294.    Article 6(3) of the Statute on “Individual criminal responsibility”, provides that:

The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

          With respect to the nature of the superior-subordinate relationship, the Appeals Chamber refers to the relevant principles expressed in the Čelebići Appeal Judgement in relation to the identical provision in Article 7(3) of ICTY Statute, as follows:

(i)         [A] superior is “one who possesses the power or authority in either a de jure or a de facto form to prevent a subordinate’s crime or to punish the perpetrators of the crime after the crime is committed”.[1] Thus, “[t]he power or authority to prevent or to punish does not solely arise from de jure authority conferred through official appointment.”[2]

(ii)         “In determining questions of responsibility it is necessary to look to effective exercise of power or control and not to formal titles. […]. In general the possession of de jure power in itself may not suffice for the finding of command responsibility if it does not manifest in effective control, although a court may presume that possession of such power prima facie results in effective control unless proof to the contrary is produced. [T]he ability to exercise effective control is necessary for the establishment of de facto command or superior responsibility and […] the absence of formal appointment is not fatal to a finding of criminal responsibility, provided certain conditions are met.”[3]

(iii)        “The showing of effective control is required in cases involving both de jure and de facto superiors.”

          This Appeals Chamber accepts these statements and notes that the Trial Chamber, in its Judgement, applied a similar approach when it found that:

[E]ven where a clear hierarchy based upon de jure authority is not present, this does not prevent the finding of command responsibility. Equally, as we shall examine below, the mere existence of de jure power does not always necessitate the imposition of command responsibility. The culpability that this doctrine gives rise to must ultimately be predicated upon the power that the superior exercises over his subordinates in a given situation.[5]

Thus, “as long as a superior has effective control over subordinates, to the extent that he can prevent them from committing crimes or punish them after they committed the crimes, he would be held responsible for the commission of the crimes if he failed to exercise such abilities of control”.[6] Therefore, Kayishema’s argument that without de jure authority, there can be no subordinate and hence, no de facto authority, is misconceived. This question turns on whether the superior had effective control over the persons committing the alleged crimes. The existence of effective control may be related to the question whether the accused had de jure authority. However, it need not be; such control or authority can have a de facto or a de jure character.[7]

350.    […] The particularly gruesome manner in which the victim, Beatrice, was killed, is an aggravating circumstance. The fact that this act of killing also supported a conviction for the crime of genocide, because it was part of the policy of genocide within Kibuye préfecture, does not prevent a separate finding that the manner in which it was carried out gave rise to an aggravating circumstance. 

361.    […] [P]erpetrating a crime in a manner which brings about irreparable harm to the victims and their families may also be considered an aggravation. When an individual commits a crime, there are differing degrees of physical and psychological harm to the victim which may result. Some types of harm are more severe than others. Certain forms of physical harm, for instance, are irreparable, particularly in the case of mutilation. The Trial Chamber found that Kayishema’s acts inflicted irreparable harm not only to the victims, but also to their families. This constituted an aggravating circumstance to be taken into account in sentencing. […]

367.    […] The Appeals Chamber remarks that there is no hierarchy of crimes under the Statute, and that all of the crimes specified therein are “serious violations of international humanitarian law”,[1] capable of attracting the same sentence. The actual sentence imposed depends, of course, upon the evaluation of the various factors referred to in the Statute and the Rules. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber’s description of genocide as the “crime of crimes” was at the level of general appreciation, and did not impact on the sentence it imposed. Furthermore, upon examining the statements of the Trial Chamber, it is evident that the primary thrust of its finding as to the gravity of the offences relates to the fact that genocide in itself is a crime that is extremely grave. Such an observation is correct, and for these reasons, there was no error in its finding on this point.

77.     The Appeals Chamber cannot accept the argument that the phrase “persons responsible for” used in resolution 955 implies that the Tribunal was unable to discharge its judicial functions. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the principle of the presumption of innocence is reiterated in Article 20(3) of the Statute:

“The accused person shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to the provisions of the present Statute.”

The Appeals Chamber reiterates with force its holding in Barayagwiza.[1]

[…]

107.    […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that in conformity with the principle of presumption of innocence, as enunciated in the Judgement,[2] supra, it is the duty of the Prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

335.    The Appeals Chamber notes that a Trial Chamber is required, as a matter of law, under both the Statute and the Rules, to take into account aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Therefore, if it fails to do so, it commits an error of law. Article 23(2) of the Statute provides, inter alia, that in imposing sentence, the Trial Chamber “should take into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”

336.    Rule 101(B) of the Rules is binding in that the Trial Chamber “shall take into account” the factors listed. Therefore, if it does not, it will be committing an error of law. The Appeals Chamber must first examine whether or not the Trial Chamber considered these factors.[1] Second, it must consider whether or not it properly took them into account.[2]

337.    In considering the issue of whether a sentence should be revised, the Appeals Chamber notes that the degree of discretion conferred on a Trial Chamber is very broad. As a result, the Appeals Chamber will not intervene in the exercise of this discretion, unless it finds that there was a “discernible error”[3] or that the Trial Chamber has failed to follow the applicable law.[4] In this regard, it confirms that the weighing and assessing of the various aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing is a matter primarily within the discretion of the Trial Chamber. Therefore, as long as a Trial Chamber does not venture outside its “discretionary framework”[5] in imposing a sentence, the Appeals Chamber shall not intervene.

338.    The burden rests on the Appellants to “show that the Trial Chamber abused its discretion, so invalidating the sentence. The sentence must be shown to be outside the discretionary framework provided by the Statute and the Rules.”[6]

[…]

352.    […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the degree of discretion conferred on a Trial Chamber in the area of sentencing is broad, and that the gravity of the offence is the primary consideration in imposing sentence.[7] Furthermore, as noted above, a Trial Chamber must consider the individual circumstances of the accused, as well as the aggravating and mitigating factors; weighing these factors is a task primarily within its discretion. The Appeals Chamber will not intervene in this exercise unless there has been an abuse of discretion. […]

See also paras. 363 and 366.

357.    The Appeals Chamber finds that the fact that the Accused held a position of authority or leadership may constitute an aggravating factor in sentencing. In the Kambanda Appeal Judgement, this Chamber, in affirming the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber, expressly noted the Trial Chamber finding that “the aggravating circumstances surrounding the crimes negate the mitigating circumstances, especially since Jean Kambanda occupied a high ministerial post at the time he committed the said crimes.”[1] Furthermore, in the Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, ICTY Appeals Chamber maintained that the Appellant’s “superior responsibility as a warden seriously aggravated the Appellant’s offences, [and that] instead of preventing it, he involved himself in violence against those whom he should have been protecting …”.[2]

358.    The Appeals Chamber would interpret the existing jurisprudence on this point as follows: Article 6(3) imposes liability on a superior if he knew or had reason to know that his subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so, and had failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators. The mere fact that an accused has command authority is not an aggravating circumstance in sentencing, in respect of Article 6(3) charge; that goes only to conviction. However, a finding that superior responsibility lies because of such failure to prevent or punish does not preclude a further finding that the manner in which an accused exercises his command can be an aggravating circumstance in relation to sentencing. […]

14. [A]n indictment must necessarily, in the absence of a special order, consist of the one document.  Its contents cannot properly or practicably be identified by reference to a number of documents in which statements made in one document are altered by statements made in another document. […]

15. In any event, the argument by the prosecution that the whole of the altered contents of the two schedules related only to matters of evidence is not made out.  An indictment is required to plead the material facts upon which the prosecution relies, but not the evidence by which those material facts are to be proved.  Whether or not a fact is material depends upon the proximity of the accused person to the events for which that person is alleged to be criminally responsible.[1]  If the accused person is alleged to have personally committed the acts giving rise to the charges against him, the material facts would include such details as the identity of the victim, the place and the approximate date of the events in question, and the means by which the offence was committed.[2]  As the proximity of the accused person to those events becomes more distant, less precision is required in relation to those particular details, and greater emphasis is placed upon the conduct of the accused person himself upon which the prosecution relies to establish his responsibility as an accessory or as a superior to the persons who personally committed the acts giving rise to the charges against him.[3]

36.     One of the duties of a Trial Chamber is to assess the credibility of witnesses.  In discharging that duty, the Trial Chamber takes into account all the circumstances of the case.  As stated in the Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, “[w]hether a Trial Chamber will rely on single witness testimony as proof of a material fact, will depend on various factors that have to be assessed in the circumstances of each case.”[1]  It may be that a Trial Chamber would require the testimony of a witness to be corroborated, but according to the established practice of this Tribunal and of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), that is clearly not a requirement.[2]

37.     In the instant case, the Trial Chamber affirmed that it “may rule on the basis of a single testimony if, in its opinion, that testimony is relevant and credible.”[3] It further stated that:

[…] it is proper to infer that the ability of the Chamber to rule on the basis of testimonies and other evidence is not bound by any rule of corroboration, but rather on the Chamber’s own assessment of the probative value of the evidence before it.

The Chamber may freely assess the relevance and credibility of all evidence presented to it. The Chamber notes that this freedom to assess evidence extends even to those testimonies which are corroborated: the corroboration of testimonies, even by many witnesses, does not establish absolutely the credibility of those testimonies.[4]

38.     The Appeals Chamber is of the view that these statements correctly reflect the position of the law regarding the Trial Chamber’s discretion in assessing testimonies and the evidence before it.