While Rule 15(B)(iii) of the Rules clearly states that there is no interlocutory appeal from a decision by the panel of three judges, it does not set out what avenues are available should a party wish to challenge the finding of the President on the merits of an application for disqualification pursuant to Rule 15(B)(ii) of the Rules. Referring to the former version of Rule 15(B) of the Rules, the Appeals Chamber concluded:

7. […] In interpreting the previous version of the Rule, the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Galić found that the Presiding Judge could determine that it was not necessary to refer the matter to the Bureau and decide the matter himself; however, if the party seeking disqualification challenged the Presiding Judge’s decision, it did become “necessary” to refer the matter to the Bureau within the language of Rule 15(B) of the Rules. Therefore, while there was no interlocutory appeal from decisions of either the Presiding Judge or the Bureau, there was in effect a second level of review by the Bureau in the case of the Presiding Judge deciding the matter alone.[1] In circumstances where an application for disqualification was referred to the Bureau, it would undertake a de novo review.[2]

8. The procedure in the current version of Rule 15(B) of the Rules differs in that it is the President, rather than the Presiding Judge, who either makes the decision on his own or refers it on for decision. Further, in the latter case, the President refers it not to the Bureau but to a panel of three judges drawn from other Chambers. However, beyond these differences, the language and general procedure of Rule 15(B) of the Rules in the two versions is broadly similar. Both provide that the matter may be decided by a lone judge (be it the Presiding Judge or the President) or “if necessary” by a panel of judges (be it a panel of three judges from other Chambers or the Bureau). Therefore, the Appeals Chamber considers that the reasoning in Galić to the extent that where a decision of the Presiding Judge acting on his own is challenged it becomes “necessary” to refer the matter to the Bureau, would equally apply to the new procedure under Rule 15(B) of the Rules. Therefore, under the current Rule 15(B) of the Rules, where the President (or, as in the instant case, the Vice-President) has determined that it is not necessary to refer the matter to a panel of judges and decided the matter himself, and that decision is challenged, it becomes “necessary” to refer the matter to a panel of three judges.

The Appeals Chamber discussed the evolution of its jurisprudence regarding what types of challenges involve subject matter jurisdiction and thus qualify for appeal as of right.

33. The Appeals Chamber recalls that Karadžić’s challenges to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction focus on the mode by which liability is attributed to him. As these challenges do not relate to persons, territories, or time periods,[1] the core issue underlying the Appeals is whether they involve subject matter jurisdiction as defined in Rule 72(D)(iv) of the Rules, and thus may be appealed as of right.[2]

34. Karadžić makes extensive reference to certain decisions, such as Rwamakuba,[3] issued by three judge panels under a previous version of Rule 72 of the Rules.[4] Many of the decisions cited by Karadžić lend some support to the view that even relatively granular issues, such as the contours and elements of mode of liability, could be jurisdictional in nature.[5] However, other decisions issued by these three judge panels advanced a narrower view of jurisdiction under Rule 72 of the Rules.[6] In 2005, a revision to the Rules eliminated Rule 72(E) of the Rules and reverted the question of whether an appeal addressed jurisdictional issues to standard panels of five Appeals Judges.[7] Since that revision of the Rules, the Appeals Chamber’s jurisprudence has gradually resolved previous uncertainty relating to the issue of which questions qualified as jurisdictional challenges.

35. The Appeals Chamber’s most recent jurisprudence on the question of jurisdiction focuses narrowly on the plain text of Rule 72 of the Rules. For example, in Gotovina, the Appeals Chamber dismissed a challenge concerning the applicable mens rea of the third category of JCE, as it determined that the claim was not related to questions of jurisdiction.[8] To the extent the appeal was challenging the definition and interpretation of a particular element of the mode of liability, the Appeals Chamber found that “[s]uch an argument goes to the pleading practice and the form of the indictment and is not a challenge to jurisdiction”.[9] The Appeals Chamber also adopted this approach in its Tolimir Decision. There, the appellant challenged the applicability of JCE to establishing responsibility for the crimes of genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide. In rejecting his appeal, the Appeals Chamber concluded that “though at first glance [the appeal seemed] somewhat related to subject-matter jurisdiction”, it involved non-jurisdictional issues that could be resolved during the course of trial.[10]

36. As Tolimir and Gotovina demonstrate, the Appeals Chamber’s approach to subject matter jurisdiction now focuses on whether the crime charged is envisioned by the statute, and whether the mode of liability upholds the principle of individual criminal responsibility; the contours and elements of modes of liability are considered an “issue[ ] of law . . . which can be properly advanced and argued during the course of trial”.[11]

37. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s reliance on the Appeals Chamber’s distillation of case law on the scope of jurisdictional appeals as set out in Gotovina and Tolimir.[12] For the foregoing reasons, the Appeals Chamber finds that Karadžić fails to raise a proper jurisdictional challenge pursuant to Rule 72 of the Rules.

The Appeals Chamber also recalled the standard of appellate review of decisions concerning jurisdictional challenge (paras 9-10).

28. With respect to Karadžić’s decision to file several separate appeals against the Impugned Decision, the Appeals Chamber agrees with the Prosecution that this is not standard practice. If a party could file an unlimited number of appeals against one decision, provisions regulating the interlocutory appeals, such as word limitation,[1] would be devoid of any sense. The proper procedure for Karadžić would thus generally be to file one appeal against the Impugned Decision, applying for extension of the word limit if necessary. Given the very particular context of these appeals, especially the wide range of issues addressed in the Impugned Decision, the filing of more than one appeal was potentially justifiable. In any event, the Appeals Chamber finds that it would not be in the interests of judicial expediency to order Karadžić to re-file his submissions in this case, and notes that no party has been prejudiced in the circumstances given that separate responses and replies were subsequently filed. In turn, the fact that the Appeals Chamber accepts these appeals as validly filed does not preclude it from rendering its decisions in a consolidated manner, if and where appropriate.[2]

17. The state of Mr. Ngirumpatse’s health and his prognosis for recovery lie at the core of the Trial Chamber’s decision to deny the request for a further stay of proceedings and instead to sever him from the case. In refusing to order a further stay, the Trial Chamber dismissed as “highly speculative” Mr. Ngirumpatse’s claim that his health might sufficiently improve within three months to allow him to more actively participate in his defence from his hospital bed.[1] […]

18. Rule 82(B) of the Rules provides that a “Trial Chamber may order that persons accused jointly under Rule 48 be tried separately if it considers it necessary in order to avoid a conflict of interests that might cause serious prejudice to an accused, or to protect the interests of justice.” In severing Mr. Ngirumpatse, the Trial Chamber concluded principally that there was a conflict of interests among the Appellants as a result of the prejudice Mr. Karemera and Mr. Nzirorera would suffer if the proceedings were stayed until Mr. Ngirumpatse became fit to attend trial.[2] The Trial Chamber noted that, “according to the doctor’s assessment”, Mr. Ngirumpatse “will, in the best case, not be fit to attend trial before nine months.”[3] The Trial Chamber also considered the interests of justice, namely, the interests of the victims and the international community that trials concerning serious crimes be completed without unnecessary delays.[4] It also noted that severance “significantly serves judicial economy”.[5]

19. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in practice, Trial Chambers generally consider various professional opinions before taking an important procedural decision arising from an accused’s medical condition which may impact the course of a trial.[6] In this respect, Rule 74bis of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”) expressly provides that “a Trial Chamber may, proprio motu or at the request of a party, order a medical […] examination of the accused.”

20. In the present case, the Trial Chamber relied exclusively on the assessment of the Tribunal’s Chief Medical Officer.[7] As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Chamber finds no merit in Mr. Nzirorera’s submission that the Trial Chamber erred in not requiring the Chief Medical Officer to take the oath prescribed for witnesses in Rule 90(B) of the Rules.[8] The Chief Medical Officer did not appear as a witness, rather, her assessment, like other information submitted by the witness protection or defence counsel management section, is akin to a submission under Rule 33(B) of the Rules.

22.     It is appropriate to take proper account of an assessment made by the Chief Medical Officer and, in some cases, to rely exclusively on it. However, the Appeals Chamber considers that particular care is warranted where, as here, the assessment is provisional and lacking in detail, is disputed by the parties, and plays a significant role in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of prejudice. The Appeals Chamber also observes that the Trial Chamber had no specific information concerning the nature of Mr. Ngirumpatse’s medical problem. While a Trial Chamber may adopt reasonable measures to protect the privacy interests of an accused, these measures cannot serve to deprive it of information essential to reaching an informed decision. In view of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds that, in this instance, the Trial Chamber reached its conclusions on prejudice without having assessed all relevant factors. It therefore committed a discernible error in the exercise of its discretion. […]

10. The Appellant submits that the Trial Chamber failed to articulate the applicable law on “the legal threshold differentiating an accused who does not understand English for the purposes of the Tribunal’s Statute and Rules, from one who does” and as such failed to correctly distinguish the legal standard applicable to an accused represented by counsel and a self-represented accused.[1] In this respect, he submits that the appropriate standard is the one set out in the Tolimir Appeal Decision that an accused must understand a language “sufficiently in order to allow for the effective exercise of his right to conduct his defence.”[2] He further submits that the Rome Statute of the ICC which sets out that the language to be used is one which the accused “fully understands and speaks”,[3] “provide[s] the best evidence of the applicable legal threshold in international law.”[4]

11. With respect to the Appellant’s reliance on the Rome Statute, the Appeals Chamber recalls that it is not bound by the Rome Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, although it may seek guidance from them when appropriate.[5] In the present case, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Tolimir Appeal Decision has already set out the Appeals Chamber’s interpretation of “a language which [the accused] understands” in Article 21(4)(a) of the Statute[6] and that the Appellant does not contest this standard.[7] Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Tribunal’s standard on language ability is consistent with other international human rights instruments setting out fair trial rights.[8] In light of this, the Appeals Chamber does not consider it necessary to engage in an analysis of the ICC’s standard regarding the level of language ability required of an accused.

12. As in the current case, the issue in the Tolimir Appeal Decision was the scope and meaning of the right to receive materials in a language that the accused understands in the context of a case with a self-represented accused.[9] The Appeals Chamber in Tolimir considered the meaning of Article 21(4)(a) of the Statute and Rule 66(A) of the Rules and found that the issue “hinges on understanding and not preference.”[10] It continued:

These provisions, when read with the other minimum guarantees provided in Article 21(4) of the Statute, create an obligation to provide relevant material in a language which the accused understands sufficiently in order to allow for the effective exercise of his right to conduct his defence.[11]

The determination of whether an accused possesses a sufficient level of understanding is a factual question and must be made on a case-by-case basis.[12]

13. While the Impugned Decision did not expressly refer to the Tolimir Appeal Decision, the Trial Chamber considered the same provisions in the Statute and the Rules and applied an equivalent standard. After noting Rule 3(A) of the Rules, which provides that the “working languages of the Tribunal shall be English and French”, the Trial Chamber recalled that this rule must be consistent with the right of an accused to a fair trial.[13] In this respect, it quoted from Article 21(4) of the Statute which provides, inter alia, that:

[i]n the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:

(a) to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him; […][14]

More particularly, it recalled that the materials disclosed to an accused pursuant to Rule 66(A) of the Rules must be “in a language which the accused understands”.[15] It proceeded to consider the materials submitted to it by the Prosecution as evidence of the Appellant’s understanding of the English language[16] before concluding that the Appellant understands English “for the purposes of the Rules and the Statute”.[17] In considering whether the Appellant understands English “for the purposes of the Rules and the Statute” with reference to Article 21(4) of the Statute and Rule 66(A) of the Rules, the Trial Chamber was in effect inquiring as to whether the Appellant “understands sufficiently in order to allow for the effective exercise of his right to conduct his defence.”[18] This is demonstrated by the fact that the Trial Chamber considered not merely the Appellant’s general English language abilities but specifically his ability to undertake tasks required “in the context of a complex criminal trial”[19] such as his ability to converse with his English speaking legal advisers,[20] to respond to questions regarding war crimes allegations[21] and exhibits placed before him,[22] and to draft or approve motions and other submissions filed by him.[23] This shows that although the Trial Chamber did not explicitly refer to the Tolimir Appeal Decision, it applied the same standard. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds no error in the legal standard applied by the Trial Chamber.

15. With regard to the Appellant’s submission that the evidence relating to his language abilities relied on by the Trial Chamber was outdated, the Appeals Chamber notes that while evidence from many years ago may not be conclusive of present language abilities, it is relevant.  In this case, however, while the Trial Chamber took into consideration evidence from 14 to 17 years ago, it also considered more recent evidence. […]

16. In the present case, the Trial Chamber found that “evidence which has already been considered and rejected by another Trial Chamber in making a finding of fact should not be admissible in a later proceeding to rebut that same finding of fact”.[1] In support of its finding, the Trial Chamber reasoned that the original Trial Chamber “was in a much better position to make determinations regarding reliability and credibility than [it], having heard the evidence viva voce”.[2] The Appeals Chamber considers that, in stating so, the Trial Chamber disregarded the fact that the assessment of admissibility criteria must be done on a case-by-case basis,[3] in light of the specific circumstances of each case. It overlooked the fact that the probative value of a piece of evidence may be assessed differently in different cases, depending on the rest of the evidence and other relevant circumstances.[4] While the prior assessment of the evidence by another Trial Chamber is a factor that may be taken into account in the assessment of its probative value, it does not relieve the Trial Chamber of its obligation to assess the admissibility of the evidence in the context of the case before it.

17. In the Karemera et al. Appeal Decision on Judicial Notice, the Appeals Chamber held that adjudicated facts:

are facts that have been established in a proceeding between other parties on the basis of the evidence the parties to that proceeding chose to introduce, in the particular context of that proceeding. For this reason, they cannot simply be accepted, by mere virtue of their acceptance in the first proceeding, as conclusive in proceedings involving different parties who have not had the chance to contest them.[5]

This is also the case for credibility findings in another case: the finding on the credibility and reliability of Ntakirutimana’s testimony in his own trial cannot be accepted as conclusive in the present proceedings by the mere virtue of the fact that it was reached by the Ntakirutimana Trial Chamber.

18. In this case, the Trial Chamber denied the admissibility of Ntakirutimana’s testimony into evidence on the basis that the Ntakirutimana Trial Chamber had found it to be less reliable than another testimony.[6] That is, instead of examining for itself whether Ntakirutimana’s testimony was prima facie reliable and credible, the Trial Chamber erroneously relied on the final evaluation of its reliability and credibility by another Trial Chamber and accepted that negative assessment as determinative of the admissibility of the evidence.

19. The Trial Chamber further reasoned that to re-engage in an assessment of the reliability and credibility of Ntakirutimana’s testimony “would essentially be acting in review of another Chamber, and therefore outside of its jurisdiction”.[7] The Appeals Chamber disagrees. As noted above, the final assessment of the weight of a piece of evidence is based on the totality of the evidence in a given case. Naturally, the same piece of evidence can be assessed differently in different cases because of other evidence on the record therein. Therefore, a Trial Chamber’s assessment of a piece of evidence from another case does not involve a review of a decision of another Trial Chamber. Moreover, in this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that “the final adjudication of facts in judicial proceedings is treated as conclusively binding only, at most, on the parties to those proceedings”.[8]

22. [...] In deferring to the assessment of the reliability of Ntakirutimana’s testimony by the Ntakirutimana Trial Chamber, the Trial Chamber not only failed to fulfil its obligation to examine whether the evidence may have probative value in the circumstances of the case before it, but also misapplied the standard for admission of evidence which only requires prima facie indicia of reliability and credibility.    

3. Pursuant to Rule 65(I) of the Rules, a convicted person may bring an application seeking provisional release for a fixed period. By virtue of Rule 107 of the Rules, the whole of Rule 65 applies mutatis mutandis to applications brought before the Appeals Chamber under this provision.[1] Rule 65(I) of the Rules thus provides that the Appeals Chamber may grant provisional release if it is satisfied that: (i) the convicted person, if released, will either appear at the hearing of the appeal or will surrender into detention at the conclusion of the fixed period, as the case may be; (ii) the convicted person, if released, will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person, and; (iii) special circumstances exist warranting such release. These requirements must be considered cumulatively.[2] The Appeals Chamber recalls that “whether an applicant satisfies these requirements is to be determined on a balance of probabilities, and the fact that an individual has already been sentenced is a matter to be taken into account by the Appeals Chamber when balancing the probabilities”.[3] Finally, the discretionary assessments of the requirements under Rule 65 of the Rules are made on a case-by-case basis.[4]

16. […] the Appeals Chamber recalls that detention for a substantial period of time may amount to a special circumstance within the meaning of Rule 65(I)(iii) of the Rules.[1] A determination must, however, be made on a case-by-case basis.[2] In the context of this case, taking into account that a date for hearing the appeal has not yet been set, as well as the good behaviour shown by Brahimaj whilst in detention, the fact that Brahimaj’s past period of provisional release did not give rise to any concerns and the fact that he has served two-thirds of his sentence, the Appeals Chamber finds that special circumstances warranting Brahimaj’s provisional release have been established.[3]

In the previous practice of the Tribunal, guarantees for an accused provisionally released in Kosovo/Kosova have usually been provided by UNMIK. In the present case, after having inquired with both UNMIK and the EULEX-Kosovo Mission, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the latter was best placed to provide the necessary guarantees of compliance with the prescribed conditions of provisional release (see para. 11).   

9. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the specificity of provisional release at the post-trial stage is reflected by Rule 65(I)(iii) of the Rules, which provides for an additional criterion, i.e. that “special circumstances exist warranting such release”.[1] For reasons described in paragraph 2 above, the Appeals Chamber will consider that, for the purposes of this decision, the appellate proceedings in this case are pending before it. In such situations, the Appeals Chamber has concluded that special circumstances related to humane and compassionate considerations exist where there is an acute justification, such as the applicant’s medical need or a memorial service for a close family member.[2] The Appeals Chamber has also granted provisional release for a visit to a close family member in “extremely poor health and whose death is believed to be imminent”.[3] The Appeals Chamber has also emphasized that “the fact that some accused have been granted provisional release for comparable reasons pending their trial cannot be automatically applied by analogy to persons who have already been convicted by a Trial Chamber and who are seeking provisional release pending the appellate proceedings.[4] Finally, because “the notion of acute justification [is] inextricably linked to the scope of special circumstances which could justify provisional release on compassionate grounds at the appellate stage”, justifications such as wanting to spend time with family have explicitly not been recognized as special circumstances under Rule 65(I)(iii) of the Rules.[5]