93. The requirement that the attack be “widespread” or “systematic” comes in the alternative.[1] Once it is convinced that either requirement is met, the Trial Chamber is not obliged to consider whether the alternative qualifier is also satisfied.  Nor is it the role or responsibility of the Appeals Chamber to make supplementary findings in that respect. 

94. […] The Trial Chamber correctly noted that “patterns of crimes – that is the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis – are a common expression of such systematic occurrence”.[2]

95. […] [T]he assessment of what constitutes a “widespread” or “systematic” attack is essentially a relative exercise in that it depends upon the civilian population which, allegedly, was being attacked.[3]  A Trial Chamber must therefore “first identify the population which is the object of the attack and, in light of the means, methods, resources and result of the attack upon the population, ascertain whether the attack was indeed widespread or systematic”.[4] The consequences of the attack upon the targeted population, the number of victims, the nature of the acts, the possible participation of officials or authorities or any identifiable patterns of crimes, could be taken into account to determine whether the attack satisfies either or both requirements of a “widespread” or “systematic” attack vis-à-vis this civilian population.

96. […] “[O]nly the attack, not the individual acts of the accused, must be widespread or systematic”.[5]  In addition, the acts of the accused need only be a part of this attack and, all other conditions being met, a single or relatively limited number of acts on his or her part would qualify as a crime against humanity, unless those acts may be said to be isolated or random.

100. The acts of the accused must be part of the “attack” against the civilian population, but they need not be committed in the midst of that attack. A crime which is committed before or after the main attack against the civilian population or away from it could still, if sufficiently connected, be part of that attack. The crime must not, however, be an isolated act.[1]  A crime would be regarded as an “isolated act” when it is so far removed from that attack that, having considered the context and circumstances in which it was committed, it cannot reasonably be said to have been part of the attack.[2]

117. The Appeals Chamber accepts the chief thesis of the Trial Chamber that the traditional concept of slavery, as defined in the 1926 Slavery Convention and often referred to as “chattel slavery”,[1] has evolved to encompass various contemporary forms of slavery which are also based on the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership.  In the case of these various contemporary forms of slavery, the victim is not subject to the exercise of the more extreme rights of ownership associated with “chattel slavery”, but in all cases, as a result of the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership, there is some destruction of the juridical personality;[2] the destruction is greater in the case of “chattel slavery” but the difference is one of degree. The Appeals Chamber considers that, at the time relevant to the alleged crimes, these contemporary forms of slavery formed part of enslavement as a crime against humanity under customary international law.

118. The Appeals Chamber will however observe that the law does not know of a “right of ownership over a person”.[3] Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention speaks more guardedly “of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”  That language is to be preferred. 

119. The Appeals Chamber considers that the question whether a particular phenomenon is a form of enslavement will depend on the operation of the factors or indicia of enslavement identified by the Trial Chamber. These factors include the “control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour”.[4] […]

120. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber does not accept the premise that lack of consent is an element of the crime since, in its view, enslavement flows from claimed rights of ownership; accordingly, lack of consent does not have to be proved by the Prosecutor as an element of the crime.  However, consent may be relevant from an evidential point of view as going to the question whether the Prosecutor has established the element of the crime relating to the exercise by the accused of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership.  In this respect, the Appeals Chamber considers that circumstances which render it impossible to express consent may be sufficient to presume the absence of consent. […]

121. […] The Trial Chamber found that the duration of the detention is another factor that can be considered but that its importance will depend on the existence of other indications of enslavement.[5] The Appeals Chamber upholds this finding and observes that the duration of the enslavement is not an element of the crime.  The question turns on the quality of the relationship between the accused and the victim. A number of factors determine that quality.  One of them is the duration of the relationship.  The Appeals Chamber considers that the period of time, which is appropriate, will depend on the particular circumstances of each case.

122. Lastly, as far as the mens rea of the crime of enslavement is concerned, the Appeals Chamber concurs with the Trial Chamber that the required mens rea consists of the intentional exercise of a power attaching to the right of ownership.[6]  It is not required to prove that the accused intended to detain the victims under constant control for a prolonged period of time in order to use them for sexual acts.

123. Aside from the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber considers it appropriate in the circumstances of this case to emphasise the citation by the Trial Chamber of the following excerpt from the Pohl case: [7]

Slavery may exist even without torture.  Slaves may be well fed, well clothed, and comfortably housed, but they are still slaves if without lawful process they are deprived of their freedom by forceful restraint.  We might eliminate all proof of ill-treatment, overlook the starvation, beatings, and other barbarous acts, but the admitted fact of slavery - compulsory uncompensated labour - would still remain.  There is no such thing as benevolent slavery.  Involuntary servitude, even if tempered by humane treatment, is still slavery.

The passage speaks of slavery; it applies equally to enslavement.

142. With reference to the Torture Convention [1] and the case-law of the Tribunal and the ICTR, the Trial Chamber adopted a definition based on the following constitutive elements: [2]

(i) The infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental.
(ii) The act or omission must be intentional.
(iii) The act or omission must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.

[…]

144. The Appeals Chamber largely concurs with the Trial Chamber’s definition[3] but wishes to hold the following. 

145. First, the Appeals Chamber wishes to provide further clarification as to the nature of the definition of torture in customary international law as it appears in the Torture Convention, in particular with regard to the participation of a public official or any other person acting in a non-private capacity. Although this point was not raised by the parties, the Appeals Chamber finds that it is important to address this issue in order that no controversy remains about this appeal or its consistency with the jurisprudence of the Tribunal.

146. The definition of the crime of torture, as set out in the Torture Convention, may be considered to reflect customary international law.[4] The Torture Convention was addressed to States and sought to regulate their conduct, and it is only for that purpose and to that extent that the Torture Convention deals with the acts of individuals acting in an official capacity.  Consequently, the requirement set out by the Torture Convention that the crime of torture be committed by an individual acting in an official capacity may be considered as a limitation of the engagement of States; they need prosecute acts of torture only when those acts are committed by “a public official...or any other person acting in a non-private capacity.”  So the Appeals Chamber in the Furundžija case was correct when it said that the definition of torture in the Torture Convention, inclusive of the public official requirement, reflected customary international law.[5] 

147. Furthermore, in the Furundžija Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber noted that the definition provided in the Torture Convention related to “the purposes of [the] Convention”.[6]  The accused in that case had not acted in a private capacity, but as a member of armed forces during an armed conflict, and he did not question that the definition of torture in the Torture Convention reflected customary international law.  In this context, and with the objectives of the Torture Convention in mind, the Appeals Chamber in the Furundžija case was in a legitimate position to assert that “at least one of the persons involved in the torture process must be a public official or must at any rate act in a non-private capacity, e.g., as a de facto organ of a State or any other authority-wielding entity”.[7]  This assertion, which is tantamount to a statement that the definition of torture in the Torture Convention reflects customary international law as far as the obligation of States is concerned, must be distinguished from an assertion that this definition wholly reflects customary international law regarding the meaning of the crime of torture generally.

148. The Trial Chamber in the present case was therefore right in taking the position that the public official requirement is not a requirement under customary international law in relation to the criminal responsibility of an individual for torture outside of the framework of the Torture Convention. However, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Appellants in the present case did not raise the issue as to whether a person acting in a private capacity could be found guilty of the crime of torture; nor did the Trial Chamber have the benefit of argument on the issue of whether that question was the subject of previous consideration by the Appeals Chamber.

168. The Appeals Chamber accepts the approach articulated in the Čelebići Appeal Judgement, an approach heavily indebted to the Blockburger decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.[1]  The Appeals Chamber held that: [2]

fairness to the accused and the consideration that only distinct crimes justify multiple convictions, lead to the conclusion that multiple criminal convictions entered under different statutory provisions but based on the same conduct are permissible only if each statutory provision involved has a materially distinct element not contained in the other.  An element is materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact not required by the other. 

Where this test is not met, the Chamber must decide on the basis of the principle that the conviction under the more specific provision should be upheld.

169. Care, however, is needed in applying the Čelebići test for, as Judges Hunt and Bennouna observed in their separate and dissenting opinion in the same case, cumulative convictions create “a very real risk of … prejudice” to the accused.[3] At the very least, such persons suffer the stigma inherent in being convicted of an additional crime for the same conduct.   In a more tangible sense, there may be such consequences as losing eligibility for early release under the law of the state enforcing the sentence.[4] Nor is such prejudice cured, as the U.S. Supreme Court warned in Rutledge v U.S.,[5] by the fact that the second conviction’s concomitant sentence is served concurrently.[6]  On the other hand, multiple convictions serve to describe the full culpability of a particular accused or provide a complete picture of his criminal conduct.[7]

170. Typically, the issue of multiple convictions or cumulative convictions arises in legal systems with a hierarchy of offences in which the more serious offences within a category require proof of an additional element or even require a specific mens rea. It is, however, an established principle of both the civil and common law that punishment should not be imposed for both a greater offence and a lesser included offence. Instead, the more serious crime subsumes the less serious (lex consumens derogat legi consumptae). The rationale here, of course, is that the greater and the lesser included offence constitute the same core offence, without sufficient distinction between them, even when the same act or transaction violates two distinct statutory provisions.[8]  Indeed, it is not possible to commit the more serious offence without also committing the lesser included offence.[9]

171. In national laws, this principle is easier to apply because the relative gravity of a crime can normally be ascertained by the penalty imposed by the law. The Statute, however, does not provide a scale of penalties for the various crimes it proscribes.  Nor does the Statute give other indications as to the relative gravity of the crimes.  Indeed, the Tribunal has explicitly rejected a hierarchy of crimes, concluding instead that crimes against humanity are not inherently graver than war crimes.[10] 

172. The Čelebići/Blockburger test serves to identify distinct offences within this constellation of statutory provisions.[11] While subscribing to this test, the Appeals Chamber is aware that it is deceptively simple.  In practice, it is difficult to apply in a way that is conceptually coherent and promotes the interests of justice.

173. For this reason, the Appeals Chamber will scrutinise with the greatest caution multiple or cumulative convictions. In so doing, it will be guided by the considerations of justice for the accused: the Appeals Chamber will permit multiple convictions only in cases where the same act or transaction clearly violates two distinct provisions of the Statute and where each statutory provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.

174. The Appeals Chamber wishes to emphasise that whether the same conduct violates two distinct statutory provisions is a question of law. Nevertheless, the Chamber must take into account the entire situation so as to avoid a mechanical or blind application of its guiding principles.

153. The Appellants argue that the intention of the perpetrator was of a sexual nature, which, in their view, is inconsistent with an intent to commit the crime of torture.[1]  In this respect, the Appeals Chamber wishes to assert the important distinction between “intent” and “motivation”.  The Appeals Chamber holds that, even if the perpetrator’s motivation is entirely sexual, it does not follow that the perpetrator does not have the intent to commit an act of torture or that his conduct does not cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, since such pain or suffering is a likely and logical consequence of his conduct. In view of the definition, it is important to establish whether a perpetrator intended to act in a way which, in the normal course of events, would cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, to his victims. […]

[…]

155. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber restates the conclusions of the Trial Chamber[2] that acts need not have been perpetrated solely for one of the purposes prohibited by international law.  If one prohibited purpose is fulfilled by the conduct, the fact that such conduct was also intended to achieve a non-listed purpose (even one of a sexual nature) is immaterial.

40. [...] Rule 94bis contains nothing which is inconsistent with the application of Rule 92bis to an expert witness.  Indeed, Rule 92bis expressly contemplates that witnesses giving evidence relating to the relevant historical, political or military background of a case (which is usually the subject of expert evidence) will be subject to its provisions.  There is nothing in either Rule which would debar the written statement of an expert witness, or the transcript of the expert’s evidence in proceedings before the Tribunal, being accepted in lieu of his oral testimony where the interests of justice would allow that course in order to save time, with the rights of the other party to cross-examine the expert being determined in accordance with Rule 92bis.  Common sense would suggest that there is every reason to suggest that such a course ought to be followed in the appropriate case.

29.     Unlike the civil law, the common law permits hearsay evidence only in exceptional circumstances.[1]  When many common law jurisdictions took steps to limit the rule against hearsay by permitting the admission of written records kept by a business as evidence of the truth of what they stated notwithstanding that rule, they invariably excluded from what was to be admissible under that exception any documents made in relation to pending or anticipated legal proceedings involving a dispute as to any fact which the document may tend to establish.  This exclusion reflected the fact that such documents are not made in the ordinary course by persons who have no interest other than to record as accurately as possible matters relating to the business with which they are concerned.  It also rested upon the recognised potential in relation to such documents for fabrication and misrepresentation by their makers and of such documents being carefully devised by lawyers or others to ensure that they contained only the most favourable version of the facts stated.

30.     The decision to encourage the admission of written statements prepared for the purposes of such legal proceedings in lieu of oral evidence from the makers of the statements was nevertheless taken by the Tribunal as an appropriate mixture of the two legal systems, but with the realisation that any evidentiary provision specifically relating to that material required considerable emphasis upon the need to ensure its reliability.  This is particularly so in relation to written statements given by prospective witnesses to OTP investigators, as questions concerning the reliability of such statements have unfortunately arisen,[2] from knowledge gained in many trials before the Tribunal as to the manner in which those written statements are compiled.[3] Rule 92bis has introduced that emphasis.

23. [...] [T]he maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius[...][1] [...] must always be applied with great care in statutory interpretation, for it is not of universal application. [...]

7. The certificate given by the Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 73(C) (as it then stood)^[[1]^] – that it was appropriate for the continuation of the trial that an interlocutory appeal be determined – related only to [one of several] issues […]. It is, however, within the discretion of the Appeals Chamber to determine also other, related, issues where it considers it appropriate to do so, at least where they have been raised in the interlocutory appeal and the respondent to the appeal has had the opportunity to put his or its arguments in relation to those related issues. […]