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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Reopening Prosecution Case - 01.07.2010 GOTOVINA et al.
(IT-06-90-AR73.6)

24. […] It is well established in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal that Trial Chambers are bound by the ratio decidendi of the Appeals Chamber.[1] Whereas a Trial Chamber may follow a decision of another Trial Chamber, should it find it persuasive, Trial Chambers’ decisions have no binding force upon each other.[2] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s decision not to follow precedents of earlier Trial Chambers as suggested by Čermak.[3] […]

[1] Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, 24 March 2000, para. 113.

[2] Ibid., para. 114.

[3] See Čermak Appeal, paras 10, 12, 17, referring, inter alia, to Čermak’s Consolidated Response [Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-T, Ivan Čermak’s Consolidated Response to the Prosecution’s Motion to Reopen its Case and its Further Submission in Support of the Motion, 17 March 2010], paras 5-13, 16. 

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Reopening Prosecution Case - 01.07.2010 GOTOVINA et al.
(IT-06-90-AR73.6)

23. Relying upon the Appeals Chamber’s holding in the Čelebići Appeal Judgement, the Trial Chamber stated the law applicable to a request for reopening a party’s case as follows:

[W]hen considering an application for reopening a case to allow for the admission of fresh evidence, a Trial Chamber should first determine whether the evidence could, with reasonable diligence, have been identified and presented in the case-in-chief of the party making the application. If not, the Trial Chamber has the discretion to admit it, and should consider whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial. When making this determination, the Trial Chamber should consider the stage in the trial at which the evidence is sought to be adduced and the potential delay that would be caused to the trial.[1]

24. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber correctly articulated the applicable legal standard. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber notes that an evaluation of what constitutes fresh evidence and whether the Prosecution has met its obligation of reasonable diligence is highly contextual, depending on the factual circumstances of each case. Thus, any assessment in this respect should be carried out on a case-by-case basis.[2]

[…]

35. [T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that in a case where the evidence is sought to be presented at a very advanced stage of the proceedings, the Prosecution should establish that the evidence could not have been obtained, even if after the close of its case, at an earlier stage in the trial.[3] […]

[1] Impugned Decision [Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Reopen its Case, 21 April 2010 (confidential)], para. 10 (footnotes omitted).

[2] Popović Decision of 24 September 2008 [Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-AR73.5, Decision on Vujadin Popović’s Interlocutory Appeal Against the Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion to Reopen its Case-in-Chief, 24 September 2008], para. 10.

[3] Čelebići Appeal Judgement [Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, 20 February 2001], para. 286.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Reopening Prosecution Case - 01.07.2010 GOTOVINA et al.
(IT-06-90-AR73.6)

25. As to the standard applied by the Trial Chamber with respect to what constitutes fresh evidence, Čermak and Markač seem to argue that because the Prosecution had evidence in its possession showing that Bilobrk was a forensic technician involved in the work of the sanitation teams at Knin, his testimony could not constitute fresh evidence for the purposes of reopening the Prosecution’s case-in-chief.[1] The Appeals Chamber does not agree with this interpretation. The evidence that the Prosecution seeks to introduce is Bilobrk’s specific testimony concerning Čermak’s or someone else’s alleged suggestion to plant weapons by the bodies of the victims in Grubori. In this respect, the fact that the Prosecution was unaware of this part of Bilobrk’s testimony until the results of the investigation conducted by the Croatian authorities became known, is uncontested by the parties.[2] Accordingly, the Trial Chamber correctly focused its assessment on whether the specific testimony of Bilobrk may constitute fresh evidence for the purposes of reopening the Prosecution’s case-in-chief. […]

[1] Čermak Appeal [Ivan Čermak’s Interlocutory Appeal Against the Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Reopen its Case, 17 May 2010 (confidential)], paras 11, 18; Markač Appeal [Defendant Mladen Markač’s Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s 21 April 2010 Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Re-Open its Case, 17 May 2010 (confidential)], para. 27.

[2] The Appeals Chamber further notes that the category of fresh evidence could include evidence in a party’s possession, which becomes significant only in the light of other fresh evidence (Popović Decision of 24 September 2008, para. 11).

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Reopening Prosecution Case - 01.07.2010 GOTOVINA et al.
(IT-06-90-AR73.6)

34. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber is not persuaded that Markač’s right to a fair trial would be adversely affected merely as a result of the reopening of the Prosecution’s case.[1] What is important for the Trial Chamber is to ascertain that following the reopening of the Prosecution’s case, the proceedings are indeed conducted with full respect for the principle of equality of arms. […]

[1] Markač Appeal, para. 29.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on the Outcome of Proceedings - 29.06.2010 DELIĆ Rasim
(IT-04-83-A)

5. This is the first time in the history of both this Tribunal and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) where an appellant has died before the rendering of the appeal judgement. The orders previously issued to terminate the proceedings following the death of an accused have so far only been rendered prior to the delivery of the trial judgement.[1] That said, the Appeals Chamber notes that while neither the Statute nor the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”) explicitly provide for the course of action to be taken following the death of an appellant, a number of their provisions clearly exclude the possibility of the continuation of the appellate proceedings in such circumstances.

8. […] the Appeals Chamber finds that, as a matter of principle, the appellate proceedings before this Tribunal should be terminated following the death of the appellant for lack of jurisdiction. […]

For an overview of considerations raised in other international criminal jurisdictions where proceedings have been terminated following the death of an accused prior to the rendering of the trial judgement, see para. 7.

[1] E.g., Prosecutor v. Djordje Djukić, Case No. IT-96-20-A, Order Terminating the Appeal Proceedings, 29 May 1996 (in which the Appeals Chamber terminated all proceedings, given that at the time of death, it was seised of the Prosecution’s appeal against the Trial Chamber’s decision rejecting the parties’ requests to withdraw the Indictment on humanitarian grounds); Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić et al., Case No. IT-95-13a-T, Order Terminating Proceedings Against Slavko Dokmanović, 15 July 1998; Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović et al., Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Order Terminating Proceedings Against Mehmed Alagić, 21 March 2003; Prosecutor v. Momir Talić, Case No. IT-99-36/1-T, Order Terminating Proceedings Against Momir Talić, 12 June 2003; Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Terminating the Proceedings, 14 March 2006; see also The Prosecutor v. Samuel Musabyimana, Case No. ICTR-2001-62-I, Order Terminating the Proceedings Against Samuel Musabyimana, 20 February 2003.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on the Outcome of Proceedings - 29.06.2010 DELIĆ Rasim
(IT-04-83-A)

For a brief overview of the relevant provisions and legal precedents in national jurisdictions, see paras 11-12.

9. The Appeals Chamber notes that neither the Statute nor the Rules indicate whether the termination of the appellate proceedings has any impact on the finality of the trial judgement following the death of an appellant and prior to the issuance of an appeal judgement. The Appeals Chamber is further mindful of the fact that pursuant to Rule 102(A) of the Rules, the enforcement of the trial judgement shall be stayed as soon as notice of appeal is given and “until the decision on the appeal has been delivered”.[1] However, the Appeals Chamber has found that the death of the appellant results in the termination of the appeal proceedings; consequently, this provision is not applicable to the situation at hand.

13. […] [T]here is no general principle that is consistently followed in the majority of jurisdictions as to the finality of the trial judgement in the event that the proceedings are terminated following the death of an appellant. For this reason, as well as bearing in mind the specific realities of, and the particular procedures before, this Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber cannot discern any prevalent approach, let alone identify any rules of customary international law, that would be directly applicable to the situation at hand.

14. The Appeals Chamber considers that the approach followed in certain national jurisdictions, where convictions entered by a court of first instance are vacated following the death of an appellant, is not compatible with the essence of the appellate proceedings before this Tribunal. […]

15. Having found that the death of an appellant results in the termination of proceedings and given that no appeal judgement can be rendered in this case, nothing can undermine the finality of the Trial Judgement. As a consequence, the Trial Judgement shall be considered final.

[1] See also Prosecutor v. Astrit Haraqija and Bajrush Morina, Case No. IT-04-84-R77.4-A, Decision on Motion of Astrit Haraqija for Provisional Release, 8 April 2009, para. 4.

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ICTR Rule Rule 102(A) ICTY Rule Rule 102(A)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on the Outcome of Proceedings - 29.06.2010 DELIĆ Rasim
(IT-04-83-A)

6. First, the personal jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to “natural persons”,[1] which, read in the context and in light of the Statute’s object and purpose, should be understood in its ordinary meaning, i.e., the living. Second, Article 25 of the Statute clearly states that “[t]he Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons convicted by the Trial Chambers or from the Prosecutor”, thus leaving no room for other persons interested in the outcome of the appeal.[2] Third, neither the Statute nor the Rules allow for Tribunal’s jurisdiction in relation to any procedures initiated by the convicted person’s heirs or victims. The Appeals Chamber is of the view that this clearly demonstrates that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione personae is limited to living accused or convicted persons.[3]

In Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-A, Decision on Motion for Continuation of the Appellate Proceedings, 29 June 2010, the Appeals Chamber denied the motion seeking the continuation of the proceedings on behalf of Rasim Delić’s son and considered that

[…] the plain reading of the Motion indicates that the entirety of the submissions therein are made on behalf of Delić’s son,[4] who is not and cannot qualify as a party to any existing proceedings before the Tribunal;

[…] Delić’s son has no standing to submit a motion before the Tribunal and cannot be represented by Counsel assigned to Delić;

[…] consequently, […] the Motion is not validly filed before the Appeals Chamber and […] the Appeals Chamber has no jurisdiction to consider its merits;

[1] Article 6 of the Statute.

[2] See also, Decision of 29 June 2010 [Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-A, Decision on Motion for Continuation of the Appellate Proceedings, 29 June 2010], p. 2.

[3] In addition, trials and appeals before this Tribunal, as such, are not conducted in absentia, unless a living accused or the appellant waives his right to be present in the courtroom (see Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement, 28 November 2007, paras 97-99 and references therein). The Appeals Chamber further notes that Rule 118(B) of the Rules provides for the possibility of the appeal judgement being rendered in the absence of the accused. However and in light of the above, the Appeals Chamber considers that this provision only deals with the issue of a living accused who is not physically present in the courtroom and therefore does not apply to the present situation.

[4] E.g., Motion, paras 3, 7; Response, para. 2.

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ICTR Statute Article 5;
Article 24(1)
ICTY Statute Article 6;
Article 25(1)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on the Outcome of Proceedings - 29.06.2010 DELIĆ Rasim
(IT-04-83-A)

14. […] In this regard, the Appeals Chamber has clarified, although not directly in relation to the matter at hand, that the presumption of innocence does not apply to persons convicted by Trial Chambers pending the resolution of their appeals.[1] This interpretation of the Appeals Chamber’s jurisprudence is further consistent with the standard of review applicable in appellate proceedings whereby the appealing party has the burden of showing an error of law or of fact that invalidates the trial judgement, or leads to a miscarriage of justice, rather than attempting to initiate a trial de novo.[2] This burden is clearly different from the one operative at trial, where the presumption of innocence does apply and the Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

[1] See e.g., Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-A, Public Redacted Version of the “Decision on Vladimir Lazarević’s Second Motion for Temporary Provisional Release on the Grounds of Compassion” Issued on 21 May 2009, 22 May 2009, para. 9; Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-AR65.8, Decision on Prosecution’s Appeal against Decision on Gvero’s Motion for Provisional Release, 20 July 2009 (public redacted version), para. 11.

[2] Article 25 of the Statute; see also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovksi, Case No. IT-04-82-A, Judgement, 19 May 2010, paras 9 et seq.; Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Judgement, 12 November 2009, paras 12 et seq.; Prosecutor v Mile Mrkšić and Veselin Šljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1, Judgement, 5 May 2009, paras 10 et seq.; Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgement, paras 11 et seq.; Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Judgement, 8 October 2008, paras 8 et seq.; François Karera v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-74-A, Judgement, 2 February 2009, paras 7 et seq.; Athanase Seromba v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgement, 12 March 2008, paras 9 et seq., all affirming, inter alia, the standard of reasonableness and deference to factual findings made in a trial judgement.

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ICTR Statute Article 24 ICTY Statute Article 25
Notion(s) Filing Case
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 ŠEŠELJ Vojislav
(IT-03-67-R77.2-A)

17. […] In any event, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber did not exceed its jurisdiction in deciding upon the allegations of contempt in the present case. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Tribunal possesses inherent jurisdiction to ensure that its exercise of judicial functions is safeguarded.[1] As the Trial Chamber explained and the Appeals Chamber has explicitly held, this inherent power extends to Rule 77 of the Rules governing contempt proceedings against conduct interfering with the Tribunal’s administration of justice.[2] […]

[1] See e.g. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 31 January 2000 (“Vujin Appeal Judgement”), paras 13-18; Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR77, Judgment on Appeal by Anto Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt, 30 May 2001 (“Nobilo Appeal Judgement”), paras 30, 36; Marijačić and Rebić Appeal Judgement, para. 23.

[2] See Trial Judgement [Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-R77.2, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 24 July 2009 (confidential; public version filed on the same day)], para. 7. See also Vujin Appeal Judgement, paras 13-18; Nobilo Appeal Judgement, paras 30, 36.

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ICTR Rule Rule 77 ICTY Rule Rule 77
Notion(s) Filing Case
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 ŠEŠELJ Vojislav
(IT-03-67-R77.2-A)

26. The Appeals Chamber underscores that the requisite mens rea for a violation of Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules is knowledge that the disclosure in question is in violation of an order of a Chamber.[1] Such knowledge may be proven by evidence other than the accused’s statement expressing a particular intent to disclose protected witness identities. […]

[1] Jović Appeal Judgement, para. 27. 

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ICTR Rule Rule 77 ICTY Rule Rule 77
Notion(s) Filing Case
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 ŠEŠELJ Vojislav
(IT-03-67-R77.2-A)

29. […] As the Appeals Chamber stated in Jović, “[t]he fact that some portions of [a w]itness’s written statement [has] been disclosed by another third party does not mean that this information [i]s no longer protected, that the court order ha[s] been de facto lifted or that its violation would not interfere with the Tribunal’s administration of justice”.[1] […]

[1] Jović Appeal Judgement, para. 30.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 ŠEŠELJ Vojislav
(IT-03-67-R77.2-A)

32. The Appeals Chamber notes that it is the established practice of the Tribunal to publish redacted public versions of documents that “[contain] information which, if disclosed, might cause prejudice, concerns about safety, or serious embarrassment to a party or a witness”.[1] This practice extends to judgements.[2] Insofar as Šešelj contends that the established practice of the Tribunal violates the Statute, Rules or the ICCPR, he is incorrect. None of these states that the right to a public judgement is absolute. They recognize that it needs to be balanced against other interests.[3] In fact, publication of confidential witness or victim information would run counter to the explicit protection of witnesses and victims required by the Tribunal’s Statute and implemented in the Rules.[4] […]

[1] Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Extension of Time, 26 April 2004, para. 6. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-T, Order Issuing a Public Redacted Version of the Confidential “Decision on Motion for Provisional Release of Ivan Čermak” of 14 December 2009, 14 January 2010; Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al. Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.19, Order Issuing a Public Redacted Version of the “Decision on Prosecution’s Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision to Provisionally Release Accused Praljak” Issued 17 December 2009, 11 February 2010.

[2] Compare Contempt Proceedings Against Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-05-88-R77.1-A, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 25 June 2009 (confidential version), with Contempt Proceedings Against Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-05-88-R77.1-A, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 3 July 2009 (public redacted version).

[3] See Article 23 of the Statute; Rules 78 and 98ter of the Rules; Article 14(1) of the ICCPR. Indeed, Article 14(1) of the ICCPR, providing for the right to a public judgement, enshrines certain exceptions. In interpreting this article, the Human Rights Committee stated that “the judgement must, with certain strictly defined exceptions, be made public”. See CCPR General Comments, No. 13, 13 April 1984, para. 6 (emphasis added). Manfred Nowak writes in his commentary on the ICCPR that "[i]f, for example, the public was excluded from [a] trial in the interest of the private lives of the parties, then there is a legitimate need in keeping certain parts of the judgment secret, which can be accomplished by making the judgment anonymous or by publishing an abbreviated version". See Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary, 1993, p. 253. The Appeals Chamber opines that the same logic must be applied to cases of witness protection. Further support for this position can be drawn from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The ECtHR held in Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom, that "in each case the form of publication given to the 'judgment' under the domestic law of the respondent State must be assessed in the light of the special features of the proceedings in question and by reference to the object pursued by Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) [of the European Convention on Human Rights] in this context, namely to ensure scrutiny of the judiciary by the public with a view to safeguarding the right to a fair trial". ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 7819/77; 7878/77, Judgment, 28 June 1984, para. 91.

[4] See Articles 15, 22 of the Statute [of the Tribunal]; Rule 75 of the Rules [of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal]. 

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ICTR Rule Rule 78;
Rule 88(A)
ICTY Rule Rule 78;
Rule 98ter(A)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 ŠEŠELJ Vojislav
(IT-03-67-R77.2-A)

Šešelj contended that his sentence was disproportionate in comparison to previous sentences imposed in other contempt cases. He further submitted that the Trial Chamber erred in ordering him to withdraw from the web-site his book in which he disclosed confidential information before the Appeals Chamber delivered its judgement on his appeal. He asserted that both alleged errors individually justified setting the Trial Judgement aside.[1]

35. The Appeals Chamber notes that while the imposition of a sentence is necessarily dependent on a finding of guilt, the conviction itself stands entirely unaffected by the sentence eventually imposed. It finds no basis or precedent in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal for setting aside a conviction on the basis of sentence, or on the basis of an order accompanying a sentence. Šešelj provides no reasoned explanation for why it should do so. Accordingly, these two grounds of appeal against conviction are summarily dismissed.[2]

[1] Šešelj Appeal Judgement, para. 33, referring to Notice of Appeal and Appellant’s Brief Against the Judgment [sic] on Allegations of Contempt Pursuant to the Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion for Order Striking Appellant’s Notice of Appeal and Appeal Brief and Closing the Case Issued by the Appeals Chamber on 16 December 2009, filed in B/C/S on 12 January 2010 (confidential), paras 16, 17.

[2] The Appeals Chamber notes that it has already upheld the Trial Chamber’s order to remove the Book from the website, and dismissed Šešelj’s contention that the non-custodial order should be set aside. See Decision on Urgent Motions to Remove or Redact Documents Pertaining to Protected Witnesses, 16 December 2009 (confidential) […], pp. 3-5.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 ŠEŠELJ Vojislav
(IT-03-67-R77.2-A)

9. […] The settled standard of review for appeals against judgements also applies to appeals against convictions for contempt.[1]

[1] Prosecutor v. Josip Jović, Case No. IT-95-14 & 14/2-R77-A, Judgement, 15 March 2007 (“Jović Appeal Judgement”), para. 11; Prosecutor v. Ivica Marijačić and Markica Rebić, Case No. IT-95-14-R77.2-A, Judgement, 27 September 2006 (“Marijačić and Rebić Appeal Judgement”), para. 15; Léonidas Nshogoza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2007-91-A, Judgement, 15 March 2010, para. 12;. See also, inter alia, Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Judgement, 12 November 2009 (“Milošević Appeal Judgement”), para. 12; Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić and Veselin [ljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Judgement, 5 May 2009 (“Mrkšić and [ljivančanin Appeal Judgement”), para. 10; Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgement, 17 March 2009 (“Krajišnik Appeal Judgement”), para. 11; Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Judgement, 8 October 2008 (“Martić Appeal Judgement”), para. 8.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 BOŠKOSKI & TARČULOVSKI
(IT-04-82-A)

167. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber found that Tarčulovski had been ordered to lead the police in the operation in Ljuboten without making a positive finding as to who gave the order.[1] This is, however, irrelevant: the fact that Tarčulovski was ordered to lead the operation does not exonerate him from criminal responsibility if in the execution of the order he in turn instructed other persons to commit a crime.[2] Moreover, the fact that someone else ordered Tarčulovski to lead the operation does not mean that he did not order the operation to be carried out. […]

[1] Trial Judgement, paras 114 and 541.

[2] Cf. Article 7(4) of the Statute. 

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Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 BOŠKOSKI & TARČULOVSKI
(IT-04-82-A)

Tarčulovski claimed that the Trial Chamber had erred in law and in fact by admitting into evidence three statements (“Statements”) made by Tarčulovski to the Commission for Inquiry of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (“FYROM”). The Appeals Chamber held[1] that there was “no incongruity in the Trial Chamber admitting evidence deemed to be ‘an apparently reliable record of the Accused’s understanding of these events’[2] and proceeding to reject virtually all of what the statement said’”. It concluded that the Trial Chamber “was entitled to admit the Statements as accurately representing Tarčulovski’s evidence before the Commission for Inquiry”.[3] It further held:

190. The proposition advanced by Tarčulovski, namely, that the Tribunal should create a privilege to exclude statements made during the course of a national investigation of suspected war crimes, would unduly compromise the Tribunal’s discretion to admit evidence under Rule 89 of the Rules. Such an exemption could potentially preclude the Tribunal from considering vital pieces of evidence and consequently undermine the Tribunal’s ability to fulfil its mandate to prosecute persons accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.[4]

191. The Appeals Chamber further considers that the creation of the aforementioned privilege could create an impromptu immunity, allowing those responsible for the commission of war crimes to comply with national investigations and thereafter rely on the exemption to exclude incriminatory evidence from subsequent criminal proceedings.

194. Further, the Appeals Chamber notes that Tarčulovski has failed to identify a “general principle of law” to support his argument. The fact that the Statements were inadmissible before FYROM courts is insufficient to support the claim that such a general principle of law exists. In this context, the Appeals Chamber observes that out-of-court statements made by an accused are admissible in a number of common law[5] and civil law[6] jurisdictions.

[1] Appeal Judgement, para. 187.

[2] Decision of 10 December 2007 [Prosecutor v. Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for admission into Evidence of Documents MFI P251, P379 and P435, 10 December 2007 (confidential)], para. 41.

[3] Appeal Judgement, para. 188.

[4] Article 1 of the Statute.

[5] Sections 81 and 82 of the Evidence Act of 1995 (Australia); Section 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, Sections 114 and 118 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (United Kingdom); R. v. C. (B.), (1993) 62 O.A.C. 13, para. 12 (Canada); Section 3(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act No. 45 of 1988 and Section 219A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (South Africa).

[6] Article 427 of the Code de procédure pénale (France); Article 322 of Keiji sosho ho (Code of Criminal Procedure), (Japan).

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ICTR Rule Rule 89(B) ICTY Rule Rule 89(B)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 BOŠKOSKI & TARČULOVSKI
(IT-04-82-A)

193. The Appeals Chamber recalls that Rule 89(A) of the Rules specifically provides that the Tribunal is not bound by national rules of evidence.[1] Furthermore, the Tribunal’s jurisprudence confirms that evidence inadmissible under domestic law is not necessarily inadmissible in proceedings before the Tribunal.[2]

[1] The Appeals Chamber notes with approval the Prosecution Response Brief, para. 166 (fn. 545).

[2] See Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, 16 February 1999, para. 19; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the Defence “Objection to Intercept Evidence”, 3 October 2003, paras 53-54; Orić Order of 21 October 2004, para. 8.

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ICTR Rule Rule 89(A) ICTY Rule Rule 89(A)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 BOŠKOSKI & TARČULOVSKI
(IT-04-82-A)

75. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber was unable to identify the direct perpetrators of the alleged murders or other crimes by name, but with respect to the crimes for which Tarčulovski was convicted the Trial Chamber did find that the direct perpetrators were members of the police who entered Ljuboten on the morning of 12 August 2001[1] and that Tarčulovski directed the actions of the police in the village that day.[2] These findings were sufficiently specific to identify the direct perpetrators as persons being directed by Tarčulovski for the purposes of establishing his criminal liability.[3] Tarčulovski’s arguments in this respect are rejected.

See also para. 89.

[1] Trial Judgement, paras 42, 58, 60-61, 66, 312-313, 316, 319, 325, 328, 380, 383, 385, 552, 555, 560 and 564.

[2] Trial Judgement, paras 555, 560, 564 and 574.

[3] See also for: Planning: Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 26, 29 and 31; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 479. Instigating: Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 27, 29 and 32; Karera Appeal Judgement, paras 317-318; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 480. See also, e.g., Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, 99 and 105-108, affirming the Trial Chamber’s finding that Gacumbitsi is responsible for instigating, referring to, in particular, Trial Judgement, paras 213, 215 and 328, where physical perpetrators are described as a “group of attackers on which the bourgmestre had influence”, and “young men who, being in the neighbourhood, heard the bourgmestre’s instigation”. Ordering: Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 176; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 28-30; Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 211; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 481; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 182; Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 361. See also, e.g., Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paras 588 (fn. 1195) and 597, finding Blaškić responsible for ordering, and confirming the Trial Chamber’s findings, in particular paras 688, 693, 699 and 735, in which physical perpetrators are referred to as the “HVO” or “HVO soldiers” and the “Military Police”; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, paras 184-187, finding Gacumbitsi responsible for ordering, and referring to, in particular, Trial Judgement, paras 98, 152, 154, 163, 168 and 171-173, where physical perpetrators are referred to as “conseillers”, the “communal police”, “gendarmes”, and the “Interahamwe”; Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 363, finding Semanza responsible for ordering, and confirming the Trial Chamber’s findings, in particular in paras 178 and 196, where physical perpetrators are described as “soldiers”, “gendarmes”, and the “Interahamwe”. Cf. for superior responsibility: Orić Appeal Judgement, para. 35; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 287; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 216, with reference to Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-PT, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motion on the Form of the Indictment, 24 February 1999, paras 38 and 40. As regards joint criminal enterprise: Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, paras 156-157.

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Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 BOŠKOSKI & TARČULOVSKI
(IT-04-82-A)

125. The Appeals Chamber finds that it is not required to prove Tarčulovski’s presence at the crime scenes to hold him criminally responsible, provided the Trial Chamber was satisfied that the crimes were committed by police acting under Tarčulovski’s direction or according to his plan.[1]

[…].

132. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the accused’s presence at the crime scene is not a requisite element of planning, instigating and ordering,[2] although it can be one of the factors to be considered in determining the mens rea of the planner, instigator or orderer. […]

[1] The Trial Chamber found that Tarčulovski was not criminally responsible for the murder of Atulla Quaili because the perpetrators of the murder were not acting under his authority or direction, and not because he was away from the site where Atulla Quaili was killed (Trial Judgement, para. 575). Furthermore, the presence of an instigator, orderer or planner at the crime scene is not required for the proof of planning, instigating or ordering criminal conduct (Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 290, regarding ordering. Cf. Aleksovski Trial Judgement, para. 62; Tadić Trial Judgement, paras 679 and 687). The Appeals Chamber also recalls that in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal and the ICTR, the accused’s presence was never mentioned as an element of planning, instigating and ordering (e.g., Planning: Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 26, 29 and 31; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 479. Instigating: Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 27, 29 and 32. Ordering: Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 176; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 28-30; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 481; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 182; Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 361).

[2] See supra para. 125. See also for the mens rea of planning: Martić Appeal Judgement, fn. 553; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 29 and 31; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 479. Instigating: Martić Appeal Judgement, fn. 553; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 29 and 32; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 480. Ordering: Martić Appeal Judgement, paras 221-222; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 42; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 29-30; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 481.

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ICTR Statute Article 6(1) ICTY Statute Article 7(1)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 BOŠKOSKI & TARČULOVSKI
(IT-04-82-A)

Tarčulovski contended that purely domestic acts carried out by a sovereign State in self-defence were outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber dismissed his argument.

31. […] The fact that a State resorted to force in self-defence in an internal armed conflict against an armed group does not, in and of itself, prevent the qualification of crimes committed therein as serious violations of international humanitarian law.[1] As the Appeals Chamber has stated, “whether an attack was ordered as pre-emptive, defensive or offensive is from a legal point of view irrelevant […]. The issue at hand is whether the way the military action was carried out [during an armed conflict] was criminal or not.”[2]

32. […] In the present case, having been satisfied that there had been an armed conflict in the FYROM at the times relevant to the Indictment and that the alleged crimes had been sufficiently linked with the armed conflict, the Trial Chamber correctly concluded that all the charged crimes (murder, wanton destruction and cruel treatment) constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law,[3] irrespective of the question whether the FYROM was conducting a lawful operation in self-defence against “terrorists” on its territory.[4]

[1] Tarčulovski’s argument that the crimes committed in the present case do not implicate the “international concerns” as outlined in Tadić is not supported by the Tadić Jurisdiction Decision [Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a.k.a. “Dule”, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995]. In this decision, the Appeals Chamber found in relation to inter alia crimes allegedly committed in an internal armed conflict, that “the offences alleged against [Tadić] do not affect the interests of one State alone but shock the conscience of mankind” (Tadić Jurisdiction Decision., para. 57).

[2] Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 268. See also Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 812; Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, para. 452. See also international instruments affirming the applicability of international humanitarian law regardless of the legality of the use of force concerned: Geneva Conventions, Common Article 1; Additional Protocol I, Preamble, para. 5 and Article 1; ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocols, paras 48 and 1927; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, para. 42. The Appeals Chamber notes that Article 51 of the UN Charter concerns an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, para. 139). Since it is not alleged in the present case that the concerned operation was against an action by another State, this provision is not relevant to this case.  

[3] Trial Judgement, paras 297-300.

[4] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that, provided that the alleged crimes are sufficiently linked with an armed conflict, the application of Article 3 of the Statute only depends on the four Tadić conditions. Thus, it is irrelevant if such violations have been committed in the context of a State’s operation in self-defence against an armed group operating in its territory (cf. Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94). In light of this finding, the Appeals Chamber dismisses Tarčulovski’s arguments that the Trial Chamber erred in law and fact “in determining that certain protocols that apply to the destruction of civilian property necessarily apply to situations where domestic terrorists are hiding among the civilian population, and in failing to consider whether the Government of Macedonia was justified in acting in self-defense in engaging in firings that had the effect of destroying houses” (Tarčulovski Amended Notice of Appeal, para. 86 (citing Trial Judgement, paras 352-358 and 380)). See also Tarčulovski Reply Brief, para. 42.

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ICTY Statute Article 3(b) Other instruments UN Charter: Article 51