The Appeals Chamber stated that, once a trial judgement has been rendered, all requests for reconsideration of decisions delivered at trial should be addressed exclusively via a notice of appeal and an appellant’s brief.

27. La Chambre d'appel considère que, dès lors que le jugement de première instance est prononcé, toute demande de réexamen d’une décision prise dans le cadre de la procédure de première instance doit être exclusivement adressée via l'acte d'appel et le mémoire de l'appelant. De l’avis de la Chambre d’appel, le jugement clôt et endosse la procédure de première instance ; pour des raisons évidentes d’économie judiciaire et dans le but d’empêcher les parties de remettre en cause constamment des questions déjà tranchées, il appartient à l’appelant qui souhaite faire réexaminer une partie ou l’ensemble de cette procédure d’en faire état dans le cadre de son appel au fond.

29. En conséquence, la Chambre d’appel considère que l’Appelant ne peut solliciter le réexamen de l’Arrêt du 31 mars 2000 par voie de requête au stade de la mise en état de l’affaire en appel et qu’une telle demande devrait être articulée dans le cadre de son appel du Jugement au fond.

The Appeals Chamber reiterated that only a definitive judgement can be reviewed. It concluded that an interlocutory decision concerns only a specific issue and subsequently can not be considered as a definitive one.

31. Quant à la question plus générale de savoir si l’Appelant peut valablement réclamer la révision de l’Arrêt du 31 mars 2000, la Chambre d’appel réitère que seul un jugement définitif peut être révisé[1]. Or, la Chambre d’appel considère que l’Arrêt du 31 mars 2000 est une décision faisant droit à l’appel interjeté par le Procureur contre l’Arrêt du 3 novembre 1999. Ainsi que la Chambre d’appel l’a déjà affirmé[2], l’Arrêt du 31 mars 2000 n’a pas statué définitivement sur le fond ; il a uniquement modifié la réparation ordonnée par la Chambre d’appel dans son Arrêt du 3 novembre 1999[3] sans préjudice de l’examen au fond de l’affaire par la Chambre de première instance.

The Appeals Chamber clarified that, under Article 25 of the Statute and according to Rules 120-123, a party may submit an application for review if it satisfies the following conditions: a new fact has been discovered which was not known at the time of the initial proceedings and which could not been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence; and this new fact could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision. The Appeals Chamber emphasized that only a definitive judgement can be reviewed under the said provisions.

20. […] Pour obtenir la révision conformément aux articles 25 du Statut et 120 à 123 du Règlement, la partie intéressée doit au préalable satisfaire quatre conditions:

1) un fait nouveau doit avoir été découvert,

2) ce fait nouveau ne doit pas avoir été connu de la partie intéressée lors de la procédure initiale,

3) la non-découverte de ce fait nouveau ne doit pas être due à un manque de diligence de la partie intéressée, et

4) le fait nouveau aurait pu être un élément décisif de la décision initiale[1].

21. La Chambre d’appel réitère en outre que « seul un jugement définitif peut être révisé en vertu des articles 25 du Statut et 120 du Règlement, et [qu’]un jugement définitif est une décision qui met fin à une procédure »[2].

23. La Chambre d’appel rappelle que la Décision du 14 septembre 2000 a rejeté la révision ainsi que le réexamen de la Requête du 28 juillet 2000 aux motifs que l’Arrêt du 31 mars 2000 n’avait pas mis fin à la procédure, que le réexamen de ladite requête ne pouvait être utilisé comme pouvoir de révision dans les cas où celle-ci n’était pas prévue et qu’il n’était pas justifié en l’espèce ; elle a dirigé l’Appelant vers la Chambre de première instance en vue de lui soumettre, le cas échéant, des faits nouveaux de nature à établir l’incompétence du Tribunal[3].

The Appeals Chamber restated the applicable law with respect to the admissibility of the additional evidence on appeal:

5. Further, according to Rule 115 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal (“Rules”), for additional evidence to be admissible on appeal, the following requirements must be met. The Appeals Chamber must find “that the additional evidence was not available at trial and is relevant and credible.” When determining the availability at trial, the Appeals Chamber will be mindful of the following principles:

[T]he party in question must show that it sought to make “appropriate use of all mechanisms of protection and compulsion available under the Statute and the Rules of the International Tribunal to bring evidence […] before the Trial Chamber.” In this connection, Counsel is expected to apprise the Trial Chamber of all the difficulties he or she encounters in obtaining the evidence in question, including any problems of intimidation, and his or her inability to locate certain witnesses. The obligation to apprise the Trial Chamber constitutes not only a first step in exercising due diligence but also a means of self-protection in that non-cooperation of the prospective witness is recorded contemporaneously.[1]

With regard to relevance, the Appeals Chamber will consider whether the proposed evidence sought to be admitted relates to a material issue. As to credibility, the Appeals Chamber will admit evidence at this stage only if it appears to be reasonably capable of belief or reliance. Admission of the evidence is without prejudice to the later determination of the weight that the new evidence will be afforded.[2]

6. Once it has been determined that the additional evidence meets these conditions, the Appeals Chamber will determine whether the evidence “could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision at trial.”[3] To satisfy this, the evidence must be such that it could have had an impact on the verdict, i.e. it, in the case of a request by a defendant, it could have shown that a conviction was unsafe.[4] Accordingly, the additional evidence must be directed at a specific finding of fact related to a conviction or to the sentence.

7. The Appeals Chamber has considered that, where the additional evidence is relevant and credible, but was available at trial, or could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, the evidence may still be admitted if the moving party establishes that its exclusion would amount to a miscarriage of justice, inasmuch as, had it been adduced at trial, it would have had an impact on the verdict.[5]

8. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, whether the additional evidence was available at trial or not, it must always be assessed in the context of the evidence presented at trial, and not in isolation.[6]

28. […] considering that the Appellant seeks in the Second Motion to obtain the potential witness’ statement with a view to seeking leave to present additional evidence on appeal under Rule 115 of the Rules,the Appeals Chamber finds it appropriate […] to associate the request for further investigation with the requirements for timely filing of a motion under Rule 115.

16. In any event, noting that the Appellant seeks to obtain Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s statement with a view to seeking leave to present additional evidence, the Appeals Chamber recalls that under Rule 115(A) of the Rules, a motion for admission of additional evidence on appeal must be filed within seventy-five days from the date of the trial judgement, unless good cause is shown for the delay. The Appeals Chamber understands the Appellant to submit that good cause for the delay of such a filing more than two years after the Trial Judgement[3] is that, in light of Jean-Bosco Baraygwiza’s refusal to participate in the trial, there was no accessibility to him until recently, even through his own counsel.[4] However, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Appellant has not indicated how and when he was first able to gain access to Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza for evidence or information. Even if Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s absence during the trial were to be considered by the Appeals Chamber as justifying the fact that such evidence was neither available at trial nor could have been obtained through the exercise of due diligence, the Appellant has failed to show why such a request could not have been submitted in time during the appeals proceedings. […]

17. […] The Appeals Chamber considers that the Appellant has failed to establish that Barayagwiza’s Rule 115 Motion contains new information pertinent for the Appellant’s case that was unknown to the Appellant before the date on which it was filed, thereby preventing him from filing his First Motion until 6 January 2006. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber finds that the filing of Barayagwiza’s Rule 115 Motion at the end of December 2005 also does not constitute good cause for the late submission of the First Motion.

18. In light of the findings above, the Appeals Chamber does not consider it necessary to address the other arguments made by the Appellant.

29. The Appeals Chamber notes that submission of the additional evidence that the Appellant seeks to obtain in the Second Motion would take place more than two years after the Trial Judgement was rendered, which makes the filing of the Second Motion untimely. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, in order to demonstrate that it was not able to comply with the time limit set in Rule 115 of the Rules for filing a motion for additional evidence within 75 days from the date of the rendering of the trial judgement, the moving party is required to demonstrate good cause for the delay and submit the motion in question “as soon as possible after it became aware of the existence of the evidence sought to be admitted”.[5] The Appellant has failed to show that he has complied with these requirements.

30. […] Moreover, the Appeals Chamber reiterates that the relevant time is when the witness became available to give evidence to the moving party, and not when a witness statement was in fact taken.[6]

After recalling the case-law on judicial notice of facts of common knowledge,[1] the Appeals Chamber held:

23. Whether a fact qualifies as a “fact of common knowledge” is a legal question.  By definition, it cannot turn on the evidence introduced in a particular case, and so the deferential standard of review ordinarily applied by the Appeals Chamber to the Trial Chamber’s assessment of and inferences from such evidence has no application. Mr. Nzirorera suggests that the Appeals Chamber should defer to the Trial Chamber’s discretion as to “admissibility of evidence” and “the manner in which facts are to be proven at trial”.[2] But the general rule that the Trial Chamber has discretion in those areas is superseded by the specific, mandatory language of Rule 94(A); as noted above, the Trial Chamber has no discretion to determine that a fact, although “of common knowledge”, must nonetheless be proven through evidence at trial.  For these reasons, a Trial Chamber’s decision whether to take judicial notice of a relevant[3] fact under Rule 94(A) is subject to de novo review on appeal.

30. Likewise, it is not relevant that these facts constitute elements of some of the crimes charged and that such elements must ordinarily be proven by the Prosecution.  There is no exception to Rule 94(A) for elements of offences.  Of course the Rule 94(A) mechanism sometimes will alleviate the Prosecution’s burden to introduce evidence proving certain aspects of its case.  As the Appeals Chamber explained in Semanza, however, it does not change the burden of proof, but simply provides another way for that burden to be met […]. (footnotes omitted).

See also para. 37.

Emphasis added are in bold, emphasis from the original decision are in italics.

47. […] in Semanza the Appeals Chamber made reference to the need to ensure “that the facts judicially noticed were not the basis for proving the Appellant’s criminal responsibility”.  This reference was made in the context of a discussion of Rule 94(A), and the Appeals Chamber did not discuss the implications for Rule 94(B).  In both contexts, however, it remains the case that the practice of judicial notice must not be allowed to circumvent the presumption of innocence and the defendant’s right to a fair trial, including his right to confront his accusers.  Thus, it would plainly be improper for facts judicially noticed to be the “basis for proving the Appellant’s criminal responsibility” (in the sense of being sufficient to establish that responsibility), and it is always necessary for Trial Chambers to take careful consideration of the presumption of innocence and the procedural rights of the accused.

48. The Appeals Chamber, however, has never gone so far as to suggest that judicial notice under Rule 94(B) cannot extend to facts that “go directly or indirectly” to the criminal responsibility of the accused (or that “bear” or “touch” thereupon).  With due respect to the Trial Chambers that have so concluded,[1] the Appeals Chamber cannot agree with this proposition, as its logic, if consistently applied, would render Rule 94(B) a dead letter.  The purpose of a criminal trial is to adjudicate the criminal responsibility of the accused.  Facts that are not related, directly or indirectly, to that criminal responsibility are not relevant to the question to be adjudicated at trial, and, as noted above, thus may neither be established by evidence nor through judicial notice.[2]  So judicial notice under Rule 94(B) is in fact available only for adjudicated facts that bear, at least in some respect, on the criminal responsibility of the accused.[3]

49.     How can this observation be reconciled with the presumption of innocence?  First, as noted above, judicial notice under Rule 94(B) does not shift the ultimate burden of persuasion, but only the initial burden of production (the burden to produce credible and reliable evidence sufficient to bring the matter into dispute).  Analogously, in the context of alibi evidence, for instance, the accused bears the burden of production with respect to a matter centrally related to the guilt of the accused; yet this shift does not violate the presumption of innocence because, as the Appeals Chamber has repeatedly recognized, the prosecution retains the burden of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.[4]

50.     Notwithstanding this point, there is nonetheless reason for caution in allowing judicial notice under Rule 94(B) of facts that are central to the criminal responsibility of the accused—for ordinarily in criminal cases the burdens of production and persuasion are on the prosecution.  Although the latter always remains on the prosecution, even shifting the former has significant implications for the accused’s procedural rights, in particular his right to hear and confront the witnesses against him.[5]  The Appeals Chamber considers that as a result an exclusion from judicial notice under Rule 94(B) is appropriate, but one narrower than that adopted by the Trial Chamber: judicial notice should not be taken of adjudicated facts relating to the acts, conduct, and mental state of the accused.  

51.     There are two reasons that this category of facts warrants complete exclusion, while other facts bearing less directly on the accused’s criminal responsibility are left to the Trial Chamber’s discretion.  First, this interpretation of Rule 94(B) strikes a balance between the procedural rights of the Accused and the interest of expediency that is consistent with the one expressly struck in Rule 92 bis, which governs the proof of facts other than by oral evidence—another procedural mechanism adopted largely for the same purpose as was Rule 94.[6]  Second, there is also a reliability concern—namely, there is reason to be particularly skeptical of facts adjudicated in other cases when they bear specifically on the actions, omissions, or mental state of an individual not on trial in those cases.  As a general matter, the defendants in those other cases would have had significantly less incentive to contest those facts than they would facts related to their own actions; indeed, in some cases such defendants might affirmatively choose to allow blame to fall on another.

52.     As to all other adjudicated facts relating to the criminal responsibility of the accused, it is for the Trial Chambers, in the careful exercise of their discretion, to assess each particular fact in order to determine whether taking judicial notice of it—and thus shifting the burden of producing evidence rebutting it to the accused—is consistent with the accused’s rights under the circumstances of the case.  […]

At paras 40-42, the Appeals Chambers explained the differences between judicial notice under Rule 94(A) and judicial notice under Rule 94(B).

The Appeals Chamber listed numerous authorities from both the ICTY and the ICTR for its inherent power to reconsider its own interlocutory appeals decisions (para. 9):

The Appeals Chamber has confirmed in numerous cases its inherent power to reconsider its own interlocutory decisions in exceptional circumstances “if a clear error of reasoning has been demonstrated or if it is necessary to do so in order to prevent an injustice”.[1]