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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
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Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 |
MUNYAKAZI Yussuf (ICTR-97-36A-A) |
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141. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber correctly set forth the requisite elements of the mens rea for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity. In particular, the Trial Chamber observed that for genocide an accused must act “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such”. With respect to extermination as a crime against humanity, the Trial Chamber recalled that an accused must “intend to kill persons on a massive scale or to subject a large number of people to conditions of living that would lead to their death in a widespread or systematic manner.” The Trial Chamber further observed that the perpetrator must have acted with knowledge that his acts formed part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds. 142. The Trial Chamber established Munyakazi’s intent to participate in the crimes based on his personal participation and leadership role in attacks, which resulted in the death of thousands of mostly Tutsi civilians. The Appeals Chamber can identify no error in this approach. The Appeals Chamber has held that an accused’s intent to participate in a crime may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including his active participation in an attack. Indeed, contrary to Munyakazi’s suggestion, “[t]he inquiry is not whether the specific intent was formed prior to the commission of the acts, but whether at the moment of commission the perpetrators possessed the necessary intent.” The lack of evidence concerning Munyakazi’s personal views about Tutsis does not undermine the reasonableness of the Trial Chamber’s findings. Furthermore, the evidence of his active participation in the killing of thousands of Tutsi civilians at two parishes reasonably demonstrates that he possessed both genocidal intent and the requisite intent for extermination as a crime against humanity, that is, the intent to kill on a large scale with awareness that the crimes formed part of a widespread and systematic attack against Tutsi civilians. [1] Trial Judgement, paras. 493, 504, 506. [2] Trial Judgement, para. 493. [3] Trial Judgement, para. 506. [4] Trial Judgement, paras. 503, 504. [5] Trial Judgement, paras. 380, 423, 491, 496, 500, 507. [6] See, e.g., Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 61; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 524; Seromba Appeal Judgement, paras. 176, 177. [7] Simba Appeal Judgement, paras. 262, 266. [8] Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 266. [9] See Trial Judgement, paras. 499, 500. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 |
MUNYAKAZI Yussuf (ICTR-97-36A-A) |
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115. The Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence is unreasonable or shows bias. A presumption of impartiality attaches to any Judge of the Tribunal.[1] The Presiding Judge’s question to Witness Nahimana reveals nothing more than her attempt to understand why the witness was better placed to know what transpired at the parish on 30 April 1994 than the two individuals whom he was visiting.[2] [1] See, e.g., Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 21; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 48; Rutaganda Appeal Judgement, para. 42. [2] See T. 2 September 2009 p. 20 (“MADAM PRESIDENT: Can you tell the Court why you think number 2, who is now a priest like yourself, and number 3, another priest – he has been a priest for all these years – would come to these Chambers and tell us that Munyakazi was present on that day and led the attack, since they were living there at the time? Why would they come and tell us that that is what happened, since you are saying that it did not happen because you were a visitor there? THE WITNESS: I do not know if I'm able to answer that question and I wouldn't know what it is they told you. They probably told you things the way they saw it. And I'm telling you things the way I saw it. I wouldn't know the reasons for which they told you what they told you. But I was present on the 30th, and I'm telling you things the way I saw them. MADAM PRESIDENT: You were a mere visitor, who left and went back, and they were living there at the time.”). |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 |
MUNYAKAZI Yussuf (ICTR-97-36A-A) |
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93. The Appeals Chamber has stated that the ordinary meaning of the term “accomplice” is “an association in guilt, a partner in crime”. The caution associated with accomplice testimony is most appropriate where a witness “is charged with the same criminal acts as the accused.” Like Munyakazi, Witness ELB was charged and convicted based on his participation in several attacks, including at Shangi parish. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the Trial Chamber correctly described Witness ELB as an accomplice. [1] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 203, quoting Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 98. [2] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 234. [3] Trial Judgement, para. 131. See also T. 17 September 2009 pp. 24, 25. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 |
MUNYAKAZI Yussuf (ICTR-97-36A-A) |
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36. The Appeals Chamber recalls that charges against an accused and the material facts supporting those charges must be pleaded with sufficient precision in an indictment so as to provide notice to the accused. In reaching its judgement, a Trial Chamber can only convict the accused of crimes that are charged in the indictment.[2] The Appeals Chamber has further held that criminal acts that were physically committed by the accused personally must be set forth specifically in the indictment, including, where feasible, “the identity of the victim, the time and place of the events and the means by which the acts were committed.” An indictment lacking sufficient precision in the pleading of material facts is defective; however, the defect may be cured if the Prosecution provides the accused with timely, clear, and consistent information detailing the factual basis underpinning the charges. 37. The Trial Chamber found that Munyakazi committed the crimes at Shangi and Mibilizi parishes “[o]n the basis of his leadership position at the crime sites”, which showed that “[he] was as much an integral part of the killings as those he enabled”.[5] As Munyakazi submits, the Indictment does not specifically state that he was the leader of the attacks at Shangi and Mibilizi parishes. However, the more general allegations in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Indictment that “Yussuf MUNYAKAZI, with the Bugarama interahamwe, attacked and killed” Tutsis at the two parishes must be read in light of paragraph 1 of the Indictment, which alleges his role as “a leader” with “de facto authority” over that militia group.[6] Therefore, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the Indictment provided Munyakazi with notice that he had a leadership role and exercised de facto authority over the Bugarama Interahamwe during the attacks at Shangi and Mibilizi parishes. Contrary to Munyakazi’s submission, the fact that the Prosecution’s theory of the scope and basis of his leadership of the Bugarama Interahamwe was broader than that ultimately proven at trial does not mean that the notice of Munyakazi’s role in the crimes was deficient. [1] Muvunyi II Appeal Judgement, para. 19; Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 53; Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, para. 46; Muvunyi I Appeal Judgement, para. 18; Seromba Appeal Judgement, paras. 27, 100; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 63; Muhimana Appeal Judgement, paras. 76, 167, 195; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 49; Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 16. [2] Muvunyi II Appeal Judgement, para. 19; Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, para. 46; Muvunyi I Appeal Judgement, para. 18; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 28; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 33. See also Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 326. [3] Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 76; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 49; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 32, quoting Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 89. See also Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 16. [4] Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 55; Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, para. 46; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 338; Muvunyi I Appeal Judgement, para. 20; Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 100; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 64; Muhimana Appeal Judgement, paras. 76, 195, 217; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 28, 65; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 49. [5] Trial Judgement, para. 491. [6] See Rutaganda Appeal Judgement, para. 304 (noting that indictment paragraphs cannot be read in isolation from the rest of the document). See also Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 358 (reading various paragraphs of an indictment together in concluding that the appellant was charged with ordering crimes). |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 |
MUNYAKAZI Yussuf (ICTR-97-36A-A) |
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71. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber has the main responsibility to resolve any inconsistencies that may arise within or among witnesses’ testimonies.[1] It is within the discretion of the Trial Chamber to evaluate any such inconsistencies, to consider whether the evidence taken as a whole is reliable and credible, and to accept or reject the fundamental features of the evidence.[2] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that “corroboration may exist even when some details differ between testimonies, provided that no credible testimony describes the facts in question in a way which is not compatible with the description given in another credible testimony.”[3] 103. […] Furthermore, corroboration does not require witnesses’ accounts to be identical in all aspects since “[e]very witness presents what he has seen from his own point of view at the time of the events, or according to how he understood the events recounted by others.” Rather, the main question is whether two or more credible accounts are incompatible. 118. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that, when faced with competing versions of events, it is the duty of the Trial Chamber that heard the witnesses to determine which evidence it considers more probative. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds that it was reasonable for the Trial Chamber to accept the Prosecution evidence over Witness Nahimana’s account. 154. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber has the main responsibility to resolve any inconsistencies that may arise within or among witnesses’ testimonies. […] 110. Finally, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber has the primary discretion to decide whether or not a site visit is necessary or relevant for the assessment of evidence. […] [1] Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 355; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 207; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 103. [2] Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 355; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 207; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 103. [3] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428. See also Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 201; Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 173. [4] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428. [5] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428. [6] Muvunyi II Appeal Judgement, para. 57; Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 103; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Rutaganda Appeal Judgement, para. 29. [7] Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 269; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 207; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 103. [8] Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 16. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 |
MUNYAKAZI Yussuf (ICTR-97-36A-A) |
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71. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber has the main responsibility to resolve any inconsistencies that may arise within or among witnesses’ testimonies.[1] It is within the discretion of the Trial Chamber to evaluate any such inconsistencies, to consider whether the evidence taken as a whole is reliable and credible, and to accept or reject the fundamental features of the evidence.[2] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that “corroboration may exist even when some details differ between testimonies, provided that no credible testimony describes the facts in question in a way which is not compatible with the description given in another credible testimony.”[3] 103. […] Furthermore, corroboration does not require witnesses’ accounts to be identical in all aspects since “[e]very witness presents what he has seen from his own point of view at the time of the events, or according to how he understood the events recounted by others.” Rather, the main question is whether two or more credible accounts are incompatible. 118. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that, when faced with competing versions of events, it is the duty of the Trial Chamber that heard the witnesses to determine which evidence it considers more probative. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds that it was reasonable for the Trial Chamber to accept the Prosecution evidence over Witness Nahimana’s account. 154. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber has the main responsibility to resolve any inconsistencies that may arise within or among witnesses’ testimonies. […] 110. Finally, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber has the primary discretion to decide whether or not a site visit is necessary or relevant for the assessment of evidence. […] [1] Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 355; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 207; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 103. [2] Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 355; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 207; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 103. [3] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428. See also Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 201; Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 173. [4] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428. [5] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428. [6] Muvunyi II Appeal Judgement, para. 57; Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 103; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Rutaganda Appeal Judgement, para. 29. [7] Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 269; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 207; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 103. [8] Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 16. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 |
MUNYAKAZI Yussuf (ICTR-97-36A-A) |
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85. […] As the Appeals Chamber has previously stated, “to suggest that if something were true a witness would have included it in a statement or a confession letter is obviously speculative and, in general, it cannot substantiate a claim that a Trial Chamber erred in assessing the witness’s credibility.”[1] [1] Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 176. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Motions to Annul and Reconsider - 27.09.2011 |
NAHIMANA et al. (Media case) (ICTR-99-52B-R) |
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NOTING Mr. Nahimana’s submission that the Decisions of 22 April 2008 and 30 June 2010 should be annulled because they are signed exclusively by Judge Pocar and thus do not evince that the remainder of the Bench participated in the deliberations; CONSIDERING that, in accordance with the consistent practice of the Appeals Chamber, the Presiding Judge signs decisions on behalf of the Bench after the conclusion of deliberations on a motion; FINDING, therefore, that Mr. Nahimana’s argument that the Decisions of 22 April 2008 and 30 June 2010 be annulled on the basis that they were signed exclusively by the Presiding Judge lacks merit; [1] Motion [Ferdinand Nahimana v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52B-R, Demande d’annulation des décisions portant la seule signature du juge Fausto Pocar prises dans mon affaire après l’arrêt du 28 [n]ovembre 2007 ; Demande de réexamen de ma “Notice of application for reconsideration of Appeal Decision due to factual errors apparent on the record” du 27 [m]ars 2008 et dans le cas échéant, de ma requête du 27 [a]vril 2010, 13 September 2011], paras. 7-10. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 19.07.2011 |
HARTMANN Florence (IT-02-54-R77.5-A) |
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158. The Appeals Chamber considers that Hartmann appears to submit that, had the Trial Chamber enforced a “strong” presumption in favour of unrestricted publicity, it would have ruled in her favour and permitted her to disclose confidential information pursuant to her freedom of expression rights. The Appeals Chamber considers that there is no merit in Hartmann’s submission. There is no strong presumption of unrestricted publicity for matters a Chamber has ruled are not to be disclosed to the public. This was made clear in the Jović case, in which it was held that: The effect of a closed session order is to exclude the public, including members of the press, from the proceedings and to prevent them from coming into possession of the protected information being discussed therein. In such cases, the presumption of public proceedings under Article 20(4) of the Statute does not apply. [1] 159. At the heart of Hartmann’s submission is the alleged inconsistency of the Trial Judgement with freedom of expression principles recognised by the ECHR. The Appeals Chamber is not bound by the findings of regional or international courts and as such is not bound by ECtHR jurisprudence.[2] 160. The Appeals Chamber notes that Article 21 of the Statute of the Tribunal mirrors the provisions of Article 14 of the ICCPR.[3] The ICCPR and its commentaries are thus among the most persuasive sources in delineating the applicable protections for freedom of expression in the context of the Tribunal’s proceedings.[4] The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations (“Human Rights Committee”) has interpreted Article 14(1) of the ICCPR to require that courts’ judgements be made public, with “certain strictly defined exceptions.”[5] The Appeals Chamber notes that, although Article 19(2) of the ICCPR states that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression,” Article 19(3) recognises that The exercise of the right provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. The travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR indicate that the “protection of […] public order” in Article 19(3) was intended to include the prohibition of the procurement and dissemination of confidential information.[7] In respect of whether the restriction to an individual’s freedom of expression is “necessary” to achieve its aim, the Human Rights Committee has considered whether the action taken was proportionate to the sought-after aim.[8] 161. Based upon the foregoing, therefore, in order to legitimately restrict Hartmann’s freedom of expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR, the restriction must have been provided by law and proportionately necessary to protect against the dissemination of confidential information.[9] The two Appeal Decisions in the case of Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević contained restrictions on the freedom of expression that were “provided by law” because they were filed confidentially under protective measures granted pursuant to Rule 54 bis of the Rules. Furthermore, restricting Hartmann’s freedom of expression in this manner was both proportionate and necessary because it protected the “public order” by guarding against the dissemination of confidential information. These restrictions were therefore within the ambit of Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. 162. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber found that the effect of Hartmann’s disclosure of confidential information decreased the likelihood that states would cooperate with the Tribunal in the future, thereby undermining its ability to exercise its jurisdiction to prosecute and punish serious violations of humanitarian law.[10] The Trial Chamber further found that prosecuting an individual for contempt under these circumstances was proportionate to the effect her actions had on the Tribunal’s ability to administer international criminal justice.[11] The Appeals Chamber is therefore of the view that the Trial Chamber was correct to conclude that Rule 54 bis of the Rules permits the Tribunal to impose confidentiality in an effort to secure the cooperation of sovereign states.[12] In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the Trial Chamber adequately took into account all relevant considerations to ensure that its Judgement was rendered in conformity with international law.[13] 163. Hartmann also relies on an Appeals Chamber decision in Brđanin to support her argument that the Trial Chamber erred by failing to consider the public’s right to receive information disclosed by Hartmann in evaluating the proportionality of the interference with her freedom of expression.[14] In the instant case, however, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber did explicitly consider the public’s right to receive information. In evaluating the proportionality of the interference with Hartmann’s freedom of expression, it considered certain factors that were: salient in weighing the public interests involved: namely, the public interest in receiving the information and the protection of confidential information to facilitate the administration of international criminal justice, which is also in the public interest, indeed, on an international scale. 164. Finally, the Appeals Chamber considers ARTICLE 19’s discussion of national legal standards regarding freedom of expression.[16] While ARTICLE 19 sets out different ways in which domestic jurisdictions address freedom of expression in the context of contempt of court, it cites no jurisprudence to support the position that contempt proceedings for disclosing confidential information in violation of a court order impermissibly restrict an individual’s freedom of expression. [1] Jović Contempt Appeal Judgement [Prosecutor v. Josip Jović, Case No. IT-95-14 & 14/2-R77-A, Judgement, 15 March 2007], para. 21. [2] Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR73.6, Decision on Appeals Against Decision Admitting Transcript of Jadranko Prlić’s Questioning into Evidence, 23 November 2007, para. 51. In the Delalić et al. Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber stated that, “[a]lthough the Appeals Chamber will necessarily take into consideration other decisions of international courts, it may, after careful consideration, come to a different conclusion”. Delalić et al. Appeal Judgement [Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, 20 February 2001], para. 24. [3] See U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 106. This Report was issued pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 808, which requested the Secretary-General “to submit for consideration by the [Security] Council […] a report” on the establishment of the Tribunal. See U.N. Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc, S/RES/808 (1993), p. 2. [4] The ICCPR has 167 state parties and, as such, is considered to be closer to universal application than the European Convention, which is a regional human rights instrument. See United Nations Treaty Collection, <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en>, accessed 11 July 2011. The Appeals Chamber in the Barayagwiza Decision stated that the ICCPR “is part of general international law and is applied on that basis.” In contrast, the Appeals Chamber indicated that, “[r]egional human rights treaties, such as the [ECHR] and the American Convention on Human Rights, and the jurisprudence developed thereunder, are persuasive authority which may be of assistance in applying and interpreting the Tribunal’s applicable law. Thus, they are not binding of their own accord on the Tribunal. They are, however, authoritative as evidence of international custom.” Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Case. No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, 3 November 1999, para. 40. [5] CCPR General Comment No. 13: Article 14 (Administration of Justice) Equality before the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an Independent Court Established by Law, 13 April 1984, para. 6. [6] ICCPR, Article 19(3). Article 14(1) of the ICCPR also restricts a journalist’s right to report on court proceedings. It states, inter alia, that “the press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice”. This provision was cited in the Blaškić and Jović cases. See Jović Contempt Trial Judgement, para. 23, note 95; Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 18 July 1997, note 248. [7] See Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 2nd Revised Edition N.P. Engel, 2005, pp. 464-65 (stating that the term “public order” “covers the grounds for restriction set out in Art. 10(2) of the [ECHR] and repeatedly proposed during the drafting of Art. 19 of the [ICCPR], namely, the procurement and dissemination of confidential information and endangering the impartiality of the judiciary”). [8] Jong-Choel v. The Republic of Korea (CCPR Communication No. 968/2001), U.N. Doc. A/60/40 vol. II (27 July 2005), p. 60, para. 8.3; see also Marques v. Angola (CCPR Communication No. 1128/2002), U.N. Doc. A/60/40 vol. II (29 March 2005) p. 181, para. 6.8 (“The Committee observes that the requirement of necessity implies an element of proportionality, in the sense that the scope of the restriction imposed on freedom of expression must be proportional to the value which the restriction serves to protect.”). [9] See CCPR General Comment No. 10: Freedom of Expression (Art. 19), 29 June 1983, para. 4; see also Kim Jong-Cheol v. Republic of Korea, para. 8.3; Marques v. Angola, para. 6.8. [10] Trial Judgement [In the Case Against Florence Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 14 September 2009], para. 74. [11] Trial Judgement [In the Case Against Florence Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 14 September 2009], para. 74. [12] Trial Judgement [In the Case Against Florence Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 14 September 2009], para. 72. The Trial Chamber relied upon testimony by Robin Vincent, who testified that the confidentiality breaches would lead to less cooperation by sovereign states regarding the disclosure of information, thereby affecting the Tribunal’s ability to administer international criminal justice. The Trial Chamber also noted that “the testimony was not challenged by the Accused”. See Trial Judgement [In the Case Against Florence Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 14 September 2009], para. 72, note 171. [13] ARTICLE 19’s brief discusses other human rights instruments that guarantee freedom of expression. See ARTICLE 19 Amicus Brief, para. 3. While the Appeals Chamber acknowledges that these instruments contain freedom of expression guarantees, they follow a similar approach to restrictions on freedom of expression as the European Convention and the ICCPR. The UDHR states: “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” UDHR, Article 29(2). The African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples states: “Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law”. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 9(2). The American Convention on Human Rights similarly notes: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression”. American Convention on Human Rights, Article 13(1). In Article 13(2), it restricts that right by noting, “The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure (a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or (b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.” American Convention on Human Rights, Article 13(2). [14] Hartmann Final Appeal Brief, para. 19. [15] Trial Judgement [In the Case Against Florence Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 14 September 2009], para. 73 (internal citations omitted). [16] See ARTICLE 19 Amicus Brief, paras 30-32. |
ICTY Rule Rule 54 bis | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 19.07.2011 |
HARTMANN Florence (IT-02-54-R77.5-A) |
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51. The legal reasoning in a confidential decision on protective measures characteristically contains references to the information or documents directly subject to an order of protective measures under the Rules, as well as references to related information or surrounding circumstances that tend to identify the documents or information directly subject to protective measures. The legal reasoning integrates such references, together with the law relevant to the determination of the issues, and the analysis of both by the Chamber in question. It therefore follows that the legal reasoning of a decision on protective measures necessarily falls within the ambit of the confidential status ordered in respect of such a decision. Similarly, the confidential submissions of parties concerning an application for protective measures and information regarding the purported effect of a decision on protective measures typically contain information tending to identify the documents or information subject to the protective measures ordered in the relevant decision. Thus, the confidentiality order respecting such a decision necessarily encompasses information concerning the purported effect of that decision and the confidential submissions of the parties regarding the application for protective measures. 52. The confidential issuance of a decision by a Chamber constitutes an order for the non-disclosure of the information contained therein, and it is not for a party to decide which aspects of a confidential decision may be disclosed.[1] This principle equally applies to third parties. The discretion as to whether the confidential status of a decision may be lifted in whole or in part belongs exclusively to a competent Chamber of the Tribunal with its intimate knowledge of all the facts, information, and circumstances surrounding the relevant case. Furthermore, “[a] court order remains in force until a Chamber decides otherwise.”[2] Accordingly, in the instant case, in the absence of an order of a competent Chamber varying or lifting the confidential status of the two Appeal Decisions, the content of both Decisions remained subject to an order of non-disclosure. 53. Regarding Hartmann’s submission that Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules does not encompass the particular information that Hartmann was found to have disclosed, the Appeals Chamber notes that Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules does not purport to restrict liability in terms of any specific kind of information that might be disclosed. Rather, the focus of Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules is the fact of deliberate disclosure in knowing violation of an order prohibiting disclosure. […] 76. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber set forth its explanation for the difference between a general legal principle, which should always be available to the public (i.e., “applicable law”), and “legal reasoning”, which is the result of a Chamber applying that “applicable law” to the facts before it and which can sometimes be withheld from the public.[3] The Appeals Chamber finds no error in the distinction drawn by the Trial Chamber between “applicable law” and “legal reasoning”, a distinction that is a regular feature of decisions issued by Chambers of the Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber also rejects Hartmann’s contention that the distinction between “applicable law” and “legal reasoning” must be provided for in Rule 77 of the Rules or international law in order for it to be employed at the Tribunal. Hartmann has therefore failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred. 92. In the present case, the filings by the Applicant and the Appeal Decisions that resulted therefrom were confidential; therefore, the content of this material was confidential until a competent Chamber of the Tribunal decided otherwise, and it was not within the authority of a party or a third party to reveal any of the confidential information. The Appeals Chamber is of the clear view that no actions on the part of associated officials or representatives of the Applicant—or any other third-parties (whether acting as agents of the Applicant or not)—could have unilaterally lifted the confidentiality of the information contained within the Appeal Decisions that Hartmann was convicted for revealing to the public. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that the Trial Chamber did not err when it held that a decision remains confidential until a Chamber explicitly decides otherwise, and rejects sub-grounds 5.1 and 5.2.[4] […] [1] Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Seal Defence Appeal Brief, 10 May 2007 (confidential), p. 3. [2] Marijačić and Rebić Contempt Appeal Judgement [Prosecutor v. Ivica Marijačić and Markica Rebić, Case No. IT-95-14-R77.2-A, Judgement, 27 September 2006], para. 45. [3] Trial Judgement, para. 39. [4] Trial Judgement, para. 46. |
ICTR Rule Rule 77 ICTY Rule Rule 77 | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 19.07.2011 |
HARTMANN Florence (IT-02-54-R77.5-A) |
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98. The Appeals Chamber considers that, in order to convict Hartmann, the Trial Chamber had to conclude that publishing the confidential information in the Book and Article in violation of a court order was done “knowingly and wilfully”.[1] The Trial Chamber convicted Hartmann in part based upon its finding that “the Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused had knowledge at the time of publication of her Book and the Article that her disclosure was in violation of an order of the Tribunal”.[2] The Appeals Chamber is of the view the Trial Chamber, having made this finding, was under no obligation to also make a finding on whether Hartmann’s actions were “more than negligent”. In the present case, the only criterion that the Trial Chamber had to explicitly consider to establish contempt under Rule 77 of the Rules was whether Hartmann knowingly and wilfully interfered with the Tribunal’s administration of justice. 127. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is settled jurisprudence that “the requisite mens rea for a violation of Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules is knowledge that the disclosure in question is in violation of an order of a Chamber. Such knowledge may be proven by evidence other than the accused’s statement expressing a particular intent”.[3] Insofar as Hartmann contends that the Nobilo Appeal Judgement set out a different standard,[4] she is mistaken; any ambiguity in its analysis of the mens rea required to enter a conviction for contempt has been definitively addressed by later Appeals Chamber judgements.[5] 128. The Trial Chamber set out the mens rea required to enter a conviction for contempt under Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules as follows: The mens rea required [....] is the disclosure of particular information in knowing violation of a Chamber’s order. Generally, it is sufficient to establish that the conduct which constituted the violation was deliberate and not accidental. This may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Where it is established that an accused had knowledge of the existence of a Court order, a finding of intent to violate the order will almost necessarily follow. Wilful blindness to the existence of the order, or reckless indifference to the consequences of the act by which the order is violated may satisfy the mental element. Mere negligence in failing to ascertain whether an order had been made is insufficient.[6] The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber’s analysis of the mens rea required to enter a conviction for contempt was consistent with Appeals Chamber precedent. It correctly found that this precedent does not require the Prosecution to prove specific intent to interfere with the administration of justice in order to secure a conviction under Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules. [1] See Rule 77(A) of the Rules. See also Nshogoza Appeal Judgement, paras 56-57 (“No additional proof of harm to the Tribunal’s administration of justice is required. The Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the defiance of a Chamber’s order conveys any different connotation than a knowing and wilful violation of one. Considerations of the gravity of an accused’s conduct or his underlying motivations are rather to be assessed in connection with the decision to initiate proceedings or in sentencing. Bearing this in mind, the Appeals Chamber considers that the various statements by Trial Chambers, cited by Nshogoza, which take into account the minimal gravity surrounding a violation of a Chamber’s order should be understood, not as a finding that the conduct was not contempt, but as an exercise of the discretion of the Chamber not to initiate proceedings in such circumstances. The fact that other persons might also have engaged in similar conduct is not a defence.”) (internal citations omitted). [2] Trial Judgement, para. 62. [3] [ešelj Contempt Appeal Judgement [In the Case Against Vojislav [ešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-R77.2-A, Judgement, 19 May 2010], para. 26 (internal citations omitted). See also Jović Contempt Appeal Judgement [Prosecutor v. Josip Jović, Case No. IT-95-14 & 14/2-R77-A, Judgement, 15 March 2007], para. 27. [4] See Hartmann Final Appeal Brief [Florence Hartmann’s Appellant Brief, 12 October 2009], para. 84. See also Nobilo Appeal Judgement [Prosecutor Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR77, Judgment on Appeal by Anto Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt, 30 May 2001], paras 40-41. [5] See, e.g., [ešelj Contempt Appeal Judgement [In the Case Against Vojislav [ešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-R77.2-A, Judgement, 19 May 2010], para. 26; Jović Contempt Appeal Judgement [Prosecutor v. Josip Jović, Case No. IT-95-14 & 14/2-R77-A, Judgement, 15 March 2007], para. 27. See also Nobilo Appeal Judgement[Prosecutor Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR77, Judgment on Appeal by Anto Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt, 30 May 2001], paras 40, 41, 53, and 54. [6] Trial Judgement [In the Case Against Florence Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 14 September 2009], para. 22 (internal citations omitted). |
ICTR Statute Article 19(4) ICTY Statute Article 20(4) ICTR Rule Rule 77 ICTY Rule Rule 77 | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 19.07.2011 |
HARTMANN Florence (IT-02-54-R77.5-A) |
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107. Hartmann is incorrect in her argument that “[w]hilst the Prosecutor need not prove an actual interference with the administration of justice, proof must be made that the impugned conduct created a real risk for the administration of justice”.[1] When a court order has been violated, the Trial Chamber does not need to assess whether any actual interference took place or whether a real risk to the administration of justice has taken place because such a violation per se interferes with the administration of justice. The Appeals Chamber in the Jović case held that “[t]he language of Rule 77 shows that a violation of a court order as such constitutes an interference with the International Tribunal’s administration of justice.”[2] Thus, “[n]o additional proof of harm to the International Tribunal’s administration of justice is required”.[3] [1] Hartmann Final Appeal Brief, para. 73. [2] Jović Contempt Appeal Judgement, para. 30, quoting Marijačić and Rebić Contempt Appeal Judgement, para. 44. [3] Jović Contempt Appeal Judgement, para. 30; see also Nshogoza Appeal Judgement, para. 56; Šešelj Contempt Appeal Judgement, para. 20. |
ICTR Rule Rule 77 ICTY Rule Rule 77 | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 19.07.2011 |
HARTMANN Florence (IT-02-54-R77.5-A) |
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108. It also follows from the above that the issue of whether there was a real risk to the administration of justice was not a jurisdictional matter. The Appeals Chamber is therefore of the view that the Trial Chamber did not err by refusing to treat this issue as such during the trial. |
ICTR Rule Rule 77 ICTY Rule Rule 77 | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Additional Evidence - 06.07.2011 |
LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ (IT-98-32/1-A) |
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NOTING that Exhibit 1D39 was “inadvertently” admitted into evidence at trial in Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian (“B/C/S”) only[1] and that the English translation of this exhibit does not currently form part of the trial record; CONSIDERING that since the B/C/S version of Exhibit 1D39 is already part of the trial record, the English translation of the exhibit does not constitute “new” or “additional” evidence pursuant to Rule 115 of the Rules; NOTING that, if necessary for deciding the merits of Lukić’s appeal, the Appeals Chamber may at a later stage request, proprio motu, the Registry to provide a complete translation of Exhibit 1D39 into the working languages of the Tribunal;[2] [1] Trial Judgement [Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgement, 20 July 2009], para. 570. [2] Cf. Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Order for Translation, 3 October 2007, p. 2, referring to Aloys Simba v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, Order for Translation, 3 July 2007, p. 2. |
ICTR Rule Rule 115 ICTY Rule Rule 115 | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Scope of Partial Retrial - 31.05.2011 |
HARADINAJ et al. (IT-04-84bis-AR73.1) |
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24. Haradinaj is mistaken in his contention that the Impugned Decision’s finding that the Prosecution may seek the admission of evidence beyond that of the two witnesses who were the focus of the Appeal Judgement undermines principles of law geared to “securing certainty and finality in criminal litigation”.[1] The Muvunyi Decision held that “a retrial […] inherently includes the possibility of hearing evidence that was not presented during the initial proceedings” and underscored that the scope of a retrial is determined “by the Appeals Chamber in a particular instance.”[2] Thus the Appeals Chamber is able to set out the appropriate parameters of a retrial, taking into account the specific context of each case, including whether the retrial follows conviction or acquittal, as well as relevant principles of law. [1] Appeal [Appeal Brief on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj on Scope of Partial Retrial, 10 February 2011], para. 2. See also ibid., paras 22, 24, 28-29, 51, 54. These legal principles include res judicata, non bis in idem, and issue estoppel (collateral estoppel). [2] The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-AR73, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Appeal Concerning the Scope of Evidence to be Adduced in the Retrial, 24 March 2009 (“Muvunyi Decision”), paras 12-13. |
ICTR Rule Rule 118(C) ICTY Rule Rule 117(C) | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Scope of Partial Retrial - 31.05.2011 |
HARADINAJ et al. (IT-04-84bis-AR73.1) |
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25. The Appeals Chamber is unconvinced by Haradinaj’s contention that decisions regarding the admission of evidence made in the course of his first trial should be binding on the Trial Chamber conducting his retrial.[1] The different contexts in which the two trials are held mean that evidentiary decisions proper in one case may not be proper in the other. In this situation, the prospect of inconsistency on an evidentiary point between a trial and a retrial is not unfair and does not risk jeopardizing public confidence in the administration of justice by the Tribunal. [1] See Appeal, paras 20, 22, 54. |
ICTR Rule Rule 118(C) ICTY Rule Rule 117(C) | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Scope of Partial Retrial - 31.05.2011 |
HARADINAJ et al. (IT-04-84bis-AR73.1) |
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26. The Appeals Chamber underscores that whether a retrial follows acquittal or conviction is not necessarily insignificant. However the context of each retrial is unique, and the impact of a previous conviction or acquittal can only be addressed by taking into account this individual context. Any potential for undue prejudice to a defendant in a retrial following an acquittal should be addressed through both the Appeals Chamber’s careful delineation of a retrial’s parameters and the Trial Chamber’s continuing duty to apply fair trial principles.[1] In this context, the Appeals Chamber directs the Trial Chamber, when determining the admissibility of evidence in the retrial, to be particularly mindful of any potential prejudice that the admission of new evidence may cause to the fair trial rights of the Accused. Where the Prosecution seeks to introduce evidence that was excluded in prior proceedings, the Trial Chamber should explicitly consider whether re-litigation of this same issue in the retrial would be unduly prejudicial. If such is the case, the evidence must be excluded. [1] See Muvunyi Decision, para. 18, which states: “[a]ll fair trial principles governing trial also apply to the retrial proceedings.” |
ICTR Rule Rule 118(C) ICTY Rule Rule 117(C) | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Scope of Partial Retrial - 31.05.2011 |
HARADINAJ et al. (IT-04-84bis-AR73.1) |
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32. […] Since the Trial Chamber may not make findings with respect to Haradinaj’s responsibility beyond those in the six counts alleged, the Appeals Chamber finds […] that consideration of the broader JCE in the context of the partial retrial does not place him in potential double jeopardy or otherwise affect his fundamental rights and interests. 39. Since the Trial Chamber cannot make findings with respect to Haradinaj’s criminal responsibility beyond that alleged in the six counts which are the subject of the retrial, the Appeals Chamber considers […] that the inclusion of the […] general allegations in the “Statement of Facts” of the Operative Indictment does not expose Haradinaj to any additional charges or render the retrial unfair per se.[1] 40. It will be for the Trial Chamber, applying the normal rules of admissibility of evidence, to assess the relevance and probative value of evidence proffered by the Prosecution in relation to such general allegations, and to decide if consideration of such evidence would unduly prejudice Haradinaj in the context of retrial following acquittal. Judge Robinson appended a partially dissenting opinion on the issue of double jeopardy. [1] The Appeals Chamber notes that in the Muvunyi retrial, the Indictment from the original trial remained the operative indictment for the retrial without any amendment, despite the fact that at trial Muvunyi had been acquitted of one charge and another charge had been dismissed. See The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-00-55A-I, Indictment, 23 December 2003; The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-00-55A-T, Judgement and Sentence, signed on 12 September 2006 and filed on 18 September 2006, para. 531; The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-00-55A-T, Judgement, 11 February 2010, para. 2, fn. 3. |
ICTR Rule Rule 118(C) ICTY Rule Rule 117(C) | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 01.04.2011 |
RENZAHO Tharcisse (ICTR-97-31-A) |
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564. Although neither Party raised the issue, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber’s language in rendering its convictions against Renzaho may give the impression that it entered double convictions under Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is inappropriate to convict an accused for a specific count under both Article 6(1) and Article 6(3) of the Statute.[1] When, for the same count and the same set of facts, the accused’s responsibility is pleaded pursuant to both provisions and the accused could be found liable under both, the Trial Chamber should enter a conviction on the basis of Article 6(1) of the Statute alone and consider the superior position of the accused as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing.[2] 565. The Trial Chamber found Renzaho guilty of genocide under Article 6(1) of the Statute for aiding and abetting as well as ordering the killing of Tutsis at roadblocks throughout Kigali from April to July 1994; for aiding and abetting and ordering killings at CELA on 22 April 1994; and for his orders in relation to crimes committed at Sainte Famille on 17 June 1994.[3] The Trial Chamber also found Renzaho “liable” as a superior for these crimes,[4] indicating that it would take this liability into account in sentencing.[5] 566. The Trial Chamber also found Renzaho guilty of murder as a serious violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II under Article 6(1) of the Statute for ordering the killing of at least 17 Tutsi men at Sainte Famille church on 17 June 1994.[6] The Trial Chamber found Renzaho “liable” as a superior for these murders as well.[7] The Trial Chamber indicated that it would take Renzaho’s liability as a superior into account in sentencing.[8] 567. In addition, the Trial Chamber found Renzaho guilty of murder as a crime against humanity under Article 6(1) of the Statute for aiding and abetting and ordering the killing of Charles, Wilson, and Déglote Rwanga, who had been removed from CELA on 22 April 1994.[9] The Trial Chamber likewise found Renzaho “guilty” as a superior based on Article 6(3) of Statute, for the killing of Charles, Wilson, and Déglote Rwanga as well as the other mostly Tutsi men removed from CELA on that date.[10] The Trial Chamber indicated in connection with these crimes that it would take Renzaho’s liability as a superior into account in sentencing. [11] 568. While it is clear that the Trial Chamber considered Renzaho’s superior position as an aggravating circumstance,[12] the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber should have refrained from using language which is suggestive of double convictions based on both Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the Statute. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the Trial Chamber impermissibly convicted Renzaho twice for the same facts where it found him to be “liable” as a superior. Likewise, and despite the unfortunate use of the term “guilty” when finding Renzaho liable as a superior for murder as a crime against humanity for the killings of Charles, Wilson, and Déglote Rwanga, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the Trial Chamber impermissibly convicted Renzaho twice for the same facts.[13] [1] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 487. [2] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 487, referring to Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 186, Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, paras. 23-28, Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 81, Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 104, Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras. 34, 35, and Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 91. [3] Trial Judgement, para. 779. [4] Trial Judgement, para. 779. [5] Trial Judgement, para. 779. See also Trial Judgement, para. 823. [6] Trial Judgement, para. 807. [7] Trial Judgement, para. 807. [8] Trial Judgement, para. 807. See also Trial Judgement, para. 823. [9] Trial Judgement, para. 789. [10] Trial Judgement, para. 789. [11] Trial Judgement, para. 789. See also Trial Judgement, para. 823. [12] Trial Judgement, para. 823. [13] The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber convicted Renzaho solely under Article 6(3) of the Statute for murder as a crime against humanity for the killing of a group of mostly Tutsi men also removed from CELA on 22 April 1994. See Trial Judgement, para. 789. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 01.04.2011 |
RENZAHO Tharcisse (ICTR-97-31-A) |
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530. Turning first to Renzaho’s arguments concerning Witness AWO raised under his Eleventh Ground of Appeal, the Appeals Chamber notes that, in relation to her rapes in Rugenge sector, the Trial Chamber was satisfied with Witness AWO’s identification of Renzaho and found her physical description of him to be adequate and consistent.[1] As to factors impacting negatively on the reliability of her identification evidence, the Appeals Chamber recalls that not all factors need to be explicitly addressed, only any significant ones.[2] The fact that Witness AWO had seen Renzaho only once before April 1994 does not, per se, diminish the reliability of her sighting, and the fact that she did not personally know him prior to the events is not sufficient to undermine the reliability of her identification evidence as to the rapes, or moreover with respect to Sainte Famille.[3] 531. Regarding whether the Trial Chamber should have exercised “extreme caution” in assessing Witness AWO’s identification evidence in relation to the attack at Sainte Famille, the Appeals Chamber recalls that such a high level of caution is required only when a witness’s identification was made under difficult circumstances.[4] In this case, the Appeals Chamber finds that the identification evidence did not necessarily call for an “extreme” level of caution.[5] While the events suffered by Witness AWO were unquestionably traumatic, her identification of Renzaho at Sainte Famille did not occur in circumstances that made him difficult to identify, such as in the dark or as a result of a fleeting glance.[6] (i) Reasoned opinion 527. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber failed to provide any reasons for accepting the Prosecution witnesses’ identifications of Renzaho at Sainte Famille on 17 June 1994. The Appeals Chamber recalls the general principle that a Trial Chamber need not articulate every step of its reasoning.[7] However, as established in the Kupreškić et al. case, “where a finding of guilt is made on the basis of identification evidence given by a witness under difficult circumstances, the Trial Chamber must rigorously implement its duty to provide a ‘reasoned opinion’.”[8] 529. The Appeals Chamber considers that the circumstances in which these witnesses identified Renzaho were traumatic. In addition, Witness AWO’s evidence was determinative to the Trial Chamber’s finding that Renzaho ordered the attack at Sainte Famille (rather than simply being present).[9] The Trial Chamber therefore should have provided some reasons for accepting their identifications of Renzaho in relation to the attack at Sainte Famille. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to do so. However, the Appeals Chamber finds that this error does not invalidate the Trial Judgement. [1] See Trial Judgement, para. 716, referring to Witness AWO, T. 7 February 2007 p. 9 (“It was a man who was bald. He had big eyes […] and I believe he must be quite old today.”). [2] Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 39. [3] Cf. Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, paras. 327, 328. [4] Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 34, 39. See also Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, para. 96. [5] In Kupreškić et al., the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that Witness H’s identification of the Defendants was carried out under “very difficult circumstances” because, inter alia, the attackers descended upon her and her family while they were sleeping; her father was killed as the family hid in the basement; and the attackers had masked their faces with paint in an attempt to camouflage themselves. Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 133. Despite these and many other “stressful conditions”, the Appeals Chamber was nevertheless “not persuaded by the Defendant’s arguments that the difficult circumstances in which Witness H found herself that morning completely eliminated any possibility of her recognising the attackers and that no reasonable Trial Chamber could have accepted that she did”. Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 135. [6] Cf. Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 40. [7] See Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 19. [8] Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 39. [9] See Trial Judgement, para. 716. |