8.          […] neither the Statute nor the Rules of the Mechanism […] expressly provides for an appeal as of right against a decision issued by a Single Judge on a matter concerning financial assistance to a convicted person released pending his relocation. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber considers that the matter before it relates to the Mechanism’s duty to ensure the welfare of released persons pending their relocation.[1] Further, the Appeals Chamber notes that it has considered appeals of decisions rendered by a Single Judge in matters that dispose of discrete litigation after the close of trial and appeal proceedings.[2] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that the present matter raises issues over which the Appeals Chamber may exercise jurisdiction and will consider the Appeal.

[…]

15.       […] there is nothing in the Mechanism’s legal framework. including in the Appeals Chamber’s binding jurisprudence on the matter, or in the provisions in the Mali Enforcement Agreement that requires the Mechanism to provide financial assistance to a convicted person who has completed serving his or her sentence and has been released on the territory of the enforcement State.

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RECALLING that the Appeals Chamber may consider post-hearing submissions if they relate to a variation of the grounds of appeal or if it has made a specific request to the parties for further information;[1]

27. The Appeals Chamber recalls that prior consistent statements cannot be used to bolster a witness’s credibility, except to rebut a charge of recent fabrication of testimony.[1]

65. […] [C]onsidering that “time served” is not among the penalties provided in the Statute and the Rules that may be imposed on a person found guilty of contempt, the Appeals Chamber finds that, by sentencing Fatuma to “time served”, the Single Judge did not impose a permissible sentence. It was incumbent on the Single Judge, when electing to impose a sentence of imprisonment, to first determine the term of imprisonment and then, in accordance with Rule 125(C) of the Rules, give credit for the time that Fatuma had spent in detention in the custody of the Mechanism pending trial. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds, proprio motu, that by not determining a specific term of imprisonment, the Single Judge committed an error in failing to follow the applicable law. […]

84. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the mens rea for a violation under Rule 90(A)(ii) of the Rules is the knowledge that the disclosure in question is in violation of an order of a Chamber or a Single Judge.[1] No demonstration of a “specific intent to interfere with the administration of justice” is required in this respect.[2] The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Hartmann case accepted the Trial Chamber’s interpretation that:

[I]t is sufficient to establish that the conduct which constituted the violation was deliberate and not accidental. This may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Where it is established that an accused had knowledge of the existence of a Court order, a finding of intent to violate the order will almost necessarily follow. Wilful blindness to the existence of the order, or reckless indifference to the consequences of the act by which the order is violated may satisfy the mental element. Mere negligence in failing to ascertain whether an order had been made is insufficient.[3]

104. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, pursuant to Rule 104(C) of the Rules, if the single judge finds an accused guilty on one or more of the charges contained in an indictment, he shall impose a sentence in respect of each finding of guilt and indicate whether such sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently. Neither the Statute nor the Rules vest in the single judge the power to order that a sentence for contempt be served concurrently with a previous sentence imposed on the same accused in separate proceedings under a different indictment before the ICTY, the ICTR, or the Mechanism.

105. In addition, the Appeals Chamber is not persuaded by Ngirabatware’s submission that, similar to the authority to suspend a sentence, the authority to impose a concurrent sentence is part of the single judge’s inherent power to determine the appropriate sentence.[1] The ICTY Appeals Chamber has previously recognized that the decision to suspend a sentence for contempt forms an integral part of a trial chamber’s judicial discretion in the determination of the sentence.[2] However, the power to suspend a sentence for contempt in a single proceeding is distinguishable from the power to order that a sentence for contempt run concurrently with another sentence imposed on the accused in separate proceedings by different judges, concerning unrelated charges under different indictments. The differences are such that the Appeals Chamber cannot accept that the authority to impose a concurrent sentence for contempt is part of the inherent power of the Single Judge in the circumstances of this case.

40. The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of approximately 2,000 adjudicated facts pursuant to Rule 94(B) of the ICTY Rules. Mladić challenged the taking of judicial notice of adjudicated facts, including adjudicated facts relating to the acts or conduct of his alleged subordinates. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in this case reviewed the Trial Chamber’s approach and found that it was consistent with the applicable jurisprudence. Relying primarily on a decision in the Karemera et al. case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber, on 12 November 2013, held that it is within a trial chamber’s discretion to take judicial notice of “facts relating to the existence of a joint criminal enterprise, the conduct of its members other than an accused, and facts related to the conduct of physical perpetrators of crimes for which an accused is alleged to be criminally responsible”.

[…]

45. In examining whether there is a clear error of reasoning in the Appeal Decision on Adjudicated Facts, the Appeals Chamber considers Mladić’s argument that the Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006 overlooked the relevance of the Galić Decision of 7 June 2002 when considering whether to take judicial notice of adjudicated facts relating to the acts or conduct of proximate subordinates. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Galić Decision of 7 June 2002 does not preclude admission of written evidence in lieu of oral testimony relating to the acts and conduct of proximate subordinates. Rather, it only precludes the admission of such evidence pertaining to the acts and conduct or mental state of the accused. In that decision, the ICTY Appeals Chamber expressly noted that the ICTY rule on the admission of written statements in lieu of oral testimony did not exclude the admission of such statements going to the acts and conduct of others for which the accused is charged with responsibility. Even with respect to admission of written evidence that is “so pivotal to the prosecution case, and where the person whose acts and conduct […] is so proximate to the accused”, the Galić Decision of 7 June 2002 recognizes that this is a matter within the discretion of the trial chamber, observing that, in such circumstances, the trial chamber “may decide that it would not be fair to the accused” to permit its admission.

46. A review of the Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006 shows that the ICTR Appeals Chamber explicitly considered as applicable in the context of judicial notice of adjudicated facts the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s analysis in the Galić Decision of 7 June 2002. In particular, the Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006 recalled the distinction drawn therein between “‘(a) the acts and conduct of those others who commit the crimes for which the indictment alleges that the accused is individually responsible, and (b) the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment which establish his responsibility for the acts and conduct of those others’”, to emphasize that only adjudicated facts going to the latter warrant complete exclusion from judicial notice. With respect to all other adjudicated facts relating to the accused’s criminal responsibility, the ICTR Appeals Chamber adopted a cautious approach by declaring that “it is for the [t]rial [c]hambers, in the careful exercise of their discretion, to assess each particular fact in order to determine whether taking judicial notice of it – and thus shifting the burden of producing evidence rebutting it to the accused – is consistent with the accused’s rights under the circumstances of the case”. Upon review of both decisions, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006 evinces a consistent approach with the Galić Decision of 7 June 2002. The Appeals Chamber further considers that Mladić’s position fails to recognize that adjudicated facts within the meaning of Rule 94(B) of the ICTR and ICTY Rules are presumptions and are not equivalent to the untested evidence at issue in the Galić Decision of 7 June 2002, and that this decision is therefore inapposite when considering what restrictions should be placed on a trial chamber when relying on adjudicated facts under Rule 94(B) of the ICTY Rules. In particular, adjudicated facts under Rule 94(B) of the ICTY Rules are rebuttable presumptions that can only be accepted where, inter alia, they have been tested and established in another trial proceeding whereas the reliability and credibility requirements for admission of untested evidence pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92 bis of the ICTY Rules are far less onerous.

47. […] In view of the above, Mladić fails to demonstrate that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Appeal Decision on Adjudicated Facts erred in relying on the Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006 or that it committed any other error.

[…]

134. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that taking judicial notice of an adjudicated fact serves only to relieve the Prosecution of its initial burden to produce evidence on the point, and the defence may then put the point into question by introducing reliable and credible evidence to the contrary. […]

98. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, pursuant to Rule 97 of the ICTY Rules, all communications between lawyer and client shall be regarded as privileged, and consequently not subject to disclosure at trial, unless: (i) the client consents to such disclosure; or (ii) the client has voluntarily disclosed the content of the communication to a third party, and that third party then gives evidence of that disclosure. This privilege is vital to the defence of an accused or appellant by allowing for open communication between counsel and client that is necessary for effective legal assistance as guaranteed under Article 21(4)(d) of the ICTY Statute.[1]

See also paras. 99-103. Wherein the Appeals Chamber addressed, inter alia, the waiving of lawyer-client privilege when “loud and audible” statements are made by an accused in the courtroom and are overheard by the Prosecution team.

193. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber further recalls that members of a joint criminal enterprise may be held responsible for crimes carried out by principal perpetrators, provided that the crimes can be imputed to at least one member of the joint criminal enterprise and that the latter – when using the principal perpetrators – acted in accordance with the common objective.[1]

 243. […] In any event, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber’s determinations are not binding on other trial chambers or on the Appeals Chamber.[1]