15. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls the well-established practice at this Tribunal that allegations of partiality of trial judges are dealt with in the course of the normal appellate process, i.e., in the appeal judgement.[1] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that it has already made a determination, in the present case, that it will make its own assessment of the issues relating to the alleged partiality of Judge Harhoff in the course of the normal appellate process.[2]

16. With respect to the Applicants’ first argument, the Appeals Chamber recalls its previous finding that there has been no “general finding” or “final determination” regarding Judge Harhoff’s alleged partiality in this case and that thus there is no basis for a claim of “ongoing prejudice” during the appeal proceedings.[3] The fairness and validity of the Trial Judgement is yet to be determined by the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chamber therefore rejects the Applicants’ argument that the appeal proceedings are themselves improper and unfair because the Trial Judgement is invalid. In relation to the Applicants’ arguments that the Grounds of Appeal are “credible” based on the Appeals Chamber’s decision to admit the Letter as additional evidence on appeal, the Appeals Chamber notes that this decision was made in the context of, and is limited to Rule 115 of the Rules. The Appeals Chamber emphasises its previous conclusion that the Rule 115 Decision “pertain[s]] strictly to the admissibility [of the Letter ]] and not to the merits of the appeals filed by the parties”.^[4] The Appeals Chamber further emphasises that the credibility and merits of the appeals filed by the parties will be determined in due course by the Appeals Chamber. It is therefore not necessary to depart from the Tribunal’s well-established practice[5] on the basis that these proceedings “[flow] […] from an invalid Trial Judgement” as alleged by the Applicants.[6] The Applicants’ arguments in this regard are therefore without merit.

17. Regarding the Applicants’ second and third arguments, the Appeals Chamber notes that under Articles 20(1) and 21(4)(c) of the Statute, the Appeals Chamber has the primary obligation to ensure that a person convicted by a Trial Chamber has a fair and expeditious process on appeal. The Appeals Chamber is now seised of the fully briefed appeals. It is considering them and will deliver its judgement in due course.[7] The Appeals Chamber observes that the Applicants’ arguments of judicial economy and potential undue delay in the proceedings are based on a speculative premise as to the outcome of the appeals as a whole.[8] However, as previously emphasised, the outcome of the appeals lodged by the parties will be determined in the appeal judgement.[9] Therefore, the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that “possible remedies” which might be ordered by it merit a departure from the practice of this Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber further emphasises that proceeding through the normal appellate process in the present case does not prejudice the Applicants. For these reasons, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that judicial economy or the interests of justice require it to depart from the normal appellate process, i.e. considering the appeals as whole.

18. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds no justification to expedite adjudication of the Grounds of Appeal. 

Fn. 709. The Appeals Chamber recalls in this regard that the right to cross-examination is not absolute. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-AR73.2, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Evidence of Witness Milan Babić, 14 September 2006, para. 12.

101. […] [T]hat a fact is mentioned during a witness’s testimony but omitted from the same witness’s statement does not necessarily imply a material inconsistency,[1] […].

202. […] While a superior need not have ordered or authorized a crime to be convicted pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute,[1] proof that an accused is able to issue orders and that his orders are actually followed, are indicators of effective control.[2] […]

201. […] To the extent that more than one person is found to have effective control over the subordinates who have committed a crime, they may all incur criminal responsibility under Article 6(3) of the Statute for their failure to prevent the crimes of their subordinates or to punish them.[1] […]

[…]

346. Furthermore, to the extent that Nizeyimana seeks to show that it was not he, but rather Muvunyi, who had the authority and material ability to prevent crimes or punish perpetrators, the Appeals Chamber considers that proof of Muvunyi’s authority does not cast doubt on that of Nizeyimana, as such power is not necessarily exclusive.[2] […]

720.   The Appeals Chamber is mindful that joint criminal enterprise and instigating, ordering, and aiding and abetting are distinct categories of responsibility and that an accused can be convicted for a crime on the basis of several categories of responsibility.[1] However, the Prosecution seeks to hold Karemera responsible for this crime through ordering, instigating, or aiding and abetting on the basis of the same essential facts that already underpin his conviction for this crime through his participation in a joint criminal enterprise […]. In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber finds that Karemera’s responsibility for this crime through his participation in a joint criminal enterprise fully encapsulates his criminal conduct and concludes that a finding that he ordered, instigated, or aided and abetted the killings in Bisesero would have no impact on the verdict.[2]

61.     A suspect arrested by the Tribunal has the right to be informed promptly of the reasons for his or her arrest.[1] In the Semanza case, the Appeals Chamber concluded that a reference to the accused being provisionally detained “for serious violations of international humanitarian law and crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal” adequately described the substance of the charges to satisfy the requirement of notice at that stage.[2] […]

150.     […] [T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that there is no requirement to specifically identify each of the persons involved in a joint criminal enterprise.[1]

[…]

605.   […] the Trial Chamber’s duty to identify the plurality of persons applies to the persons belonging to the joint criminal enterprise,[2] not necessarily to the principal perpetrators of the crime. In that regard, the Trial Chamber expressly found that the Interahamwe, soldiers, and others who carried out the vast majority of the rapes and sexual assaults were not members of the joint criminal enterprise to pursue the destruction of the Tutsi population in Rwanda.[3] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the decisive issue with regard to the principal perpetrators of the crimes is whether they were used by the accused or by any other member of the joint criminal enterprise in order to carry out the actus reus of the crimes forming part of the common purpose.[4]

632.   […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that knowledge of crimes combined with continued participation in a joint criminal enterprise can be conclusive as to a person’s intent,[1] […]

597.   […] The Appeals Chamber has confirmed that a trial chamber has the discretion to admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value, even where it is not possible to convict an accused on such evidence due to lack of notice.[1]