and Ruzindana the ICTR Appeals Chamber stated that “a genocidal plan is not a constituent element of the crime of genocide”.[3] Although these judgements do not explicitly address the issue of State policy, the Appeals Chamber considers that if a policy is not a legal requirement, it follows that State policy cannot be a legal requirement. Thus, the question of whether the existence of a State policy is required for the crime of genocide has already been considered by the Tribunal.

1615. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it has previously held that the participation of an accused in a JCE need not involve the commission of a crime, but that it may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common objective or purpose.[1] Moreover, it has previously held that “the fact that [the] participation [of an accused] amounted to no more than his or her ‘routine duties’ will not exculpate the accused”.[2] […]

The Trial Chamber found that the Appellant was liable under JCE III for murder as a crime against humanity. At the same time, the Trial Chamber, without providing any further reasons, held that “in the circumstances of [the] killings arising from a JCE to Forcibly Remove – encompassing forcible transfer as other inhumane acts constituting a crime against humanity – his criminal responsibility is for murder as a crime against humanity and not as a war crime”. See para. 1710. The Appeals Chamber considered that the Trial Chamber’s scant reasoning as to why it acquitted the Appellant for war crimes suggests that the Trial Chamber required that the category of the JCE III crime must match that of the JCE I crime. See para. 1713.

1713. […] [T]he jurisprudence of the Tribunal does not require the category of the JCE I crime and the JCE III crime to match.[1] […]

762. To establish the actus reus of persecution in the present case, the Trial Chamber was required to establish that the underlying acts of terrorising civilians: discriminated in fact, denied or infringed upon a fundamental right laid down in international customary or treaty law,[1] and were “of equal gravity to the crimes listed in Article 5 whether considered in isolation or in conjunction with other acts.”[2] […]

766. […] The Appeals Chamber reiterates that “it is not necessary that every individual act underlying the crime of persecution […] be of a gravity corresponding to other crimes against humanity: underlying acts of persecution can be considered together”.[1] […]

738. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that persecution as a crime against humanity does not require that the underlying acts are crimes under international law.[1] A trial chamber does not need to establish the elements of the underlying acts, including the mens rea, even when the underlying act also constitutes a crime under international law. With respect to the mens rea, all that is required is establishing that the underlying act was deliberately carried out with discriminatory intent. […]