86. The Appeals Chamber recalls that pursuant to Article 16(C) of the Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, “[a]cting under the authority of lead counsel, the co-counsel may deal with all stages of the proceedings and all matters arising out of the defence of the suspect or accused.” The Appeals Chamber has previously considered that when the accused is represented, the presence of his lead counsel or co-counsel at trial is essential.[1] Thus, a lead counsel who absents himself has the duty to ensure that his co-counsel is present at trial.[2] The Trial Chamber therefore did not err in holding that one of the purposes of Article 16(C) of the Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel is to allow for the accused to be represented at trial hearings by a co-counsel in the event that the lead counsel is unable to attend.[3] Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber explicitly took into account that Pavković’s lead counsel and co-counsel were in contact with each other, so that the co-counsel could continue to act under the authority of the lead counsel in compliance with the relevant requirement of Rule 16(C) of the Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel.[4] In light of these considerations, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber did not err in holding that the Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel allowed for representation by co-counsel acting under the authority of lead counsel in the absence of the latter.

See also paras 87-88.

1662.  […] Whether the resort to the use of force is legitimate under international law is a question of jus ad bellum, which is distinct from whether the way in which that force was used was legal under international humanitarian law,[1] i.e. jus in bello. The rules of international humanitarian law do not require a military commander to refrain from defending his country but demand that he ensure that his conduct and that of his subordinates comply with established humanitarian principles. […]

250.   Recalling that waiver “should not entirely foreclose” indictment defects from being raised for the first time on appeal by the defence,[1] the Appeals Chamber notes that it has not previously considered whether waiver should preclude the Prosecution from arguing for the first time on appeal that its Indictment should have been interpreted differently, when it had been put on notice at trial that the Trial Chamber considered the Indictment to be defective. The Appeals Chamber observes that the rationale for allowing the Defence to raise such objections for the first time on appeal does not apply to the Prosecution who bears the obligation of ensuring that the indictment adequately pleads its case against the accused.

611. […] the Appeal Chamber recalls that JCE liability requires the existence of “a common plan, design or purpose” amounting to, or involving the commission of a crime.[1] Such a common plan, design, or purpose may “be inferred from the facts”,[2] including events on the ground.[3] […]

[…]

654. […] [I]n view of the magnitude of forcible displacement committed in an orchestrated manner and showing a discernible pattern as well as the extensive seizure and destruction of IDs during the forcible displacement, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the evidence regarding these two factors is sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find that the only reasonable inference is that a common purpose to forcibly displace a number of Kosovo Albanians existed.[4]

1557. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber erred in law in concluding that for JCE III liability to arise, it must be foreseeable to the accused that the crime “would be committed”.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the jurisprudence subsequent to the Brđanin Decision[2] confirmed that JCE III liability arises even if the JCE member knows that the commission of the crime is only a “possible consequence” of the execution of the common purpose.[3] It is necessary “that the possibility a crime could be committed is sufficiently substantial as to be foreseeable to the accused.”[4] The correct legal standard for the JCE III mens rea requires that it was foreseeable to the accused that such a crime might be committed by a member of the JCE or one or more of the persons used by the accused (or by any other member of the JCE) in order to carry out the actus reus of the crimes forming part of the common purpose[5] and the accused willingly took the risk that such a crime might occur by joining or continuing to participate in the enterprise.[6] The Appeals Chamber discerns no cogent reason to depart from its jurisprudence on this matter.

1558. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber finds no merit in Šainović’s assertion that the Trial Chamber’s approach is “deeply compatible and consistent”[7] with the Appeals Chamber’s affirmation of the “possibility” standard. While it is necessary that the crime be foreseeable based on the “information available to the accused”,[8] this does not reflect the degree of foreseeability required. It is the degree of foreseeability that marks the difference between the “possibility” and “probability” standards. Šainović’s argument is therefore dismissed. The Appeals Chamber further considers that awareness of a higher likelihood of risk and a volitional element are reflected in the mens rea for JCE III. The Appeals Chamber recalls in this respect that “criminal responsibility may be imposed upon an actor for a crime falling outside [the common purpose], even where he only knew that the perpetration of such a crime was merely a possible consequence, rather than substantially likely to occur, and nevertheless participated in the [JCE]” because the accused already possesses the intent to participate and further the common criminal purpose of a group.[9] Lukić’s argument is accordingly dismissed.

[…]

1575. The question of whether persecution, through sexual assaults, committed in Beleg, Ćirez/Qirez, and Priština/Prishtina were foreseeable to Šainović and Lukić must be assessed in relation to their individual knowledge. Depending on the information available, what may be foreseeable to one member of a JCE, might not be foreseeable to another.[10] Consequently, the Appeals Chamber will consider whether it was foreseeable to them, individually, that sexual assaults could be committed and that they willingly took that risk. While the Appeals Chamber is cognisant that situations of widespread violence against the civilian population are conducive to the commission of a wide range of criminal acts, for JCE III liability to arise it must be established that the possibility of sexual violence being committed was sufficiently substantial as to be foreseeable to each accused.[11]

1256. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the essential requirement for holding a JCE member responsible for a crime under the first category of JCE is that the crime formed part of the common purpose of the JCE. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that JCE members may be held responsible for crimes carried out by principal perpetrators who were non-JCE members, provided that it has been shown that the crimes can be imputed to at least one JCE member and that the latter – when using the principal perpetrators – acted in accordance with the common objective.[2] The existence of this link between the crimes in question and a JCE member is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.[3]

1257. Pavković’s argument that the Trial Chamber failed to examine whether he closely cooperated with the principal perpetrators for each crime charged is without merit. Close cooperation between a principal perpetrator and a JCE member, including the accused, is but one of various factors from which a chamber may infer that a crime formed part of the common purpose and is thus imputable to JCE members. It is not a prerequisite for imputing the crime to JCE members. Pavković’s argument in this regard is based on a misunderstanding of the law and is therefore dismissed.

1258. […] The Trial Chamber only imputed crimes to the JCE members at various sites, once it was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to identify principal perpetrators as members of the VJ and/or the MUP.[6] Given the prominent positions of JCE members such as Milošević, Šainović, Pavković, and Lukić and their significant power over the VJ and/or the MUP in Kosovo,[7] the Trial Chamber’s findings regarding the principal perpetrators at each crime site was sufficiently specific to identify them as persons used by one of the JCE members.[8] […]

1259. The Appeals Chamber is not persuaded by Pavković’s assertions that in order to incur liability for using a principal perpetrator as a tool, a JCE member must have ordered or instructed the principal perpetrator to commit the crime and that there was no evidence of any such orders.[9] A JCE member’s order or instruction to non-JCE members to commit a crime is not a sine qua non prerequisite but one of several factors which may be taken into account by a chamber when determining whether to impute the crime to that JCE member.[10]

1260. There is no merit in Pavković’s arguments that it was inappropriate to charge him with “committing” crimes as those who carried out the actus reus of the crimes were not members of the JCE[11] and that, if it were proven that he or other JCE members ordered non-JCE members to commit crimes, “ordering” would have been the appropriate mode of liability.[12] The Appeals Chamber recalls that it has “consistently held that participation in a JCE is a form of ‘commission’ under Article 7(1) of the Statute.” […]

1838. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in determining the term of imprisonment, the Trial Chamber did not consider it appropriate to distinguish between Ojdanić and Lazarević, who were sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment for aiding and abetting crimes, or to discriminate among Šainović, Pavković, and Lukić, who were each sentenced to 22 years of imprisonment for their participation in the JCE.[1] However, although the Trial Chamber acknowledged that the crimes attributed to each individual were not entirely identical,[2] it failed to indicate whether it considered these differences in sentencing. […]

1839. Moreover, it is not apparent whether the Trial Chamber individually evaluated the mitigating and aggravating factors as well as the different role and participation of each of the Appellants in determining their respective sentences. For example, the Trial Chamber assessed the mitigating and aggravating factors in relation to each[3] and identified differences in the conduct and roles of Šainović, Pavković, and Lukić in executing the common purpose of the JCE.[4] Nonetheless, it imposed identical sentences on the three, simply because they were convicted on the basis of the same mode of liability.[5] The Appeals Chamber considers that, in light of the Trial Chamber’s obligation to individualise penalties in accordance with the circumstances of the accused and the gravity of the crime,[6] the Trial Chamber erred in declining to individualise the sentences it imposed.

1834. The Appeals Chamber recalls that trial chambers are vested with broad discretion in determining an appropriate sentence[1] and that it is incumbent on parties to present all information relevant to sentencing at trial.[2] The Appeals Chamber will only intervene where a trial chamber has abused its discretion.[3] The Appeals Chamber notes that in its Closing Brief and closing arguments, the Prosecution requested “sentences raging from 20 years to life imprisonment” with regard to all the Appellants, irrespective of the modes of liability charged.[4] The Prosecution cannot seek to have a more severe sentence imposed on appeal where, as here, the Trial Chamber, by exercising its discretion, imposed a sentence within the Prosecution’s requested range. Thus, the Appeals Chamber dismisses the Prosecution’s arguments concerning Šainović, Pavković, and Lukić who were sentenced to 22 years of imprisonment.[5] However, as Lazarević was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment, below the 20-year minimum sought by the Prosecution, the Appeals Chamber will examine whether the Trial Chamber erred in its assessment of the gravity of his crimes.[6]

114.   The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber’s decisions setting time limits within which Lukić was required to file the translations of the exhibits on his Rule 65 ter list are discretionary decisions to which the Appeals Chamber must accord deference.[1] It further recalls that, pursuant to Rule 3(E) of the Rules, “[t]he Registrar shall make any necessary arrangements for interpretation and translation into and from the working languages” of the Tribunal. This obligation does not imply, however, that the parties have unlimited access to the translation resources of the Tribunal. Rather, a trial chamber may impose certain limitations provided that they are consistent with the right of the accused to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence.[2] Any such limitations must be based on a reasonable assessment of the Defence needs of each particular accused in a multi-accused trial, taking into account the legal and factual complexity of the case.[3] Accordingly, it is not appropriate to limit a party’s access to translation resources solely because of CLSS capacity restraints.[4]

CONSIDERING further that Counsel have no standing in their own right in circumstances where the appellant has died and the appellate proceedings before the Tribunal have been terminated;