Showing 2496 results (20 per page)

Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Provisional Release - 23.02.2016 TOLIMIR Zdravko
(MICT-15-95-ES)

Footnote 45:

[…] The Rules Governing Detention of the ICTY apply mutatis mutandis to individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the Mechanism.

See also para. 7.

Download full document
Other instruments Rules Governing the Detention of Persons Awaiting Trial or Appeal before the Tribunal or Otherwise Detained on the Authority of the Tribunal
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Leave to Appeal - 17.02.2016 ORIĆ Naser
(MICT-14-79)

14.     […] In the absence of special circumstances, a party cannot raise arguments for the first time on appeal where it could have reasonably done so in the first instance.[1] […]

[1] See Andre Rwamakuba v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-A, Decision on Prosecution’s Notice of Appeal and Scheduling Order, 18 April 2007, para. 6. See also Prosecutor v. Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-A, Judgement, 19 May 2010, para. 244.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Leave to Appeal - 17.02.2016 ORIĆ Naser
(MICT-14-79)

6.       […] The Appeals Chamber observes that the Rules do not expressly provide for an appeal as of right from a decision of a trial chamber or a single judge applying the non bis in idem principle set out in Article 7 of the Statute and Rule 16 of the Rules.[1] Notwithstanding, Article 7(1) of the Statute prescribes that “[n]o person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for which he or she has already been tried by the ICTY, the ICTR or the Mechanism” and Rule 16 of the Rules provides for a remedy in the event of a violation of this principle. The Appeals Chamber considers that, in order to give full effect to the statutory principle of non bis in idem, it is necessary to recognize that decisions by a trial chamber or a single judge that affect a party’s right to the protections afforded in Article 7 of the Statute and Rule 16 of the Rules are subject to appellate review as of right.[2] […]

[1] See also Article 12(1) of the Statute and Rule 2(C) of the Rules. 

[2] Cf. Prosecutor v. Radovan Stanković, MICT-13-51, Decision on Stanković’s Appeal against Decision Denying Revocation of Referral and on the Prosecution’s Request for Extension of Time to Respond, 21 May 2014 (“Stanković Decision”), para. 9, and references contained therein.

Download full document
IRMCT Statute Article 7 IRMCT Rule Rule 16
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Leave to Appeal - 17.02.2016 ORIĆ Naser
(MICT-14-79)

11.     The Appeals Chamber observes that, in the Impugned Decision, the Single Judge compared the acts on the basis of which Orić was charged and tried before the ICTY with the acts for which he is charged in Bosnia and Herzegovina and concluded that these acts differ fundamentally with respect to the alleged victims and the nature, time, and location of the alleged criminal conduct. […] The Appeals Chamber finds that […] Orić fails to demonstrate that the Single Judge incorrectly interpreted the governing law. The ICTR Appeals Chamber’s discussion [of non bis in idem] in Ntakirutimana [referenced by the Single Judge] is consistent with the clear language of the Statute and relevant jurisprudence holding that a defendant shall not be tried before a national jurisdiction for the same acts on the basis of which he has already been tried before the relevant international jurisdiction.[1]

[…]

13.     Similarly unpersuasive is Orić’s contention that the Single Judge erred in dismissing his abuse of process argument because the allegations in the case against him in Bosnia and Herzegovina concern matters of which the ICTY Prosecutor was aware. The Appeals Chamber considers that nothing in Article 7(1) of the Statute prohibits prosecutions in national jurisdictions in such circumstances. Rather, Article 7(1) of the Statute stipulates that a person cannot be tried in a national jurisdiction for acts for which he was already tried in the relevant international jurisdiction. It expressly refers to acts on the basis of which the person was tried, in the sense that a final judgment was rendered,[2] not circumstances in which certain acts may have been investigated but upon which the person concerned was not tried. […]

[1] See, e.g., Laurent Semanza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, Decision, dated 31 May 2000, filed 4 July 2001 (“Semanza Decision”), para. 74 (noting that the “non bis in idem principle applies only where a person has effectively been ‘tried’’’ and that the “term ‘tried’ implies that proceedings in the national Court constituted a trial for acts covered by the indictment brought against the Accused by the Tribunal”) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added). See also Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgement, 30 March 2004, para. 31 (observing that the plea agreement only concerned crimes committed “during the attack in Glogova” and noting that the accused “can still be indicted for all other possible crimes which he might have been involved, including, e.g. Srebrenica, before [the ICTY] or in other countries which have jurisdiction as well”); Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a/ Dule”, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on the Principle of Non-Bis-in-Idem, 14 November 1995 (“Tadić Decision”), para. 9 (“Whether characterized as non-bis-in-idem, double jeopardy or autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, this principle normally protects a person from being tried twice or punished twice for the same acts.”) (emphasis added). Cf. The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-AR73, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Appeal concerning the Scope of Evidence to be Adduced in the Retrial, 24 March 2009 (“Muvunyi Decision”), para. 16 (referring to Article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) (“The non bis in idem principle aims to protect a person who has been finally convicted or acquitted from being tried for the same offence again”) (emphasis added).

[2] See Muvunyi Decision, para. 16; Semanza Decision, para. 74. See also Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on the Accused’s Motion for Finding of Non-bis-in-Idem, 16 November 2009, para. 13; The Prosecutor v. Joseph Nzabirinda, Case No. ICTR-2001-77-T, Sentencing Judgement, 23 February 2007, para. 46; Tadić Decision, paras. 9-11, 20, 22, 24, 30.

Download full document
IRMCT Statute Article 7 IRMCT Rule Rule 16
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Leave to Appeal - 17.02.2016 ORIĆ Naser
(MICT-14-79)

9.       Orić contends that the Single Judge committed errors of law and fact when deciding that his prosecution in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not violate the non bis in idem principle.[…] The Appeals Chamber considers that, to succeed on appeal, Orić would have to demonstrate that the Single Judge committed a discernible error in his decision because this was based on an incorrect interpretation of the governing law, a patently incorrect conclusion of fact, or because it was so unfair or unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.[1]

[1] See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-AR73.5, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal against the 27 March 2015 Trial Chamber Decision on Modality for Prosecution Re-Opening, 22 May 2015, para. 6; Eliézer Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-R75, Decision on Motion for Clarification, 20 June 2008, para. 14. See also Stanković Decision, para. 12; Phénéas Munyarugarama v. Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-09-AR14, Decision on Appeal against the Referral of Phénéas Mu[n]yarugarama’s Case to Rwanda and Prosecution Motion to Strike, 5 October 2012, para. 19. 

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Order on Assignment of Counsel - 17.02.2016 NGIRABATWARE Augustin
(MICT-12-29)

Page.1:

CONSIDERING that, in general, the Appeals Chamber only authorizes the assignment of counsel at the expense of the Mechanism where it cannot exclude the likelihood of success of a potential ground of review;[1]

CONSIDERING that such a determination necessarily relates to the potential merits of the request for review and as corollary the Prosecution should have the opportunity to respond;[2]

[1] See, e.g., Niyitegeka Decision of 13 July 2015 [Eliézer Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-16-R, Decision on Niyitegeka’s Request for Review and Assignment of Counsel, 13 July 2015], para. 12; Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-R, Decision on Motion for Legal Assistance, 21 July 2009, para. 18.

[2] In this respect, the Appeals Chamber further notes that, at the review stage, the assignment of counsel under the legal aid system has never been authorized on an ex parte basis by the Mechanism or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Order on Assignment of Counsel - 17.02.2016 NGIRABATWARE Augustin
(MICT-12-29)

Page. 2:

CONSIDERING that, in limited circumstances, particularly sensitive material could be included in an ex parte annex so long as the motion is prepared in such a way to allow for a meaningful response;[1]

[1] The Appeals Chamber notes that the requirement that an applicant provide information as to the potential grounds for review in the context of a request for the assignment of counsel at the expense of the Mechanism necessarily involves revealing certain aspects of the applicant’s strategy in connection with the eventual request for review. 

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Motions to Strike - 04.02.2016 UWINKINDI Jean
(MICT-12-25-AR14.1)

6. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Rules are silent on the procedure for filing appeals from decisions on requests for revocation of referral.[1] However, it has held that such appeals should follow the same procedure as provided for in cases involving appeals from decisions on referral as set out in Rule 14(E) of the Rules.[2] In relevant part, Rule 14(E) of the Rules provides that the “[n]otice of appeal shall be filed within fifteen days of the decision”. This Rule is mirrored in paragraph 21 of the Practice Direction on Appeals, which provides that “[a] party wishing to appeal from a decision of […] a Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 14 […] of the Rules shall file a notice of appeal within 15 days of the decision”.[3]

[1] The Appeals Chamber has held that a decision on whether or not to revoke the referral of a case is subject to appellate review. See Stanković Decision of 21 May 2014 [Prosecutor v. Radovan Stanković, Case No. MICT-13-51, Decision on Stanković’s Appeal against Decision Denying Revocation of Referral and on the Prosecution’s Request for Extension of Time to Respond, 21 May 2014], para. 9. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that an appeal lies as of right from the Impugned Decision, which dismissed Uwinkindi’s request to revoke the order referring his case to Rwanda.

[2] Stanković Decision of 21 May 2014, para. 9.

[3] Practice Direction on Requirements and Procedures for Appeals, MICT/10, 6 August 2013 (“Practice Direction on Appeals”). See also Practice Direction on Appeals, paras. 22-24.

Download full document
ICTR Rule Rule 11 bis(H) ICTY Rule Rule 11 bis(I) IRMCT Rule Rule 14(E)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Motions to Strike - 04.02.2016 UWINKINDI Jean
(MICT-12-25-AR14.1)

9. The Appeals Chamber notes that Uwinkindi understands neither English nor French.[1] However, the Pre-Appeal Judge has previously found that Uwinkindi’s counsel can work in English and is able to discuss the contents of legal documents with his client.[2] Moreover, the Appeals Chamber reiterates that, on appeal, counsel bear the main burden in preparing submissions,[3] allowing sufficient time to discuss relevant issues with their clients,[4] as well as ensuring the timely submission of all pleadings. The determination of potential grounds of appeal falls primarily within the purview of counsel and good cause for extending a deadline to file a notice of appeal is normally not present where the judicial determination, which is the subject of the appeal, is made in a language in which counsel can work.[5] Accordingly, Uwinkindi has not shown the existence of good cause warranting the late filing of his Notice of Appeal.

[1] Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi, Case No. MICT-12-25-R14.1, Decision on Jean Uwinkindi’s Motion for Translation of the Prosecution’s Response, 16 September 2015, p. 1.

[2] [Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi, Case No. MICT-12-25-AR14.1,] Decision on Applications for Translations and Extensions of Time, 17 December 2015, p. 3.

[3] See Augustin Ndindiliyimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-00-56-A, Decision on Bizimungu’s Motion for Extension of Time to File His Reply Brief, 8 March 2012, p. 2, referring to, inter alia, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Motions for Extension of Time, 9 December 2004, p. 3.

[4] Cf. Justin Mugenzi and Prosper Mugiraneza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-50-A, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion for Extension of Time to File His Appellant’s Brief, 26 January 2012, para. 10.

[5] Cf. Augustin Ndindiliyimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-00-56-A, Decision on Motions for Extension of Time for the Filing of Appeal Submissions, 11 July 2011, paras. 9, 15; Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-42-A, Decision on Motions for Extension of Time for the Filing of Appeal Submissions, 25 July 2011, para. 5.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Motions to Strike - 04.02.2016 UWINKINDI Jean
(MICT-12-25-AR14.1)

10.     Nonetheless, even where good cause has not been demonstrated, the Appeals Chamber may recognize submissions as validly filed where they are of such substantial importance to the appeal that doing so is in the interests of justice.[1] The Appeals Chamber considers that the Notice of Appeal is of substantial importance to Uwinkindi’s appeal: to refuse to consider it would deny Uwinkindi the opportunity to challenge the Impugned Decision. The subject-matter of Uwinkindi’s appeal concerns the fairness of criminal proceedings in Rwanda in which he is charged, inter alia, with genocide, a crime that is punishable with a sentence of life imprisonment.[2] Furthermore, as the deadline for appealing decisions on requests for revocation is not set forth explicitly in the Rules and has only been clarified by the Appeals Chamber in a single decision, the principle of in dubio pro actionis and the interests of justice weigh in favor of recognizing the Notice of Appeal as validly filed despite the failure of Uwinkindi’s counsel to file it on time or seek an extension. Additionally, accepting the Notice of Appeal will not prejudice the Prosecution, which will have sufficient time to respond to the submissions that form the basis of Uwinkindi’s appeal. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that it is in the interests of justice to recognize the Notice of Appeal as validly filed.

[1] Phénéas Munyarugarama v. Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-09-AR14, Decision on Appeal against the Referral of Phénéas Munyarugarama’s Case to Rwanda and Prosecution Motion to Strike, 5 October 2012, para. 12.

[2] See Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi, Case No. MICT-12-25, Monitoring Report for November 2015, 21 December 2015, para. 23 (“The [Rwandan] Prosecution request was that Mr. Uwinkindi be sentenced to life imprisonment for the genocide, as well as for crime against humanity with the sentences running concurrently”). The Appeals Chamber is not persuaded by the Prosecution’s contention that the Haxhiu Decision of 4 September 2008 is controlling with respect to the circumstances of this proceeding. That decision concerned an appeal against conviction for contempt of court that resulted in a punishment of a fine of 7,000 Euros. See Haxhiu Decision of 4 September 2008, para. 2. Uwinkindi is charged, inter alia, with the crime of genocide, which is materially of greater gravity and can be punishable with a sentence of life imprisonment.

Download full document
IRMCT Rule Rule 154(A)(ii)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision re Prosecution Witnesses - 29.01.2016 NIYITEGEKA Eliézer
(MICT-12-16)

9. […] Given that the proceedings against Niyitegeka have been concluded, the only legitimate forensic purpose for obtaining access to this material is to establish a “new fact” capable of constituting the basis for a review of Niyitegeka’s convictions.[1] In this regard, Niyitegeka merely advances a broad and speculative assertion that any evidence provided by the witnesses in other proceedings before the ICTR necessarily serves a legitimate forensic purpose.[2] It follows from jurisprudence that the requesting party may not engage in a “fishing expedition”.[3] In the absence of more particularized submissions, the mere fact that witnesses may have testified in more than one case does not necessarily reflect that their evidence is relevant to establishing a “new fact” in the context of review proceedings, or demonstrate that any related material may be of material assistance to the preparation of a review application. […]

[1] See Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-R, Decision on Georges A. N. Rutaganda’s Appeal against Decision on Request for Closed Session Testimony and Sealed Exhibits, 22 April 2009, para. 16. See also Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. MICT-13-33-R86.2, Second Decision on Motion for Access to Confidential Material from the Nshogoza Case, 9 November 2015, para. 5.

[2] [Eliézer Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-16-R, Urgent Request for Orders Relating to Prosecution Witnesses, 21 December 2015 (public with public and confidential annexes) (“Motion”)], paras. 35-36.

[3] See Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Decision on Radovan Karadžić’s Motion for Access to Confidential Material in the Dragomir Milošević Case, 19 May 2009, para. 11, referring to Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović et al., Case No. IT-01-47-AR73, Decision on Appeal from Refusal to Grant Access to Confidential Material in Another Case, 23 April 2002, p. 3.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision re Prosecution Witnesses - 29.01.2016 NIYITEGEKA Eliézer
(MICT-12-16)

10. […] in order to carry out their duties in full, counsel recognized, assigned, or appointed by the Registrar as acting for an accused or convicted person must, in principle, automatically have access to the complete record of the proceedings to which their client is entitled.[1] […]

[1]See Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware, Case No. MICT-12-29, Decision on Request for Access, 16 September 2015, p. 2, referring to Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. MICT-13-48, Decision on Request for Access, 3 August 2015, p. 1; The Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. MICT-13-33, Decision on Request for Access, 25 June 2015, paras. 11, 14. 

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2015 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A)

174. Rule 73bis(E) of the Rules provides that after the commencement of the trial, the Prosecutor, if he considers it to be in the interests of justice, may move the trial chamber for leave to reinstate the list of witnesses or to vary his decision as to which witnesses are to be called. The rule does not impose a time limit to validly raise a request under this provision. However, the jurisprudence of both the Tribunal and the ICTY indicates that, when assessing whether it is in the interests of justice to permit the Prosecution to vary its witness list, the trial chamber shall take into account the potential prejudice to the Defence and the stage of the proceedings among other factors.[1] The Appeals Chamber nonetheless emphasises that decisions concerning the variation of a party’s witness list are among the discretionary decisions of the trial chamber to which the Appeals Chamber must accord deference.[2]

[…]

178. […] [T]he purpose of Rule 73bis(E) of the Rules is to allow the Prosecution to correct its prior assessment of which witnesses to call “after the commencement of [t]rial”. Nothing in Rule 73bis(E) of the Rules requires that the addition of new witnesses be conditioned upon the removal of witnesses who were expected to testify about the same facts.[3] […]

179. […] Furthermore, while the Appeals Chamber observes that trial chambers of the ICTY have previously emphasised considerations such as the stage of the proceedings and the justification provided in support of requests for the amendment of witness lists,[4] the Appeals Chamber finds that Ntahobali’s reliance on the Mrkšić et al. decisions is not pertinent. The Appeals Chamber stresses that the manner in which the discretion to manage trials is exercised by a trial chamber should be determined in accordance with the case before it; what is reasonable in one trial is not automatically reasonable in another.[5] The question of whether a trial chamber abused its discretion should not be considered in isolation, but rather by taking into account all relevant circumstances of the case at hand.[6] It can therefore not be held that granting a request for the addition of witnesses in the last stages of a party’s presentation of its case is per se unreasonable and prejudicial to the opposing party; such an assessment rather requires a careful balancing of various interests and circumstances on a case-by-case basis.

[1] See Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Rule 65ter Witness List and for Disclosure of an Expert Witness Report Pursuant to Rule 94bis, 31 August 2010, para. 4; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Leave to Amend Its Witness List to Add Witness KDZ597, 1 July 2010, para. 5; Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perišić, Case No. IT‑04-81-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Substitute Expert Witness, 30 October 2009 (“Perišić 30 October 2009 Decision”), para. 6; Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Đorđević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Add Milan Đaković to the Rule 65ter Witness List, 21 May 2009 (“Đorđević 21 May 2009 Decision”), para. 6; The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Leave to Vary the Witness List Pursuant to Rule 73bis(E), 21 May 2004, para. 13. See also The Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana et al., Case No. ICTR-2000-56-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion to Vary Its List of Witnesses: Rule 73 bis (E) of the Rules, 11 February 2005, paras. 22, 23.

[2] See Augustin Ngirabatware v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54-AR73(C), Decision on Ngirabatware’s Appeal of the Decision Reducing the Number of Defence Witnesses, 20 February 2012 (“Ngirabatware Appeal Decision”), para. 12; The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et al., Case No. ICTR-98-42-AR73, Decision on Joseph Kanyabashi’s Appeal Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 21 March 2007 Concerning the Dismissal of Motions to Vary His Witness List, 21 August 2007 (“21 August 2007 Appeal Decision”), para. 10; Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-AR73.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Against Second Decision Precluding the Prosecution from Adding General Wesley Clark to Its 65ter Witness List, 20 April 2007 (“Milutinović et al. Appeal Decision”), paras. 9, 10.

[3] See The Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware, Case No. ICTR-99-54-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Leave to Vary Its Witness List, 28 January 2010, para. 50, referring to The Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana et al., Case No. ICTR-2000-56-T, Decision on Sagahutu’s Request to Vary His Witness List, 26 May 2008, paras. 5, 6.

[4] See, e.g., Perišić 30 October 2009 Decision, para. 6; Đorđević 21 May 2009 Decision, para. 5; Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Amend Prosecution’s Witness List (Dr. Fagel), 3 November 2008, p. 3.

[5] Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 39.

[6] Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 39.

Download full document
ICTR Rule Rule 73bis(E) ICTY Rule Rule 73bis(F)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2015 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A)

295. It is not disputed by the parties that nothing in the Statute or the Rules imposes the mandatory communication to the parties to the main proceedings of an amicus curiae report requested pursuant to Rules 77(C)(ii) or 91(B)(ii) of the Rules.[1] The decision to communicate an amicus curiae report filed before the trial chamber pursuant to Rules 77 or 91 of the Rules to the parties of the main proceedings therefore falls within the discretion of the trial chamber. This discretion must be exercised consistently with Articles 19 and 20 of the Statute, which require trial chambers to ensure that trials are fair and expeditious.[2] […]

[…]

300. Mindful that the decision to communicate to the parties of the main proceedings an amicus curiae report filed pursuant to Rules 77 or 91 of the Rules falls within the discretion of the relevant chamber and that there may be instances where the communication of such reports is not in the interests of justice, the Appeals Chamber fails to understand why, in this case, the Trial Chamber decided to deprive the parties of information that might have been relevant to their cases in the absence of any circumstances that may have justified its non-communication. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that the Trial Chamber’s decision not to communicate the Second Amicus Curiae Reports to the parties before the delivery of the Trial Judgement was unreasonable and constituted an abuse of the Trial Chamber’s discretion.[3]

[1] Both Rules 77(C)(ii) and 91(B)(ii) of the Rules state that the appointed amicus curiae is to “report back to the Chamber as to whether there are sufficient grounds for instigating” contempt or false testimony proceedings.

[2] See, e.g., Nizeyimana Appeal Judgement, para. 286; Ndahimana Appeal Judgement, para. 14; Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 19.

[3] In light of this outcome, the Appeals Chamber finds it unecessary to considers Nyiramasuhuko’s and Ntahobali’s contention that the Trial Chamber erred in stating in the Trial Judgement that the investigations against Witnesses QA, QY, and SJ were “on-going”.

Download full document
ICTR Rule Rule 77(C)(ii);
Rule 91(B)(ii)
ICTY Rule Rule 77(C)(ii);
Rule 91(B)(ii)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2015 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A)

1099.            […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that a decisive factor in determining the degree of specificity with which the Prosecution is required to particularise the facts of its case in the indictment is the nature of the alleged criminal conduct with which the accused is charged.[1] The Appeals Chamber considers that when the Prosecution intends to prove that an accused ordered particular crimes, it must identify in the indictment, at least by category, to whom the accused is alleged to have given orders[2] and all detail it possesses regarding the location of the incidents.

[1] Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 150; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 89.

[2] Cf. Uwinkindi Appeal Decision [Jean Uwinkindi v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-75-AR72(C), Decision on Defence Appeal Against the Decision Denying Motion Alleging Defects in the Indictment, 16 November 2011], para. 36 (“When the Prosecution pleads a case of ‘instigation’, it must precisely describe the instigating acts and the instigated persons or groups of persons”), referring to Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 226. See also Ndindiliyimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 174.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2015 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A)

1405.            With respect to Ntahobali’s argument regarding the lack of caution exercised by the Trial Chamber in assessing his co-accused’s evidence, the Appeals Chamber considers that Ntahobali does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber was required, as a matter of law, to treat all the evidence presented by his co-accused with caution[1] […]

See also para. 1292.

[1] Ntahobali again simply refers to a paragraph in the Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, which concerns the treatment of accomplice witness evidence. However, Ntahobali does not demonstrate that any witness he contends the Trial Chamber failed to treat with caution was an accomplice witness whose evidence required a cautious assessment. See Ntahobali Appeal Brief, para. 412, referring to Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 46.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2015 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A)

2135.            Article 3(h) of the Statute, which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal over the crime of persecution as a crime against humanity, reads as follows:

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: […] (h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds[.]

2136.            The Appeals Chamber notes that Article 3(h) of the Statute limits the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over persecution as a crime against humanity to three listed discriminatory grounds, namely political, racial, and religious grounds.[1] While persecution as a crime against humanity under customary international law might not be restricted to these three discriminatory grounds, the Appeals Chamber recalls that “it [was] open to the Security Council – subject to respect for peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) – to adopt definitions of crimes in the Statute which deviate from customary international law.”[2] Whether or not the Security Council may have defined the crime of persecution as a crime against humanity more narrowly than necessary under customary international law, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds.[3]

2137.            As ethnicity is not enumerated among the discriminatory grounds of persecution in Article 3(h) of the Statute, the question remains whether it is subsumed under one of the three listed discriminatory grounds, more specifically under the “racial” ground. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, while the Statute “is legally a very different instrument from an international treaty”,[4] it is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose, within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, which reflects customary international law.[5] In this regard, the Appeals Chamber observes that the chapeau of Article 3 of the Statute distinguishes “ethnicity” from “race” in the listed discriminatory grounds for the attack against a civilian population.[6] The Appeals Chamber, Judge Agius dissenting, considers that, according to the ordinary meaning of the terms of the provision, such distinction reflects the autonomy between the two notions. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, Judge Agius dissenting, this conclusion is also supported by a contextual reading of Article 3 of the Statute which makes it clear that “ethnicity” cannot be encapsulated in “race”. Indeed, interpreting the discriminatory ground of “race” in Article 3(h) of the Statute as including “ethnicity” would render the distinction in the chapeau of Article 3 of the Statute redundant, illogical, and superfluous.[7] According to a textual and contextual interpretation of Article 3(h) of the Statute, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Agius dissenting, therefore finds that “ethnicity” cannot be interpreted as being included in the list of discriminatory grounds enumerated therein.

2138. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber notes that the definition of persecution as a crime against humanity is well settled in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. As reiterated by the Appeals Chamber in the Nahimana et al. case, “the crime of persecution consists of an act or omission which discriminates in fact and which: denies or infringes upon fundamental right laid down in international customary or treaty law (the actus reus); and was carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on one of the listed grounds, specifically race, religion or politics (the mens rea).”[8] Thus, in the Nahimana et al. case, the Appeals Chamber specified the mens rea requirement for persecution as a crime against humanity and, contrary to the Trial Chamber’s holding, did not extend it to include “ethnicity” as an additional discriminatory ground. The Appeals Chamber notes that to support its conclusion that “discrimination on ethnic grounds could constitute persecution if the accompanying violation of rights was sufficiently serious, such as killings, torture and rape”, the Trial Chamber relied, inter alia, on paragraphs 986 through 988, and 1002 of the Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement.[9] However, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber’s reliance on these paragraphs of the Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement to define the mens rea of the crime of persecution is misplaced.[10] Contrary to the Trial Chamber’s finding, these paragraphs of the Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement deal with the actus reus – and not the mens rea – of the crime of persecution, holding that hate speech targeting the population on the basis of ethnicity could constitute an act, which discriminates in fact.[11]

2139.            Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber committed an error of law in considering that “discrimination on ethnic grounds could constitute persecution if the accompanying violation of rights was sufficiently serious, such as killings, torture and rape.”[12] […]

[1] Cf. Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 284; Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995 (“Tadić Appeal Decision on Jurisdiction”), paras. 78, 140-141. The Appeals Chamber notes that this is similar to the Statute of the ICTY. See Article 5(h) of the Statute of the ICTY. On the contrary, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Rome Statute does not limit the jurisdiction of the ICC to an exhaustive list of discriminatory grounds on which persecution as a crime against humanity must be committed. Indeed, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute contains an illustrative (open-ended) list of prohibited grounds for persecution as a crime against humanity, which reads as follows: “For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crimes against humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: […] (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”. The Appeals Chamber further notes that the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), which was adopted after the Rome Statute, limits the jurisdiction of the SCSL over the crime of persecution as a crime against humanity to an exhaustive list of four discriminatory grounds, namely political, racial, ethnic, and religious grounds. See Article 2(h) of the Statute of the SCSL.

[2] Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 296. See also Tadić Appeal Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 78, 140, 141. Cf. also Tadić Appeal Judgement, paras. 249, 251.

[3] Cf. Tadić Trial Judgement, para. 711 (“There are no definitive grounds in customary international law on which persecution must be based and a variety of different grounds have been listed in international instruments. The grounds in the Statute are based on the Nürnberg Charter which included race, religion and politics as the three grounds, as did Control Council Law No. 10, both of which were drafted to address the European situation. In contrast the Tokyo Charter excluded religion as a basis for persecution, given its inapplicability to the Pacific theatre of operation while, alternatively, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide contains the additional ground of ethnicity as do the 1991 and 1996 versions of the I.L.C. Draft Code, whereas the original 1954 Draft Code included culture as a basis for persecution. The possible discriminatory bases which the International Tribunal is empowered to consider are limited by the Statute to persecutions undertaken on the basis of race, religion and politics.”) (internal references omitted).

[4] Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 282.

[5] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331 (“Vienna Convention”). See also Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 282, referring to International Court of Justice, Competence of the General Assembly for the admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 4; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 98, referring to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention (“Ultimately, that question must be answered by an examination of the Tribunal’s Statute and Rules, and a construction of them which gives due weight to the principles of interpretation (good faith, textuality, contextuality, and teleology) set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”); Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 67 and references cited therein (reiterating that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention reflects customary international law); Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 35 (“Following the settled jurisprudence of the Tribunal, those words [(of Rules 98bis(B) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence)] are to be ‘interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to [them] in their context and in the light of [their] object and purpose’, within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.” (alteration in the original)).

[6] See supra, para. 2135.

[7] The Appeals Chamber recalls that “it is an elementary rule of interpretation that one should not construe a provision or a part of [it] as if it were superfluous and hence pointless: the presumption is warranted that law-makers enact or agree upon rules that are well thought out and meaningful in all their elements.” See Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 284. The Appeals Chamber further observes that the distinction between “race” and “ethnicity” is also clearly established in the definition of genocide given in Article 2 of the Statute (“Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group […].”).

[8] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 985. See also, e.g., Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 320; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 101; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 131; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 185.

[9] Trial Judgement, para. 6097, referring to Bagosora et al. Trial Judgement, para. 2209, Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 986-988, 1002. The Appeals Chamber notes that paragraph 2209 of the Bagosora et al. Trial Judgement also refers to paragraphs 986 through 988, and 1002 of the Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement.

[10] See Trial Judgement, para. 6097.

[11] See Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 986. The Appeals Chamber further notes that, in the Nahimana et al. case, the convictions for persecution as a crime against humanity were based on the Trial Judgement’s finding that “the discriminatory intent of the Accused falls within the scope of crime against humanity of persecution on political grounds of an ethnic character”, noting that “RTLM, Kangura and CDR […] essentially merged political and ethnic identity, defining their political target on the basis of ethnicity and political positions relating to ethnicity.” See Nahimana et al. Trial Judgement, para. 1071. This finding was not challenged on appeal.

[12] Trial Judgement, para. 6097.

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3(h) ICTY Statute Article 5(h) Other instruments Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2015 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A)

49. The Appeals Chamber considers that the circumstances of this case differ from the situation in the Kajelijeli case, in which the Appeals Chamber found that the delay in the holding of the initial appearance was attributable to the Tribunal notwithstanding any attribution of fault to Kajelijeli.[1] Unlike in Ntahobali’s case, Kajelijeli’s initial appearance was held 211 days after his transfer to the Tribunal as a result of difficulties in assigning him a counsel, the Registrar’s failure to assign a duty counsel, and the Registry’s difficulties in finding a date acceptable to all counsel representing Kajelijeli’s co-indicted.[2] Further, unlike Kajelijeli, Ntahobali was given the opportunity to enter his plea on 3 September 1997 but preferred to wait for his assigned counsel. The Appeals Chamber considers that when, like in Ntahobali’s case, the counsel for an accused explicitly requests the date of the initial appearance to be postponed and the accused expresses his preference for entering his plea in the presence of his assigned counsel rather than entering it at an earlier opportunity, the delay caused by the postponement of the initial appearance is not attributable to the Tribunal.[3]

[1] See Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 253.

[2] See Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, paras. 248-250.

[3] Cf. Laurent Semanza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, dated 31 May 2000, filed 1 June 2000 (originally filed in French, English translation filed on 4 July 2001) (“Semanza Appeal Decision”), paras. 110, 111.

Download full document
ICTR Rule Rule 62 ICTY Rule Rule 62
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2015 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A)

69. Joinder and severance of trials are governed by Rules 48 and 82 of the Rules. Rule 48 of the Rules provides that “[p]ersons accused of the same or different crimes committed in the course of the same transaction may be jointly charged or tried.” A transaction is defined under Rule 2 of the Rules as “[a] number of acts or omissions whether occurring as one event or a number of events, at the same or different locations and being part of a common scheme, strategy or plan.” It has been held that, pursuant to Rule 2 of the Rules, a common scheme, strategy, or plan therefore includes one or a number of events at the same or different locations.[1] There is no requirement under Rules 2 and 48 of the Rules that the events constituting the “same transaction” take place at the same time or be committed together.[2] In deciding whether the case against more than one accused should be joined pursuant to Rule 48 of the Rules, a trial chamber should base its determination upon the factual allegations contained in the indictments and related submissions.[3]

70. Where a trial chamber finds that two or more persons have allegedly committed crimes in the course of the same transaction, it then considers various factors, which it weighs in the exercise of its discretion as to whether joinder should be granted.[4] Rule 82 of the Rules provides:

(A) In joint trials, each accused shall be accorded the same rights as if he were being tried separately.

(B) The Trial Chamber may order that persons accused jointly under Rule 48 be tried separately if it considers it necessary in order to avoid a conflict of interests that might cause serious prejudice to an accused, or to protect the interests of justice.

71. In light of Rule 82 of the Rules, it is therefore appropriate for a trial chamber deciding on a motion for joinder pursuant to Rule 48 of the Rules to consider and weigh the following factors: (i) protection of the fair trial rights of the accused pursuant to Article 20 of the Statute; (ii) avoidance of any conflict of interests that might cause serious prejudice to an accused; and (iii) protection of the interests of justice. Factors that a trial chamber may look to in the interests of justice include: (i) avoiding the duplication of evidence; (ii) promoting judicial economy; (iii) minimising hardship to witnesses and increasing the likelihood that they will be available to give evidence; and (iv) ensuring consistency of verdicts.[5]

[1] Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir et al., Case No. IT‑04‑80-AR73.1, Decision on Radivoje Miletić’s Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Joinder of Accused, 27 January 2006 (“Miletić Appeal Decision on Joinder”), para. 7; Prosecutor v. Vinko Pandurević and Milorad Trbić, Case No. IT‑05‑86‑AR73.1, Decision on Vinko Pandurević’s Interlocutory Appeal against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Joinder of Accused, 24 January 2006 (“Pandurević Appeal Decision on Joinder”), para. 7.

[2] Cf. Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al., Cases Nos. IT-01-45-AR73.1, IT‑03-73-AR73.1, IT-03-73-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeals Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision to Amend the Indictment and for Joinder, 25 October 2006 (“Gotovina Appeal Decision on Joinder”), para. 16; Pandurević Appeal Decision on Joinder, para. 7. The Appeals Chamber considers that, although these decisions were taken in the context of joinder of cases where the Prosecution requested both joinder of the charges and consequently of the trials, this jurisprudence applies mutatis mutandis to cases, like the present case, where only joinder of trials was requested on the basis of several confirmed indictments.

[3] Gotovina Appeal Decision on Joinder, para. 16; Miletić Appeal Decision on Joinder, para. 7; Pandurević Appeal Decision on Joinder, para. 7.

[4] Miletić Appeal Decision on Joinder, para. 8; Pandurević Appeal Decision on Joinder, para. 8. See also Gotovina Appeal Decision on Joinder, para. 17.

[5] See Gotovina Appeal Decision on Joinder, para. 17; Miletić Appeal Decision on Joinder, para. 8; Pandurević Appeal Decision on Joinder, para. 8. Cf. also Ntabakuze Appeal Decision on Severance [Théoneste Bagosora et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-41-A, Decision on Aloys Ntabakuze’s Motion for Severance, Retention of the Briefing Schedule and Judicial Bar to the Untimely Filing of the Prosecution’s Response Brief, 24 July 2009], para. 25.

Download full document
ICTR Rule Rule 48;
Rule 48bis;
Rule 82
ICTY Rule Rule 48;
Rule 82
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2015 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A)

115. […] Moreover, Rule 82(A) of the Rules does not, as a matter of principle, bar trial chambers from relying on the evidence presented by a co-defendant where that evidence supports the Prosecution case. Trial chambers are tasked with determining the guilt or innocence of the accused and must do so in light of the entirety of the evidence admitted into the record.[1] As noted by the Trial Chamber, the Rules provide for remedies where the presentation of incriminating evidence through co-accused after the close of the Prosecution case may prejudice one of the co‑accused. In the instant case, the evidence of Witnesses Reyntjens and Karemano upon which the Trial Chamber relied was already part of the Prosecution case‑in-chief and was only accepted as corroborative of Prosecution evidence.[2] The record shows that Nyiramasuhuko was also afforded the opportunity to cross‑examine these witnesses at length and Nyiramasuhuko does not show that she requested further cross-examination, recall, or the presentation of rejoinder evidence. Accordingly, Nyiramasuhuko does not demonstrate how the Trial Chamber’s reliance on this evidence violated her fair trial rights or caused her prejudice.

[1] The Appeals Chamber also highlights that a joint trial may give rise to adverse defence strategies and that “the mere possibility of mutually antagonistic defences does not in itself constitute a conflict of interests capable of causing serious prejudice” within the meaning of Rule 82(B) of the Rules. See Gotovina Appeal Decision on Joinder, para. 37. See also infra, Section V.D.

[2] See Trial Judgement, paras. 879, 884, 888, 896, 897, 931, 932.

Download full document
ICTR Rule Rule 82 ICTY Rule Rule 82